THE YEAR OF LEADER DEVELOPMENT

CY18 Edition
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The Chief of Chaplains

The Army Mission remains constant: To deploy, fight, and win our Nation’s wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict, as part of the Joint Force. Nested within the Army Mission, the Army Chaplain Corps Mission — our Corps’ unique purpose — remains constant: To build Army spiritual readiness to deploy, fight, and win our Nation’s wars, by providing reliable and relevant world-class religious support, as a unique element of the Army that is fully engaged across the full spectrum of conflict.

We achieve mission success most effectively when the Chaplain Corps operates as a fully integrated network of mutually supportive Army religious support professionals. Chaplains must be committed to serving in the Army as a sacred calling to serve God and Country; and all other Chaplain Corps members must energetically support Chaplains in that unique calling. As we continue to emphasize Leader Development, while we work together to strengthen our network, we celebrate the renaissance of our very own U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal, which has lain dormant for several years. I am excited to present this new, improved, modern tool for leader development across our Corps. My sincere thanks to the members of the journal review board, as well as the authors of the articles in this publication, for their leadership and contributions to our Corps. That kind of collaboration is exactly what we need across the Corps, as we continue to work together to get even better in our mission of building Army spiritual readiness.

Regimental Sergeant Major

The United States Army is the most lethal and capable ground combat force in history. As a special branch within the Army, the Chaplain Corps is the most multifaceted and capable chaplaincy in history. The keys to this success have been the faithfulness of Chaplain Corps members; the quality of the Corps’ Leaders; the superiority of the Corps’ education, training, and development; and the ability of the Corps – Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve – to care for Soldiers, their Families, and Army Civilians, within a complex and continuously changing environment. The Corps’ Chaplains, Religious Affairs Specialists, Civilian Directors of Religious Education, and other Army Civilians operate together as a vital component of enhancing Army readiness; and this revived Journal will help all of us continue to improve the religious support capabilities we bring to the Army. I am particularly proud of the work senior Religious Affairs Specialists contributed to the Journal’s revival, both as members of the Editorial Board and as professional contributors of important content in these pages. May this Journal help us all continue to support and challenge one another in becoming even better at building Army spiritual readiness.
Forty-plus Years of Chaplain Corps Knowledge: Now Only a Click Away

by Chaplain (COL) Brian D. Ray, Ph.D.

The U.S. Army Chaplain Corps has a long and proud tradition of producing a top-quality academic journal. Our Corps published the first edition of its branch-specific journal in January of 1972. The Chief of Chaplains at the time, CH (MG) Gerhardt Hyatt, said the following about this new and important endeavor regarding our branch publishing content for the academic community as well as practitioners in the field.

The publication of this initial volume is a signal event in the history of our branch. It means that a medium for the dissemination of scholarly articles and research findings has been provided. Since our whole reason for being chaplains must always be tied first to religious ministrations, the contents of the journal will be that which assists military clergy in their very special calling. Our publication should also speak to the most vital problems faced....and possibilities seen....in the ripe fields and vineyards where chaplains labor. My hope is that the tremendous resources of scholarship and experience which are in our ranks....and available to us in the religious groups we represent....will be reflected in a growing collection of volumes across the years.

In keeping with Chaplain Gerhardt’s vision of “a growing collection of volumes across the years”, the Chaplain Corps produced over 100 editions of a branch-focused journal from 1972 through 2015. Over those forty-plus years, our Corps’ journal was published under three different titles:

Military Chaplains’ Review

The Army Chaplaincy: Professional Bulletin of the Unit Ministry Team


Within the pages of the 100-plus editions of our Corps’ journal, there is a tremendous wellspring of knowledge on topics that are just as important to our Army today as they were decades ago. The chart on the following page shows an analysis of the main themes of the articles published in our journal. It is not surprising that many of the main topics focus on important areas like leadership, ethics, counseling, training, and homiletics. Imagine the many lessons learned over the years from our brother and sister chaplains, as well as the wise counsel and knowl-
edge of our religious affairs specialists, contained in the thousands of pages in our Corps’ journal!

Until recently, that rich depository of knowledge has only been accessible by visiting the shelves of the library at the US Army Chaplain Center and School.

Fortunately, that significant limitation on accessing this tremendous body of knowledge is no longer an issue for our Army and our Corps! Earlier this year, CH (COL) Jeff Hawkins and I set a goal by establishing the following task and standard.

**TASK:** Make the entire 40-plus years of content contained in the previous editions of the Chaplain Corps’ journal accessible to key stakeholders (e.g., all military services, coalition partners, VA personnel, civilian pastoral practitioners, historians, etc.).

**STANDARD:** The Chaplain Corps’ journal will be the Army’s “best practice” among branch-specific journals with regard to state-of-the-art online access for scholars and practitioners as well as key word-search capability (e.g., author, title of article, topics/themes, etc.).

Through the tremendous support of the team of librarians at University of Florida Digital Collections, every single article published over the past forty-plus years in our branch’s journal is only a click away. To access the 100-plus editions of our Corps’ journal, visit the USACHCS Training Portal. Many of the articles written over the years by chaplains and religious affairs specialists provide a great starting point for developing UMT training plans as well as conducting OPD and NCODP. The following page shows just a few examples of articles that are now available online for our Army.

The forty articles listed on the following page are just a sample of the knowledge that our chaplains and religious affairs specialists have produced over the past 45 years. Fortunately that wisdom is now only a click away for our Army by visiting the USACHCS Training Portal ([usa-chcstraining.army.mil/journal](http://usa-chcstraining.army.mil/journal)). May we who serve God and Country in the Chaplain Corps continue to be enriched and blessed by this wisdom from those in our branch who have come before us.

**Main Topics of Articles from 1972 - 2015**
Highlights from 1972-1979

• The Moral Role of the Chaplain Branch
• The Moral Leadership of the Military Chaplain in the Small Group Process
• The Chaplain Counselor as Strategist
• Avoiding an Ethical Armageddon
• Caution for Chaplains as They Discuss Death with Terminal Patients
• The Chaplain’s Ministry to Dying Children and Their Family
• A Primer on Human Grief
• Ministry to Conscientious Objectors
• Excellence in Preaching: A Neglected Art
• Kohlberg for Chaplains: A Theory of Moral Development

Highlights from 1980-1989

• Leadership Styles and Chaplain Applications
• Emotional Strategies for Moral Development
• The Ethical Role of the Military Commander
• A New Technique for Teaching Military Ethics
• Values and the United States Army Chaplaincy
• The Chaplain as an Advocate for Religious Freedom
• Family Adaptability: Coping with Separation and Reunion
• Pastoral Counseling in Helping Those Who Face Life and Death Situations
• Responding to Family Violence
• The Chaplain and Domestic Violence
• Volunteerism in Military Ministry
• Developing a Holistic Pastoral Care Program in a Confinement Facility

Highlights from 1990-1999

• The Chaplaincy and Moral Leadership
• Chaplain Leadership as the Art of Persuasion
• The UMT and Peace Keeping Operations
• Adversity: Soldier’s Friend or Foe?
• Combat Trauma, Resiliency, and Spirituality
• Spiritual Resilience: Renewing the Soldier’s Mind
• Communicating with Soldiers During Emergency Religious Support

Highlights from 2000-2015

• Taking Spiritual Leadership to the Next Level
• Role Models for Religious Leadership
• Mentoring for Operational and Strategic Vision in Military Ministry
• Moving Soldiers to the Moral High Ground
• Increasing Readiness: Mentoring and Teaching Junior UMTs
• The U.S. Army Chaplain in Trauma Ministry
• The Role of Religion in Information Operations
• Rethinking Morality in War
• Mentoring as a Spirituality of Power
• The Relevance of Virtue Ethics and the Formation of Character Development in Warriors
• Twelve Ethical or Moral Dilemmas in Military Affairs

Chaplain (COL) Brian D. Ray, Ph.D.
Senior Army Reserve Advisor, USACHCS Transformation
Executive Editor, U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal

CH Ray assumed his duties as the Senior Army Reserve Advisor for the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School’s transformation initiative in February 2018. His most recent previous assignment was Command Chaplain for the 377th Theater Sustainment Command, the largest command in the U.S. Army Reserve with 35,000 soldiers serving in 500 units across the United States. In this role CH Ray directed the religious support of over 100 chaplains and 30 chaplain candidates. In his civilian capacity Dr. Ray serves as Director of the Poe Business Ethics Center at the University of Florida.
International Military Ethics Symposium Looks to the Past to Gain Perspective on the Future

By Chaplain (MAJ) Nathan H. White, Ph.D.

Changes in modern warfare may necessitate a reevaluation of the role of ethics in the military domain. So argued an international gathering of prominent academic ethicists, military leaders, and other professionals at the International Military Ethics Symposium (IMES) 2018. This seminal event broke new ground for the Chaplain Corps through its expansive scope and scale and contemplated issues including: ethical considerations for the use of technology in military applications, the development of contemporary professional military education models, and the usefulness of ‘moral injury’ as a category for discourse in military ethics.

The symposium was hosted by the United States Army Chaplain Corps, the United Kingdom Royal Army Chaplains’ Department, and the National Defense University at the National Defense University, Washington, DC from 30 July through 1 August 2018. The scale of the symposium was remarkable, bringing together 250 military professionals, academics, and government officials from all U.S. Army components, joint forces, and interagency partners as well as coalition and international allies from 20 countries. Attendees included heads of military chaplaincy departments from multiple nations, general officers, and other significant individuals in the field of military ethics. By strengthening moral reasoning and ethical decision-
making amongst emerging strategic leaders, IMES’18 increased interoperability and readiness across joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational forces.

This outcome was further facilitated by the symposium’s theme, “1918-2018: Lessons from The Great War—Ethical Imperatives for the Contemporary Profession of Arms,” which highlighted the need to look back at the past in order to gain insight into current and future ethical considerations in the military domain. This theme was timely given the centennial close of World War I which marks a century of great change within modern warfare, including tactical, operational, and strategic transformations that continue to mark the profession of arms and the discipline of military ethics. As arguably the first truly global conflict in human history, the Great War contained in it the seeds of contemporary joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and military operations, particularly amongst Allied nations. In areas such as the Western Front, armies that had never previously trained or operated together collectively confronted significant military and ethical challenges such as rapid technological advances in weaponry, challenges to military leadership, new geopolitical alliances in tension with national allegiances, and the advent of weapons of mass destruction, to
name but a few. IMES’18 afforded an opportunity to reflect upon these changes, commemorate this momentous conflict, and elucidate lessons learned that will shape warfare in the coming decades. Although during the Great War leaders had to discern right conduct in the heat of battle and amidst changing technology and geopolitical turmoil, those gathered at IMES’18 sought to consider ethical challenges of present and future conflicts before new kinds of battles belonging to a new paradigm of warfare are fought. This reflection, informed by the technological advances and geopolitical changes of the present day, would seek to avoid many of the dire consequences and needless loss of life that characterized the First World War, where ethical considerations often lagged behind these developments.

Plenary speakers at the symposium included: General James C. McConville, USA (36th Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army), Lieutenant General Nadja Y. West, USA (44th Surgeon General of the U.S. Army), Professor Nigel Biggar (Regius Professor of Divinity, Oxford University), Dr. Eric Patterson (Dean, Robertson School of Government, Regent University), Dr. Victoria Barnett (Director on Ethics, Religion, and the Holocaust, United States Memorial Holocaust Museum), and Canon Professor Michael Snape (Michael Ramsey Professor of Anglican Studies, Durham University).

In his opening plenary address, GEN McConville suggested that ethics is “doing the right thing in the right way.” To illustrate this, he related a story from his tenure as a brigade commander in Iraq where his troops had utilized all required non-lethal means in attempting to stop a speeding vehicle. Putting aside the ‘distance’ created by the technology of the weapons system he was operating, GEN McConville put himself in harm’s way to assess the situation before using lethal force—a query that revealed the vehicle contained a family, not enemy combatants. As displayed in GEN McConville’s story, just doing the right thing is not enough; it also must be done in the right way—that is, in a way that is ethical, moral, and legal. GEN McConville’s address grounded further discussion at the symposium firmly within the profession of arms and set the tone for dialogue by clearly showcasing the gravity of what is at stake in discussions regarding military ethics: human lives.

Other plenary speakers built upon GEN McConville’s opening address through speaking to a breadth of topics from the vantage point of their diverse specialties. Some focused upon ethical theory, others upon lessons to be gained from history, and still others on ethical approaches to issues of the present and future. Plenary speeches were followed by opportunities for attendees to ask questions of the speaker as well as panel discussions in which plenary speakers weighed in on various topics. In addition to the plenary sessions, attendees had the opportunity to attend breakout sessions in which presentations were given on a variety of topics related to military ethics.
If, as many argue, the nature of armed conflict itself is changing radically, then developments in the application of ethics within warfare must keep pace with technological and geopolitical changes. This symposium was a sobering call to think carefully about ethics in armed conflicts of the present and future—a focus that attendees found helpful due both to the quality of presentations and positive interactions with other symposium participants. CH (CPT) Timothy Usset, USAR, Brigade Chaplain for 364 Civil Affairs Brigade and a practitioner/researcher for the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and the University of Minnesota, related, “I valued hearing the perspectives from warriors and scholars on the intricate ethical dynamics in war and military life. Coming together with service members across branches and nationalities gave the opportunity to discuss and debate warfighting in the 21st century from numerous perspectives.” Similarly, Jonathan Lewis, Esq., a scholar from University College London and retired judge in the United Kingdom, noted, “I found the whole Symposium a superb event, and felt truly privileged to attend it.”

IMES’18 was a profound event in the annals of the Chaplain Corps—one which it is hoped will have a positive impact for years to come. Through exploring the ethical imperatives from the First World War that continue to mark the contemporary profession of arms, the symposium was an opportunity to broaden thinking regarding military ethics as well as to strengthen and create partnerships integral to the practice of ethics in the profession of arms. A similar event is planned for 2020 in order to continue the beneficial discussion and cooperation begun here.

Insights gained at the symposium will be codified through the publication of a strategic military ethics primer to be published by National Defense University Press in early 2019. This volume, which will include the plenary addresses and a referred selection of papers given at the breakout sessions, will be available from NDU press for a variety of uses, including for unit-level courses and individual study.

Photos in this article are courtesy of Diane Pollard and Richard Williams, Jr., U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Chaplains.
In the fall of 2017, I had my blood drawn at the post hospital. Giving blood evokes fear in this chaplain, and the corporal taking the sample could sense the tension. In an attempt to comfort me, he began sharing about God’s love. With a smile, I introduced myself as a follower of Jesus and one of the installation pastors. We connected in that moment and I asked, “Do you go to the contemporary service?” His smile faded as he looked down and said, “I did a couple times, but that place isn’t for corporals....” The following Sunday in our contemporary service we surveyed the congregation, “If you are in your twenties and not here with your parents, would you raise your hand?” Of the 300 gathered, two people shyly put up a hand. Since 33% of Soldiers stationed at Fort Leavenworth are young millennials, it was clear our chapels were failing to connect. It seemed that CH Steve Peck’s admonition in 2008 is still relevant 10 years later: “The Chaplain Corps is not using the chapel model that most effectively serves the majority of soldiers.”¹ One could argue, that while our chapel services are wonderfully executed, the traditional services are engineered to serve the baby boomer generation and contemporary services are designed to meet the worship expectations of the Generation X population (age 34-54). But these models are not answering the questions young Soldiers and Families are asking.
The Chaplain Corps could become a victim of what Clayton Christensen calls the Innovators Dilemma. Christensen explains that although Xerox invented the personal computer, and Kodak the digital camera, these companies were so invested in keeping their best customers happy they refused to entertain disruptive change. The pressures of maintaining the status-quo for the best customers left only room for incremental changes to current products. Likewise, the Chaplain Corps may be settling for incremental changes to outdated models rather innovating to reach the next generation. A group formed in September 2017 to pray and research — how do we reach the next generation through army chapels? However, we were all field grade officers. The path forward was not intuitive. So, CH Jeff McKinney suggested we host a symposium that gives the captain-level chaplains — those who still intuitively knew what to do — a voice. The Combined Arms Center Chaplain, CH David Wake, loved the idea and gave his full support and energy to making the event a reality.

On September 19, 2018, more than 100 chaplains, Religious Affair Specialists and DREs — from every component and service — gathered at Fort Leavenworth to discuss Next Generation Religious Support. David Kinnaman, the President of Barna, began by delivering a keynote address, challenging chaplains to boldly speak the enduring counter-cultural message to those exiled in a “digital Babylon.” This was followed by three moderated panel discussions. In The Future of Preaching, CH Brandon Moore interviewed Kinnaman to ask, “How has the importance of preaching changed and/or stayed the same?” “How do these trends relate to the military environment?” “What’s next and how do we proceed?”

The next panel was titled “iChapel – The Future of Communication and Community. CH Erik Alfsen moderated a panel that helped participants understand how Generation Z interacts with the digital world and talk best practices for leveraging current technologies and digital meeting places to reach and disciple the next generation. The third panel talked about principles of leading change in the chaplaincy through a retelling of the Chaplain Next story. Chaplains
Shoffner, Peck, and Hawkins shared the ups-and-downs of introducing a new model of chapel ministry to the Army. Their talk illustrated what is possible to the next generation of UMTs. All panels were recorded and available at www.facebook.com/NextGenReligiousSupport/.

The afternoon was dedicated to presentations from the field. Twenty-four chaplains, DREs, and para-church partners led breakouts on topics that ranged from “Why Liturgy” to “Dinner Chapels” to “How to do a podcast.” As one chaplain wrote in his AAR, “The breakouts provided an excellent opportunity to hear some of the best practices that are occurring across the Corps.” These papers will be published through Army University Press and distributed electronically.

On the final day, CH Steve Peck’s keynote address challenged young chaplains to be bold, take risks, and work in teams. He encouraged mid-grade chaplains to take the occasional butt-chewing necessary to give young chaplains freedom to operate. Lastly, Peck exhorted senior chaplains to lead, resource, and embrace out-of-the-box thinking. To conclude, participants broke into working groups according to the IMCOM Common Levels of Support: worship, spiritual fitness, religious education, family ministry, pastoral care and training – to discuss the way forward. CH David Wake summarized the results in an executive summary and shared it with the Chaplain Corps leadership.

The enduring value of the event was evident in informal conversations and the relationships established around the question, “How do we reach the next generation of Soldiers?” We hope the symposium is a catalyst to break the phalanx around “doing it the way we always have,” and release the innovation needed to reach and serve today’s Army and tomorrow’s Soldier. As one chaplain said while departing, “I was energized to catch a vision for ministry and carry it to the next generation!” Let it be so.

NOTES
Religious Leader Symposium

Moral Leadership Training: Religious, Secular, or Someone Else’s Problem?
by Chaplain (MAJ) Sam Ricco

Ever since Adam put his hand to the forbidden fruit, and the warrior king David rendezvoused with Bathsheba, we cannot under or overestimate the value of moral leadership. The two previous examples demonstrate failings in moral leadership prove disastrous.

26-30 August 2018 in Southbridge, MA, the Chief of Chaplains hosted the Religious Leader Symposium 3 (RLS3). RLS3 discussed Moral Leadership Training (MLT). Participants deliberated over the challenges of moral leadership within Army formations. Attendees wrestled with how to implement MLT, and implement in such a way that moral leadership does not become perfunctory. Namely, how do we develop and integrate MLT so as not to make it another “annual awareness training”? 
RLS3 examined Moral Leadership, and the way ahead for the Chaplain Corps (CHC) to advise and instruct moral leadership. Renewed emphasis on MLT has been in effect since August 2015. RLS3 approached MLT within the overall framework of the CSA’s Army Vision. The CSA requires leaders who are moral under his “Readiness” priority (see CSA vision). Readiness demands moral leadership. Within the Army Vision, leadership occupies a pivotal role, particularly the quality of character.

The CHC has vast equity tied to MLT. Moral leadership is inherent to our advise capability. Army doctrine and regulation place ample requirements upon the Chaplaincy to promote MLT. RLS3 discussed ways in which the CHC can develop and provide moral leadership training in the operational, institutional, and self-development domains.

The CHC finds itself immersed in a target rich environment as the Army emphasizes leaders of character, competence, and commitment. Within the science of control and the art of command, moral leadership touches on the “art” quality of leadership. We have yet to plumb the strategic implications of the impact of moral leadership. From a grand strategy perspective, when Army leaders fight and win the nation’s wars, morally—these effects even have a diplomatic power. Thinking holistically about fighting, winning, and leading entails that units execute the Army mission morally.

A prophetic voice safeguards planning, resourcing, and technology from eclipsing the human dimension, especially morals. The culture may tilt its head like a dog hearing an odd sound, but our Corps must continue to probe the conscience. Leading with a moral conscience will secure our nation’s trust. The public confidence which the Army garners rests upon the ethical and moral standards of its trusted professionals. And if trust is the bedrock of the Army profession, MLT is the bedrock of trust. George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Ulysses S. Grant embodied moral leadership as such an icon.

Of course, the question remains. How? How will our Corps plan, prepare, and implement, moral leadership and character development? Thankfully, by God’s grace our Corps has been doing this since its inception in 1775. We have more work to do, but this is not a burden, it is an opportunity to influence not only the Army, but by implication the United States, and the world. May God empower us to teach and live that which accords with sound doctrine, both religiously and militarily.
To fully leverage the strategic reach and diplomatic capability of the National Guard (NG) State Partnership Program (SPP), the National Guard Bureau (NGB) must encourage and resource every state and territory to use military chaplains in engagements with United States (US) allies and partners around the world. Chaplains are well-suited to this task, and exporting the professionalism of the American military chaplaincy furthers the goals of building partner capacity and religious diplomacy. Better coordination between Department of State (DOS) requirements, geographic combatant command (GCC) planning, and NGB resources will enable NG chaplains to further US policy interests through their direct participation in the SPP. While some may argue that chaplains and religious diplomacy are not critical to military
An operational commander who is ignorant of or discounts the importance of religious belief can strengthen his enemy, offend his allies, alienate his own forces, and antagonize public opinion.
—Paul R. Wrigley

operations and are therefore unnecessary capabilities to develop, recent research indicated that the US has ignored the role of religion in statecraft, mostly to its own detriment and at great risk to US forces and interests around the world. Rather than being a topic too sensitive to address with other nations’ military forces, religion, religious support, and a professional chaplaincy are all critical elements in cross-cultural and multinational engagements.

Religious Diplomacy and the Chaplain’s Mission

Religious diplomacy is the development of attitudes and practices that allow for the respectful engagement of religious and ideological differences, without denigrating or doubting the intentions of critics and rivals alike. Douglas Johnston in Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft finds that religious and cultural factors have been, and continue to be, routinely ignored in the development and execution of US foreign policy. He argues that neither diplomats nor politicians are comfortable with engaging in religious dialogue or with religious leaders because, “the rigorous separation of church and state in the United States has desensitized many citizens to the fact that much of the rest of the world does not operate on a similar basis.” This is true of not only US diplomats and politicians, but also US strategic military leaders.

Johnson therefore recommends that military chaplains should enter into the international diplomatic stage in order to further “peace and understanding” among people and nations. The US military has also adopted this perspective and made a formal change to doctrine in 2009 by updating Joint Publication 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. The updates now reflect the duties of a military chaplain to include; Religious Leader Engagement (RLE), Religious Advisement (RA), and expanded support to GCC in such matters. Additional resources that can help define these ideas in more detail include; Religious Support (FM 1-05, Oct 2012), Religious Support and the Operations Process (ATP 1-05.01, Oct 2013).
Eric Patterson, a fellow at George-town University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, makes an even more pointed cri-tique. He claims, “US foreign policy is blind to religious factors in interna-tional affairs.” In the recent past, the US was unprepared to believe that events of international importance could be motivated by religious ideas and leaders. Patterson points to the difficulty for American policy makers in coming to terms with the religious mobilization of Iran by the Ayatollah Khomeini, left-leaning religious sup-port for pro-democratic movements in Latin America, the fracturing of military forces in Lebanon along religious lines, and the rise of Al-Qaeda leading to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US. Yet, religious leaders and ideas can also lead to more positive developments. For example, former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, identified that Roman Catholic Pope John Paul II’s visit to communist ruled Poland started a chain of events that eventually led to the fall of communism across all of Eastern Europe.

Thomas Matyok, a scholar of religion, peace and conflict studies, sounds a warning bell about religious illiteracy among US Government actors at the strategic level—that is, senior and strategic leaders, often well-schooled in diplomatic and military theo-
ries—lack basic knowledge about the world’s religions, religious practices and customs, and the role of religion in other cultures. In order to counter this phenomenon, religion should become an essential element that is always included in the planning and implementation of peacebuilding and stability operations. The lack of religious awareness incorporated into national security and diplomacy has placed the nation’s military forces directly into dangerous situa-
tions. Many of these problems could have been avoided if the topic of

religion had been addressed in the planning phase. During the Spanish American War, US military chaplains engaged both Catholic clergy and Muslim leaders on behalf of the US commander General “Black Jack” Pershing to avoid increased conflict and to help end hostilities in the Philippines.
As a nation, the US encourages religious freedom and the ability to worship as one sees fit. In the book Rethinking Religion and World Affairs, the authors argue that the concept of religious freedom as a basic human right took hold with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and the idea that religion should be a private reality and not a public influence on society has been reinforced in western thinking. If religious faith is a private, personal matter, then it follows that discussion of religious ideas and practices are essentially off-limits in professional and official environments. Former career US diplomats have pointed out that there is serious doubt among some that religion is even relevant to their duties, and they further suggest that even if it were assumed to be relevant, there could be high costs for engaging in such talk, as it might invite controversy. This error seems to be one continually perpetuated by US policy makers who have foolishly divested themselves from meaningful talks that include religion. The fountain of hubris has been flowing non-stop for so long in this area, that to consider anything less than the Western idea of a secularized government seems not only impossible, but the only right and proper way to operate and function.

Yet religion is a critical part of the environment, and secular governments do interact frequently with religious people, institutions, and ideas. Former Chief of Staff for the US Army, General Ray Odierno, acknowledged this truth in 2014, stating “military officers need to understand the religious environments within which they will operate, because conflicts possess a religious dimension.” Odierno realized what many scholars have been trying to get strategic leaders within the US Government to realize over the past several decades: not everyone separates religion from public life. Globally, Matyok observes that “the West makes up less than one-sixth of the world population” and that it is arrogant “for Western actors to presume that religion is marginal to people’s lives, or that western leaders know what is best for the other five-sixths of the populace.” Religious traditions and practices, especially as they relate to government policy, must be addressed alongside diplomatic, information, military, and economic considerations.

A multidisciplinary effort must be taken in response to conflict, as a way to truly understand how to end wars and prevent conflict from occurring in the future. This effort must include a deep and sophisticated understanding of religion. Most people around the globe—including many in the “secular” West—use religious beliefs and practices to frame their lives and provide an informed way to view the world. Further, religion is often a useful way to motivate political action, a point exemplified by Gandhi’s observation that, “anyone who thinks that religion and politics can be kept apart, understands neither religion nor politics.”

How then can someone better understand religion and why it matters? Defining “religion” is, itself, a difficult challenge and the subject of many books and studies. For simplicity, Patterson’s description of religion will be used here and is defined as, “an organized and shared set of beliefs and practices, founded on reverence for a supernatural power(s) or in the teachings of a spiritual leader.” A further premise of this work is the idea that religion is a primary driver of how a culture makes judgments and transmits beliefs from generation to generation. This means that for strategists, a main issue is how to engage with different cultures and their religion(s) as a matter of military preparedness and understanding. Religion’s influence on culture and politics must be understood in all of its complexity and as having diverse manifestations, it must not be reduced to merely a driver of some violent extremist ideologies.

Rather, the US value of religious freedom should be supported in diplomatic and military operations. The National Security Strategy (NSS) is based upon the view that peace, security, and prosperity depend on strong, sovereign nations that respect their citizens at home and cooperate to advance peace abroad. This includes the freedom of religion for all people as an inalienable human right. This is really the crux of the ongoing tension within the US Government, where it will work to protect individual religious freedoms, but at the same time fails to
fully incorporate religious ideas and elements into planning and policy as a practical matter of diplomacy.

There are five general trends that can be seen globally in regards to religion that provide opportunities to engage military staff and commanders the strategic level.

1. Individual religiosity is rising around the world.

2. Public expressions of religion by individuals and groups worldwide matters more in political discourse.

3. States are no longer the sole legitimate centers of authority and authenticity, nor are they always the most reliable providers of vital services.

4. Religious actors, identities, and ideas, are vigorously transnational.

5. Whether at the individual or collective level, religious impulses can transcend what scholars typically define as “rational” or material interests.25

These are all areas where US foreign policy could and should intersect with religious dialogue and religious engagement. Understanding these trends would provide occasions for discussion amongst strategic leaders and policy makers. Once discussing religion become commonplace for national security professionals, military planners and diplomats at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels could begin to include religious considerations in the day to day discharge of their duties.

Diplomatic and military leaders must stop ignoring the role that religion plays concerning international affairs around the world. In addition to the five opportunities for religious engagement at the strategic level, Peterson also notes specific trends about religion that affect the international environment. Surveys indicate the following trends:

1. Over the past 20 years, belief in God increased on every inhabited continent except Western Europe, in Eastern Europe belief in God has risen 10 percent.

2. The proportion of people attached to the world’s four biggest religions (Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism) rose from 67 percent in 1990, to 73 percent in 2005, and may reach 80 percent by 2050.

3. Majorities of publics in key regional players, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa, India, and Brazil, report that religion is “very important to their life.”

4. Over 90 percent of the publics in 46 countries surveyed say that religious freedom is important to them.26

Every GCC is affected or influenced directly by these trends. Military planners and commanders who ignore them and fail to engage their chaplains in such matters do so at great risk to themselves and those within their areas of operation.

Building Partner Capacity

The US now finds itself engaged in one of the most complex security environments ever imagined. More than ever before, the ability of the US to project military power to protect vital US interests relies on working with allies and partners. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that, “the capabilities of US allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more than, the fighting the US does itself.”27 The NG SPP continues to be uniquely poised to provide this capability, in peacetime and during war, in order to support Building Partner Capacity (BPC) around the world in every GCC.

This also then begs the question of whether or not every GCC is truly affected by this religious phenomenon. In his analysis of the world’s global cultural differences, Samuel Huntington argues there are nine major world civilizations. He describes these cultural zones as Western Christian, Orthodox, Islamic, Confucian (Sinic), Hindu, Buddhist, Latin American, Japanese, and African worlds.28 Just a cursory review of these divisions of culture around the globe highlights the fact that two-thirds of these zones (the first six) are explicitly tied to religious tradi-
tions. In addition, the seventh (Latin America) overwhelmingly identifies as a Roman Catholic culture. Japanese culture may also be associated with a specific national religious tradition: Shintoism. Only the “African” world is not explicitly drawn around religious-cultural lines.

The nine civilizations laid out by Huntington were largely shaped by religious traditions that are still relevant today, despite the effects of modernization. The most important strategic implication for US military consideration is that future conflicts may occur between these cultural civilization divides.

A quick comparison of the two previous maps shows significant congruence between the US military organization globally, and the religious orientation and geography of world civilization. The US Northern Command and European Command each predominately share Western Christianity and Orthodoxy. The US Southern Command is largely Roman Catholic, with ties to Western Christianity. Across the Atlantic, US Africa Command finds itself a mixture of many religions, however the predominance of Islam across the north sweeping over into and encompassing US Central Command cannot be ignored. Finally, US Pacific Command finds itself in the unique position of having to address five of the nine major world civilizations previously identified. By addressing the religious underpinnings of each GCC, the commanders can begin to develop better plans and utilization of NG SPP chaplains in their engagements and overall strategy.

The significance to military thinking and diplomacy of religion has not diminished, but has increased over the past two decades as the security environment has become more interconnected and complicated. Because of US security concerns and the need for military coalitions to defend against global threats, the 2017 NSS mentions the phrase “allies and partners” no less than 30 times. Two of the four pillars that constitute “vital” US national interests mention allies and partners. In order for the US to “preserve peace through strength” in pillar three, the NSS states that allies and partners will “magnify our power.” The fourth pillar in NSS is to “advance American
influence” through multinational cooperation. Relying on and developing allied and partner capacity has become a national security interest in and of itself. Military chaplains can directly help link these capabilities to military power.

A brief overview of the ends-ways-means construct in the context of religious diplomacy underscores these connections. The ends are the third and fourth pillars just mentioned. Next, the ways are military chaplaincy RLE and RA through the NG SPP. Finally, the means involve planning, financial, and operational support given by each GCC and synced with DOS. Finally, the risk being faced would be loss of pillars three and/or four contained within the NSS, due to a lack of religious knowledge, engagement, or awareness by the military in the execution of its strategy.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) developed this concept further and specified how the Department of Defense (DOD) would help BPC. The unclassified summary of the NDS described three lines of effort for the DOD with the second one being, “strengthening alliances as we attract new partners.” The strategy then points out that, “our allies and partners provide complementary capabilities and forces along with unique perspectives, regional relationships, and information that improve our understanding of the environment and expand our options.”

The NDS describes the requirements for achieving a capable network of allies and partners:

1. Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability
2. Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning
3. Deepen interoperability

The last line is: 34 The unclassified summary of the NDS described three lines of effort for the DOD with the second one being, “strengthening alliances as we attract new partners.” 35 The strategy then points out that, “our allies and partners provide complementary capabilities and forces along with unique perspectives, regional relationships, and information that improve our understanding of the environment and expand our options.” 36 The NDS describes the requirements for achieving a capable network of allies and partners:

1. Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability
2. Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning
3. Deepen interoperability
Understanding the religious environment of US allies and partners is critical to achieving these networks. If the American military chaplaincy, organizationally and doctrinally, is central to religious advising and religious engagement, we must thoroughly consider how chaplains can be used to build partner capacity as directed in the NDS. Not only can a well-engaged military chaplaincy help prevent conflict, it can also assist in stability and peacekeeping operations in order to BPC. While DOD and DOS could acknowledge the value of using chaplains to engage allied and partner military forces and civilian populations, US military planners and commanders are often reluctant to use chaplains beyond their more traditional role of ministering to the troops and their families.

National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program

National Guard chaplains and the State Partnership Program offer some structural and cultural advantages in solving the challenge presented above. The three ongoing missions of the National Guard are to fight America’s wars, secure the homeland, and build enduring partnerships. These missions have been restated over the past two decades and have become the de-facto expectation for NG service to the joint force. Because of this development and the continued demand for SPP activities by every GCC, a logical step in the process would be to provide a standard framework and expectation for chaplaincy engagement that supports the larger idea of religious diplomacy that is needed around the world from the US Government.

How can the SPP more effectively implement religious diplomacy in support of the NDS? The SPP is as a joint DOD program, managed and administered by NGB, guided by DOS foreign policy goals and country strategies, through GCC Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) objectives. This is done by matching a state NG with a specific Partner Nation (PN), in order to provide mutually beneficial security relationships with US allies and partners. The execution and coordination with the GCC ensures that the right personnel can be sourced by the NG for the types and purposes of missions the DOS wants DOD to focus on with each PN.

Figure 3. National Guard Bureau Mission Triad

**Mission Triad**

*What We Do*

This is our story and we all need to tell it

This symbol, the Mission Triad, is our brand. We prioritize based on these three missions — fighting America’s wars, securing the homeland and building enduring partnerships.

These missions are intertwined, where the capability built in one strengthens and reinforces the others.

The Minuteman in the middle represents our heritage and connects the earliest Citizen-Soldiers to today’s full spectrum Soldiers and Airmen. It also reflects the foundation upon which the National Guard is built — our Soldiers and Airmen, their families, and their communities with invaluable support from our employers.

**Our People**

Our storied history and future accomplishments are directly attributable to the dedication and skill of our most important weapon system: our people. Nothing happens across the force without the capable, competent and ready Army and Air National Guard warriors and their families and employers who support them. Their spirit of sacrifice and desire to do more makes me proud.

**Fight America’s Wars**

*More than 787,000 mobilizations since 9/11*

**Secure the Homeland**

*More than 1.2 million man-days in FY16*

**Build Partnerships**

*Enduring relationships with 79 nations*

Figure 3. National Guard Bureau Mission Triad
From a geographic perspective it becomes evident how much of an impact the SPP already has globally, while also taking a view to where potential future partnerships could develop. In terms of the current numbers and effectiveness of the SPP, the NGB currently accounts for the following:

1. 73 Partnerships in force
2. An average of 2 new partnerships each year
3. Over 900+ engagements annually
4. All of the 6 Geographical Combatant Commands involved
5. Each of the 54 States & Territories participating

In fiscal year 2015, the program cost American taxpayers $13.07 million out of the overall DOD budget of $560.4 billion for that same year. The SPP is a low cost, high payoff program that is ready for further development in the area of religious diplomacy. NG military chaplains are already in place and ready to function in this capacity. But how does the process work and where can each state chaplaincy plug into the process to begin and extend the strategic reach of the US Government in this underutilized area of influence?

Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter described the way that the program functioned as of 2015. As he reported to Congress, SPP activities are done in conjunction with DOS strategies and GCC planning. By linking these two agencies together, the NG can narrow down each SPP effort to meet both US and PN objectives. The SPP can conduct not only military-to-military engagements, but also military-to-civilian engagements to assist BPC goals. Important steps in planning are to include NG planners in the process with the GCC, so that SPP activities are supporting GCC lines of effort. In addition, the importance of properly projecting those activities through the use of the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS) cannot be understated, as this is the DOD security cooperation database of record.

There are still several glaring deficiencies that currently prevent broader implementation of chaplains

Figure 3. National Guard Bureau Mission Triad
as religious diplomats in support of the NDS through RLE and RA. While there have been and will continue to be chaplaincy engagements through NG SPP and Active Component (AC) exercises, there remains a lack of a national level chaplain RLE and RA strategy that is financially resourced and planned for across every GCC in support of the NDS.

The first impediment to success is that the NG SPP lacks a financially resourced strategy for RLE and RA at the national level. While the SPP is funded annually for many different engagements, there is virtually no budget set aside to implement chaplaincy RLE across every GCC that is synchronized and nested with the NDS. Funding that goes to AC units for exercises and engagements is only able to pay for travel and operational costs. Funds are rarely allocated towards NG pay and allowances. This gap leads to the overutilization of AC and State’s Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Soldiers to support TCSP. This results in Soldiers with mismatched skill sets being sent to PN engagements simply because they are available. It also leaves NG personnel, and chaplains in particular, on the sidelines of professional engagements that would benefit from the development of personal relationships and continuity.

The second barrier to further NG chaplaincy SPP involvement comes from GCC planners making plans for TSCP events, without appropriate NG participation for those PN engagements. Each year “requirement documents” are laid out for GCC TSCPs that outline the needed personnel, equipment, and financial resources required to support the engagement strategy being pursued. Chaplains are routinely not identified on these documents. This results in “no requirement” for a chaplain to go on any engagements whatsoever. In some instances chaplains have been fortunate enough to make inroads with their PN by taking the initiative to fill a valid manning document requirement in another occupational specialty. The cycle of “no chaplain requirement” then continues unabated year after year, and is left to the whims of every new planner and/or chaplain that comes into the SPP process.

The third barrier to making a strategically viable chaplaincy engagement strategy a reality is the fact that discussion of religion is usually left out of GCC planning sessions, and there is no global integration by NGB or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make religious engagements a priority across the force with DOS involvement. Without a unified voice at the national strategic level, there is no overall direction for religious engagement with PN religious leaders and chaplains, and there is little opportunity to help develop PN professional chaplaincy for PN military forces lacking that capability.

In order to successfully realize the benefits that can be gained through the proper usage of religious diplomacy by military chaplains, the NGB must take ownership of the process of SPP chaplaincy engagement. This could be done by simply expanding GCC teleconferences beyond chaplain involvement to include those staff directorates that have the planning officers and resource management professionals determining the requirements for all TSCP events. They can then forecast and budget properly for NG chaplains to be involved with each GCC engagement that their state is partnered with each year. The Chief of the NGB can also make RLE a priority requirement that each state must engage with their PN once per training year. This requirement will help provide NG continuity and relationships over time and facilitate BPC in a way that makes each PN more spiritually fit and resilient. Ongoing relationships will also develop diplomatically sensitive senior leaders in each state who take into account the cultural and religious implications of their PN that are routinely overlooked by many different parts of DOD and DOS each year.

Leveraging Military Chaplain Professionalism

Military chaplaincy is an underutilized resource that can be leveraged to help reduce conflict and build partner capacity by increasing understanding between governments, militaries, and the populations they serve. Chaplains should be utilized to perform RLE as an element of BPC, while also performing RA for the GCC to enable better planning and understanding at the strategic level.
Military chaplains are uniquely positioned to help advance and influence all elements of national power for the US Government.

This type of chaplain corps utilization will help commanders understand faith and culture in order to put military endeavors in the most appropriate context for the areas of the world they find themselves operating within. Yet implementing such utilization faces several challenges. The first would be internal resistance by chaplains who do not see this as a role they should fulfill. Second, there is limited force structure to support additional chaplain positions at strategic level headquarters. Finally, there is currently a lack of synchronization at the strategic level that puts an overall plan into place across all GCCs.

Even still, this effort is important and in fact, the US already has significant capacity and infrastructure to support this effort. Namely, the chaplain corps within the NG is uniquely positioned to provide this strategic capability through the SPP. These forces can be specifically leveraged through the SPP, which is already in place, and that is easily aligned with DOD and DOS requirements. Each NG state Joint Force Headquarters, brings together Army Unit Ministry Teams (UMT) and Air Force Religious Support Teams (RST) that can provide full-spectrum advising and training that is the most strategically developed in the world.

The biggest benefit that the NG can bring through the SPP, is their ability to help build partner capacity with countries that do not have an official military chaplaincy or whose chaplaincy program is not professionalized. As the illustration above points out, chaplains have the ability to provide commanders with RLE and RA at every echelon of force structure. But especially at the strategic level, chaplains are expected to provide the GCC with more time in these two areas. Within the last century, chaplains have shown their ability to do these very things with civilian religious leaders from Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, in order to provide assistance to local populations after natural disasters and during post-conflict stabilization.

Another good example of how to address a way for the chaplaincy to view RLE and RA utilization can be found from the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Padre S.K. Moore served as a chaplain with the CAF for over 22 years, during which time he completed three deployments to Bosnia, Haiti, and Afghanistan. Upon his retirement from active service, he began teaching in the area of Conflict Studies at Saint Paul University in Ottawa. At the same time, he was asked by the CAF to join the Army
Capabilities Development Board to help research RLE and external RA as a viable option for CAF missions. His research led to the development of the operational ministry construct. The model depicts a diversity of ministry that can (and should) be performed by chaplains in global military missions, where they can support their own troops and also perform external mission requirements for commanders as religious diplomats.

Another extension of this strategic objective would be for chaplains to help plan and organize events for allies and partners in order to BPC. First, countries that already have a chaplaincy could be provided with more guidance and information about how to make their chaplains more operationally focused and effective for their own soldiers. General George C. Marshall summed up the very essence of why allies and partners would want to develop or improve their own chaplaincy.

*It is in the national interest that personnel serving in the Armed Forces be protected in the realization and development of moral, spiritual, and religious values consistent with the religious beliefs of the individuals concerned. To this end, it is the duty of command-.*

Secondly, countries that do not have a chaplaincy could be offered help with the development of their own chaplain corps for their troops and families. While this may seem far-fetched, there have recently been tangible security gains achieved within the last decade to this very end. Within the US Pacific Command in 2009, Bangladesh requested assistance with the development and organization of a professional chaplaincy within its armed forces. Senior leaders in Bangladesh were concerned with the quality, competence, and security of the volunteer chaplains that had been utilized by their army in the past. In looking at

![Figure 6. Operational Ministry Construct](image-url)
the capabilities and professionalism of US chaplains in current and past operations, the chief of armed forces from Bangladesh asked for US assistance in developing a chaplaincy capability.

Since 2009, the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) chaplain and chaplain assistant team has partnered with Bangladesh to help its army in establishing a professional chaplaincy. First, the Bangladesh Army sent several students each year in 2010-2012 through the US Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) to receive training alongside US and other foreign military students for basic chaplaincy training. Next, the USARPAC UMT traveled to Bangladesh in 2013 to further develop the relationship and to address any concerns or challenges faced by the new chaplaincy there. Later in July of 2014 the Bangladesh Army Chief of Chaplains, Brigadier General Shah Alam visited with USARPAC UMT at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii.55

By utilizing the military chaplaincy as an element of soft power, the US will be able to further persuade and attract countries into closer partnerships that can advance the export of US values and ideals in support of the 2017 NSS.56 Even when the benefits for religious diplomacy outweigh the costs, there are a few areas of concern that should be addressed before chaplains get started with RLE and RA. First is the fact that some chaplain endorsers may not support their clergy conducting inter-faith dialogue. Second, outside of the SPP, active duty chaplains spend short amounts of time in their areas of operation making it hard to develop long term relationships. Third,

Chaplains visited Schofield Barracks in Hawaii, where the USARPAC UMT was able to brief their counterparts from Bangladesh in doctrine, force design, training, Family Life, and World Religions chaplain functions.54

The RLE was well executed by the US and provided a needed capability to the Bangladesh Army. The USARPAC UMT took the lead in building chaplain capacity with a partner nation, and paved the way for the Oregon NG to provide long term continuity and relationships with Bangladesh, its SPP Partner Nation.

Conclusion

Effective religious diplomacy can show commanders how the chaplain corps capability to conduct RLE and RA activities will positively impact current and future operations. In addition to caring for the spiritual needs of the troops, the authority that chaplains now have from JP 1-05 to conduct RLE and RA will help build allied and partner capabilities, thereby directly improving national security in line with NDS objectives. The NG SPP stands out as a system that is already in place and making a difference within every GCC in the US military. Now is the time to leverage the professional capability of the NG chaplaincy and resource the SPP to provide this capability around the globe.

Figure 7. Bangladesh Army Chief of Chaplains, Brigadier General Shah Alam Visiting with USARPAC UMT at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii.55
The demand for religious engagement around the world will only continue to grow, driven by both globalization and the ongoing communications revolution that is connecting people at a faster and wider pace than ever known before. The ability for a religious leader to influence military operations around the world can now happen transnationally and almost instantaneously. Without a deliberate effort to engage the US military chaplaincy in RLE and RA at the strategic level, future GCC Commanders will be fighting through all phases of operations at a disadvantage.

Chaplain (LTC) Kurt A. Mueller, D.Min.
State Command Chaplain, Hawaii National Guard

Chaplain (LTC) Kurt A. Mueller, D.Min. has served as the State Command Chaplain for the Hawaii National Guard since 2014. In this role, he enables Army and Air Force chaplains to provide religious support to soldiers and airmen across the state of Hawaii. Chaplain Mueller recently graduated from the United States Army War College with a Master of Strategic Studies degree in 2018, where his research focused on religious diplomacy becoming a key competency of military chaplaincy. In his civilian capacity, Kurt serves internationally with Cru Military to develop effective military ministry and chaplaincy efforts with countries seeking help and encouragement throughout the Pacific.

NOTES

4 Ibid., 4.
5 Eric Patterson, Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond (London, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group, 2014), 43.
6 Defense, Religious Affairs, iii.
8 Ibid., 4.
Ibid.
Johnston, Faith Based, xi.
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Johnston, Religion and Foreign, 269.
Hanes, Religious Transnational Actors, 4.
Contemporary military operations in a long war on an asymmetric, decentralized battlefield have stressed religious support systems. Internal religious support assets are often stretched to provide timely and effective ministry to a myriad of personnel among countless Forward Operating Bases and combat outposts. This situation is exacerbated by a decrease in force structure and accentuated within low density religions, resulting in delayed or missed ministry opportunities. An answer to this problem is to mobilize joint and coalition chaplains in a partnership with the U.S. Army at the Combatant Command (COCOM) level. This can be achieved through building partner capacity, policy reform, and enhanced interoperability training and leader development.

It is necessary to consider two models of religious support implementation: the traditional Isolationist (Go-It-Alone) approach and the Interoperability model. The contemporary operational environment has transitioned from Army-centric to joint and multinational. While once an isolationist approach to soul care was sufficient, now it is essential to leverage a vast array of religious support assets. According to Joint Publication 1-05, “Religious Affairs in Joint Operations,” the Combatant Command Chaplain is responsible for the “integration of Religious Support Teams (RST) into joint force organizations in order to coordinate defense-wide religious support.” This scope of responsibility necessitates the optimization of all ministry assets to achieve these Department of Defense (DoD) objectives and foster the Soldier’s spiritual and human dimensions.
Isolationist Model of Religious Support

The traditional model to implement religious support in the U.S. Army is exclusionary when we rely solely upon internal assets. This model depicts how we entered the Global War on Terrorism, resulting in stressed systems through protracted warfare. Dr. John Brinsfield and Chaplain Peter Baktis, in “The Human, Spiritual, Ethical Dimensions of Leadership in Preparation for Combat,” note the Soldier’s heightened need for pastoral care in combat as “the danger and chaos of war gave rise to the human need to believe a greater spiritual being is guiding one’s fate for the best, regardless of whether one lives or dies.”

In the joint, multinational fight, it is the joint chaplain’s constitutional requirement to provide for this Title 10 right for free exercise of religion. Although the isolationist model of religious support allows a construct of implementation, there are substantial setbacks. The negative aspects of the isolationist model are decreased opportunity for religious support and not engaging in partner capacity. Contributing factors to these negative aspects can stem from the lack of joint and coalition forces in the area of operation, the lack of effort to coordinate interoperable religious support, or the lack of education on how to plan and execute a joint venture. The ministry void not only hurts the individual Soldier, but also thwarts national objectives for international partnership.

The benefits of an isolationist model for religious support are speed of execution and control. A supervisory chaplain may need to employ Unit Ministry Teams (UMT) in an acute situation where direct control is essential and time is of the essence. Using internal religious support provides maximum flexibility, expediency, and centrality of execution.

Interoperaeble Model of Religious Support

The integrated approach to executing religious support in contemporary missions is the interoperability model as it leverages joint and coalition ministry assets for soul care. The Joint Staff and Combatant Command Chaplains set the criteria for success utilizing the guiding principles found in JP 1-05 that direct the commander to establish relationships with organizations to “enhance capabilities, promote interoperability, and … support mission requirements” in the joint, multinational arena.

The interoperability model of religious support relies on relationships and being a team player. The U.S. Army must be willing to assist other military services and countries just as fervently as we seek their support. Chaplain
(Colonel-Retired) Scott McChrystal recounts from a NATO assignment that it is essential for the Combatant Command Chaplain to “work well with other chaplains in his area of operations...build relationships and appreciate other cultures and faiths...and identify resources and strengths that each chaplain brings to the table.”

Relationships are paramount to successful interoperability for all involved in this system.

The benefits to the interoperability model of religious support are clearly defined by increasing the opportunity for personnel to receive pastoral care. Chaplain Jeremy Dow, in “The Value of Spirituality for Soldiers,” recounts the importance of combat ministry stating, “worship is one of the most important opportunities for Soldiers to stay connected to their spirituality.” Operationalizing DoD policy through building partner capacity and promoting joint ministry cooperation affords opportunity for worship and pastoral care. Interoperable framework is accomplished through top-down leadership development from the Joint Staff and Combatant Command Chaplains that optimize religious support.

The negative aspects of the interoperable model of religious support are few and center around impeding the process for quick action that necessitates speed and autonomy of control. An example of a negative aspect is the immanent need for chaplains to maneuver to a forward mass casualty location on a medivac operation. The challenges to interoperability entail extra-organic logistical coordination, but the dividends are well worth the effort in most scenarios.

Building Partner Capacity

Our national wars are no longer fought from autonomy. We do not engage in a myopic United States front, but rather through a coalition of countries. Building partnership capacity is essential to engaging the foes of the 21st century with a world-wide solidarity of cooperation. The chaplain’s role in this process is vital to grow these multinational alliances. JP 1-05 instructs the Combatant Command Chaplain to “assist the development of professional chaplaincies in militaries ...build partner-capacities in the areas of good governance, human dignity, and religious freedom...when directed by the commander.”

Chaplain Michael Brainerd, in “Chaplain Garrison Services and Their Relevance to the Human Dimension,” reminds us that a shared understanding of needing each other is a “step toward unity of effort to achieve greater efficiency and working toward shared resources.” This reality was recently discovered in Erbil, Iraq, with CJTF-OIR prior to the Mosul offensive in 2016. The entire coalition of religious support assets were mobilized to provide Protestant and Catholic ministry across the battlespace. Coalition and U.S. Army RSTs were able to share resources in order to conduct joint and multinational worship.

There are challenges and risks involved in working with a coalition of countries. One challenge entails the inability of the CJTF Chaplain to have tactical or operational control over coalition chaplains. The coalition chaplain is often encumbered by their national policy that prohibits them from travelling to locations where they do not have their nation’s personnel located. Additional utilization restrictions are also found in legal authorities of coalition countries, to include NATO prohibitions. Other risks in leveraging partner capacity for ministry involve non-Department of Defense (DoD) organizations that...
are hostile toward military chaplaincies. The attacks of these non-chaplain friendly entities could intensify as the scope of chaplain impact extends internationally. The risk of misusing a coalition chaplain is on an international magnitude and holds the potential for strategic, negative consequences. But when utilized appropriately and effectively, the positive effects of interoperability can yield effusive religious support coverage.

Policy Reform

JP 1-05 instructs the Joint Staff Chaplain to advise the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff on the religious aspects of functional policy and joint operations in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense through the Armed Forces Chaplains Board and the Service Chiefs of Chaplains. This is a critical role to inform national leaders of the impact and effects of chaplain interoperability. In recent years, the Joint Staff Chaplain position was moved from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s personal staff to the J-1 staff, thus losing some ability to influence policy.

In order to optimize influence, the Theater and Combatant Command Chaplains need to advise their commanders to present interoperable religious support policy in conjunction with the Joint Staff/J-1 Chaplain initiatives at the Joint Staff level. Current policy does support interoperable religious support, however, there are some areas that can be improved.

One policy improvement is to add a coalition chaplain on the Joint Manning Document (JMD) of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). However, in many instances, a coalition country refuses to expend a limited JMD billet on a chaplain, rather preferring to give the JMD slot to combat branch personnel. The impact of having a coalition chaplain on the CJTF staff would not only assist with building international relationships, but also facilitate the synchronization of multinational religious support. The Joint Staff Chaplain can influence defense leaders’ policy development that directs respective coalition villages to place their chaplains on CJTF JMDs.

Training and Leader Development

Enhancing RST interoperability is a key line of effort in the U.S. Army Chief of Chaplain’s Campaign Plan (2016-2021) with special emphasis on synchronization, training, doctrine, and leader development. It is incumbent upon the Joint Staff and Combatant Command Chaplains to ensure the implementation of DoD policy, guidance, and regulations in regard to interoperability and the execution of the free exercise of religion. As innovation develops with this process, the chaplaincy service schools should be directed to teach these emergent initiatives. JP 1-05 directs Combatant Command Chaplains to “build joint and multinational RST interoperability and capacity through exercises, training events, and subject matter expert exchanges.”

Top-down leader development will hone planning skills to facilitate successful implementation of quality pastoral care throughout a decentralized, multinational area of operations.

Training opportunities can assist the U.S. Army to make breakthroughs in interoperable barriers for mutual religious support. The FORSCOM Chaplain (Colonel) Robert Whitlock notes that we should be looking for coalition countries that will be good candidates for reciprocal religious support partnerships. Once identified, the respective countries’ Chiefs of Chaplains should implement a policy to allow educational exchanges between national chaplain schools. This will create a climate of shared understanding and doctrine so that we can mutually support each other better, bridge the interoperability gap, and deliver timely and effective pastoral care to the Combined Joint Operation Area.

Way Ahead

Operations during the long war at hand have stressed UMTs utilizing the traditional isolationist, “go-it-alone,” religious support model. The result creates delayed and missed opportunities to deliver pastoral care during a Soldier’s critical time of need. These tensions can be mitigated by leveraging joint and coalition Chaplains to partner together in supporting reciprocal ministry needs through the interoperability religious support model.
The key to forming interoperable support channels is through mutual relationships that will optimize religious support assets in the battle space. Further assistance can be achieved through the Joint Staff/COCOM Chaplain promoting emerging, interoperable innovations to DoD leaders that will be codified into new policy and regulations. It is also crucial for the Joint Staff/COCOM Chaplain to issue training guidance to chaplaincy service schools that will detail how to coordinate and synchronize religious support with joint and coalition ministry teams.

Successful joint and multinational religious support integration will develop leaders in the art of leveraging interoperable doctrine that will deliver timely and effective ministry. When executed successfully, as noted by Chaplain Bryan Koyn in “Religious Participation: The Missing Link in the Ready and Resilient Campaign,” the human dimension flourishes with “better overall physical, emotional, and mental health (yielding) spiritual fitness outcomes of values-based behavior, strength of will, resilience, and purpose and meaning in life.” Interoperable religious support is the way of future ministry on the multi-domain battlefield in an era of limited forces and multiple requirements.

NOTES

The United States Army Active Component

Chaplain Talent Management Model

by Chaplain (COL) Rajmund Kopec

On September 20, 2016, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, published U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy, Force 2025 and Beyond. This document outlines the Army’s strategy to create “a culture of continuous learning and a transformation on how we identify and cultivate the full potential of our people.” At present, the Army Chaplain Corps uses the Chaplain Life Cycle model to manage and develop active duty chaplains. The Life Cycle model serves its purpose and produces competent chaplains well versed in the overall knowledge of the Corps’ purpose and mission. However, the current system does not support the development of subject matter experts whose expertise is necessary for the Chaplains Corps to achieve a higher level of efficacy. Publication of the U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy creates an environment conducive to reevaluation and improvement of the current personnel management system. The Army Chaplain Corps will achieve this goal by aligning its personnel management system with the talent management strategy. Specifically, the Chaplain Corps should implement a talent management model nested in the framework outlined in the strategy.

The purpose of this project is to propose a talent management model for the Army’s Active Component Chaplains aligned with the Army’s Talent Management Strategy. First, the author will provide an overview of the Army’s Talent
Management Strategy to describe a framework for the chaplains’ talent management model. He will pay particular attention to the clarification of fundamental terms. He will then survey education and training programs that are relevant to talent management and already available in the Army Chaplain Corps. Against this background, he will identify gaps in the current approach to chaplain talent management and suggest ways to bridge those gaps. Finally, the author will propose a basic model designed specifically for the Army Active Component Chaplains.

Overview of U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy, Force 2025 and Beyond

U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy, Force 2025 and Beyond clarifies basic terms that are essential to a reader’s proper understanding of the strategy. It provides definitions of talent, skills, knowledge, behavior, and talent management. Furthermore, the document outlines a framework which serves as a foundation for the author’s proposed talent management model.

“Talent is the unique intersection of skills, knowledge, and behaviors in every person. It represents far more than the training, education, and experiences provided by the Army.”

Talent refers to overall life experience to include a frame of reference of an individual. It is safe to say that talent underlines a person’s overall ability to perform various tasks with variable aptitudes.

The document defines skills as ranging “from broadly conceptual or intuitive to deeply technical. People tend to manifest aptitudes for skills development most powerfully in the fields to which their native intelligence draws them.” Thus, the productivity of a person is most likely to increase if utilized within the field of his or her skills. For that reason, it is essential for an institution to identify its members’ skills and match them with an appropriate position within the system.

Knowledge is necessary for further development. “While some [knowledge] is acquired via training and life experience, education provides the largest knowledge lift because it bolsters mental agility and conceptual thinking.” The military environment creates a vast range of educational opportunities for service members to advance their knowledge. It ranges from very technical, military-specific education to civilian-based schooling. A person’s educational performance is one of the indicators of one’s potential for advancement within the enterprise.

Behavior, on the other hand, refers to “values, ethics, attitudes and attributes that fit [a profession’s] culture.” This aspect of an individual’s characteristics requires particular attention, evaluation, and assistance with modifications. Some percentage of individuals joining the Army come...
from backgrounds and societies whose values and attitudes do not reflect those of the Army such as acceptance of a pluralistic environment or teamwork. Without proper modifications, those service members will be unable to assimilate into the military culture and contribute to the productivity of the system.

The document defines talent management as “a way to enhance Army readiness by maximizing the potential of the Army’s greatest asset--our people.” It is a method to “effectively acquire, develop, employ, and retain the right talent at the right time.” Overall, the process contributes to the organization’s readiness and improves the level of performance.

Also, the talent management framework cautions against a one-size-fits-all approach. It clarifies that the Army workforce consists of various segments such as Active or Reserve components; commissioned, non-commissioned, and warrant officers; enlisted, civilian, military occupational specialty, etc. Each of those segments has a different mission and purpose. For that reason, each element should have a uniquely tailored talent management approach.

Finally, the text stresses the necessity of integrating four core functions of talent management: acquire, develop, employ and retain. Those core functions are interdependent and must stay in balance. Hence, the system requires continuous assessment and identification of possible developmental gaps. This framework provides the foundation for the proposed Talent Management model for Army Chaplains. For the purpose of this project, the author will focus on Active Component Army Chaplains who constitute a specific segment of the Army workforce.

**Chaplain Branch Specific Education, Training and Programs**

The Army Chaplain branch already possesses assets and programs which provide a solid base and contribute to various aspects of the talent management framework. Those resources include recruiting, Professional Military Education, chaplain specific Professional Military Education, Chaplain Advanced Education Program and professional development training. The Chaplain Corps manages the wide range of programs at various levels and through several organizations such as the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, the United States Army Chaplain Center and School, and the U.S. Army Medical Command. The programs have diverse levels of visibility and importance in the process of chaplains’ development. However, all of them, if properly utilized, contribute to an effective chaplain talent management system. For those reasons, the author will provide a consolidated list and a brief description of available programs.

Recruiting plays an essential role in selecting the right candidates for the Army Chaplain Corps. Therefore, chaplains are intensely involved in the process. The Active Duty and Reserve Components utilize chaplains as recruiters. The application process to become an Army chaplain requires an extensive interview with a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel Chaplain. Additionally, a specialized cell, Special Category Recruiting, focuses on recruiting low-density chaplains and chaplain candidates, specifically Roman Catholic and Orthodox priests and seminarians.

In addition to the Army-wide Professional Military Education (Intermediate Level Education and Senior Service College), the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School developed the chaplain specific Professional Military Education program. The entry-level training, Chaplain Basic Officer Leadership Course, focuses on training “professionals steeped in the profession of arms, technically and tactically competent, confident, and capable of making independent assessments in complex environments through focused spiritual leadership and critical thinking.” The Chaplain Captain Career Course concentrates on battalion and brigade level staff skills and knowledge. It pays special attention to teaching the foundations of leadership, mission command, administration, supervision, ethics, family life, world religions, homiletics, and resource management.

Company-grade chaplains also have an opportunity to complete a two-week long Combat Medical Ministry Course provided by the Department of Pastoral Ministry Training of U.S. Army Medical Department Center.
and School, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The course prepares chaplains for deployment medical ministry and “to address the trauma, crisis, grief, death, spiritual health, and other ministerial concerns that arise in a Combat Support Hospital or Combat and Operational Stress Control Detachment.”

Field-grade chaplains have an opportunity to attend the Operational Religious Support Leader Course, the Initial Strategic Religious Support Leaders Course, and the Resource Management Course. The Operational Religious Support Leader Course prepares chaplains in the rank of Major to function on a junior field-grade level. It provides training in the area of chaplain identity, force management, and religious operations in a Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational environment. The Initial Strategic Religious Support Leader Course offers training to Lieutenant Colonels and focuses on key leadership skills and the Chaplain Corps competencies on the senior leadership level. The course instructs attendees in pastoral care to senior leaders, the Army force management, coordination of force management and religious support resources.

Chaplain Colonels have an opportunity to attend the Senior Strategic Religious Support Leadership Course which concentrates on the art of religious support and leadership in the Army specific and Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multinational environment. Training modules include pastoral care to senior leaders, advising command and staff on religion; morality and ethics; supervision of religious support personnel; coordination of force management and religious support resources. The Resource Management Course is open to all field-grade chaplains and teaches the effective and legal use of monetary resources. It emphasizes the best practices, skills, financial, contracting, and business activities of religious support.

“The Chaplain Advanced Education Program exists to provide selected chaplains with the skills necessary to meet certain assignment-specific requirements.” It consists of Clinical Pastoral Education and Advanced Civilian School programs. The Clinical Pastoral Education Residency Program for Military Chaplains provides opportunities to first-term Captains (minimum 18 months of Active Duty service) and newly selected Majors. Clinical Pastoral Education prepares chaplains for trauma and crisis ministry. Chaplains who complete this program receive professional credentials and in-depth training in the area of crisis, death, grief, family and spiritual counseling. Upon completion of the training, chaplains complete a three-year utilization tour in Army medical or correctional facilities to utilize and sharpen their skills.

Advanced Civilian School program offered to newly selected Majors is directed by the Director of Officer Personnel Management and is rooted in billets validated by the Army.

Gaps

Currently, the Active Component Chaplain Corps uses the Chaplain Life Cycle model to manage the workforce. The model presents several challenges. First, it does not provide sufficient ways to evaluate the system’s and individual’s talent performance. Second, it produces competent chaplains with a solid general knowledge. However, it does not provide sufficient paths to Captain Promotable, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel levels leading to developing and retaining subject matter educational requirements system. Advanced Civilian School for Army Chaplains includes a one-year master’s degree program at Army approved universities in the areas of ethics, world religions, homiletics, and resource management. The Family Life master’s degree program is approximately 15 months in duration and is offered at Family Life Chaplain Training Centers credentialled by civilian institutions at Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Benning, Georgia.

Additionally, Army doctrine authorizes professional development training for chaplains. “Commanders will ensure that chaplains receive necessary professional development training by encouraging and funding attendance at technical and professional training events.” This includes, but is not limited to, endorsers denominational conferences, seminars, training events, retreats, and religious updates.
experts in the areas essential to the Chaplain Corps mission.

The Talent Management Strategy calls for ongoing evaluation of the system. Currently, the Chaplain Corps uses Promotion Board Analysis to evaluate the efficacy of the Life Cycle model. The research of the Promotion Board Analysis shows the evolution of trends and hidden potentials of the tool. However, the present method does not provide an objective evaluation of the system since it focuses only on the operational experience of individuals.

Up until the fiscal year 2014, the Promotion Board Analysis focused solely on the Officer Evaluation Reports distribution and was limited to Center of Mass, Above Center of Mass, and Senior Rater’s rank factors. In fiscal years 2014-16, the promotion board analysis considered additional factors. However, they were limited only to the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel. Both ranks’ analyses included zones selection rates (the Primary Zone, Above the Zone, and Below the Zone), the Officer Evaluation Report blocks distribution (Center of Mass and Above Center of Mass), Senior Rater’s distribution, previous assignments listed by Major Command, Direct Reporting Unit, and Installation Management Command. Additionally, in the fiscal year 2014-15 Lieutenant Colonel breakdown included Brigade Chaplain assignments, Professional Military Education level, Chaplain Advanced Education Program, and supervisory positions. In the fiscal year 2016, the analysis of both ranks added additional skill identifiers, duty titles, locations served, and deployments. The year 2014 Colonel’s analysis provided information on additional skill identifiers, duty titles, locations served, Division Chaplain assignments, and deployments. Moreover, the year 2015 document offered a summary of the analysis in the form of key points.

The fiscal year 2017 marks a significant shift in the board’s analysis factors. First, the report includes the Chaplain Major promotion board analysis. Second, it provides an in-depth analysis of Officer Evaluation Report distribution, Professional Military Education, and deployments in the Primary Zone, Above the Zone, Below the Zone selections, and the Primary Zone non-selections. Third, it compares the Chaplain Corps and the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act selection rates to the current and the previous two fiscal years. It also provides a summary of the analysis in the form of key points. Additionally, the Lieutenant Colonel board analysis provides information on the selective continuation selections and the Colonel’s analysis adds assignments information.

The author recommends that the Army Chaplain Corps restructure the promotion board analysis document in a manner which reflects the performance of all the elements of the system. At a minimum, it should include data on the percentage and rates of promotion for chaplains serving in billets which require Additional Skill Identifiers. One of the options is to track 7E - Chaplain Education and Training, 7F - Resource Management, 7K - Marriage and Family Ministry, and 7R - Hospital Ministries. In addition, the document should provide an analysis of billets allocated to the Installation Management Command.

The Talent Management Strategy also calls for the ongoing assessment of individual skills, knowledge, and behavior within the system. At this point, the Officer Evaluation Report is the only formal way to provide that type of feedback. Rater’s, Intermediate Rater’s, Senior Rater’s, and the future successive assignments comment blocks provide that opportunity. Also, broadening and operational assignment blocks in the field-grade Officer Evaluation Report plate provide actionable feedback.
To make those tools useful, supervisory chaplains must play an active role in synchronizing comments with raters and senior raters in order to establish recommendations for a specific career path of the evaluated chaplain.

Commanders typically complete the Officer Evaluation Report on an annual basis. This limits the space and frequency of feedback on an individual's accomplishments, potential, and progress. The Talent Management Strategy calls for ongoing assessment which requires a systematic evaluation and feedback. “Continuous talent assessments, supported by data-rich information systems, are critical enablers of the framework.”24 With the exception of limited informal communication via e-mail or phone with assignment officers, chaplains do not have any means to communicate their desires to develop knowledge and skills. Furthermore, with the exception of Officer Evaluation Reports, the supervisory chaplains do not have any other formal means to provide ongoing input regarding subordinate chaplains’ potentials, skills, knowledge, and behavior. Ultimately, the current system does not provide enough actionable data.

To bridge this gap the Office of the Chief of Chaplains Personnel Management Directorate should modify the Chaplain Assignment Preference Sheet (which is no longer in use) in the form of an application or another globally accessible database program. The application or program should allow chaplains to express their expectations and enable the supervisory chaplains to provide frequent updates on subordinates' potentials, skills, knowledge, and behavior. Reactivation of this tool will contribute to building a sufficient database for the individual’s and system’s evaluation.

“It is critical to remember that each workforce segment has unique responsibilities and challenges, necessitating a tailored talent management approach.”25 The Chaplain Corps' unique mission to “perform or provide religious support for all Soldiers, Family members, and authorized Department of Defense (DOD) Civilians from all religious traditions”26 calls for distinctive skills, knowledge, and behavior. To address those needs, the Army offers the Chaplain Advanced Education Program described in previous paragraphs. Considering those factors, the author proposes establishing the following, flexible career paths within the Chaplain Corps: Operations, Family Life, Hospital Ministry, Resource Management, and Instructor. The Instructor path includes chaplains trained in ethics, homiletics, and world religions. The proposed career paths support the three core competencies of the Chaplain Corps to Nurture the Living, Care for the Wounded and Honor the Fallen. These competencies provide the direction in executing the Corps mission.27

First, the career paths’ design calls for a careful planning process to estimate and validate a specific number of billets which require a particular expertise. The number must also consider a rank or level of responsibility. Assignment officers must plan and monitor those ratios very carefully in order to assure opportunities for broadening assignments, avoiding vacancies, and accounting for the rate of attrition.

Also, the career paths should provide equal opportunities for progression and establish groups of subject matter experts. Currently, most chaplains do not stay on a specific career path. Family Life, Hospital Ministry,
Resource Management, and Instructor Chaplains, after completing their training and mandatory utilization tour, usually go to operational units in order to be competitive for promotion. This creates a situation where it is difficult to groom subject matter experts in family life, hospital ministry, resource management, or instruction.

Introduction of those career paths will require a change in the Army Chaplain Corps culture. Mature organizations such as the Army Chaplain Corps present a particular challenge and require leadership to use embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to facilitate the change. The purpose of embedding mechanisms is to place the assumptions in an organization. Leadership’s clear focus, allocation of resources, rewards system, deliberate teaching and coaching, recruitment, selection, promotion, and attrition are essential embedding mechanisms. Reinforcing supports those instruments and includes organizational design, structure, systems, procedures, philosophy, organizations rites and rituals. The current culture favors operations and deployments as the way to career progression. It downplays the importance of the garrison-based and force generation functions such as family life, hospital ministry, resource management, and instruction.

The Army cannot underestimate the importance of the garrison in the Chaplain Corps mission for three reasons. The garrison contributes to the generating force mission, is a technical skills training platform for operational chaplains, and is the religious support provider for military
members and families. “Religious support activities using Government facilities are a primary entitlement for Soldiers, their Family members, DOD Civilians, and other authorized personnel.” Garrison based and supported subject matter experts in the area of family life, hospital ministry, resource management, ethics, world religions, and homiletics will equip unit chaplains with the skills necessary for successful performance during deployments and reassure adequate religious support to soldiers and family members.

Furthermore, “Commanders provide for the free exercise of religion through assigned chaplains, religious affairs specialists, and other religious support personnel.” Grooming competent and skillful Garrison Chaplains is as important as it is with Operations. Chaplains on the Family Life, Hospital Ministry, Instructor, and Resource Management paths create an excellent pool of future Garrison Chaplains due to experience in operating in the garrison environment. Those chaplains must be well versed in the intricacies of the Installation Management Command operations. Also, the garrison owns the religious support facilities and the religious support program with very limited personnel. For that reason, a Garrison Chaplain must be skillful in coordinating religious support with tenant Unit Ministry Teams to reassure the availability of human assets.

Also, the author must point out the vital role of the Resource Management Chaplain in garrison operations, especially in maintaining chapel contracts. Resource Managers are essential enablers of religious support activities. In the author’s twenty years of experience in leading Catholic programs at various installations, the majority of the Resource Managers perform well in managing funds but show serious deficiencies in understanding contracting processes. In most of the cases, contracts are essential to satisfying the commanders’ obligation to provide for free exercise of religion. For that reason, Resource Managers must be well versed in contracting procedures.

Mentoring plays an important role in developing and evaluating an individual’s talents. The Chaplain Corps’ doctrine encourages each individual to “seek advice and counsel from schools, leaders, mentors, and peers to determine individual strengths and weaknesses.” It is the responsibility of a supervisory chaplain to provide mentoring to subordinates. However, those relationships do not last long due to frequent assignment changes. For that reason, chaplains should enter into a long-term mentoring program. One of the options for the workforce is to utilize the Chief of Chaplains Mentor Program where active duty chaplains are “paired with a retired chaplain mentor.” Research indicates that the program does not have sufficient advertisement and many chaplains are not aware of its existence. The situation calls for a systematic advertisement in the form of quarterly e-mails or milSuite posts.

Talent Management Model

Before the author introduces the proposed Talent Management Model it is important to define what he understands by “model” in the context of a framework. A model is usually a visual and a verbal description of the key factors (but not all) needed to explain a thing. A model usually displays causality; does not explain why something is the case; attempts to represent reality. Also, it is important for the reader to understand the five guiding principles of the process of transition to an effective talent management model. Those principles are the foundation for the Army-wide concept and describe talent management as “an investment, [which] requires a systems approach, [which] balances the needs of the individuals with the needs of the organization, ensures job-person fit, and empowers employees.” Those principles are persisting and accompany the whole process of planning, transition, execution, and evaluation of the system.

The proposed U.S. Army Active Component Chaplain Talent Management model (see figure on the next page) borrows from the Chaplain Life Cycle and the Army Officer Human Capital Model constructed by Michel J. Colarusso and David S. Lyle. As an open system, talent management acquires human resources from a limited population of civilian clergy and religious groups leaders. Those candidates must meet specific requirements. The essential char-
characteristic of a chaplain is the ability to function in a pluralistic environment. “Chaplains cooperate with each other, without compromising their religious tradition or ecclesiastical endorsement requirements, to ensure the most comprehensive religious support opportunities possible within the unique military environment.”36

Furthermore, the Active Component of the Army Chaplain Corps does not leave much room for lateral entry. Usually, it is limited to transfers from the Army Reserve Component or the Army National Guard. “Unlike corporate entities, it [the Army] cannot poach mid-career or senior talent from other firms.”38 Therefore, acquisition, recruiting, and marketing strategies play a pivotal role in attracting and bringing in the best skilled and qualified candidates. Considering the changing needs of the Army (e.g., a cyber domain), evolving society and generational differences, ongoing review and updating of marketing strategies is essential for the future of the Army Chaplain Corps.

Upon completion of the Chaplain Basic Officer Leadership Course, First Lieutenant and Captain Chaplains continue the process of learning the profession. They typically function as battalion chaplains with a two-year tour of duty. The author recommends reemphasizing the concept of follow-on assignments in drastically different units, e.g., move from an Infantry
to an Armor Battalion. This provides junior chaplains an opportunity to learn how to perform and provide religious support throughout a wide spectrum of operations.

Supervisory Chaplains in cooperation with commanders on a battalion, brigade and division level, play an essential role in developing and employing desirable knowledge, skills, and behavior. Using the individual’s performance evaluation tools the author introduced in previous paragraphs, the leaders begin to identify individuals with an aptitude for operations, family life, hospital ministry, resource management, ethics, homiletics, or world religions to prepare them for a specific career path. Supervisory chaplains provide regular feedback to the individual through counseling and to assignment officers via Officer Evaluation Reports and the Chaplain Assignment Preference Sheet (or equivalent). Also, it is essential for the leaders to encourage junior chaplains to participate in professional development training and long-term mentoring.

In evaluating behavior, leaders must pay attention to an individual’s attitude towards teamwork. “In particular, ‘teamwork behavior’ is...critical to the creation of a highly adaptable military profession. Teamwork, the ability to respectfully share goals and knowledge with others, leads to rapid problem-solving.” Finally, supervisory chaplains must be systematic in the proper documentation of the developmental process in the form of counseling. The Chaplain Corps must enforce the quarterly counseling requirement since it is an excellent tool for documenting and tracking an individual’s performance and progress. Ultimately, “learning the profession” is the most formative period in the chaplain’s development which determines future educational opportunities, employment, and retention or attrition.

Upon selection to the rank of Major, chaplains determine their career path as they transition to the practicing of the profession phase. At this stage, they should be well versed in battalion level staff skills and have a basic understanding of leadership, mission command, administration, supervision, ethics, family life, world religions, homiletics, and resource management. The transition from a company to a field-grade officer coincides with competition for school opportunities offered by Professional Military Education and Chaplain Advanced Education Program. The chaplains on the Operations career path compete for resident and satellite Intermediate Level Education billets to prepare themselves to serve as Brigade or Regimental Chaplains. Those interested in becoming instructors specializing in ethics, homiletics, and world religions compete for civilian schooling. Candidates for hospital ministry apply for Clinical Pastoral Education Resident Programs. Those skilled in counseling will compete for Family Life training, and those with an aptitude for finance and contracting should obtain Resource Management education.

As Majors transition to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, they must continue to improve their knowledge and skills. The Operational Religious Support Leaders and the Initial Strategic Religious Support Leaders Courses provide that opportunity. Professional development is also another useful tool. It is important for the author to caution that development is not limited to technical or staff skills. Spiritual fitness is equally or even more important. Daily spiritual exercises, involvement with chapel worship services, attendance at retreats, spiritual renewal programs in accordance with a chaplain’s religious tradition are essential in improving one’s skills. All of these are necessary for personal growth and credibility in teaching and guiding subordinates.

In evaluating individual performance at this level the leaders pay particular attention to the ability to balance the threefold role of a chaplain as Staff Officer, Spiritual Leader, and Distinctive Faith Minister. The chaplain identity concept encaptures that dynamic. Chaplain identity is critical for field-grade chaplains. It is based on maturity, empathy, self-awareness, self-regulation, and self-control. Chaplain identity requires flexibility and embracing new challenges as it evolves according to the position. For example, an identity as a supervisory Army Chaplain varies from the one of staff officer or civilian clergy. Well developed chaplain identity allows comfortable cooperation with members of different faith groups helping
them to embrace the Army Chaplain identity.\footnote{40}

The changing character of war calls for readjustments in the military. For that reason, “the National Military Strategy focuses on multidomain security challenges that are now global security challenges.”\footnote{41} To address the challenge “the Armed Forces of the United States have embraced “jointness” as their fundamental organizing construct at all echelons.”\footnote{42}

Considering the transition to a Joint Bases concept in the garrison and the joint character of most combat operations, all chaplains must have the ability to function effectively in a joint environment. Major and Lieutenant Colonel Chaplains’ performance assessments should include their ability to function and coordinate religious support in a joint environment. The Chaplain Corps is a conducive environment for joint efforts since Army Chaplains share a similar mission with the Air Force and Navy chaplains. “Some shared military activities are less joint than are ‘common;’ in this usage ‘common’ simply means mutual, shared, or overlapping capabilities or activities between two or more Services.”\footnote{43}

The joint concept presents a challenge due to a certain level of the parochialism within individual services and branches. Unfortunately, the Chaplain Corps is not free of that mentality and requires a culture change in that area. The skill of effectively functioning in a joint environment and the ability to overcome the services’ resistance can be a force multiplier especially in the area of utilizing low density/high demand chaplains. “Jointness implies cross-service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the capability of individual components)”\footnote{44} For those reasons the supervisors assessing the performance should pay particular attention to the individual’s effectiveness in changing the culture.

Strategic thinking, ability to formulate concepts, subject matter expertise, supervisory and pastoral skills constitute the transition to the final stage of the model. Those skills play a pivotal role in the task of leading the profession. They enable the senior chaplains to provide long-term mentorship to junior chaplains, advise the Chief of Chaplains, provide pastoral care for senior leaders, and coordinate religious support in joint and combined (international) environments. Senior chaplains must pay particular attention to the difficult task of providing pastoral care for the senior leaders. Frequently, the level of responsibility and job demands predispose senior leaders to neglect their own spiritual and psychological needs. Senior chaplains must find ways to reach out to senior leaders to provide pastoral care.

The assessment of an individual’s performance on this level includes strategic thinking and conceptual abilities. Strategic thinking focuses
on improving an organization and “has the goal of facilitating good judgment to inform decision-making and the development of innovative strategies to align the organization’s future direction with the expected environment.”45 Chaplains at this level of responsibility must constantly build their frame of reference, follow changes in military doctrine, and propose ways to align the Chaplain Corps’ strategy with the Military National Strategy.

Concepts play an essential role in planning and executing the chaplain’s mission in the current volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment. “A military concept is the description of a method or scheme for employing specified military capabilities in the achievement of a stated objective or aim.”46 The ever-changing environment calls for new and creative ways of coordinating and providing religious support. Senior chaplains must master the ability to formulate new concepts and provide a framework for subordinates to plan and execute religious support according to their commands’ needs.

Core Functions
Integration of the Talent Management Model

The Talent Management Strategy calls for integrating into the talent management core functions of acquiring, developing, employing, and retaining. “Holistic integration of these functions will help achieve the desired end state of ‘a ready, diverse, and integrated team of trusted professionals optimized to win in a complex world.’”47 Performance and the level of integration of the core functions require ongoing assessment. In previous paragraphs, the author discussed the necessity to acquire qualified personnel through recruiting efforts. Recruitment constitutes the first segment of the Talent Management Model.

To develop talent, the Chaplain Corps assists members with career planning, provides training, education, and professional development opportunities. However, the area of career planning and management warrants caution against focusing solely on military rank and promotion. The process must be balanced and aligned with the Chaplain Corps’ two fundamental capabilities expressed in the dual role of a chaplain as a “professional military religious leader and professional military religious staff advisor.”48 The planning must stress the importance of individual spiritual development through mentoring, spiritual direction, retreats, and close relationships with endorsing agents. Also, the process must help with the development of the chaplain’s identity and set conditions for fulfilling the core competencies of nurturing the living, caring for the wounded, and honoring the fallen.

The employment of the force requires an alignment of career management with the two fundamental capabilities of the Chaplain Corps. Personnel managers must pay particular attention to the task of succession planning to ensure uninterrupted execution of religious support. Specificity of the Chaplain Corps presents challenges. It is a strictly Military Occupational Specialty based assignment system. Unlike some other staff sections, a chaplain position can be filled only by a qualified chaplain (56A military occupational specialty). Demanding training, school attendance, unqualified resignations, and emergent needs for low-density chaplain services frequently create gaps and interfere with assuring proper succession. Additionally, talent matching has an essential role in employment and productivity of the force. Supervisory chaplains play a pivotal role in guiding junior chaplains into specific career paths as they transition to the field-grade ranks.

Specificity of the Chaplain Corps calls for a distinctive approach to retention. Again, the importance of a well-developed and understood chaplain identity comes to the forefront. Chaplains are called to serve God or deity and people within the guidelines of their traditions in the military environment. Service is the key concept for chaplains. As ministers and religious leaders chaplains choose the path of service. All chaplains volunteer to serve in the Army. As such retention should focus not on additional compensations but on sustaining the spirit of service and voluntarism among chaplains.
Conclusion

Since 1775, Army Chaplains have provided with great sacrifice and dedication for the spiritual and religious needs of Soldiers and their families. In the 21st Century, the Army Chaplain Corps continues the tradition of providing and performing religious support throughout the whole spectrum of operations. Publication of the U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy, Force 2025 and Beyond creates an opportunity for the Army Chaplain Corps to create a new approach that develops chaplains who are subject matter experts armed with professional skills, knowledge, and behaviors. Ultimately, this effort will improve efficacy in providing religious support and meeting Chaplain Corps mission requirements. Developing the Talent Management Model for the Active Component Army Chaplains should be the first step in that direction. Religious Affairs Specialists, Reserve, and National Guard components should take this opportunity and develop their own models. Implementation of Talent Management Concept will benefit individuals, the Chaplain Corps, and the Army.

by Chaplain (COL) Rajmund Kopec
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Developing a U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Understanding and Response to Moral Injury

by Chaplain (COL) Gary T. Fisher

“All wars are fought twice, once on the battlefield, the second time in memory”

— Viet Thanh Nguyen, Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War

We have come to accept that the trauma of combat can leave profound unseen wounds on participants. Throughout the 20th century, and into the 21st century, military commanders, psychologists, and physicians have described that trauma response as battle fatigue, combat stress response, or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Yet those efforts failed to fully account for the deep spiritual and psychological distress that results, not from the direct stress of combat, but from actions during combat that violate one’s values or deeply held moral beliefs.

Beginning in Vietnam and continuing into the present conflicts, some mental health experts have developed a framework around the concept of Moral Injury (MI). Although the term lacks wide acceptance as a psychiatric diagnosis and a clear treatment plan, an increasing
number of combat veterans believe moral injury accurately describes their symptomatic urges to socially withdraw, self-medicate or, in extreme cases, self-harm.

Some institutions have begun to include moral injury in their approach to the treatment and care of veterans. The Veterans Administration has accepted the concept of moral injury, describing it as causal events that “transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.” In 2010, the Marine Corps in its doctrine adopted the term, describing moral injury as an “inner conflict” caused by a “betrayal of what is right.” While the clinical understanding of moral injury is still evolving, the time has come for the Army institutionally to consider the concept of moral injury as a significant issue facing our Soldiers and to explore options for prevention, care, and recovery. The U.S. Army Chaplain Corps must play a critical role in leading this response due to their unique position as providers of moral and spiritual guidance at the individual and unit levels. An examination of moral injury as it relates to the Army and the Chaplain Corps begins with a clear working definition, an understanding of the effects on our Soldiers and families, and possible responses from the Chaplain Corps.

Defining Moral Injury

While the relationship of morality to combat is an ancient debate, the use of the current concept of moral injury to understand those actions and emotions is a relatively new phenomenon. Before moving to the evolving
clinical definition, it is helpful to begin with an example that illustrates the key facets of the concept of moral injury.

In the 1960s, Stefan Westmann, a German veteran of World War I gave a dramatic interview, describing his own moral injury. He had been a medical student, dedicated to saving life, but in the trenches, his military training and his desire to survive drove him to kill.

“One day we got orders to storm a French position. We got in and my comrades fell right and left of me, but then I was confronted by a French Corporal. He with his bayonet at the ready and I with my bayonet at the ready.

For a moment I felt the fear of death and in a fraction of a second I realized that he was after my life exactly as I was after his. I was quicker than he was. I tossed his rifle away and I ran my bayonet through his chest. He fell, put his hand on the place where I had hit him and then I thrust again. Blood came out of his mouth and he died.

I felt physically ill. I nearly vomited. My knees were shaking and I was quite frankly ashamed of myself.”

On a cognitive level, Westmann understood that he had simply carried out his work as a Soldier. He had made a split-second decision that had saved his life but took that of his enemy. While the fear of the instant never left him, Westmann was most deeply haunted by his personal action and the implications of what he had done.

“My comrades, I was a corporal there then, were absolutely undisturbed by what had happened. One of them boasted that he had killed a poilu with the butt of his rifle, another one had strangled a captain, a French captain.

A third one had hit somebody over the head with his spade and they were ordinary men like me. One of them was a tram conductor, another one a commercial traveler, two were students, the rest were farm workers, ordinary people who never would have thought to do any harm to anyone.

How did it come about that they were so cruel? I remembered then that we were told that the good soldier kills without thinking of his adversary as a human being. The very moment he sees in him a fellow man, he is not a good soldier anymore. But I had in front of me the dead man, the dead French soldier and how would I liked him to have raised his hand.

I would have shaken his hand and we would have been the best of friends. Because he was nothing like me but a poor boy who had to fight, who had to go in with the most cruel weapons against a man who had nothing against him personally, who only wore the uniform of another nation, who spoke another language, but a man who had a father and mother and a family perhaps and so I felt.”

Ultimately, that incident left Westmann with a deep moral dissonance and profound injury that left him questioning his own values and that of broader society.

“What was it that we soldiers stabbed each other, strangled each other, went for each other like mad dogs? What was it that we, who had nothing against them personally, fought with them to the very end and death?

We were civilized people after all. But I felt that the culture we boasted so much about is only a very thin lacquer which chipped off the very moment we come in contact with cruel things like real war. To fire at each other from a distance, to drop bombs is something impersonal.

But to see each other’s white in the eyes and then to run with a bayonet against a man it was against my conception and against my inner feeling.”

This moral burden and mental conflict over actions he had taken that were “against my conception and against my inner feeling” illustrates...
the essence of moral injury in its nature and its lasting impact.

These perceived failures to live up to deeply held personal and social expectations generates the moral dissonance between what is valued and what was done. Combat veterans like Westmann know they must make life-death decisions within what has been called the “three-second war”. The Soldier has one second to figure out what is happening, another second to decide what action should be taken, and a final second to act. Yet an action taken within those three seconds can have a profound, lifelong impact on the Soldier, the unit, and the Soldier’s family and social network.

The proper usage of the term “moral injury” is still a matter of ongoing debate and exploration. The concept continues to develop in psychology, trauma studies, and recently in theology. The first use of the term appears to have been in Jonathan Shay’s seminal work, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of the Character, published in 1994. Shay derived his concept of moral injury from the stories of his patients, coupled with an analysis of the narrative of Achilles in the Iliad. His concept contains three clear elements: (1) a betrayal of what is right, (2) by someone in authority (e.g., a military leader), (3) that takes place in a high-stakes situation. A key feature of Shay’s definition is that it centers on the actions of an authority figure and results in moral injury for those under the leader’s influence.

In 2009, Brett Litz published additional research that expanded Shay’s concept to include a broader spectrum of wartime experiences. Litz argues that moral injury includes “perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held beliefs and expectations.” Shay has accepted this idea and considers it to be a second form of moral injury. In this case, the moral injury arises from a service member doing something or not doing something that violates his or her own ideals, ethics, or expectations.

In the Litz definition, the violator is the self. In the Shay definition, the violator is an authority or person in power. Both potential sources of moral injury are important, both can be true at the same time, and one can lead to the other.

A clinical understanding of moral injury is still in its infancy, at best, and will require a validation process to finalize a definition. However, it is not too early to propose an initial working definition of moral injury:

The stress (moral burden) from an experience or set of experiences that transgresses or violates (wounds the soul) deeply held moral beliefs and expectations, provoking mild or intense expressions of shame, guilt, anger, contempt, loss of honor, and even debilitating or harmful behaviors.

This definition uses the Litz concept of moral injury as the causal component, while expanding it to include the resultant effects of the cause. Including such effects highlights the psychological impact of moral injury and the potential for service members to engage in harmful behaviors such as self-medication, domestic or criminal violence, and suicide.

Differentiating Moral Injury from PTSD

The distinction between PTSD and moral injury is critical to this discussion. If no clear distinction is made, we will continue to address moral injury with a current PTSD approach for treatment, missing the opportunity to directly speak to the war-related stress reactions that result in guilt, shame and remorse. Moral injury occasionally coexists with PTSD, but it can be its own separate trauma with symptoms of shame, guilt, regret, anxiety, self-loathing, and self-destruction.

The Veterans Administration offers a clear definition of PTSD. They describe it as “a mental health problem that some people develop after experiencing or witnessing a life-threatening event like combat, a natural disaster, a car accident, or sexual assault.” They go on to explain that “it’s normal to have upsetting memories, feel on edge, or have trouble sleeping... at first, it may be hard to do normal daily activities... But most people start to feel better after a few weeks or months. PTSD is a possible diagnosis if the symptoms last longer than a few months.” PTSD can be accompanied by “intrusive
memories, flashbacks and nightmares; avoidance of anything that reminds them of the trauma; and anxious feelings they didn’t have before the event that are so intense their lives are disrupted.” According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), there are four diagnostic clusters for PTSD: 1) re-experiencing, 2) avoidance, 3) negative cognitions and mood, and 4) arousal. Re-experiencing covers “recurrent dreams and flashbacks or intense or prolonged psychological distress.” Avoidance refers to the “distressing memories, thoughts, feelings or external reminders of the event.” Negative cognition/mood represents a “myriad of feelings. persistent blame of self or others. estrangement from others. diminished interest in activities, to an inability to remember key aspects of the event.” Finally arousal is marked by aggressive, reckless, or self-destructive behavior, sleep disturbances, hyper-vigilance… ” Recent statistics show that nearly 18.5% of the Soldiers deployed since 2001 exhibited symptoms of PTSD. The main distinction for a diagnosis of PTSD is that the triggering event is an actual or threatened death or serious injury situation in which the sense (or necessity) of safety is lost. “The amygdala, a pair of almond-sized regions deep in the brain, are the main orchestrators of fear, reading incoming signals such as smells and sounds and sending messages to other bits of the brain, which filter the signals before reacting.”

In someone with PTSD, the “filters struggle to distinguish between real threats and those that can safely be ignored.” When a person is confronted with a dangerous or threatening situation the “amygdala shows a heightened response. At the same time the prefrontal cortex, which regulates fear, is suppressed.”

The distinction between PTSD and moral injury is highlighted in the recent work by Pastor Duane Larson and CH (COL) Jeff Zust, where they describe the fundamental difference by saying that, “The perceptions of a combatant after an injurious action (triggering event) create a fundamental difference between traumatic injuries (resulting from fear-based responses to physical threats) and moral injuries (resulting from valued-based responses to physical actions).” We see here that the perception of the combatant is fundamental to understanding the nature of the triggering event and what necessity is lost (i.e., trust...reference table 1) to distinguish between PTSD and moral injury. Those who qualify for a diagnosis of PTSD may very well present troubling behavior and anxiety that is linked to value-based response to combat action. Some without a diagnosis of PTSD may be troubled by the psychological and spiritual challenges resulting from combat. Zust and Larson conclude that, “These issues are ‘value-based’” It is these struggles that must be recognized and treated as moral injuries. Moral dissonance causes moral injury. The dissonance is the space between the competing perceptions and active tension between the moral voice (moral sense, small voice, conscience, sense of duty, or ethical motivation) and moral agency (capable of acting with reference to right or wrong). Moral injury occurs when this dissonance is profound, extends beyond reconciliation, and even affects behavior.

Combat at the basest level is nothing but choices where Soldiers put their professional ethics on the line every day. “Value and practice flow togeth-

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<th>Table 1 – Distinguishing Elements of PTSD and Moral Injury*</th>
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<td><strong>PTSD</strong></td>
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<td>Triggering event</td>
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<td>Individual’s role during event</td>
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<td>Predominant painful emotion</td>
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*Table 1 adapted from a summary and chart of Litz et al. (2009)
er in non-rational and non-cognitive combinations. They react on the basis of experience and competence, and their reactions override their values (moral voice and moral agency). The resulting conflict of values or woundedness of the soul drives the wound but also can lead to the path of healing as one seeks to find meaning in the midst of what has been lost.

The Cost and Challenges of Moral Injury

The implications of moral injury on our fighting forces and their families are far-reaching. Moral injury can involve a broad array of emotional, cognitive, and physical responses. A common symptom of moral injury is the struggle with intrusive thoughts and memories, accompanied by intense negative emotions. Viet Thanh Nguyen, author of the non-fiction examination of the Vietnam War, Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War, writes “that all wars are fought twice, once on the battlefield, the second time in memory.”

Symptoms become observable when service members attempt to dull or avoid the recurring memories or experiences of the initial event. Jonathan Shay likens moral injury to physical injury. He contends that the initial event is not what kills the injured, but rather, “the complications that arise as they desperately try to manage the aftermath of the initial event, usually with strategies that are maladaptive, dangerous, and even lethal.” Evidence suggests that moral injury is associated with a wide range of social challenges, spiritual issues, risk-taking behavior, and emotional distress. In addition, moral injury is frequently associated with suicidal ideation and suicide attempts. Litz and colleagues list chronic collateral indicators as follows:

- Self-harming behaviors, such as poor self-care, alcohol and drug abuse, severe recklessness, and para suicidal behavior,
- Self-handicapping behaviors, such as retreating in the face of success or good feelings, and demoralization, which may entail confusion, bewilderment, futility, hopelessness, and self-loathing.

Severe emotional distress can lead a service member to withdraw from helpful social support systems and be reluctant to seek help. In order to protect themselves from future emotional harm, service members may either strike out or else retreat and become isolated. These maladaptive coping mechanisms may include concealment strategies that can reduce visible symptoms and prove to be destructive in the long run. These strategies of camouflage or concealment may seem helpful on the surface but make matters worse over time. Concealment strategies may include: acting like everything is fine when it is not, substance abuse to numb the pain and keep functioning, or isolating or pushing people away in one’s life.

The costs and challenges of moral injury must be acknowledged in the same way we now recognize the psychological costs and effects of conditions like PTSD. One of the challenges, however, is that moral injury, by its nature, is highly subjective and unique to the individual. Therefore, the individual, according to his or her own beliefs and needs, must define the causes and play a key role in the assessment and treatment of moral injury. It is the deeply personal aspect of moral injury that positions chaplains as ideal conduits of care to prevent potential long-term issues and to address areas of moral injury in the lives of Soldiers they serve.

The Role of The Chaplain Corps in Moral Injury

Army Chaplains have a long and honored history in the Army, having served Soldiers and families since 1775. The 42nd Army Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (Major General) Paul K. Hurley, stated that “the title chaplain itself carries an intrinsic mandate for selfless service that facilitates the spiritual needs of Soldiers’ souls.” In that same vein, the Army recognizes the important role of chaplains to “advise on matters of morals and ethics to assist leaders at all levels.” Furthermore, “chaplains can help with prevention and resolution of moral, ethical, social,
spiritual issues.” The chaplain is equipped and trained to be sensitive and to look for the broad dimensions of woundedness that can be present, such as trauma and the unknown moral dimensions and moral injuries that exist in people’s lives.

Chaplains have several competencies for facilitating prevention, recognition, care, and support for moral injury. First, as professionals trained in both military and religious matters, chaplains bring an important perspective to and a special understanding of the moral issues and challenges that our Soldiers face. As veteran war reporter, David Woods, puts it, “[The chaplain] is one of a cadre of thousands of ministers, imams, rabbis and priests . . . to guide [Soldiers’] spiritual and ethical lives.” Woods goes on to point out that the Army tasks chaplains to promote “strong personal character and moral well-being” of the troops. The chaplain can “help the morally injured toward healing by assisting them in the spiritual task of the construction and sharing of their personal stories.”

Second, chaplains are a compassionate moral authority serving on the front lines of Soldiers’ spiritual and inner lives. David Woods calls chaplains “first responders” in the realm of moral injury. Chaplains are often the most frequently sought out from among professional caregivers by those who are struggling with personal issues, challenges of life, and the trials of combat. Chaplains are recognized as confidential counselors. Chaplains listen without judgment, offering a release from the pressure upon souls, hearts, and minds. To be able to hear the story of moral injury without censure, blame, or judgement is a fundamental part of the repair process. Chaplains, by regulation, perform or provide religious services, rites, and sacraments in accordance with their faith perspective and endorsement. A religious/spiritual framework applied toward the care and healing of moral wounds is embodied in the motto of the Army Chaplain Corps, “Bringing God to Soldiers and Soldiers to God.”

The six domains of religious experience as outlined by C.J. Grame and colleagues are an apt illustration of what a chaplain can do while providing religious support to Soldiers in and out of combat. They are: 1) the ideological dimension (helping Soldiers find meaning in their life particularly in the context of suffering and trauma); 2) the intellectual dimension (religious/sacred doctrines, narratives, information, images); 3) the ritualistic dimension (prayer, services, religious worship and music); 4) the experiential dimension (spiritual awareness of God’s presence and immensity, union with the divine, the feeling-state, and connection with deity); 5) the consequential dimension (one’s spiritual qualities and its outward manifestations witnessed by others, changed behaviors such as: self-care, altruistic attitude, sobriety, reduced suicidal ideation, improved relationship quality); 6) the supportive dimension (religious community, sense of belonging, support, and associated well-being).

The Army’s religious preference data does little to reveal the specific values Soldiers actually hold. It takes a chaplain who is active and engaged in his formation and among the guidons to sort out the spiritual needs of Soldiers. Soldiers will have internal conversations with themselves: “Is my life on track?” “Is this action the best possible action in accord with how I understand my purpose in life to be?” “Am I still a good man if I have done these things?” “Will I ever feel good about myself again?” Soldiers may experience a disorientation around meaning in their lives and actions. Chaplains can uniquely help explore these questions of meaning by having profound and genuine conversations with Soldiers and providing a moral authority to speak directly to the issue.

Third, chaplains serve as a conduit of care. Soldiers who are suffering from an inner conflict are often more willing to talk deeply with their chaplains rather than to leaders, peers, or other care providers. Because of their close and natural connection with Soldiers’ inner lives, chaplains can assess and guide individuals to other professionals for ongoing care and recovery when necessary. In addition, chaplains can assist in overcoming hesitation and the stigma of asking for help. Katie Mansfield, director of the Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience (STAR) at Eastern Mennonite University’s Center for Justice and Peace Building, addresses stigma directly: “There is something in the deep stigmatizing in what happens in body, brain, belief, and behavior that...
opens up the possibility of change. One of the most important things we do is to destigmatize the very natural array of responses that happens in people’s brains, bodies, beliefs, and behaviors.” Chaplains are a natural bridge to cross the mental health divide and help unfold what is going on in the brain and the body and unpack what in the protective impulse makes the body do these things as a natural response to trauma. Chaplains can use that unique connectedness and trust to direct people where they can get the help they need.

The Army need not and should not wait for more evidence on moral injury. Though in its infancy as an area of psychological and medical research, moral injury appears to accurately describe the reported experiences of a large number of combat veterans. A 2008 survey found that 30 percent of Soldiers who deployed encountered ethically challenging situations in which they were unsure how to respond. Furthermore, early evidence suggests that the consequences of moral injury are potentially long-lasting and/or severe. Thus, while we wait for the science to catch up, many already suffer. Fortunately, we have the capacity to act now. The U.S. Army Chaplain Corps is ideally positioned to spearhead Army efforts to address moral injury. As a natural outgrowth of their special relationship and insight into the lives of Soldiers, chaplains can serve on the front lines of prevention, recognition, care, and support for moral injury.

Recommendations for Further Research

1. Further research needs to be done in the area of Moral Voice and Moral Agency as it relates to different theological frameworks and faith perspectives. It would be useful to understand how different faith perspectives would address moral injury as it relates to moral voice, moral agency, reconciliation, and redemption. A developed understanding of moral voice is critical for this discussion because a Soldier’s moral voice is heavily influenced through training and indoctrination. A clear and consistent framework that is both learned and applied for moral injury across a chaplain corps will greatly assist chaplains to be able to understand and meet the needs of those in their ranks that suffer from moral injury.

2. Further research is needed in the area of the role of memory in trauma and moral injury.

3. Further examination is needed in the area of moral injury and the analysis of the Sacred texts. The most recent and perhaps the only examination is “Exploring Moral Injury in Sacred Texts” edited by Dr. Joseph McDonald. The authors explore particular aspects of healing from their faith communities. This book is a ground breaking analysis of moral injury and trauma in the light of sacred writings. In conjunction with this, one could study efficacy rates of faith-based approaches to trauma care and moral injury.

4. Further research is needed in the area of “broken expectations”. It is clear that moral injury is the result of broken moral expectations or values. These expectations are at risk of being broken because they are most likely wrong in the first place. Perhaps God desires for us to live according to His will and His design. To go against that design leads to broken values or expectations.

5. A particularly helpful case study that needs further examination in light of moral injury is the My Lai massacre which took place in March of 1968. There is a wealth of information available to include written information and analysis as well as interviews that would be helpful for a discussion of moral injury. This incident could also be used to analyze an emerging framework. In addition, there are some generational case studies that may be able to highlight generational differences as it relates to moral injury -- such as Abu Ghraib, the 507th Maintenance Company, and other incidents in different theaters of war as in OEF and OIF.

Recommended Initiatives for the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps

1. Host a moral injury summit to assemble a gathering of the seminal thinkers of our Corps in the area of Moral Injury. Many chaplains of all ranks have completed degree programs whose research focus has been moral injury. Many PhD, DMin, and master’s thesis’ projects have focused on Moral Injury. It would be valuable to tap into and disseminate
this wealth of knowledge. The focus of this event would be to develop a collective understanding of moral injury and to chart the way forward for the Chaplain Corps. Specific areas of interest could include theoretical writing, prevention approaches, treatment in a faith-based setting, faith based group approaches, non-faith based approaches.

2. Establish an institutional learning track from Initial Military Training throughout a career of Professional Military Education focusing on developing an understanding for the prevention, recognition, care, and support for moral injury at echelon.

3. Each chaplain needs to be trained and certified in working with those who experience trauma. An excellent organization that is especially helpful is the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (ICISF). This organization offers a particular structure for dealing with trauma that is very helpful. Certifying each chaplain offers a consistent understanding of trauma and common language when dealing with trauma victims. Some of the classes include “Assisting Individuals in Crisis”, “Group Crisis Intervention”, and “Pastoral Crisis Intervention”. Classes like these would build a fundamental capacity and competency across the Corps to work with trauma victims and their families.

4. Finally, develop and standardize a working definition of and a model for moral injury. Also, produce a training circular that could offer a basic understanding and approach to moral injury.

**Recommended Initiative for the U.S. Army**

1. Make the Chaplain Corps the proponent for morals, ethics, and character development.

2. Initiate a study of moral injury’s impact on the active force, suicide etc.

3. Include a comprehensive discussion of moral injury as part of the instruction in the Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program.

4. Include a block of instruction within “The Soldier For Life” program. This would be designed to assist Soldiers with the transition to civilian life. This would offer awareness and solutions for moral injury into the future.

5. Introduce the concepts of trauma response and moral injury as early as Basic Combat Training (BCT) or Advanced Individual Training (AIT) or Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC).

6. Include analysis and discussion of moral injury as part of the Senior Leader Education Program.

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**Chaplain (COL) Gary T. Fisher**

10th Mountain Division (LI) and Fort Drum, New York Command Chaplain

CH Fisher assumed his duties as the Senior Chaplain for Fort Drum, New York in June of 2018. His most recent previous assignment was as an Army War College Fellow at the University of Texas in Austin. He was able to focus his research on “Moral Injury” during this time. Prior to his selection to the fellowship he was the Division Chaplain for the 10th Mountain Division.
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6. K. D. Drescher, “An Exploration of the Viability and Usefulness of the Construct of Moral Injury in War Veterans,” Traumatology 17:1 (2011) 8-13, revealed that “health and religious professionals” who work with veterans described the category of “Moral Injury” as useful and necessary, but (35%) found the current working definitions to be inadequate to account for the experiences of their patients.
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Developing Others

A Quantitative Analysis of The Perceptions of Leader Development for U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Soldiers

by Chaplain (MAJ) John Scott

Problem Statement

Developing junior leaders is critical because the Army grows its leaders from within.¹ The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) conducts an annual survey used to assess leadership and leader development across the Army. Despite the importance of leader development for Army officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), the survey results reflect a perception that superiors are not doing well at developing their subordinates. Leaders in the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps believe that the Army-wide leader development deficiency extends to chaplaincy Soldiers.² There is currently a lack of empirical evidence examining how the Chaplain Corps compares to the total force in developing subordinates. The researcher conducted a quantitative-comparative study to confirm or refute the belief that chaplaincy leaders perceived their immediate superior’s effectiveness as developing others as favorably or less favora-
bly than their peers in other Army branches and MOSs. Furthermore, examining which actions subordinates reported their superiors took to develop others helped indicate areas of strength, needs, and underlying causes that affect leader development for chaplains and religious affairs specialists.

**Significance of the Problem**

The Army Chaplain Corps provides chaplain sections and unit ministry teams (UMTs) that are capable of operating in fluid and uncertain environments. Supervisory chaplaincy leaders at all levels must develop and prepare their subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists to meet the challenges involved with delivering religious support in increasingly complex situations. Concerns about chaplain leader development have been a leading issue for the Chaplain Corps since late in the First World War at the advent of formal military education for chaplains. The researcher hopes that the current study will contribute to the further refinement of training and development for chaplaincy leaders. The current Army Chief of Chaplains, Chaplain (Major General) Paul Hurley, designated improving leader development as one of his six lines of effort in the 2016-2021 Chaplain Corps Campaign Plan. Recently, Chaplain Hurley also declared 2018 the year of leader development for the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps. Leader development for chaplaincy Soldiers is vital. Chaplaincy members believe that leader development for Soldiers in the Army Chaplain Corps needs improvement to meet expectations.

Research projects from the Chief of Chaplains and other senior leaders in the Corps indicate there are leader development challenges which hinder the ability to provide capable chaplain sections and UMTs. Chaplain Hurley concluded that the Army Chaplain Corps needs to focus on doctrine, training, and leader development to strengthen chaplain identity in a research project published in 2013. Chaplain (Colonel) Karen Meeker highlighted concerns over lowered standards for ministerial education and pastoral formation for incoming chaplains leading to less effective ministry in her Army War College research paper. The Commandant of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Chaplain (Colonel) Jeffrey Hawkins, wrote, “The Army and its Chaplaincy have a critical problem – there is a pervasive, persistent leader development deficit.” These concerns and others like them from leaders across the chaplaincy and the U.S. Army inspired this research.

**Purpose of Study**

The purpose of this study was to confirm or refute the assertion that the Army-wide leader development problem, as reported on the Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), applied equally to chaplaincy leaders. A statement in Chaplain Hawkins’s dissertation inspired the methodology for this project. After summarizing some of the Army-wide leader development deficiencies reported in the 2013 CASAL, he wrote, “Without a doubt, in the absence of any statistical data, the anecdotal evidence confirms that this institution-wide assessment applies equally to the sub-population of Army Chaplains, too.” This research sought to provide that statistical evidence.

The researcher conducted a quantitative-comparative analysis of the responses to the CASAL question, “How effective is your immediate superior at the following: Developing their subordinates?” The researcher compared the percent favorable responses (e.g., Effective or Very Effective) of four groups of chaplaincy leaders to four peer groups from the rest of the Army to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in their mean favorable perceptions of their immediate superiors’ effectiveness at developing their subordinates. The researcher also examined respondents’ answers to 14 questions which asked the CASAL participants to indicate which actions their immediate superiors took to develop them in the twelve months that preceded the survey. The results of this study will contribute to the understanding of the perceived current state of leader development for the Chaplain Corps and the Army. Chaplaincy leaders will be able to use this analysis to design approaches to address the Army Chief of Chaplains’ “Improve Leader Development” line of effort.
Hypotheses

The quantitative-comparative analysis had three possible outcomes which became the hypotheses for this study. The null hypothesis suggests there is no difference between chaplaincy leaders and their peers in the rest of the Army in terms of their favorable perceptions of their immediate superior’s effectiveness at developing subordinates (see figure 1). Alternative hypothesis 1, chaplaincy leaders reported favorable perceptions of their immediate superior’s effectiveness at developing subordinates at a lower rate than their Army peers (see figure 2). Alternative hypothesis 2, chaplaincy leaders reported favorable perceptions of their immediate superior’s effectiveness at developing subordinates at a higher rate than their Army peers (see figure 3).

Figure 1. Null hypothesis
Source: Created by author.

Figure 2. Alternative hypothesis 1
Source: Created by author.

Figure 3. Alternative hypothesis 2
Source: Created by author.
The researcher hypothesized that Chaplain Corps leaders’ favorable ratings of their immediate superior’s effectiveness at developing subordinates would be the same (null hypothesis) or lower (alternative hypothesis 1) than their peers’ ratings. The researcher based this assumption on three factors. First, chaplains’ immediate superiors are usually non-chaplain officers which can hamper the superior’s ability to develop the supervised chaplain. Second, chaplains and religious affairs specialists who serve as immediate superiors typically have less supervisory experience, potentially making them less effective at developing subordinates. Third, chaplains cannot command, and religious affairs specialists have very few opportunities to serve as part of a command team. Therefore, their education and training do not include the same leadership focus as the training conducted for leaders in other branches and MOSs.

2015 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership

The data used for the project came from the larger set reported in subsection “2.2.1 Leader Effectiveness in Developing Others” of the 2015 CASAL. The analysis of the CASAL data reflects a perceived Army-wide deficit in Leader Effectiveness in Developing Others. CAL researchers set a 67% favorable response benchmark as the start point for minimal acceptable levels for the leadership assessment questions. Less than two-thirds of the 2015 CASAL respondents, 64%, rated their immediate superior effective at developing subordinates. The 2015 CASAL also contained respondents’ answers to 14 questions about specific actions superiors took to develop their subordinates.

The following are some of the results from the report. Only five of the 14 categories exceeded a 50% endorsement. Less than 50% of the respondents reported they received formal or informal feedback (e.g. counseling) on their job performance. Less than 30% of the respondents reported they received training, teaching, coaching, or skill development from their immediate superiors. The researcher will present the full results for the Army, the chaplaincy, and the Army not including chaplaincy leaders later in this article. The responses from chaplains and religious affairs specialists reflect the current perception of leader development in the Army Chaplain Corps, which directly addressed the problem statement for this project. Chaplain Corps leaders can use these findings as a starting point to design a follow-up study or to help facilitate improved leader development for members of the Army Chaplain Corps.

Research Methods

The researcher employed a quantitative approach to test the null hypothesis and lay the groundwork to design focused approaches to address the Chief of Chaplains’ “Improve Leader Development” line of effort. The primary research objective was to compare Chaplain Corps leaders’ perceptions about leader development to the perceptions of their peers in other Army branches and MOSs. The researcher compared the responses of Army Chaplain Corps leaders to those of their peers in the rest of the Army to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the favorable perception of leader development between the two groups. The researcher compared the groups’ responses to the question, “How effective is your immediate superior at the following: Developing their subordinates”, to achieve the primary research objective.

A secondary objective of this study was to identify potential areas in which Army and Chaplain Corps leaders can sustain or improve in developing subordinates. To do this the researcher compared chaplaincy leaders and their Army peers’ 14 yes or no responses to the supporting CASAL query, “In the past 12 months, what action(s) has your immediate superior taken to develop your leadership skills?” This comparison enabled the researcher to see specific actions that Chaplain Corps leaders can either sustain or improve as they seek to develop their subordinates.

Data Collection

The researcher used the responses from the 177 chaplains and chaplain assistants who participated in the 2015
CASAL. The CASAL online instrument does not require individuals to respond to all questions on the survey. Therefore, 12,724 Army leaders from all other branches and MOSs responded to the primary question about the effectiveness of leader development and 12,794 responded to the 14 yes or no questions about specific leader development actions that immediate superiors performed. Eighty-two chaplains and chaplain assistants responded from the active component (AC), and 95 responded from the reserve components (RC). There were 135 chaplain respondents (active and reserve combined) and 42 chaplain assistants (AC and RC combined).

The researcher’s inquiry was a cross-sectional examination of the 2015 CASAL. The CASAL is a longitudinal study that captures Soldiers’ perceptions about leadership and leader development. Each year CAL administers the CASAL online to a representative sample of Regular Army, U.S. Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who are globally dispersed. The CASAL is a mixed methods instrument that uses a variety of question types to gather information about perceptions, such as Likert scales, dichotomous questions (yes/no), and open-ended questions for some topics. The CASAL researchers keep many of the survey items the same year-to-year to track trends over time, but do add, delete, or modify others based on stakeholder input to make sure the survey captures data on relevant topics and remains a manageable size for respondents. The researcher for the current project used only the respondents’ answers to the Likert and dichotomous questions.

There are some weaknesses associated with the researcher’s decision to use CASAL data. First, non-chaplain officers usually rate chaplains. The CASAL question asked the respondent to comment on his or her immediate superior. Therefore, chaplains’ responses are likely not about their perceptions of a supervisory chaplain’s actions to develop them. Second, the sample sizes from Chaplain Corps respondents are small. The CASAL team requires any group to have at least 75 respondents to be able to report out on results. No single Chaplain Corps strata met that standard, so all the Chaplain Corps results had to combine at least two groups (e.g., AC and RC chaplains reported as one group). The 75 respondent requirement also prevented the researcher from isolating chaplain assistants as a comparison group. Only 42 chaplain assistants participated in the survey, so CAL did not release the chaplain assistant cohort results to the researcher. Most chaplain assistants have chaplains as raters, so this would have provided a more specific look at the perceptions about chaplains as immediate superiors. Finally, the comparison groups are different sizes which will always be the case when separating a subset of Soldiers from the rest of the Army.

The decision to use the 2015 CASAL data provided the researcher several advantages. First, CAL has conducted this survey Army-wide for over a decade. CAL makes results available to outside entities to give leaders a tool to help improve leadership and leader development. The researcher decided to take advantage of the CAL information freeing the researcher of the requirement to design a new instrument and gain approval to conduct research with human subjects. Second, the CASAL researchers have continued to improve and adapt the instrument over time. Third, leaders across the Army recognize the CASAL and have used it to describe the state of leader development in the Army. Fourth, the researcher undertook this project based on a statement about leader development in the Chaplain Corps based on previous CASAL results. Therefore, using CASAL data was an obvious choice for this research.

Data Analysis

A description of the survey population for the 2015 CASAL is in table 1. Table 2 shows the number of Chaplain Corps and peer group respondents’ answers used for the current project. It also contains the corresponding sampling error for each group based on a 95% confidence interval, which means that 95 times out of 100 the observed score will fall within the stated value plus or minus the sampling error. The researcher did not have access to the raw data from respondents, therefore could not capture invitations sent to Chaplain Corps Soldiers with the corresponding rates of return. The researcher
could not gather the actual number of chaplains and chaplain assistants serving in the Army during the 2015 CASAL collection period. Instead the researcher used the number of chaplain and chaplain assistant authorizations for fiscal year 2016 from FMSWeb as an estimate of the total population of chaplaincy leaders in the grades of E5 to O6. The 95% confidence interval and the number of survey respondents for the grouping are also part of the calculated sampling error.

CASAL researchers survey Soldiers from sergeant to colonel, which may be one reason for the low response rate among chaplain assistants. Many chaplain assistants are privates or specialists. In fiscal year 2016, 42% of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Strata</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Random Sample (Invitations)</th>
<th>Returned N</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
<th>Sampling Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Active Component (Regular Army)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Grade Officer (major - colon)</td>
<td>30,160</td>
<td>7,704</td>
<td>1,776</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Grade Officer (second lieutenant - captain)</td>
<td>49,223</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>2,364</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer (warrant officer 1 - chief warrant 5)</td>
<td>14,837</td>
<td>8,282</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior NCO (sergeant first class - sergeant major)</td>
<td>51,300</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>2,369</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior NCO (sergeant and staff sergeant)</td>
<td>128,802</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>2,957</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Active</strong></td>
<td>274,322</td>
<td>74,386</td>
<td>10,963</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reserve Components (US Army Reserve and Army National Guard)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Grade Officer</td>
<td>25,426</td>
<td>8,568</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Grade Officer</td>
<td>42,931</td>
<td>21,227</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>11,797</td>
<td>7,356</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior NCO</td>
<td>53,642</td>
<td>11,760</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior NCO</td>
<td>154,125</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>2,253</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Reserve</strong></td>
<td>287,921</td>
<td>88,911</td>
<td>9,052</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Uniformed Personnel</strong></td>
<td>562,243</td>
<td>163,297</td>
<td>20,015</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Population, sample, response rates, and sampling error

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Strata</th>
<th>N (Respondents)</th>
<th>Sampling Error (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chaplains (Active and Reserve)</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants (Active)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants (Reserve)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants (Active and Reserve)</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Branch Officers (Active and Reserve)</td>
<td>5591</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Branch Officers and Enlisted CMFs (Active)</td>
<td>6715</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Branch Officers and Enlisted CMFs (Reserve)</td>
<td>6009</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Branch Officers and Enlisted CMFs (Active and Reserve)</td>
<td>12724</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Chaplaincy and peer group populations and sampling error
Source: Created by author.
chaplain assistant authorizations across the total Army were for specialists or below. There were 1,154 authorizations for chaplain assistants in the ranks of specialist and below, and 1,557 authorizations for chaplain assistants in the ranks of sergeant thru sergeant major. In other words, nearly half of the chaplain assistant population was not eligible to receive an invitation to participate in the survey. The actual number of chaplain assistants in the ranks of specialist and below may have been higher because Army leaders expect units to grow their sergeants, until then privates and specialists often fill sergeant billets.

The researcher used IBM SPSS Statistics software to analyze the data from the various respondent subgroups. The researcher asked the CAL team to perform an independent samples t-test to compare the perceptions of the members of the specified Chaplain Corps subsets to their corresponding subsets from the rest of the Army. An independent samples t-test compares the means of two independent groups to determine if the means are significantly different. The researcher only conducted statistical analysis of the positive responses (e.g., Effective and Very effective) to the question “How effective is your immediate superior at the following: Developing their subordinates?” Neither the researcher nor the CAL team processed the responses to the 14 supporting questions about leader actions to develop others with SPSS Statistics software because they are simple yes or no responses with implications that are easily understood.

**Primary Study Findings**

The CAL research team provided the results for eight subgroups of respondents to the 2015 CASAL question “How effective is your immediate superior at the following: Developing their subordinates” (see table 3). The percentages in table 3 represent that part of the population that reported their superior was effective in developing others. Participants rated their superior’s effectiveness using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very ineffective) to 5 (Very effective). The CAL researchers collapsed these five response options into three, so that the choices Very effective and Effective indicate favorable perceptions of superiors’ effectiveness at developing others. The researcher did not consider neutral or unfavorable responses for this study. The researcher organized these subgroups into four comparison groups to test the null hypothesis that there was no difference between Chaplain Corps leaders’ and their peers’ perceptions of their immediate superior’s effectiveness at developing their subordinates (see table 4). CAL researchers then found the mean favorable responses (the average of the four and five scores) among the eight groups (see column M in table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th># of Total Respondents</th>
<th>% Positive Responses</th>
<th>Sampling Error (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC and RC Chaplains</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC and RC Chaplains and Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC and RC All other Officers</td>
<td>5591</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC and RC All other Leaders</td>
<td>12,724</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC All other Leaders</td>
<td>6715</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC All other Leaders</td>
<td>6009</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Positive perceptions of leader development by subcategory
Source: Created by author.
Table 4. The four comparison groups
Source: Created by author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison Groups</th>
<th>versus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC and RC Chaplains</td>
<td>All other Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC and RC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</td>
<td>All other AC and RC Officers and NCOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</td>
<td>All other AC Officers and NCOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</td>
<td>All other RC Officers and NCOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the comparison groups
Source: Created by author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q122. How effective is your immediate superior at the following: Developing their subordinates?</td>
<td>Chaplains</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>1.375</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All other officers</td>
<td>5591</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>1.567</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1.408</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All other AC/RC</td>
<td>12,724</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>1.564</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>1.416</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All other AC</td>
<td>6,715</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>1.590</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>1.406</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All other RC</td>
<td>6,009</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>1.534</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 (above) shows the descriptive statistics for the four comparison groups. The main takeaway from this table is that the mean (M) favorable perceptions of superiors’ actions to develop subordinates are higher in the chaplaincy groups than the favorable perceptions of their Army peers. CAL researchers conducted independent samples t-tests to determine if the level of chaplaincy subordinates’ favorable perceptions about their immedi-
ate superiors’ effectiveness at developing them differed significantly from officers and NCOs in the rest of the Army.

The results of the independent samples t-tests for the first three groups support alternative hypothesis 2, Chaplain Corps leaders reported their immediate superiors as effective in developing subordinates at a higher rate than their peers in the rest of the Army. The fourth comparison group, RC chaplain and chaplain assistants versus all other RC leaders, had a higher mean favorable effectiveness score as well but it was not statistically significant (see tables 6 and 7). The research findings refute the null and the alternative hypotheses that a similar or lower percentage of chaplaincy leaders rate their immediate superiors effective at developing others in comparison to their Army peers. One must interpret these results with caution because the researcher used an estimated population of chaplains and chaplain assistants to calculate the sampling error. Also, the Army peer group scores fall within the chaplaincy groups sampling error range. What are some of the implications of these results?

First, one must keep in mind that chaplains and other officers who responded to the survey had a similar pool of immediate superiors. Put another way, non-chaplain officers rate chaplains and other branch officers. For example, in an infantry brigade, the brigade executive officer rates most of the primary staff officers to include an adjutant general officer, a signal officer, a medical officer, and a chaplain. The survey responses seem to show that chaplains and their raters have effective developmental relationships at higher rates than the officers with whom they work. This could indicate that chaplains believe that their non-chaplain superiors are contributing to their development. This result is significant given the challenges chaplains historically faced in units, as noted in the literature review contained in the full thesis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q122. How effective is your immediate superior at the following: Developing their subordinates?</th>
<th>Levene's test for equality of variances</th>
<th>t-test for equality of means</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chaplains v. Other Officers</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>15.189</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC and RC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants v. All Others</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>13.747</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants v. All Other AC</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>9.369</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants v. All Other RC</td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>4.511</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Independent samples t-tests of comparison groups
*Source:* Created by author.
*Note:* The gray shaded boxes indicate the row for which to read.
Second, the chaplaincy leader respondent groups were the only ones in the current study to meet or exceed the CAL researchers’ 67% minimal acceptable level for favorable responses (69.5%, 68.4%, 67.1%, and 69.5%; see table 3). Only 64% of the total 2015 CASAL respondent population rated their immediate superior effective at developing their subordinates. The results seem to demonstrate something positive in the superior to subordinate relationship for chaplaincy members as compared to officers and NCOs in other branches and MOSs.

Third, the three chaplaincy groups that included chaplain assistants also met or exceeded the 67% benchmark. Most of these chaplain assistants likely had chaplains as their immediate superiors. Therefore, one can cautiously posit that these ratings indicate that chaplain assistants perceive their chaplains as effective at developing them. This is a cautious conclusion because there were only 42 chaplain assistant respondents. Accordingly, the CAL researchers could not report their results separately.

The primary study findings have positive implications for leader development for chaplaincy members. However, the CASAL results do not reflect the chaplaincy respondents’ effectiveness ratings of chaplains serving as intermediate raters. Army leaders expect intermediate raters to provide coaching, mentoring, and feedback about chaplaincy-specific duties and responsibilities. The researcher was not able to directly confirm or refute Chaplain Hawkins’ assertion that chaplains serving as technical supervisors are equal to or worse than their Army peers at developing subordinates. Furthermore, when one considers the CASAL responses to the 14 specific actions superiors performed to develop their subordinates, it becomes clear that there is room for improvement.

**Secondary Study Findings**

The CAL researchers asked respondents to indicate what actions their immediate superior took to develop them over the previous 12 months. The CAL researchers based these 17 additional inquiries on Army leader development doctrine. Therefore, these findings indicate which doctrinal actions subordinates reported their superiors performing to develop them. CAL researchers only reported the responses to 14 of the action inquiries. The other three responses were: no development provided, not applicable, and other, which CAL researchers did not include in their final report. These descriptive results indicate there are some potentially vital gaps in leader development across the Army.
CAL researchers grouped the actions according to the fundamentals of leader development found in FM 6-22. The researcher for this project combined the chaplaincy leaders’ results with the CASAL results into a modified version of the CASAL table (see table 8). The researcher shaded items where fewer chaplaincy leaders indicated that their immediate superiors took an action than indicated by AC or RC CASAL respondents overall. The chaplaincy leaders reported lower perceptions of leader actions in the Enhancing Learning and Creating Opportunities categories. The AC chaplaincy responses were lower than the total AC responses in four of seven Enhancing Learning categories and two of three Creating Opportunities categories. The RC chaplaincy responses were lower than the total RC responses in three of the seven Enhancing Learning categories and one of the three Creating Opportunities categories. Non-chaplain raters may expect the chaplaincy technical supervision channel to carry out the tasks in these areas which could contribute to the lower scores in these two categories. If the technical supervisors are performing these duties but the respondent did not perceive that the technical supervisor was his or her immediate superior, then subordinates’ indications of developmental actions taken by their superiors may be lower than occurred. However, the numbers reported by chaplaincy respondents are not so far from their Army peers to believe that confusion over the immediate superior skewed the results.

One trend to notice in both the chaplaincy and the peer results is that leaders seem to take more interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setting Conditions for Development</th>
<th>Chaplaincy AC</th>
<th>Chaplaincy RC</th>
<th>CASAL AC</th>
<th>CASAL RC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Remained approachable for me to seek input and ask questions</td>
<td>73.2%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fostered a climate for development (e.g., allow learning from honest mistakes)</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Providing Feedback</th>
<th>Chaplaincy AC</th>
<th>Chaplaincy RC</th>
<th>CASAL AC</th>
<th>CASAL RC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Provided encouragement and/or praise</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Provided me with feedback on my performance (e.g., formal or informal counseling)</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enhancing Learning</th>
<th>Chaplaincy AC</th>
<th>Chaplaincy RC</th>
<th>CASAL AC</th>
<th>CASAL RC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5. Involved me in decision-making or planning process</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Shared experiences, lessons learned, or advice</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Encouraged or recommended continuing education (e.g., college courses)</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Provided training, teaching, coaching or skill development</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Provided mentoring to prepare me for future roles or assignments</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Authorized or allowed me to attend resident training or education</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Referred me to developmental resources (e.g., online courses, readings, study guides)</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creating Opportunities</th>
<th>Chaplaincy AC</th>
<th>Chaplaincy RC</th>
<th>CASAL AC</th>
<th>CASAL RC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. Delegated tasks to develop me</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Provided me with new opportunities to lead</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Created or called attention to challenging job assignments or opportunities</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Leader development actions taken by chaplaincy respondents’ immediate superiors versus CASAL totals. Source: Created by author. Note: The CASAL totals in the last two columns include chaplaincy leaders and warrant officers which are not represented in the “other leaders” used throughout this project. Adapted from, Ryan P. Riley et al., 2015 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Military Leader Findings, (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Leadership, July 29, 2016), 92, table 24.
in getting the job done in the present than preparing leaders for future assignments (see table 8). The researcher considered the action items under Setting Conditions for Development and Providing Feedback to be now-focused behaviors. The highest frequency reported across all cohorts for these actions was 81.7%. The lowest frequency reported across all cohorts for these actions was 44%. The researcher considered the action items under Enhancing Learning and Creating Opportunities to be future-focused behaviors. The highest frequency reported across all cohorts for these actions was 63.4%. The lowest frequency reported across all cohorts for these actions was 17.1%. The coaching and mentoring related behaviors top out in the low 60% range with several scores not reaching 30% (see items 8 and 9 in table 8). The difference in reported frequency of immediate superiors executing these actions seem to suggest an inconsistency with Army leader development doctrine.

Army leaders are responsible for developing their subordinates, yet over two-thirds of the survey respondents indicated that their leaders are not coaching or mentoring them. ADP 6-22 contains the assertion that it is not enough to accomplish the mission, leaders must also develop their subordinates for the long-term good of the organization. The CASAL results seem to indicate that Army leaders are falling short of this principle. Subordinates develop through mission accomplishment, but these results may reflect a lack of intentionality when it comes to preparing subordinates for the future.

The researcher chose to highlight four of the 14 action areas as an evaluation of the current perceived state of development for chaplaincy leaders. The full results are in Appendix A of the complete thesis. The first fundamental of Army leader development listed in FM 6-22 is that leaders set the conditions for leader development. Table 9 shows the actions AC and RC chaplains and other officers reported their leaders taking to develop them. Less than 52% of the chaplain respondents perceived that their immediate superior fostered a climate for learning. The chaplains reported the highest officer result in the vital area of counseling which was barely over 50%. Nearly 75% of chaplain respondents did not indicate that they received coaching or mentoring. These results are concerning even if one disregards coaching and mentoring, since some of the doctrine says these are optional. Counseling is mandatory and has a separate ATP governing its conduct. Raters are supposed to record proof of counseling yet only 50% of the chaplain respondents and less than 50% of the other officer respondents report that their raters counsel them. This indicates a failure to meet the standard established by Army leaders and opens the possibility that raters are falsely reporting completed counseling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the past 12 months, actions your immediate superior has taken to develop your leadership skills:</th>
<th>AC and RC Chaplains</th>
<th>All other Officers</th>
<th>2015 CASAL Totals AC</th>
<th>RC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fostered a climate for development (e.g. allowed learning from my honest mistakes)</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided me with feedback on my performance (e.g., Formal or informal counseling)</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided training, teaching, coaching, or skill development</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided mentoring to prepare me for future roles or assignments</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Actions taken to develop AC and RC chaplains and other officers.
Source: Created by author.
The results for AC and RC chaplains and chaplain assistants combined are a little better than the results for AC and RC chaplains. Active component chaplains and chaplain assistants reported that nearly 60% of their immediate superiors fostered a climate for development (see table 10). While this is still low for an activity that Army doctrine and policy makers consider critical, it indicates hope for the Army chaplaincy. AC and RC chaplains and chaplain assistants combined reported that their immediate superiors fostered a climate for development 3.7% points more frequently than of AC and RC chaplains combined. Most of the chaplain assistants likely had a chaplain as their immediate superior at the time of the survey. This result is the only indicator that may reflect what chaplains did to set the conditions to develop their subordinates. However, only about 25% of the chaplaincy respondents reported receiving coaching from their immediate superior and less than one third received mentoring for future roles and assignments (see tables 9, 10, and 11). These percentages reflect the importance of intermediate raters and technical supervisors being intentional about coaching and mentoring subordinate UMT members. Technical supervisors must also help non-chaplain supervisors coach and mentor the chaplaincy members.

Table 11 contains the percentage of reported actions that other AC and RC immediate superiors performed to develop their subordinates. Chaplains and chaplain assistants reported that their immediate superiors fostered a climate for development and provided feedback more frequently than did subordinate officers and NCOs from the other Army branches and MOSs. AC as well as AC and RC combined chaplains and chaplain assistants reported that their immediate superiors provided mentoring for future roles or assignments more frequently than their peers. However, the other Army leaders reported their im-

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**Table 10. Actions taken to develop AC and RC chaplains and chaplain assistants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>AC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</th>
<th>RC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</th>
<th>AC and RC Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants</th>
<th>2015 CASAL Totals AC</th>
<th>RC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fostered a climate for development (e.g., allowed learning from my honest mistakes)</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided me with feedback on my performance (e.g., Formal or informal counseling)</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided training, teaching, coaching, or skill development</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided mentoring to prepare me for future roles or assignments</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author.*
mediate superiors performing the action more frequently in the AC and RC chaplains versus other officers and AC chaplains and chaplain assistants versus all other officers and NCOs combined categories.

Just over 30% of RC chaplains and chaplain assistants reported that their immediate superiors provided mentoring to prepare them for future roles or assignments, the highest among the eight comparison groups. 70-75% of the respondents across all eight comparison groups perceived that their immediate superiors did not take future focused actions to develop them. Over two-thirds of the respondents also believed that their superiors did not perform actions aimed at teaching, coaching, and training them in new skills. This is a grim assessment given that ADP 6-22 contains the assertion, “Military leadership is unique because the Armed Forces grow their own leaders from the lowest to highest levels.”31 Subordinates seem to rate their Army immediate superiors low in this unique duty.

**Interpretation of Findings**

Army Chaplain Corps leaders reported more favorable perceptions of their immediate superior’s effectiveness at developing them than their peers. They also indicated that their superiors performed more now-centric actions to set the conditions for development and provide feedback than did other Army leaders. Chaplaincy leaders perceived that their superiors did not take as many future-directed actions related to enhancing learning and creating opportunities (see table 8). These results may indicate that leaders sacrificed development in favor of accomplishing the mission. Again, leader development and mission accomplishment do not have to be competing efforts according to ADP 6-22.32 An item of interest to some leaders who read the CASAL report from year to year is that about half of the respondents indicate they do not receive formal or informal feedback from their raters. Part of the reason for the low perceptions of informal counseling might be a lack of understanding on the part of the subordinate leader.

![Table 11. Actions taken to develop other AC and RC leaders](source: Created by author.)

Figure 4 lists ways to enable learning through formal, semiformal, and informal activities. CAL researchers combined the inquiry about formal and informal counseling on the CASAL. All the uniformed CASAL respondents are NCOs, warrant officers, and officers. This audience should understand formal and informal feedback because this is the audience who employs these mechanisms to develop others. The person-to-person contacts considered...
informal counseling cover a wide range of activities that happen naturally and on a frequent basis. Superiors use informal feedback to enhance formal counseling. Informal counseling includes informal conversation between superior and subordinate. There is an adage popular among some Army leaders which declares that all conversations about work, family, and future are counseling. The adage may be an overstatement. It is more accurate to say that all conversations are informal counseling based on the examples of informal feedback in ADRP 6-22 (see figure 4). The advice and guidance line of the table includes counseling in the formal block, mentoring and coaching in the semiformal block, and indirect questioning in the informal block. It is hard to imagine a direct supervisor not asking an indirect question of a subordinate leader for twelve months.

The researcher for this project offers three implications here. First, chaplaincy and Army leaders should perform more future-oriented development actions if they want to live up to the expectations set forth in Army doctrine and regulations. The CASAL responses grouped under the enhancing learning and creating opportunities fundamentals of leader development are the lowest of the survey. Less than one-third of the chaplaincy respondents perceived that their superiors provide coaching or mentoring-related activities (see table 8).

Second, intermediate raters and technical channel supervisors must assist raters to develop ways to better enhance learning and create opportunities for chaplaincy leaders. Chaplaincy leaders, especially in the active component, perceived that their raters remained approachable and provided encouragement at higher rates than their peers. However, this did not translate into higher perceptions of feedback and future-focused activities such as coaching and mentoring. In the researcher’s experience one reason for this is that non-chaplain raters and senior raters expect the intermediate rater to do these tasks. The rater and the intermediate rater should teach, coach, and mentor the rated leader as a team. The raters must also make sure that the rated leader understands that the chain of command and the technical supervisor are working together to facilitate his or her development. The intermediate rater can pass some of his or her ob-

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**Figure 4. Enablers for learning**

servations to the rater so that the chaplain perceives the rater as a vital part of his or her development as a chaplain and an officer.

Third, Chaplain Corps leaders must leverage opportunities to improve in the institutional and self-development training domains to make up for the gap in practice that exists in the operational training domain. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists do not have the same opportunities as their peers to rate Soldiers and leaders. Most chaplains will directly supervise one religious affairs specialist throughout most of their careers. This religious affairs specialist may or may not be an NCO. Religious affairs specialists can go an entire career without rating an NCO. Therefore, chaplaincy leaders may benefit from deliberate efforts by the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School to teach the formal leader development tools and processes. The leaders then exercise initiative by putting these tools into practice in creative ways in their units. Chaplaincy leaders can also learn from other leaders in their units, read about leader development on their own, and enroll in courses and training designed to improve their supervisory skills.

Leader development for chaplaincy leaders must improve no matter what avenue chaplaincy leaders take to do it. The Chaplain Corps respondents seem to have an overall more favorable perception of the developmental environments in which they serve. However, their reports of actions taken to develop them fall well short of expectations in many areas. Chaplaincy participants indicated that 50% or less of their immediate superiors performed counseling, coaching, and mentoring. The chaplaincy's leader development deficit reflects the deficit in the rest of the Army.

This study did result in some unexpected findings. First, the researcher did not expect chaplains and religious affairs specialist to have more favorable perceptions of their leader development than their peers. Chaplains do not have the same experience in leader development as their peers in Army basic branches, so the researcher expected the chaplaincy leaders’ perceptions to be less favorable. Second, the low perceptions of informal feedback surprised the researcher. Nearly any form of interaction can be informal feedback, so the researcher expected most leaders to believe they received this level of feedback. Finally, the low perceptions of future-focused developmental actions such as coaching and mentoring surprised the researcher. Admittedly, the surprise diminished some when the researcher discovered the inconsistent definitions and emphases placed on coaching and mentoring in Army doctrine. Army leaders expect Soldiers to either move up in rank or move out of service. If Army leaders are not preparing their subordinates to progress to higher levels of the organization, those leaders are failing those whom they lead. The next subsection contains a few low-cost, low-turbulence recommendations for improving leader development for Chaplain Corps leaders.

**Recommendations**

The researcher used some of the tools from FM 6-22, *Leader Development*, Chapter Seven, “Learning and Development Activities,” to form the recommendations presented here. The researcher considered the information gleaned from the literature review and the analysis of the CASAL results using the evaluation model from FM 6-22 (see table 12). The researcher determined that chaplaincy leaders need to engage in all three developmental activities (feedback, study, and practice) to improve leader development for Chaplain Corps Soldiers. Furthermore, the researcher concluded that practice is the most important developmental activity for chaplains and religious affairs specialists. The researcher then used suggestions for implementing the developmental activities contained in table 13 to form the recommendations that follow. The first set of recommendations are ideas for actions to improve leader development for the chaplaincy and its leaders through feedback, study, and practice. The second set of recommendations address unanswered questions and suggestions for further study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If...</th>
<th>Then...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I need more insight into how well I am demonstrating a competency or component and what I can do to improve...</td>
<td>I should seek Feedback. Feedback is an opportunity to gain information about how well you are doing. Feedback can include direct feedback, personal observations, analysis of response patterns, and acknowledgment of outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I need to gain or expand my understanding of theory, principles, or knowledge of a leader competency or component...</td>
<td>I should Study. Study facilitates an intellectual understanding of the topic. Study can include attending training courses, reading, watching movies, observing others on duty, and analyzing various sources of information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I need more experience to build or enhance my capability through opportunities to perform a leader competency or component...</td>
<td>I should Practice. Practice provides activities to convert personal learning into action. Practice includes engaging in physical exercises, team activities, rehearsals, and drills.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Evaluation model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developmental Step</th>
<th>Options to take</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
<td>Ask for feedback...</td>
<td>From others about how you are doing with specific issues and areas of performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gain support...</td>
<td>From peers, colleagues, friends, or other people who can provide encouragement or recognize success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consult...</td>
<td>With friends, supervisors, peers, subordinates, coaches, mentors, or other professionals to give advice on strengths or areas of concern.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observe...</td>
<td>Other leaders, professionals, and similar organizations. Note the most or least effective behaviors, attributes, and attitudes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make time to reflect on...</td>
<td>Personal or situational characteristics that relate to the strength or need. Consider alternative perspectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Read...</td>
<td>Books, articles, manuals, and professional publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investigate...</td>
<td>A topic through internet or library searches, gathering or asking questions, and soliciting information and materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>Practice...</td>
<td>A skill or behavior that needs improvement in a work situation or away from the unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participate in training...</td>
<td>Including Army schools, unit training programs, outside seminars, degree programs, and professional certifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teach...</td>
<td>A skill you are learning to someone else.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accept an opportunity...</td>
<td>That stretches personal abilities, such as giving presentations, teaching classes, volunteering for special duty assignments, position cross-training, and representing the unit at meetings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explore off-duty events...</td>
<td>Such as leading community groups, trying a new skill in a volunteer organization, or presenting to schools and civic organizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Methods to implement developmental activities
Recommendations for Action

Figure 5 is an operational approach to improving leader development for members of the Chaplain Corps. The 2015 CASAL results represent the current state of leader development. The desired end state represents increasingly favorable results about leader effectiveness and developmental actions reported on future CASALs or feedback from other sources. The arrows between the current state and end state are the three developmental activities which serve as lines of effort. The practice line has a double arrow head indicating that it is the main effort. Acting to improve leader development begins with gathering appropriate feedback. This line is second here because existing feedback tools such as the CASAL, published books, and research projects provide enough general input for leaders to assess the situation, define the problem, and take steps to achieve the desired end state. The study line of effort is the foundation that holds up the other two rather than third in priority. All four study actions involve the self-development domain reflecting the importance of individual initiative in making any improvements.

The numbers inside the arrows correspond to the actions in the box below the graphic. The researcher attempted to present the actions in a recommended order of priority by considering the potential payoff, ease of implementation, and speed in which the action could begin. Each line of actions starts with a number one signifying that these efforts are concurrent rather than consecutive. At the end of each action are the training domains, by precedent, in which these actions would likely occur. The results of the current study indicate that the practice line of effort is the one that needs the most improvement.

Practice is the main line of effort in the researcher’s recommended operational approach. This line contains actions taken to improve skill and comfort in developing subordinates. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists can practice leader development competencies in all three training domains.

Actions one and two under practice in figure 5 relate to formal counseling. Chaplains who rate a religious affairs specialist whose rank is private or specialist do not use...
the noncommissioned officer evaluation report (NCOER) support form to conduct initial and quarterly counseling. These chaplains use a developmental counseling form to capture the monthly developmental notes for lower enlisted Soldiers. The developmental counseling form does not have the same structure as the NCOER support form. However, there is nothing that says the rater cannot use the NCOER support form as a counseling vehicle for non-NCO religious affairs specialists. The NCOER support form has blocks that ensure that raters address duty description, performance goals and expectations, and develop performance objectives in accordance with the Army leader requirements model attributes and competencies. Religious affairs specialist NCOs can produce support forms for the chaplaincy Soldiers for whom they provide technical supervision. Such action will help the lower enlisted Soldiers better understand the NCOER when they become sergeants and must help an inexperienced chaplain understand the evaluation process.

Supervisory chaplains serving as intermediate raters can use the officer evaluation report (OER) support form to counsel their subordinate chaplains. Intermediate raters do not have to conduct periodic formal counseling in accordance with AR 623-3. However, if chaplain intermediate raters do not practice formal counseling skills as an intermediate rater, the chaplain may be a lieutenant colonel the first time he or she has a formal counseling session with an officer. Therefore, intermediate raters can gain experience by counseling the chaplains they supervise using an OER support form.

Using formal counseling helps in several ways. First, the rater can gain valuable experience with the Army counseling process and can share this experience with the UMTs he or she supervises. Second, using a formal counseling tool conveys that the supervisor cares about the development of the rated chaplain. Third, the formal counseling tool is a record that the intermediate rater’s supervisor can use to teach, coach, and mentor that chaplain. Using NCOER and OER support forms voluntarily takes initiative and possibly some extra time. However, these are ways for chaplains and religious affairs specials-
chance to earn certifications in several different curricula designed to promote individual and interpersonal growth. Many of these courses are internationally known, thoroughly researched, and have proven effective over decades. Participating in the training for trainers for these programs enhances the chaplaincy leader’s ability to interact with and develop others.

Education is an important component for developing chaplaincy leaders. Chaplain Corps members need to keep up with their officer and noncommissioned officer education system courses as well. These courses help equip Army leaders to perform their duties at their current and higher levels. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists sometimes neglect these schools because they do not want to take time away from their units. However, it helps the unit more to have everyone fully qualified in their duty position. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists can also enroll in continuing education programs. Whether degree programs, professional certifications, or seminars, chaplaincy leaders can use these opportunities to improve their ability to develop themselves and others.

Finally, the installation chapel program is a great place for chaplains and religious affairs specialists to improve their leadership skills. Volunteers make-up an important part of the staff in chapel services and programs. Leading these volunteers can help chaplaincy leaders hone the personal power and influence that they exhibit in their units.

Feedback comes from multiple sources and methods. Leaders and subordinates use feedback to guide self-development efforts. In this case self-development pertains to the entire chaplaincy. Many of the actions in the feedback line of effort reflect the recommendations for further study previously presented in this chapter. The key takeaway is that collecting feedback continuously will allow Chaplain Corps leaders to refine their understanding of the state of leader development and their definition of any related problems. All the suggested actions for gaining feedback can be little-to-no-cost options for the Chaplain Corps, including commissioning an outside agency to conduct an assessment because the Army Research Institute could potentially fund such a study. There are many ways to increase the quality and specificity of feedback that can help improve leader development for chaplains and religious affairs specialists.

Study is the process through which individuals and teams learn more about a behavior. In the current case, study applies to the effort to learn more about developing others. The study line of effort also contains easily implemented actions. Three of the four suggested actions in this section are primarily or exclusively in the self-development training domain. Whether or not a leader is successful at developing subordinates largely depends on the effort given by the individual. Self-assessment and self-study are valuable tools for improving one’s performance in any area. Army organizations have produced regulations, doctrine, tools, and guides intended to enhance leader development. The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and CAL provide resources and links to many of these tools on their websites. The Army tools are consistent with the leadership and leader development theories used in the business, education, and religious sectors. Leaders may need assistance finding some of these tools but after that it is up to the individual to take advantage of the available information.

The study line of effort includes observation (see table 13). Chaplaincy leaders can observe other officers and NCOs in the unit as they counsel and evaluate their subordinates. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists can also ask more experienced leaders to look over their sup-
port forms and evaluation forms. UMT members can even ask other members of the unit to observe them as they conduct formal or informal counseling. These actions are within the scope of a rater’s duties and responsibilities. Finally, individual leaders can begin their own study of the available leadership and leader development literature from other professional sectors.

The actions to improve leader development presented in this section serve as broad suggestions for reaching the desired end state. The researcher’s goal was to provide some little-or-no-cost options that individuals and unit leaders can implement quickly. The current project was more about framing the problem than finding solutions. However, ideas for solutions naturally develop as one better understands the problem. Future research will develop more feedback allowing Chaplain Corps leaders to implement the developmental activities necessary to improve leader development for their subordinates.

**Recommendations for Further Study**

One of the most important actions leaders can take to improve subordinate development for chaplaincy members is continuing to ask questions to refine understanding. The methodology used for this study did not answer some fundamental questions related to analyzing chaplaincy leader development. The obvious question is how do chaplaincy leaders perceive their technical channel supervisor’s actions to develop them? The CASAL collected data about the respondent’s perceptions of his or her immediate superior’s effectiveness and actions. Most of the chaplains who responded to the survey likely had non-chaplain raters. The religious affairs specialists likely had chaplain raters, but the survey did not capture the actions that supervisory religious affairs specialists took to develop those they technically supervise.

Another question that comes from this study is, would subordinate leaders’ perceptions of their supervisors’ actions to develop them improve if technical channel supervisors helped the non-chaplain raters understand the chaplaincy? Some raters do not know how to properly counsel and evaluate chaplaincy members. There are not a lot of opportunities for the non-chaplain officers to practice what they learn in the operational domain. The non-chaplain officers who rate chaplains may only get one chance in their careers to rate a chaplain. The result is that these non-chaplain raters expect the intermediate rater to perform some of the chaplain-specific developmental actions. The rater and intermediate rater should share responsibility for the direct development of the rated officer. Some of this sharing should include the intermediate rater facilitating the non-chaplain rater’s ability to observe and evaluate chaplain-specific skills so that the rater can give feedback directly to the chaplain. The rater should evaluate and give feedback on chaplain-specific tasks, including leading worship, in accordance with appendix C of AR 623-3. Rated chaplains need to know that their raters take interest in their development as an officer and a religious leader. The rater and intermediate rater should explain the sharing relationship with the rated officer to enhance his or her understanding. These questions lead into the researcher’s recommendations for further study.

Future researchers may want to conduct a study that looks at rated chaplains’ perceptions of their chaplain-branch rater or intermediate raters’ effectiveness and actions to develop them. The same study could also ask NCO respondents to share their perceptions of their technical channel religious affairs specialists’ effectiveness and actions to develop them as chaplaincy leaders. These inquiries would assess leader development inside the Chaplain Corps. A future research design could use a mixed-methods approach like the CASAL instead of the quantitative approach taken in the current study. Future researchers would have to create an original instrument to capture the data described here. A follow-on study could also include a series of semi-structured interviews to capture nuanced input about their perceptions. These interviews could give the respondents a forum for offering their ideas about improving leader development in the Chaplain Corps. Future researchers could design their study protocol to increase the chance of capturing a representative cross-section of chaplaincy members by rank, race, sex, endorsing body, and type of unit in which they serve.
There is one caution for future research about the perceptions of leader development effectiveness for chaplaincy members. There is a belief that chaplains tend to rate people higher on surveys because of their pastoral nature and not wanting to be the bad person. This observation is anecdotal rather than scientific, however results from this study seem to suggest it is possible. All four chaplaincy groups had higher mean favorable perceptions of their immediate superior’s effectiveness in developing them. Furthermore, the percentage of favorable responses exceeded the CASAL 67% benchmark in all four chaplaincy groups. However, their responses about their immediate superior’s actions taken to develop subordinates were like those of their non-chaplaincy peers. The four isolated areas involving climate, feedback, coaching, and mentoring were all near 50% or lower across all groups. Chaplain Corps leaders rated their immediate superiors more favorably, but their immediate superiors do not appear to have done anything differently to develop them than did the immediate superiors of the non-chaplaincy respondents. Future researchers will want to keep the possibility of bias in mind and try to find ways to mitigate it if possible.

Conclusions

The researcher addressed the need for empirical evidence about development for Army Chaplain Corps leaders by conducting a quantitative analysis of the perceived effectiveness of an immediate superior’s efforts to develop chaplaincy members. The purpose of this project was to confirm or refute the assertion that any leader development deficit in the Army extended to the Chaplain Corps. The researcher did this by analyzing the 2015 CASAL responses to the question, “How effective is your immediate superior at the following: Developing their subordinates?” The researcher asked CAL to provide results for the groups contained in table 3. The author compared the Chaplain Corps members’ positive responses with their peer groups’ positive responses to see if there was a statistically significant difference in the responses of the comparison groups using the IBP SPSS program to analyze and compare the mean positive responses. All four chaplaincy comparison groups had higher mean favorable perceptions of their immediate superiors’ effectiveness at developing others than their Army peers (see table 7). The IBM SPSS analysis results showed that three of the four groups had statistically significant higher mean positive perceptions. Statistical significance indicates that the change in positive perception is likely due to the respondent’s branch or MOS rather than a result of chance.

The researcher also analyzed the yes or no responses to the 14 supporting inquiries as to respondents’ perception.
of specific actions immediate superiors took to develop their subordinates (see tables 8-11). Chaplaincy leaders had higher overall perceptions than their peers of their immediate superiors’ specific actions taken to develop subordinates. However, the perceptions captured in these tables also indicate that Army leaders are not meeting the regulatory, doctrinal, and implied expectations for developing subordinates. Chaplaincy leaders and their Army peers reported actions taken by superiors to develop subordinates were low in similar categories.

The researcher draws five primary conclusions from this study. First, chaplains and religious affairs specialists perceive their raters as effective at developing them at a higher rate than their peers. This more favorable perception may indicate that leaders rating chaplains and religious affairs specialists understand the differences between the experience levels of these members and are making efforts to adjust their leadership styles accordingly. Second, the more favorable perception of development seems to be reflected in the chaplains’ and religious affairs specialists’ perceptions of their immediate superior’s actions taken to set conditions for development and providing feedback. Third, the results do indicate a possible leader development deficit for members of the Army Chaplain Corps when it comes to future-focused actions related to coaching, mentoring, and continuing education. The deficit in future-oriented learning and guidance may be more harmful for chaplaincy leaders because they do not get the same opportunities to practice and hone their skills as their peers in the rest of the Army. However, intermediate raters should be providing this for chaplains. This area may be one where raters and intermediate raters need to increase collaboration with each other. Fourth, the Army has sufficient doctrine, regulations, and training in place to improve leader development. The challenge is leaders and individuals prioritizing the practice of leader development skills in all three training domains. Fifth, chaplaincy leaders must take responsibility to improve themselves in the self-development training domain. Chaplain Corps leaders can assist chaplains and religious affairs specialists by incorporating leader development opportunities in the institutional training domain.

Leader development is a top priority for the Army. Though chaplains and religious affairs specialists do not fill many formal leadership roles over the course of their Army careers, chaplaincy Soldiers fill informal leadership roles in nearly every unit they serve. Intentional leader development is more vital for Chaplain Corps members because they do not get the same opportunities for practice as their peers. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists can begin implementing solutions to the problems identified during this study right away. The vital traits and behaviors necessary to solve the problem are initiative and leadership.

Chaplain (MAJ) John Scott

Chaplain (MAJ) John E. Scott, M.Div., MMAS
Assistant Division Chaplain, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX

Chaplain Scott assumed his duties as the Assistant Division Chaplain for the 1st Armored Division in July 2018. In his most recent previous assignment CH Scott was a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College. Prior to that, Chaplain Scott served as the Brigade Chaplain for the 3d US Infantry Regiment “The Old Guard.” In that role with The Old Guard Chaplain, CH Scott supervised battalion UMTs and participated in numerous high-profile ceremonies to include the 58th Presidential Inauguration in January 2017.
NOTES

8 Ibid., 73. In a footnote Hawkins added “This author’s informal poll of over twenty supervisory chaplains corresponds with a widespread acknowledgment that, on whole, chaplains lag even further behind most officers in regard to their education, training, and experience regarding leadership, in general, and leader development, in specific. This is completely understandable given a chaplain’s direct commissioning process, combined with the regulatory prohibition which prevents chaplains from commanding. Leadership development opportunities for chaplains are not congruent with other officers.”
11 Riley et al., 2015 CASAL, 89.
12 Ibid., 89.
13 Ibid., 5.
14 Ibid., 89.
15 Ibid., 92.
16 Riley et al., 2015 CASAL.
17 Ibid., 1.
18 Ibid., 2.
19 Ibid., 1.
20 Creswell and Creswell, Research Design, 158.
23 Riley et al., 5.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 89.
29 ATP 6-22.1
31 HQDA, ADP 6-22, 9.
32 HQDA, ADP 6-22, 1.
34 Ibid., 7–12.
35 HQDA, FM 6-22, 7–2.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
Spiritual Imprinting in Healing

by Chaplain (CPT) Christopher Salerno

Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany receives and cares for wounded, sick, and injured Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines serving throughout the Eastern Hemisphere. Every wounded warrior is greeted by a military chaplain when they arrive at the hospital. Chaplain (Colonel) Karen Meeker, Chief of the Clinical Pastoral Division at LRMC, describes the encounter as “imprinting,” where a bond is formed in the critical moment a wounded warrior arrives at the hospital. When this bond forms it creates a “micro-community” for the wounded warrior during the brief time he or she spends at the hospital before the flight to the United States for further treatment. If the opportunity is available and the wounded so choose, they can begin to process in a sacred, confidential setting. To quote Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “there is meaning in every journey that is unknown to the traveler.” We as chaplains seek to sojourn with the men and women of our country to help them heal the inner wounds of the soul while medical personnel treat the physical injuries. What follows is a process we have observed and now call imprinting.

When battle injuries or critical care patients arrive on the hill at Landstuhl, they are met before they enter the hospital by a chaplain who customarily calls out to them by their first name, “Welcome to Landstuhl Joe/Jane, you made it!” This affirmation is followed-up by an offer to visit with them later, as staff transfers them into the hospital. Regardless of their condition, the chaplain endeavors to minister to these patients in that brief but poignant moment of arrival. The patient has often travelled with pain, and dealt with the discomfort of being stripped, probed, and stuck. Some may have even seen battle buddies wounded or killed. A chaplain’s unflinching look, words of consolation, or in some cases reassuring touch, is generally
received as a welcome reprieve from the emotional distress aggravated by medical interventions which often require a certain impersonal brutality. In this regard, multiple senses can be impacted in the moment of imprinting – sight, sound, and touch, dependent on the situation.

Along these lines, chaplains can be received as a representative manifestation of God’s presence. The “power of human connection” may be a significant component in a Soldier’s recovery.4 The initial intent is to help sustain the wounded warrior in a time of emotional chaos and physical calamity, and to be a reminder that God has not forsaken them in their hour of need. In cases where chaplains have in some manner reflected the image of God, patients tend to convey feelings of relief. One battle injured patient upon meeting a chaplain at arrival exclaimed, “God has not abandoned me after all.” Colonel Michael Elliott, Chief of Staff, Regional Health Command Europe added, “I witnessed the healing power of this special moment for both our wounded Soldiers and all of those who were standing by, privileged to care for them.”5

The follow-up visit is essential assuming the patient consents. It is typically six to eight hours later and delivers on an earlier promise reinforcing the original imprint. Patients sedated at arrival will have become more lucid, and the preliminary procedures will often have taken place. Given acceptance of an in-room visit, a silent moment of acknowledgment of all that has taken place is regularly shared as the chaplain endeavors to provide a safe, non-anxious presence. Following guidance with emotional-debriefing, patients are usually open to prayer, particularly if there is an impending surgical procedure. LRMC Anesthesiologist Rajni Patel MD, affirms the efficacy of a holistic approach to care. “Medicines can cure, but a good doctor and a chaplain’s words of inspiration can give the patient strength to fight from within.”6 This vital time of patient acceptance is enhanced by empathetic listening, staff collaboration, and intercessory prayer which reinforces the imprint made earlier.

Ideally the same chaplain will continue with the patient for the third visit and further strengthen the relationship. But depending on scheduling, another staff member may have the opportunity for visitation prepared with a SOAP Note7 understanding of the plan of care. By this stage, the expectation is that a level of trust has developed to allow for spiritual healing to begin if the individual is grappling with anger, guilt, despair, or issues of theodicy. Whether it calls for a time of commiserating, listening to feelings being sorted through, or exhorting those longing for a reminder to be strong, it is here that patient-centered pastoral care is most robust. The norm is for patients to yearn for a chaplain who is compassionate toward their plight, while confident in the goodness of God to see them through their circumstances. Depending on the patients’ faith tradition, s/he may be open to a reading from Scripture, a deeper time of prayer, or communion if from a sacramental background.

Most patients who arrive at the hilltop at LRMC experience a relatively short visit. Those stabilized and recuperating, are quickly scheduled for transfer stateside. The ensuing plan is usually for specialized treatment at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Brooke Army Medical Center, other military treatment facilities, or a Veterans Administration Healthcare facility. At this time, the final touch can solidify the rapport between patient and chaplain; it may take place at the ICU, on the ramp of a U.S. Air Force C17 Globemaster III Aircraft before a medical evacuation flight, or somewhere in between. The basic premise of the pattern punctuated by the farewell is to further comfort the afflicted, recognize them for their sacrifice on behalf of country, and validate them as image-bearers of God, worthy of dignity and hope.

While the imprinting sequence is not a constant, the purpose is to facilitate spiritual healing as do similar paradigms that focus on continuity of care. We view the imprinting approach as a best practice and what a “ministry of presence” should look like in our setting. Consistent with Seward Hiltner’s classic “Principles of Pastoral Counseling,” our prayer is to encourage an intentional ministry to those dealing with the effects of combat.8 When effective pastoral ministry is received, it can include patients working through absolution from transgression, issues of
redemption, and reconciliation with God or others.

While this approach in no way claims to mend all the complexities of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, psychosocial issues, or physical maladies that our wounded warriors have endured, the chaplain is well-equipped to answer the existential questions of life and assist in helping patients come to terms with their trials. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, we work in conjunction with other medical, behavioral health professionals, and down range or stateside chaplains to augment the healing process. In that vein, Army Reserve Chaplain Donald Smith, who interned at LRMC while working toward an MSW, recounted the healing hand of God in a therapeutic sense: “Those open to spiritual support often leave the hospital expressing gratitude for the care rendered, are more resilient toward their challenges, and feel optimistic about the journey ahead.”

When we as chaplains witness pastoral and therapeutic outcomes such as described above, we are grateful to have the opportunity to play a role in serving alongside medical staff in seeking to nurture the living, care for the afflicted, and in binding the wounds of war.

“The views expressed in this review are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.”

Chaplain (CPT) Christopher Salerno
Family Life Chaplain
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CH Salerno, BCC was mobilized to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany in 2017-2018, as a Clinical Chaplain assigned to the Deployed Wounded Warriors Medical Management Center, in support of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Previously CH Salerno completed a one-year Clinical Pastoral Education residency at the James A. Haley Veterans’ Hospital in Tampa, Florida and currently provides non-denominational pastoral care for Cornerstone Hospice and Palliative Care, The Villages, FL in his civilian career. He is also a Doctor of Ministry candidate at Knox Theological Seminary, Fort Lauderdale, FL.

NOTES

1 Hennessy, Karen, RN, A Legacy of Lessons Learned: Landstuhl Regional Medical Center During Wartime, 2001-2014, (Borden Institute, Fort Sam Houston, 2016) p. 147.
2 Imprinting defined as “phase sensitive learning” in animals that starts at a critical time and is rapid (Wiki). Spiritual imprinting starts at a “chairos” moment (arrival to LRMC) and is a rapid phase sensitive healing (Meeker).
* Disclaimer: Spiritual Imprinting is not intended to imitate biological or behaviorist theory in approach, but seeks to glorify God in pastoral care as image-bearers of God consistent with Colossians 3:10.
4 Hennessy, p. 149
5 Elliott, M.A. Colonel, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff, Regional Health Command Europe, and former LRMC Troop Commander 2010-2012, Interview
6 Patel, R. MD, Colonel, Retired, U. S. Army, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, Interview
7 SOAP Note is an acronym for: Subjective, Objective, Assessment, and Plan in documenting patient visitation. (https://www.physio-pedia.com/SOAP_Notes) Accessed: 2 MAY 2018
8 Hiltner, Seward, Pastoral Counseling (Abingdon, Nashville, 1949)
Religious Support Teams

A Key Contributor to Readiness

By SGM James Edward Morris

Introduction

The Army devotes a plethora of resources and budget allocations toward readiness. Chief of Staff of the Army General Mark A. Milley said, “The readiness of the Total Army is his number one priority.” (Hale, 2016) Although readiness is the Army’s top priority, one of the Army’s greatest combat multipliers and contributors to ensuring the readiness of countless Soldiers, Civilians, and Family members sits underutilized, and housed behind a figurative glass door waiting only to engage emergency situations. A Chaplain and Religious Affairs Specialist (formally known as Chaplain Assistant) form one of the Commander’s best readiness tools, the Religious Support Team (RST). This paper will examine the underutilization of the RST and the need for educating leaders on the RST’s role in religious support, the RST transformation, and the uninhibited employment efforts toward effectively sustaining the Army’s readiness goals against internal and external religious impacts at the individual unit level.
Background

Since 29 July 1775 and as a part of the Commander’s religious support program, Religious Support Teams have played a pivotal role in military operations by providing equitable support for religious, moral, and ethical activities to all personnel in their commands (Army Regulation 165-1 (AR 165-1), 2015, p. 1). Unfortunately, leaders at the Brigade and Battalion levels sometimes have underutilized this asset and cultivated a command climate that has only seen the RST capabilities in the form of relationship enhancement programs and suicide prevention training. Ask most leaders, “What does a RST do for your unit,” and many will say, “taking care of my Soldiers.” Yet, the commander’s measures of effectiveness for their RST are either nonexistent or antiquated. As a ploy to energize unit awareness, most emergency generated Army programs mark chaplains as the number one or two person to see to get help. Uniquely enough, RSTs present to their command teams a religious support plan based off a unit needs assessment, and to the RST’s shock, most commanders will say, “sorry chaplain, we don’t have enough appropriated funds to accomplish this program.” Lastly, as viewed from a pluralistic point of view, leaders have found the chaplain’s religious leader title to be offensive to non-religious personnel. As such, leaders lessen their stance and resource allocations in support of religious support activities to lower the risk of anti-religious sentiments within the command.

Problem

The Army profession has seen a plethora of changes in the last ten years. Leaders must effectively target readiness degraders, root causes to high risk behaviors, and impart protective factors to ensure command climate control to sustain a high level of unit readiness. As the Army implements methods of assuring readiness, religious support remains to be a weapon unused effectively due to leader unawareness of the Religious Support Team (RST) capabilities as personal staff advisers and combat multipliers. This omission of effective employment of the RST leaves gaping holes in the foundation of readiness, and increases the negative impacts on the Army profession at all levels.

Discussion

The following are four areas of consideration when employing an effective religious support team that enhances readiness within the Army.

#1 Educating the Leaders: Commanders and leaders must trust and have confidence in their advisors. On the foundation of trust, a chaplain constructs the pillars of professional competence, character, and confidentiality with his or her commander. To solidify that trust, Commanders must be well informed of the full capabilities of their chaplain. In like manner, the chaplain, command sergeant major (CSM) and other leaders must be aware of the holistic capabilities of their RST. Scheduling Leader Professional Development for leaders at the brigade, battalion, and company levels regarding the capability of the RST will have the same results as becoming familiar with the
instruction manual of a newly fielded piece of equipment.

Leaders should become familiar with the RSTs’ two corps capabilities: provide religious support and advise commanders on the impact of religion. Religious support is applicable to three core competencies: nurture the living, care for the wounded, and honor the fallen. Religious advisement’s two focus areas regard religious impacts internal and external to the unit. The RST enables readiness growth by conducting programmed events meant to train the force, empowering people to endure forthcoming hardships, and encouraging those who experience loss. Intentionally, the RST engages one-on-one with Soldiers, Family members and Civilians daily, building trust that results in present and future positive outcomes.

Employing the RST with funding resources enhances the overall religious support impact. Unfortunately, leaders are sometimes apprehensive when allocating appropriated funds to conduct religious support activities. “Appropriated funds are authorized for command-sponsored religious support activities, including, but not limited to, religious education, retreats, camps, conference, meetings, workshops, and Family support programs.” (Army Regulation 165-1 (AR 165-1), 2015, p. 37)

Consequently, leaders at all levels have the latitude to utilize mission funding to maintain readiness and resilience of the Army Family structure. Training Commanders, resource managers, and contracting comptrollers will vanquish doubt regarding the utilization of appropriated funds that undergirds a successful religious support program and makes it better.

#2 RST Transformation: The Army transformed the RST naming convention for the enlisted member of the team, from Chaplain Assistant to Religious Affairs Specialist/Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) with an effective date of 1 October 2017. The Religious Affairs Specialist/NCO adds a few new capabilities to the RST: integrate religious operations, spiritual fitness, and basic human interaction tasks. In the past, chaplain assistants functioned solely within the team construct, but the experience of two wars across fifteen years has shown that the 56M must be able to integrate religious support operations apart from or in concert with the chaplain as mission dictates. As such, the Religious Affairs Specialist/NCO plans, prepares, integrates, and assesses religious support operations in concert with staff planning, programming, and performance to achieve mission success. The 56M must be familiar with all beliefs and practices of certain “religious” groups. Awareness of these religious groups helps facilitate understanding of Soldier needs, which fosters spiritual readiness of the unit when advising leaders on religious accommodations. Spiritual readiness promotes a sense of identity and purpose while anchoring an individual on core beliefs and values through spiritual practices. The Religious Affairs Specialist, when employed properly, will serve as the enlisted subject matter expert (SME) for the execution of religious support operations and Soldier crisis management. Due to future projections, operational environments (OE) will present complexities where enemy threats may hide among people in complex terrain to thwart the Army’s conventional combat overmatch (Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-7 (TRADOC 525-3-7), 2014, p. 7). The Army postured Religious Affairs
Specialist/NCO with the skill sets to conduct religious area analysis and religious impact assessment that could unveil positive or negative influences on mission outcomes. 56M contributions aid in the development of RST running estimates embedded in the staff mission analysis during the military decision-making process (MDMP) that could potentially save the lives of Soldiers and help prevent military miscues that could have negative strategic implications.

#3 Countering Internal Impacts to Readiness: The religious support team has a secret weapon many are aware of, but few capitalize on. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists/NCOs serve as the command pulse meter through the capability of confidentiality that reveals the potential for internal impacts to readiness. Although commanders and leaders are unable to gain full view of individual service member issues, they can receive the information associated with analysis from source assessments conducted by the RST. These source assessments serve like a cardiograph or heart monitor of the unit. RSTs can assess the unit based off personal observations, counseling frequency and topics, religious service attendance, work/living space walk throughs, discussions with leaders and medical and human resource reports. This type of analysis, coupled with other special staff input, could help target high risk behavior, reduce the degradation of the command climate, increase readiness, and thwart possible catastrophic outcomes. The RST’s advisory role regarding internal impacts can prove beneficial to commanders and leaders when done with intentionality.

#4 Ease Religious Sentiment Concerns: Army leaders have noted the complex social framework of foreign and domestic operating environments (OE). Multiple factors within political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) help leaders understand the elements and characteristics of the OE to shape modern warfare and the modern battlefield (Graphic Training Aid 41-01-005 (GTA 41-01-005), 2008, p. 2). In relation to Army units, leaders must understand the social factors that help in the, “process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” (Army Doctrine Publication 6-22 (ADP 6-22),
Because the Army is a microcosm of society, and religion is part of the social framework of society, leaders must safeguard readiness by capitalizing on religious support’s power to influence and not lessen their stance and resource allocations due to the risk of anti-religious sentiments.

Anti-religious sentiments will always be prevalent within society if there is freewill. As Army leaders seek the outcomes of secure healthy climates, mission success, fit units, and stronger families, RSTs need leaders to understand the root causes to these sentiments, embrace the challenge of developing those that exude these sentiments, and lead the charge by improving the organization regardless of opposition. “To ensure readiness across the range of military operations, commanders enable religious support functions as prescribed in army regulation.” (Field Manual 1-05 (FM 1-05), 2012, p. 12) This means Commanders at all levels should enable the functionality of religious support within their sphere of influence. If readiness is the Army’s number one priority, then each commander must consider all avenues of approach to sustain the spiritual readiness of the force.

As a part of legacy framework for resiliency that embraced spiritual dynamics, it would be without foundation to disregard the potential of administering quality comprehensive religious support programs. The quality of Army training when contrasted to the resources devoted to its accomplishment directly characterize the effect it will have on the trainees. For example, there is a significant difference between conducting movement to contact drills using a sand table vis-a-vis conducting the same drills against a determined opposing force at the National Training Center. Both achieve the overarching training effect by familiarizing the troops to task, but the takeaways are totally different from the trainee’s perspective in relation to the experience. In the same light, weighing, measuring, and executing religious support with appropriated funding resources to gain optimal training effect; leaders will see the results of a well postured and ready Army family for any mission, anywhere, at any time.

Solution

Because of the arguments discussed within this paper, commanders and leaders at all levels must understand, capitalize, and resource the capabilities that RSTs offer to the readiness of the Army. Points of discussion, although extensive, only mentioned a few of the capabilities RST members bring to the organization. Training and educating senior and junior leaders on the capabilities, funding opportunities, and assessment tools RSTs can provide will enhance readiness. Introducing a segment of training as a part of the Company Command Team Course, and unit level awareness training coupled with Army Regulation 350-1 training events will ensure leader understanding of the RST’s capabilities. Religious support, coupled with the Army physical readiness training, readiness assessment programs, family readiness groups and the like, will codify the benefits that over time will change the Army culture to embrace its sustaining power of the force.

Conclusion

Because readiness is the Army’s number one priority, Religious Support Teams offer resolute support to the Commander by ensuring spiritual readiness. While the RST engages the Army family to develop spiritual readiness, the other pillars of readiness and resilience are potentially improving. Utilizing the RST as a part of the readiness construct is the Commander’s responsibility. RSTs are in the people business. It should be the goal of the chaplain and religious affairs specialist to educate leaders, making them aware of potential hidden issues in their ranks that if left unaddressed could cause a cancer that destroys the unit’s cohesion, trust, and resilience. That awareness brings a level of understanding, courses of action, and application that will breed replication and ensure the readiness of the unit, one Soldier at a time.
REFERENCES


By SGM James Edward Morris

Chief Religious Affairs Noncommissioned Officer
Command Chaplain Directorate, Headquarters, 8th Army

SGM Morris assumed his duties as the Chief Religious Affairs NCO for the 8th Army Command Chaplain Section, Camp Humphreys, Korea in August 2018. His most recent previous assignment was as a student in the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Sergeant Major Course Class 68, part of the largest class ever selected to attend the course. Previous to that course, SGM Morris served as the Master Religious Affairs NCO for the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment
The Army Profession

The Army Profession

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1 – The Army Profession, augments ADP 1 – The Army. This ADRP defines and describes the Army Profession and the Army Ethic, and it expands the discussion on the Army’s dual nature as a military department of the United States Government and, more importantly, a military profession. It identifies two mutually supportive communities of practice: the Profession of Arms (Soldiers) and the Army Civilian Corps (Army Civilians). It identifies the essential characteristics that define the Army as a profession: Trust, Honorable Service, Military Expertise, Stewardship, and Esprit de Corps. It discusses the certification criteria for Army professionals in character, competence, and commitment; and it describes the Army culture of trust and its inherent relationship with the Army Ethic, the heart of the Army Profession, inspiring and motivating our shared identity as trusted Army professionals.

Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part I: The Enduring Nature

Two centuries ago, Carl von Clausewitz described the need for able intellects to lead armies in his work, On War. He noted that any complex activity, virtuously executed, requires the gifts of intellect and temperament, as well as two other indispensable qualities: first, “an intellect that even in the darkest hour retains some glitterings of the inner light which leads to truth” and second, the courage “to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.”


Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part II: Keeping Pace with Changes

Understanding the enduring features of the profession of arms provides insights into the culture of military organizations. More importantly, understanding the drivers of change in the profession can help ensure the relevance of military education and training continuums. In reviewing the competencies required of a contemporary (and likely future) military professional, there are multiple influences that demand consideration. While the nature of the profession will remain stable, the skills and attributes it requires will evolve.


Leadership Lessons From General George C. Marshall

Many people today don’t remember George Marshall, but in the middle of the 20th century he was inescapable. A five-star general who later won the Nobel Peace Prize, Marshall was once described by President Harry S. Truman as the greatest soldier in American history. Other world figures agreed, and after World War II, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill called Marshall the true organizer of Allied victory.

After his retirement from public life, Marshall turned down many lucrative offers for his memoirs. In 1956, the historian Forrest Pogue began a thirty-year project of researching and writing a massive four-volume biography of Marshall. In the first volume (Education of a General, 1880-1939), Pogue provides a small anecdote from Marshall’s early life. This story serves as a diagnostic for one important aspect of leadership. Leaders are usually thought to be self-starters, and this story can serve any potential leader as a way of measuring their own level of individual initiative.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/01/11/leadership_lessons_from_general_george_c_marshall_112885.html
George Marshall’s 1920 Letter on True Leadership

George Marshall must be one of, if not the most underappreciated leaders in American history, and certainly of the 20th century. Not only was he the military genius in charge of the US Army during World War II and the most directly responsible for its success, he was considered the primary leader of the Allied War effort by every major Allied leader. Roosevelt found him indispensable as his Army Commander, Winston Churchill called him the “true architect of victory” in the War. It was Marshall who, from a standing start of a few hundred thousand soldiers, raised an army of millions and oversaw the major operations that would lead to the liberation of Europe.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/george-marshalls-1920-letter-true-leadership-carl-berger

GEN(R) Martin Dempsey’s Leadership Principles

Leaders are busy. Most will suggest that they have more to do and less time to do it than ever before. It’s probably true. After all, leaders still have to do the things they would normally be expected to do but with the added challenge of managing exponentially more information and competing with digital echoes for the attention, the trust, and the confidence of their followers.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/14U54IlURNyN8K_CGV6Yf4cf4V3zYxpkJ/view?usp=sharing

Strategic Insights: Revolutionary Change Is Coming to Strategic Leadership

Clausewitz famously observed that war has an enduring nature and a changing character that evolves over time as technology, society, economics, and politics shift. This observation also applies to strategic leadership: it too has an enduring nature and a changing character.

https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/Revolutionary-Change-is-Coming/2017/12/19

The Army’s Framework for Character Development

Simply stated, the U.S. Army must be able to Fight and Win our Nation’s Wars in the right way. Peer and near-peer adversaries contest our traditional strengths in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyber domains as well as the information environment. Large-scale combat operations will be hyperactive, exponentially more lethal, and unforgiving to the
unprepared. Units will operate in complex terrain, in and among populations, and may be widely separated without communication, resupply, or accurate situational understanding. These changing conditions in the character of war will present new ethical challenges, requiring Army professionals who can effectively exercise disciplined initiative in the chaos of combat. We must anticipate these challenges and be prepared to meet them. Success in this large-scale, multi-domain battle environment depends on leaders who can truly exercise the principles of mission command. As the synchronizing and integrating warfighting function, mission command demands mutual trust, and trust requires character.


Growing Army Professionals: Closing the Values Gap

As the U.S. Army transitions from the conflicts of the last fifteen years to a more home-station-focused effort on training and readiness, it has spent intellectual and developmental energy on defining its future as a profession vice a bureaucracy. In Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, The Army Profession, Army leadership has established a sound framework for a professional force dedicated to protecting the nation that has been entrusted to its care. Unfortunately, while the Army profession has been studied, described, and written about, a transition in culture has been taking place within the very core of the Army profession. With changes to social and cultural values in the last decade, the Army now has a gap between the norms of the profession that ADRP 1 seeks to foster and the core values of its newest soldiers.


Six Questions on Ethics and Leadership

In the wake of nearly every scandal and moral lapse in the military, we hear the same response, “This is a leadership issue.” This view is problematic as it seems to assume all ethical matters are reducible to leadership issues or these scandals are a product of the personal morality of the leader in question. Responses like these ought to push us to ask, What is the connection and overlap between ethics and leadership in the military? We need to think about the nature of leadership in general and then specifically in the military.

https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/5/24/six-questions-on-ethics-and-leadership
Ethical Dilemmas of Future Warfare

At the Visualizing Multi Domain Battle 2030-2050 Conference at Georgetown University, participants addressed the requirement for United States policymakers and warfighters to address the ethical dilemmas arising from an ever-increasing convergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and smart technologies in both battlefield systems and embedded within individual Soldiers. While these disruptive technologies have the potential to lessen the burden of many military tasks, they may come with associated ethical costs. The Army must be prepared to enter new ethical territory and make difficult decisions about the creation and employment of these combat multipliers.


Five Myths about Military Ethics

Winning in a complex world requires a professional military capable of generating new expert knowledge that addresses the demands of evolving characters of war as well as the changing society the military serves. Ethical application of this knowledge is critical since it demonstrates our moral commitment and provides the cornerstone of our trust with the American people. This trust will be essential if the military profession is to navigate the uncertain and ambiguous environment associated with twenty-first-century security challenges. To this end, the following article addresses current challenges to the military profession and its ethic


Great Captains: Command & Those Who Did it Best

What makes a military leader great? WAR ROOM’s new podcast series, Great Captains, takes up this old question. Moderated by Dr. Andrew Hill, Editor-in-Chief of WAR ROOM and Chair of Strategic Leadership at the Army War College, the series features military historians and other experts applying their insight, experiences, and scholarship in discussing the lives and achievements of exceptional military leaders. As professional military educators, the faculty of the U.S. Army War College strives not only to tell the stories of great leaders, but also to coach and mentor the next generation of senior military leaders. Studying the great captains of the past is an essential part of this work.

The Coming Storm: Ethics in the Next War

As the U.S. military transitions from a strategy-level focus on violent extremist organizations to great power competition, Americans would do well to establish reasonable expectations for the future. The U.S. Department of Defense’s recent National Defense Strategy has suggested as much. Secretary Mattis warns that “without sustained and predictable investment to restore readiness and modernize our military to make it fit for our time, we will rapidly lose our military advantage, resulting in a Joint Force that has legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people.” David Barno and Nora Bensahel have described this kind of language throughout the NDS as a “clear warning shot,” and a “message to the American people” that without adhering to the principles laid out in the strategy, the U.S. “could actually lose those wars.” The message, according to Barno and Bensahel, is that the American people must accurately manage their strategic and operational expectations of their armed forces.

In addition to managing expectations about warfighting efficacy in the next war, Americans must also manage expectations about warfighting ethics in the next war. Military ethics in general, and the Just War Tradition in particular, are often taken to be moral constraints on the conduct of war. The tactician works to win battles, the strategist to win wars, and policy-makers strive to preserve the polity through the war and into the better peace. But morality demands that the tactician, the strategist, and the policy-maker operate within certain boundaries. If a justified war is a political endeavor aimed at securing the political community, throughout the struggle participants must also ensure the political community remains one worth preserving.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/10/16/the_coming_storm_ethics_in_the_next_war_113898.html

Essential to Success: Historical Case Studies in the Art of Command at Echelons Above Brigade (pdf link below to newly released book)

The United States Army exists to deter conflict through credible readiness and, when the nation commits its forces to war, to prevail in large-scale ground combat as a part of unified action. To win, the Army must be trained and organized to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape and dominate the operational environment while continuously consolidating gains. The largest and most complex Army organizations – divisions, corps, and theater armies – play a critical role in doing this. Each is structured to orchestrate and converge the capabilities of forces assigned them to defeat enemies in battle, consolidate gains, and set conditions to win in unified land operations. It is critical to provide robust, large-scale combat operations training for commanders and senior staff. Enemies will not give us the luxury of preparation after a war begins. As the operational environment continues to evolve, so must the Army and the Joint Force. Peer and near peer adversaries are aggressively modernizing, adapting their methods of warfighting, and can now contest U.S. Forces in domains where they have had superiority for decades.

The Evolving Operating Environment

Back on a War Footing: Five Capabilities the Army Must Have in a Decade

The future is not what it used to be. Not, at least, for the U.S. Army. In the three-plus years since Russia invaded Ukraine, Army leaders have had to rethink what they will need to wage tomorrow’s wars successfully. Near-peer, state-based threats such as the Russian military are a different kind of challenge than the Taliban. Somehow, the Army will need to prepare for fighting both kinds of enemies, and a diverse range of other adversaries, with a budget that amounts only to a dozen days’ worth of federal spending per year. Personnel and readiness will have to come first, leaving relatively little money for modernization.

https://www.ausa.org/articles/back-war-footing-five-capabilities-army-must-have-decade

How the US Army is Preparing to Fight Hybrid War in 2030

The U.S. Army’s new draft strategy for 2025 to 2040 expects enemies to attack ever more lethally in multiple domains — land, sea, air, space, and online — while blurring the distinction between peace and war. To meet these foes, the strategy says, the Army of the future must be much more mobile, with small teams that can fight like today’s large units — and do it in every domain of warfare, simultaneously.

A New Dependency: Our Addiction to Information and Approval are Killing Mission Command

The Army has doctrine and flow charts describing Mission Command. Fort Leavenworth boasts a Mission Command Center of Excellence. The term has supplanted “command and control” as the means leaders use to guide and direct their subordinates’ operations. But, the Army has yet to truly inculcate Mission Command into its leadership culture. After nearly two decades in conflict, the Army has invested billions of dollars in communications platforms that provide the highest levels of command with real-time awareness of the smallest actions at the lowest tactical level. Theater-level command centers can track the icons of moving vehicles, and in some cases individual soldiers, on large format screens in arena-like command centers.

In practice, this concept of command’s challenges are well documented and thoroughly discussed. The roots of the problem remain the very issues Mission Command aims to correct—the abuse or misuse of communications platforms to micromanage operations, and subordinate leader hesitancy to demonstrate initiative without prior approval. The appetite for information has become an addiction, and expectations at higher levels of maximum awareness of subordinate actions results in a reluctance among junior leaders to act without permission. If the future operating environment resembles anything close to what the Multi-Doman Battle describes—with units continuously in contact and command posts constantly on the move—the Army must break this cycle of addiction and practice the Mission Command message it preaches.

https://mwi.usma.edu/new-dependency-addiction-information-approval-killing-mission-command/

The Next Revolution in Military Affairs: Multi-domain Command and Control

A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a theory about the evolution of warfare over time. An RMA is based on the marriage of new technologies with organizational reforms and innovative concepts of operations. The result is often characterized as a new way of warfare. There have been a number of RMAs just in the past century.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/12/06/the_next_revolution_in_military_affairs_multi-domain_command_and_control_112741.html
**Multi-domain Battle: Tactical Implications**

Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) is the latest concept buzzword across the military. Optimistic leaders view the initiative as an opportunity to synergize the joint force, improving how the military organizes, trains, equips, and ultimately fights. Critics view MDB as more of the same, a reinvention of what has always existed in warfare. The defense industry sees MDB as a demand signal for new technology and increased defense spending during a period of fiscal uncertainty. Facets of each perspective are true. Multi-Domain Battle is dependent on today’s military leaders to drive effective change throughout the joint force.


**An Army Trying to Shake Itself from Intellectual Slumber, Part I: Learning from the 1970s (essay one of two)**

For the past three decades, the U.S. military has lived off the concepts and eroding capabilities for conflicts against peer adversaries that it developed during the Cold War. For the Army, AirLand Battle is the last fully institutionalized intellectual and doctrinal warfighting construct intended for high-end adversaries, although there have been several replacement candidates in recent years. These have included “Strategic Landpower,” and, most recently “Multi-Domain Battle.” The former never gained traction within the Army and vanished from the discussion in a few short years. Why is that? What must be done to keep Multi-Domain Battle from going the way of Strategic Landpower?


**An Army Trying to Shake Itself from Intellectual Slumber, Part II: From 9/11 to Great Power Competition (essay two of two)**

In military operations after 9/11, U.S. conventional warfighting dominance was on full display. The Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s military were quickly routed. However, the decisive initial operational
and tactical successes in Afghanistan and then Iraq turned out to be illusory. It was soon evident that the campaign plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, although delivering as promised in toppling Saddam and his military, did not have a realistic vision for what would follow. Consequently, there were not enough forces on the ground to deal with a post-Saddam Iraq, and that country soon went off the rails. Coalition forces were suddenly in the midst of a full-blown insurgency. The challenges of Iraq, coupled with a worsening insurgency in Afghanistan, presented a different problem that, while not existential, created a political crisis and demands for military solutions. The Army and the other services responded.


10 Rules for Media Relations

During my 27-month tenure as Chief of Public Affairs for the United States Army from 2015-17, I followed ten simple rules for media relations that guided my personal philosophy for interacting with the media. Whether short duration “headline” crisis events or complex, long term coverage topics that spanned several months, these ten rules were critical to media relations success with the venerable Pentagon Press Corps.

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/10-rules-media-relations-malcolm-frost
**Multinational Sustainment is Essential to the Next Fight**

In a 1948 speech to the National War College, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower said that when it came to building a multinational alliance, “one of our great problems was what to do about the matter of administration, and particularly about administration as it applies to supply.”

Undoubtedly, the effects of our past 16 years of conflict have conditioned leaders to have a very different understanding of how sustainment operations are executed. For the most part, units were based in large forward operating bases, stockpiled large amounts of supplies, managed a relatively small number of commodities (for example, small-arms ammunition and not tank rounds), had low casualty rates, and did not have to defend rear areas. U.S. allies enjoyed air superiority, uninterrupted communications, and a relatively slow operating tempo.

Fighting a near-peer adversary requires a much different approach, and units of all warfighting functions are challenged in meeting the demands of the European Multi-Domain Battle operational environment.

[https://www.army.mil/article/203918/multinational_sustainment_is_essential_to_the_next_fight](https://www.army.mil/article/203918/multinational_sustainment_is_essential_to_the_next_fight)

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**Logistics Innovations and Getting the Basics Right**

In my Army career, I have deployed to the National Training Center three times. During a rotation when I was a young second lieutenant, I proceeded to get lost almost every night, but I eventually made it to my logistics release points because of the basic skills I had learned at my home station. This experience has shaped my thinking for 37 years.

Today, as the deputy chief of staff, G-4, I set policies that all Army logisticians will use on an expeditionary battlefield, where our basic skills will be put to the test. The Army may end up in a remote corner of the globe without much infrastructure, where our forces have to self-sustain and where our adversaries have new approaches to warfare. It will not be like the past 16 years of war, when our troops regularly arrived at well-established forward operating bases.
The G-4 office and our partners have made strides in enhancing materiel readiness and ensuring logistics support is available to increase the lethality of combat units. The next expeditionary battlefield will have many improvements to help logisticians do the basics of supply and maintenance better.

https://www.army.mil/article/203893/logistics_innovations_and_getting_the_basics_right

**Thoughts on Force Protection**

One of the prime objectives of an adversary is to inflict damage on the joint force. With thinking enemies, vulnerability is an inescapable characteristic of conflict, and every joint force will have vulnerabilities. Contemporary threats transcend space far easier than in the past, and operational protection is not confined to lethal threats to formations located in hostile environments overseas. With modern technology, even individual Service members can be targeted directly or indirectly through families or communities and by both lethal and nonlethal means.

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-81/Article/702065/thoughts-on-force-protection/
The Fires Complex: Organizing to Win in Large-scale Combat Operations

As the Army refocuses on what it takes to win in largescale combat operations (LSCO), determining the right organizational structure is a key component of the solution. Army Fires will play a critical role in LSCO and must be organized in a way that maximizes the timely, accurate employment of cross-domain Fires throughout the depth of an increasingly lethal, expanded battlespace.


Army Preps for Underground & Urban Warfare on Korean Peninsula

US Army war-planners and weapons developers have been intensifying efforts to fast-track networking technologies designed to potentially counter or destroy a North Korean ground invasion – by better enabling soldiers to operate underground in tunnel complexes and in dense urban environments.

https://fortunascorner.com/2017/10/19/army-preps-underground-urban-warfare-korean-peninsula/

A Solution Looking for a Problem: Illuminating Misconceptions in Maneuver-Warfare Doctrine

Warfare exists in the realm of both art and science – as a phenomenon in which sensing and intuition (in other words, art) play a complementary role to education and training (science). Just as a painter must have more than one color on his pallet, the practitioner of warfare must understand more than one form of warfare to be effective on the battlefield. However, the emphasis on maneuver warfare in current U.S. Army doctrine, at the expense of other forms of warfare, limits Armor and Cavalry
leaders’ ability to be true artists in warfare by not fully educating and training them on the realities of warfare, thus negatively influencing their ability to sense and apply intuition in battle. Doctrine’s focus on maneuver warfare lies at the heart of this conundrum.

http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2017/Fall/4Fox17.pdf

**Warbots and Due Care: The Cognitive Limitations of Autonomous and Human Combatants**

During World War II, pilots relied on analog calculators and heuristics to place their bombs on target. By the 1980s, targeting computers notified pilots precisely when to release their munitions. The failure of the pilot to release munitions at the correct moment could result in munitions missing their target by large distances, all dependent on the aircraft’s altitude, speed, and orientation. Today, the large launch acceptability regions of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) require pilots to exercise significantly less skill to place bombs on target. If a PGM misses a positively identified target, fault likely lies with the warhead, not the pilot’s release technique.

The proliferation of semiautonomous systems on the battlefield will further this trend. As computers take on increased warfighting responsibilities, equipment malfunctions will make up an increased percentage of weapon employment errors. The complexity of future warbot decision-making will potentially make combatant attempts to exercise jus in bello responsibilities—just conduct in war—increasingly difficult. In parallel with their capability, warbots will exercise greater latitude on the battlefield, and their decision-making parameters will be largely set before they leave the factory, potentially unmodifiable by the soldiers who employ them. Society imposes ethical responsibility proportionate to an individual or an organization’s ability to control the actions in question. When lethal autonomous systems proliferate on the battlefield, combatants may not be the dominant force in controlling their activities.

The War Starts

When the United States declared war on Germany 6 April 1917, the number of chaplains available for service were 74 in the Regular Army and 72 in the National Guard. A total of 146.

Chaplains were not the only ones unprepared, for war, the entire US Regular Army numbered at most 213,000 officers and men. To succeed volunteers and draftees would be needed to build an army that would
eventually number almost 4-million men. Among them, 2,300 would be chaplains by 1918.

In early 1917, the US Army War Department reorganized into combat divisions, consisting of brigades, regiments, and battalions. As a result, the number of soldiers in a regiment tripled, from 1,200 to 3,600 men.

Unfortunately for chaplains, the authorization of one chaplain per regiment did not change until May 1918. For two-thirds of the war, one chaplain attempted to minister to 3,600 men. It was a daunting, if not impossible task. However, additional chaplains were needed to fill the new regiments that were created, possibly as many as 600.

To meet this emergency, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America stepped in to both vet and recommend chaplains for the Army as there was no organized Chaplain Corps or Chief of Chaplains to perform this function.

Led by Frank M. North, the Federal Council, an organization of thirty Protestant faiths, performed this service admirably during the war.

Chaplain George J. Waring, a veteran of 12 years service, disliked change. He advised his fellow chaplains to “work within the confines of their regiment.” In his opinion the reglemental system was “perfect” and no chaplain should work above or beyond it. He warned that “a chaplain on the General Staff would be disastrous to the corps,” and cause “religious friction.”

Waring, and many other Regular Army chaplains, were products of their time. Prior to 1917, the largest unit of the Army was the regiment. This is all anyone had ever known; now all that had changed. Meanwhile, chaplains had no collective unity, no training plans for newly selected chaplains, no approved doctrine, and no voice.

**Chaplains in the Camps**

For almost two-thirds of the war chaplains labored in hastily built training camps throughout the USA. Over 32 training camps were built: camps Jackson, Upton, Dix, Meade, Pike and Taylor were but a few.

Throughout August and September of 1917, National Guard soldiers, as well as 500,000 drafted (inducted) soldiers, reported to the camps. It was here they encountered Army Chaplains.
However, there were simply not enough. To help, the Federal Council stepped in, procuring civilian clergy (camp chaplains) as well as civilian “volunteer” chaplains to work with assigned regiments.

In addition to this, religious “welfare” agencies were also asked to lend a hand. The YMCA, Knights of Columbus, Jewish Welfare Board, Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Christian Scientists provided clergymen and workers to care for soldiers. They also built structures called “huts” where soldiers could socialize and relax when not training.

Progressive-Era ideas were also introduced into the camps. Raymond Fosdick headed the Commission of Training Camp Activities and his assistant, Joseph Lee, created the War Camp Community Service. Their intent was to keep soldiers engaged in healthy moral activities such as athletics, singing, game playing, or reading.

Army chaplains were taken aback by the large number of welfare workers and camp chaplains. Although these organizations were intended to help chaplains, in several instances, friction or disagreement prevailed.

Chaplain Stephen R. Wood later concluded, “welfare agencies do not occupy the proper relations to chaplains.” He believed chaplains should “have absolute control of every function religious or otherwise.” Wood recommended, “the War Department [have] absolute control of the chaplains who shall have detailed enlisted men as helpers.”

A School Needed

Regular Army chaplains were alarmed at the number of new chaplains selected by the Federal Council that were suddenly commissioned and put into the Army. They were ordained ministers and clerically qualified but not militarily qualified.

Fortunately, Regular Army Chaplain Aldred A. Pruden, considered a senior chaplain by his peers, recognized a training school for chaplains was needed. After several proposals, one of which included Harvard Seminary School, the War Department asked Pruden to submit a plan which was accepted in February 1918.

Starting at Fort Monroe on 1 March, the first class was held, with subsequent sessions conducted at Camp Taylor, Kentucky. To its credit, the school was racially integrated, ahead of its day. In all, 1,041 students would graduate from the school by war’s end.

The course work covered military law and customs, rules of war, wear of the uniform, first aid, equitation and other coursework in five week sessions. While the 84th Infantry Division was training at Camp Taylor, chaplain students worked with them one half-day each week, similar to a college practicum.

An AEF School in France

Unfortunately, half of all chaplains commissioned during the war did not attend Pruden’s school. Many were recruited in France from the welfare agencies like the YMCA or Knights of Columbus. Others were direct commissions that went directly to France. These chaplains needed training; in fact, it was soon determined that almost all chaplains deploying to France lacked the skills to survive trench warfare.
For this reason, an AEF Chaplain school was established at Neuilly-sur-Suize near General John J. Pershing’s headquarters in Chaumont. The AEF school, headed by Chaplain John A. Randolph, taught trench warfare skills, to include the use of gas masks, what to do under artillery fire, and how to minister to troops in the trenches. The school trained 600 chaplains. New men (casuals) reported to the school prior to unit assignment, and chaplains recovering from wounds, needing rest, or transferring to other units considered it an oasis.

Denominations Needed

Over four-million Americans would serve in the US Army by 1918, and 2.8 million of them were draftees. As such, the new Army was a microcosm of American society, as were its ethnic groups and denominations.

The Chaplain School had made a good start, training 57 African-American chaplains in an integrated school. However, they still served in segregated units.

At times, Black chaplains had to deal with the racist attitudes of some enlisted soldiers and white officers. This occurred in several units, including the all African-American 92nd ID, the “Buffalo” soldiers.

Jewish-Americans and other faith groups, such as Mormons, Christian Scientists and dozens of smaller Christian faiths, wanted chaplains for their soldiers. In this, the Federal Council was quite sensitive as was Congress. On 6 October 1917, a bill was passed opening the chaplaincy to Jewish, Mormon, Christian Scientists and other faith groups. The number was expanded again in May of 1918.

Change came in fits and starts, but signs of progress were evident. One chaplain regretted that the war would end too soon for many soldiers to see the justice of an integrated and religiously tolerant society.

Jewish chaplains often had to confront anti-Semitism and step in to protect their soldiers. At least Rabbi Lee Levinger once remarked...
with levity that part of the chaplain’s job was to protect soldiers from their real “tyrants and oppressors, the line officers.”

When the senior chaplain of the 77th Division, John J. Allan was reassigned to the GHQ Chaplain Office, he recommended a former enlisted soldier, Chaplain (Rabbi) Elkan Voorsanger, for the senior position. Saying he “is well liked by the other chaplains and will fill the bill,” a Protestant chaplain had recommended a Jewish Rabbi. This nonchalant act remains an historical first.

The Advent of Brent

On 1 May 1918, Episcopal Bishop Charles H. Brent, a civilian with no military experience, was selected by Gen. John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, to be the AEF Senior Chaplain.

It mattered little what other chaplains might think. Brent was a personal friend of Pershing and that was qualification enough.

Brent could have taken the title “chief of chaplains,” but he demurred. Instead, he set up a three-man committee with himself as chairman. To help him, he selected Chaplain Francis Doherty, an experienced Regular Army chaplain (Catholic), and Chaplain Paul D. Moody, a National Guard chaplain (Protestant), son of the famous Dwight L. Moody. Together they forged an alliance that made lasting changes to the US Army chaplaincy. Brent may not have been a military man, but he was a master organizer.

May 1918: A Revolution in Military-Chaplain Affairs

In May 1918, everything changed. Meeting with Pershing, the GHQ Chaplain office initiated a number of actions:

1) The AEF School was authorized 5 May, to start on 1 June.

2) Senior Chaplain positions were authorized. For the first time, there would be division, brigade, regiment and eventually corps-level chaplains.

3) On 25 May, Congress passed a bill authorizing one chaplain per every 1,200 enlisted soldiers — tripling the number of chaplains needed in the Army.

4) Through Pershing, Brent pushed out guidance to the Army that tasking chaplains to be mess officers, postmasters, censors, or “handy men” with other additional duties must stop. It interfered with their primary focus — their ministry.

5) And, in an ill-advised move, Brent persuaded Pershing to rescind the use of rank insignia for all chaplains. Beginning in May, all chaplains would remove rank insignia and wear the Latin cross on their shoulder straps.
This last was a source of great distress to Chaplain Pruden at the Training School. Pruden openly discouraged chaplain students from removing their rank insignia to the point where he would be relieved for insubordination a few days before the end of the war.

When the senior chaplain of the 77th Division, John J. Allan was reassigned to the GHQ Chaplain Office, he recommended a former enlisted soldier, Chaplain (Rabbi) Elkan Voorsanger, for the senior position. Saying he “is well liked by the other chaplains and will fill the bill,” a Protestant chaplain had recommended a Jewish Rabbi. This nonchalant act remains an historical first.

**Combat Divisions**

The AEF and chaplains went to war in earnest beginning May 1918. It was in May that 9 combat divisions of 32 still in the US finally arrived in France.

Brent and Company had not been idle, they had assigned over 86% of all chaplains in France to combat divisions. To their credit, this is where the majority of chaplains sought assignment. Chaplain Celestine Bittle was heartbroken to find himself assigned to a Motor Repair unit until SR Chaplain Moody reminded him, “These men who have souls, too, need you and are waiting for you. You have a splendid field of labor.”

In almost all cases, the school-trained chaplain had been told that their most effective place of duty was at aid and dressing stations during a “push” or a “drive.” It was where the need was greatest.

Bittle, too, was told, “His place is really the first-aid station rather than the front line itself, because all the wounded will pass through this station and they are the ones needing immediate spiritual help.”

At one aid station during the battle of Chateau–Thierry, 1,280 casualties of one division went through a single dressing station in an 18-hour period. Indeed, so long as chaplains were at medical facilities, they were classified as noncombatants under the Geneva Convention, signed by the US in 1882.

However, some chaplains — like many a young soldier — had a fascination with war (which most quickly got over). Men like Chaplain Lyman Rollins went over-the-top on raids with his troops. And, like many other chaplains, his presence on the battlefield was a source of inspiration and confidence to his men. No man was truly alone when a man of faith was present. They knew, if wounded, they would be cared for, and if dying they would receive last rites. Rollins was one of the first to be awarded the coveted French Croix de Guerre.

**Fighting Chaplains**

In practice, the era of the “Fighting Chaplain” had ended with the signing of the Geneva Convention, but a few chaplains pushed the limits of their noncombatant status.

The most decorated chaplain of WWI was Julius Bapst (two Distinguished Service Crosses and a Silver Star). He reputedly went into combat with a Bible in one hand and a hand grenade in the other. Indeed, Chaplains Bapst and John de Valles were known to have thrown a few. Their avowed purpose was to keep German soldiers away while they evacuated the wounded or administered last rites.

Indeed, the hand grenade was the ideal chaplains’ weapon of choice. It was an excellent area denial weap-
on, which, if used, carried a degree of moral and ethical uncertainty as to whether it killed, wounded, or scared off German soldiers when thrown — not always easy to tell. They were plentiful, easy to obtain, easy to carry, and easy to use — just pull pin and throw towards enemy. Truly handy deterrents when in a tight spot.

While Bapst and De Valles could at least claim they used grenades when performing their duties of evacuation and last rites; a few chaplains did more. When four gunners of his battery were killed, Chaplain William Farrell “carried ammunition and helped to keep the guns working all Saturday night,” according to one account.

Chaplain Robert Campbell performed a similar service for his battery, loading guns and pulling lanyards. When it was over, he later said “he was anxious to prove he was willing to put his hand where he had put his heart, as much as he disliked to.”

Chaplain Ray Jenny happened to go over-the-top with a squad of soldiers when their squad leaders got killed. Jenny kept his cool and directed the soldiers to take out a German machine-gun nest.

There were other sporadic reports of chaplains pulling lanyards, throwing hand grenades, carrying and handling ammunition, but by enlarge the majority of chaplains remained true to their noncombatant status.

**Base Hospitals & the SOS**

Working behind the lines, 14% of the chaplains in France (anywhere from 100 to 125) served in Evacuation Hospitals, Advance Base Hospitals, Hospital Trains, and Base Hospitals. They also served training regiments and other units working behind the lines in what was called the Services of Supply (the rear support areas). When Chaplain Bittle reported to the Motor Transport Repair Park (base) at Verneuil, he ministered to 4,000 repairmen, 2,000 German POWs and an African-American Prisoner Escort Company. The base also included a hospital where he faithfully went two to four times a day. Bittle later reminisced that “the relation between the chaplain and the men became more intimate here, due to personal contacts . . . heart to heart.” He later admitted, “only with reluctance had I obeyed orders to come here. But now my heart went out to these men. They were my boys.”
Influenza

Bittle’s greatest battle, as it was for most chaplains and the soldiers of the Medical Department, was Influenza, another killer of the Great War. The epidemic swept through the AEF starting in late August through mid-November 1918.

Chaplain J. W. Weldon, stationed at Camp Taylor, reported 9,000 sick in his Base Hospital. Weldon put “on a hospital apron and a ‘flu’ mask over my nose . . . I gave them water, fed them, adjusted their covers, smoothed their foreheads, read them the Bible, prayed with them . . . and some I buried.”

Chaplain K. L. Nance, 81st division reported, “We have been heavily hit by the ‘Spanish Flu’ and Pneumonia. We have something like a thousand men in hospitals at the present time.” As the 81st prepared for combat, a battalion’s worth of men had been taken out of the line, and Nance was forced to leave a chaplain with them.

It was the same sad story throughout the AEF.

Chaplain Assistants

Thanks to visionaries like Chaplain Aldred A. Pruden and others who had sat on a Chaplains’ Board in 1909, the Chaplain Assistant had been recommended and authorized that same year.

However, the first real utilization of Assistants would occur in 1917-1919. With the creation and fielding of combat divisions, the need for Assistants made itself known.

Chaplains needed clerks, drivers, typists, orderlies, stenographers, and men to set up their religious ceremonies. Throughout the AEF men with these talents were in demand. Getting them was the challenge. First, the chaplain requested the Assistant; then, if all went well, a soldier with the requisite talents was pulled out of a unit and assigned to the chaplain. Some assignments could last only for the duration of an operation. In other cases, a chaplain assistant might stay assigned with his chaplain for the duration of the war.

We do not know many chaplain assistants by name, but we do know what some did.

Cpl. Greene Strother, for example, earned the Distinguished Service Cross. Strother, a chaplain assistant (11th Infantry Regt.), earned the DSC for capturing 14 Germans and their machine guns in Vieville, France, in 1918.

Throughout the war, chaplain assistants were a vital component when keeping up with and producing the volumes of correspondence written by chaplains to the families and loved ones of their soldiers. When a soldier was KIA it was usually the battalion chaplain that wrote a letter of condolence to the family, as well as secure their personal effects and mail them home.

During battle, the SR Division Chaplain was usually appointed Division Burial Officer. To do this job, he was assigned a sergeant, clerk, and squads of soldiers from each regiment to bury the dead. Under direction from the
chaplain, the sergeant took charge of the detail with the clerk as his corporal. These men were chaplain assistants.

Chaplain S. Arthur Deven, writing to his wife, would go as far as to say that his assistant Keegan was so helpful that he was “spoiled” during the war.

26 Sept. to 11 Nov. 1918

The Meuse-Argonne offensive was intended to end the war. The 47-day attack did just that. Today, it is considered the deadliest battle of all time. During the offensive, 26,000 doughboys would be killed, and another 96,000 would be wounded. For Army chaplains and assistants, the Meuse-Argonne would be the supreme test.

The battle plan was simple: nine divisions would attack in line. But this was more difficult than it appeared. Pershing’s best divisions had been used in his previous attack at St. Mihiel two weeks before, and they could not break contact and be moved to start the new offensive. As a result, seven of the attacking divisions had received little training, and few had worked with the field artillery batteries assigned to them.

Montfaucon

The plan called for the 79th division, which had the least training, to attack and fix the German fortress at Montfaucon, nicknamed “Little Gibraltar.” To help, the 4th division would move on the right flank of the 79th, beyond Mountfaucon, and force the Germans out by making a left turn behind the fortress. This never happened. Instead, the 4th continued to move forward while the hapless 79th made frontal assaults resulting in over 3,500 casualties in two days.

Along most of the firing line, the attack faltered and slowed after initial gains. By 28 September it was apparent to all that a battle of attrition would decide the outcome.

Throughout the AEF, there were casualties and pain. SR GHQ Chaplain Bishop Brent reacted to the death of a close friend, Maj. Benjamin Pepper. Grief stricken, Brent drew the only sketch ever made in his diary. He drew a cross with the major’s name upon it, and that of Pepper’s friend Cpt. Harry Ingersoll. Brent took the losses personally. He was not alone.

All his chaplains took their losses personally too.
The Chaplains Make Good

Of the 11 chaplains killed during the war, eight were killed during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. In addition to this, 16 out of 27 Distinguished Service Crosses awarded to chaplains occurred during the 26 September—11 November time period.

Chaplains died because too many dead and wounded soldiers lay exposed on the battlefield. Attacking divisions and the Medical Department discovered that their planned systems of evacuation and treatment had failed. They were overwhelmed by the staggering numbers of injured soldiers. Wounded men suffered on the battlefield, sometimes for as long as 6 hours. Due to the impossible terrain of No Man’s Land, evacuation was often impossible. Roads backed up, ambulances slowed to a crawl, and litter bearers worked to exhaustion.

Chaplains saw a need and responded. They went into No Man’s Land to aid and evacuate wounded soldiers and, if necessary, to administer last rites or to comfort dying men. After the lines moved forward, they buried men in small groups sometimes under artillery fire.

Artillery and machinegun fire were the chief killers of the war, and chaplain DSC citations bear witness to this fact. Seventeen of 25 citations examined mention chaplains under machine gun fire, and 16 of 25 citations mention chaplains under artillery fire. Twelve citations mention both.

Chaplain Thomas G. Speers (26th ID) citation reads in part: accompanied the advance elements, which were constantly under terrific artillery and machine-gun fire during the action. He was continually aiding and cheering the wounded, and particularly distinguished himself by carrying a wounded officer to a dressing station through heavy artillery and machine-gun barrage.

The 1918 use of the word “cheered” or “cheerfully” seems to have been applied to chaplains frequently. It is best understood in the context of its time. Doughboys looked to the “cheering” chaplain as a source of comfort and optimism. It gave the soldier confidence to know that a clergyman was present who would exclusively focus on his well-being. The doughboy was not alone.

Col. William “Wild Bill” Donovan (165th Regt.) would say of Chaplain Duffy: Chaplain Duffy is the most valuable military asset the regiment has ever had. Cheerful, human, full of fighting spirit he is always an encouragement and an inspiration to the men. He never missed a battle and where the situation was most desperate, there could he be found imparting his cool courage to all around him. He epitomized the soul of the regiment.

A few chaplains stumbled into combat encounters while trying to be “cheerful” — as when Chaplain John M. Moore advanced with the 79th ID into the heart of the Montfaucon trenches with the remainder of two battalions — 300 men. He was hunkering down in a captured enemy trench when a German threw a hand grenade into it. Reacting quickly, he picked it up and threw it out: as he did, the grenade exploded, injuring his hand. Part of Moore’s DSC citation reads:

Though wounded on 26 September 1918, Chaplain Moore remained with the attacking lines of his regiment, [313th] ministering to the dying and aiding the wounded.

Chaplain John de Valles was so exhausted carrying stretchers that his hands gave out. Refusing to quit he wrapped signal wire around his wrists and the carrying
Regrettably, not all wounds were visible. Several thousand soldiers suffered from shell-shock. Here chaplains worked in uncharted territory with Medical Department neuropsychiatrists. During training, chaplains were lectured on how to deal with shell-shock, and neuropsychiatrists in turn studied the influence of faith on shell-shock victims. One thing both discovered — a soldier could be returned to combat faster if they were treated closer to the front lines.

**The Last Act of Love**

Chaplain Francis Duffy, 42nd ID, had mentioned that burying his boys “is the last act of love I can do for them and the folks back home.” He was right.

In 1918, the Grave Registration service was in its infancy, meaning SR Division Chaplains were usually designated as Division Burial Officers.

Burying soldiers was tricky, odious, and a dangerous task. Although the proper time to bury soldiers was after

Today the Meuse-Argonne still stands as the greatest MASCAL of all time. Almost 21,000 doughboys of the
26,000 killed died in an intense three-week period, from late September to early October.

There were no body bags, and there were few resources to move the dead, not to mention impossible terrain. All this impeded removal to a cemetery. Although the senior chaplain usually designated a division burial site, the site could seldom be used during battle. Theoretically, one could move the dead using an empty ammo-wagon going back to resupply, but these were usually loaded with wounded. Besides, the sight of dead soldiers moving to the rear had a poor effect on the morale of troops moving to the front. In addition, the need to bury soldiers immediately with dignity and due to health risks was extremely important — it could not wait.

Chaplains labored on. They buried expediently and struggled to identify the dead — a challenge in the age of artillery and machine guns. Some soldiers had not worn their steel identification disks, some were never found. At times chaplains had to make their best guess.

The Work Continues

And then it was over. At 11a.m. on 11 November 1918, the Armistice took effect and the shooting stopped; but not before Chaplain William F. Davitt made history in the worst possible way — he became the last officer killed in the Great War. Stories abound as to how he was killed, sniper or artillery. It mattered little. A noncombatant, a chaplain, had died 20-minutes before the shooting had ended.

For the victorious soldiers of the AEF, chaplains gave thanks in sermon and in song. Chaplain Gladstone H. Yeuell wrote: “I have been continually through flame, smoke, mud, dead beasts and men — thru Hell.” And yet he would hasten to say, “I am proud of my country as never before . . . Rejoicing with those who rejoice. . . The new age starts and out of the ocean of blood will come a freer, purer epoch.”

For soldiers of the AEF, there was joy, jubilation, and great relief. The war was over, and they had nothing to do but sleep, eat, and get into trouble.

For AEF officers, especially chaplains, there would be no rest. The job now was to keep the troops busy — Idle hands were the Devil’s Workshop.

Within days of the Armistice, Brent and his office pushed out directives to all SR Division Chaplains to stand up AEF schools, sports, entertainment activities, as well as religious services and faith based studies. The goal was to keep the troops engaged, to cut down on alcoholism and venereal disease, and to keep the Army moral and ethical: living up to the ideals and expectations of America.

The GHQ Chaplain Office decided to send 40 chaplains home immediately to liaison with churches to coordinate and reintegrate AEF soldiers back into civilian life. A list was circulated asking which chaplains were willing to
serve with American forces occupying Germany. Brent also tried to ensure that every returning troopship had a chaplain on board.

CONCLUSIONS

When examined, SR GHQ Chaplain Charles H. Brent and his staff established an operational template for a future corps of chaplains. In the closing days of the war, he recommended that a chief of chaplains’ position be created as well as a bona fide Chaplain Corps. The war had opened Brent’s eyes. As the bloodshed came to a close he had come to believe in the “Unity of All Christendom.” It is perhaps for this reason that Brent, Doherty and Moody built a truly ecumenical and multi-denominational corps of chaplains. It certainly stood as a prototype from which there was no going back.

With Brent’s support, the National Defense Act of 1920 authorized a chief of chaplains. It was the first step towards a modern Chaplain Corps. The Chaplains had Made Good.

by Dr. John Boyd

U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Historian

Dr. John “Jay” Boyd, (Colonel, Retired), received his bachelor’s degree in history from Vanderbilt University, two master’s degrees (in history and education) at the University of Cincinnati and a Ph.D. from the University of Kentucky. In 2003 he was appointed the historian for the 81st Regional Support Command and later became the director of Army Reserve History from 2014 to 2016. He is currently the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps historian. He deployed to Bosnia in 1996 as part of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, and to Iraq with the 45th Military History Detachment in 2005–2006 as a theater historian during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In 2010 he was attached as a command historian to Joint Task Force HAITI as part of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. He devotes much of his time to doing research with his wife Rachel—also a military historian.
As described in an earlier article, the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps has a long and proud tradition of producing a top-quality academic journal. With the successful digitization initiative that has now placed every single article published by our corps over the past forty-plus years just a click away, it seemed fitting to highlight great work from decades past. As such, with this edition of the journal we begin an annual tradition of highlighting the best articles from forty years ago (1978), thirty years ago (1988), twenty years ago (1998), and ten years ago (2008).

**Great Articles from 1978**

An Oak or a Squash?
CH (MG) Orris E. Kelly, U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains

Minister/Chaplain as Educator
Dr. D. Campbell Wyckoff, Princeton Theological Seminary
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00028/19j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00028/19j)

The Moral Role of Chaplain Branch
CH (1LT) Bernard R. Bonnot, Ph.D., Ohio Army National Guard
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00026/11j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00026/11j)

**Great Articles from 1988**

Family Separation and Maintaining Relationships
CH (CPT) Chet Lanious, 1-7 CAV

Ministry to the Critical Care Givers
CH (MAJ) Dave DeDonato, U.S. Army Academy of Health Services
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00068/51j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00068/51j)

SHALOM in the Jewish Tradition
CH (Major) Samuel Weinstein, U.S. Air Force Reserve

**Great Articles from 1998**

Personal Spiritual Fitness and Effective Leadership
CH (MG) Donald W. Shea, U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00006/5j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00006/5j)

Alexander’s Challenge: Issues in Teaching Leadership
CH (COL) John W. Brinsfield, U.S. Army War College Instructor
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00006/16j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00006/16j)

**Great Articles from 2008**

Ethics and the Human Development of the Soldier Spirit
Dr. Don M. Snider

The Unique, Prophetic Voice of the Army Chaplain
CH (MAJ) Donald W. Kammer
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00017/81j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00017/81j)
Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War
by COL (Ret) Douglas A. Macgregor, PhD

Macgregor tells the riveting stories of five military battles of the twentieth century, each one a turning point in history. Beginning with the British Expeditionary Force holding the line at the Battle of Mons in 1914 and concluding with the Battle of Easting in 1991 during Desert Storm, this teases out a connection between these battles and teaches an important lesson about how future battles can be won. Macgregor links each of these seemingly isolated battles thematically. He theorizes that strategy and geopolitics are ultimately more influential than ideology, and stresses that if nation-states want to
**Combat Chaplain: The Personal Story of the WWII Chaplain of the Japanese American 100th Battalion**
*by Monica Elizabeth Yost, Israel A. S. Yost, and Michael Markrich (Editor)*

In October 1943, twenty-seven-year-old combat infantry chaplain Israel Yost arrived in Italy with the 100th Battalion, a little-known National Guard unit of mostly Japanese Americans from Hawai‘i. Yost was apprehensive when he learned of his assignment to this unusual unit composed of soldiers with whom he felt he had little in common and who were mostly Buddhists. But this would soon change.

For the next nineteen months at the front--from Salerno to Monte Cassino to Anzio to Bruyeres--Yost assisted medics, retrieved bodies from the battlefield, buried enemy soldiers, struggled to bolster morale as the number of casualties rose higher and higher, and wrote countless letters of condolence, all in addition to fulfilling his ministerial duties, which included preaching in the foxholes. Although his sermons won few converts, Yost’s tireless energy and concern for others earned him admiration from his fellow soldiers, who often turned to him as a trusted friend and spiritual advisor.

Forty years after the war had ended, with the help of his field diaries and the letters he had written almost daily to his wife, Yost wrote of his wartime experiences in the hopes that they might one day be published as a record of the remarkable character and accomplishments of the 100th. Combat Chaplain presents this heartfelt memoir intact with the addition of photographs and subsequent letters and speeches by Yost and other veterans.

**It’s Personal, not Personnel, Leadership Lessons for the Battlefield and the Boardroom**
*by COL (Ret) Robert C. Campbell*

Campbell, a 27-year Army officer and leader of more than 5,000 troops in the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, uses his experiences leading large teams in high-stakes work to apply those insights to your work as a leader. Whether from lack of will, experience, or training, many leaders pay lip service to investing in people. They manage them on spreadsheets and in HR focused software applications without personal consideration. By understanding that leadership is personal, you will begin to understand that all workplace challenges -- productivity issues, efficiency issues, turnover problems, lack of employee engagement -- come down to whether employees are being acknowledged, valued, and understood.
**Values-Based Leaders In Action: Over 125 Stories of Advice and Inspiration from Everyday Values Based Leaders**  
by Dr. Chris Hitch, Beth Ritter, and Michael Saccavino (editor)

When you encounter ethical or moral dilemmas, you go through a leadership crucible where you are forced to come to grips with your values and their impact on others. The cornerstones of values-based leadership -- honesty, integrity, compassion, diversity, and social responsibility -- define who you are as a person. The Foreword by GEN (Ret) H. Hugh Shelton and his nationally-recognized five cornerstones of values-based leadership apply to early career professionals, mid-career leaders, and senior executives. This book is packed with real-life stories by everyday people who don’t come with exalted titles. You’ll see how they apply the five cornerstones when making hard decisions and how doing so pays off in their lives and in the lives of others.

**A Military Leadership Notebook: Principles into Practice**  
By LTG (Ret) Walter Ulmer

Within formal organizations like the military, individuals in charge rely on two sources of authority to get the job done: granted statutory power and person power, which is gained by trust. Good leaders use both. In this book, Ulmer explores what makes a great commander. While he focuses on the military, the leadership lessons he shares work in war and peace, on land and at sea, and in small and large organizations. He defines leadership, shares his personal philosophy of leadership, revels tips on measuring a leader’s success, and outlines behaviors than can lead to success, as well as those that can lead to disaster. He also wades into the debate over whether leaders are born or made, explains why it’s important to respect the authority and responsibility of subordinate leaders, and how to manage organizations and large staffs. No matter what your position or occupation, this guide is a timeless leadership teaching tool.

**Stand Your Ground: Building Honorable Leaders the West Point Way**  
By Evan Offstein, PhD

West Point is the ideal laboratory for studying the dynamics of character, honor, and leadership: first, it operates a comprehensive honor education and enforcement program that has been subjected to rigorous Congressional scrutiny; second, it builds all of its academic, athletic, and military programs
on this bedrock of honor. As a result, West Point invests heavily in mentoring, training, and evaluation to ensure the leadership and character development of its 4,000 cadets. From Civil War General Robert E. Lee to astronaut Edwin E. Buzz Aldrin to basketball coach Mike Krzyzewski, West Point has groomed leaders whose contributions far exceed the successful management of their immediate charges. By illuminating the principles by which West Point teaches leadership, Stand Your Ground not only provides a unique tour behind the scenes at this revered institution, but, more generally, imparts lessons of honor and character-building that can be adopted by any aspiring leader.

Management professor and West Point graduate Evan Offstein approached leaders at the U.S. Military Academy and the Department of the Army with two primary questions: (1) How does West Point develop its leaders?; (2) Can other individuals and organizations apply these methods effectively? Two years later, after conducting extensive on-site research at West Point and with business leaders in a variety of industries, he offers unprecedented access to the process of leadership development at West Point, and practical insights that can, indeed, be applied in any type of organization that strives to operate on the principle of integrity.

7 Leadership Lessons of D-Day: Lessons from the Longest Day - June 6, 1944
By COL (Ret) John Antal

The odds were against the Allies on June 6, 1944. The task ahead of the paratroopers who jumped over Normandy and the Soldiers who waded ashore onto the beaches, all under fire, was colossal. In such circumstances, good leadership can be the defining factor in victory or defeat. This book is about the extraordinary leadership of seven men who led American Soldiers on D-Day and the days that followed. It is not a full history of D-Day, nor does it cover the heroic leadership shown by men in the armies of the Allies and French Resistance who also participated in the Normandy assault and battles for the lodgment areas. It is a primer on how you can lead today, no matter your occupation or role in life, by learning from the leadership of those seven in their dynamic and immersive stories that the reader will never forget.
**19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership**  
*By Edgar F. Puryear Jr.*

This book is a wonderful study of the leadership styles of four of the most prominent generals in World War II: MacArthur, Marshall, Eisenhower, and Patton. It gives a brief synopsis of each of their biographies then goes on to address how they handled themselves in different facets of leadership such as dealing with subordinates, character, courage, and preparation. It pays great attention to how they each used a different style to accomplish the same thing which was defeating fascism and winning the greatest war the world has ever fought.

**The Business Ethics Field Guide**  
*By Brad Agle, Aaron Miller, and Bill O’Rourke*

Any cursory online search will reveal thousands of books and articles that try to help you become a better manager or a better leader. According to many of these texts, managing involves planning and budgeting, organizing, controlling, problem solving, and communicating; while leading means establishing direction, aligning people, motivating and inspiring them, and creating change.

In this book, we propose a third set of skills that are often neglected but are just as essential for effective leadership: the ability to clarify individual and organizational values and to find a way forward when these values conflict. This book will help you develop those skills and apply them in your organization to become a better leader.

“A superb guide to personal and organizational ethics!”  
Stephen M. R. Covey, author of *The Speed of Trust*

**Company Commander: The Classic Infantry Memoir of World War II**  
*Charles B. MacDonald*

As a newly commissioned Captain of a veteran Army regiment, MacDonald’s first combat was war at its most hellish—the Battle of the Bulge. In this plain-spoken but eloquent narrative, we live each minute at MacDonald’s side, sharing in all of combat’s misery, terror, and drama. How this green commander gains his men’s loyalty in the snows of war-torn Europe is one of the great, true, unforgettable war stories of all time.
Go Forward Into the Storm: An Iwo Jima Journal
by Kerry Hotaling

Go Forward Into the Storm is the story of a Navy chaplain who buried 1,800 Marines on Iwo Jima during 26 intense days of combat. Landing ashore on D Plus 2, Chaplain Gage Hotaling recounts—through his journal—the terror of the air raids, the piles of bodies, the ever present smell of death, and much more. As a member of the Graves Registration Team his task was to search Marines for personal effects then give them a proper burial. This book offers a sobering example of honoring the dead to a generation accustomed to limited casualties and expansive funerals.

As of July 28th, 2017, hostile action has taken the lives of 1,833 Soldiers in Afghanistan.¹ Chaplain Hotaling prepared for burial, and laid to rest, nearly as many in just three weeks. It was common for his journal to say, “February 28, 1945—200 men buried,” or “March 2, 1945—247 men buried.” Modern training exercises briefly invite Commanders to contemplate such numbers, but it is difficult to simulate the psychological toll of casualties on this scale. Hotaling’s account reminds us what the human spirit is capable of in pursuit of a just cause. It also prods us to carefully think through the logistics of honoring the dead in the next near-peer conflict.

When enemy fire brought down a Blackhawk in my brigade, the unit invested hundreds of hours on the Dignified Transfer, funeral, memorial, and correspondence with the affected families. These activities were right and good. However, during the crisis at Iwo Jima the first two of these activities were reduced to a prayer spoken by Hotaling over each open grave: “You have gallantly given your life on foreign soil in order that others might live. Now we commit your body to the ground, in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. May your soul rest in eternal peace. Amen.” This Spartan committal seems almost sacrilegious in light of today’s robust services. It causes the reader to reflect on the tension between mission accomplishment and honoring the dead.

On March 16th, twenty-five days after the first fatality on Iwo Jima, 4,000 Marines gathered at the sandy cemetery adjacent the landing beaches to pay their respects. The memorial was short but fitting. Afterwards Marines slowly paced through the sacred place looking for the graves of friends they had fought alongside. It was an open-air cathedral. Readers will be reminded of their own experiences and convinced anew that the paying of respects at the end of a memorial is perhaps the most important part of the event. We must allow Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines time to linger—even if it means cutting the ceremony short.

Although the book does not purpose to promote religion, it is written from the Christian perspective. The author switches between scenes at Iwo Jima and formative moments in Hotaling’s spiritual development. Mature readers will be reminded that Chaplains are religious leaders whose development precedes military training. If there is detracting bias in the book, it springs from the author’s beautiful attempt to write a lasting tribute to his late father.

This short and powerful book preserves the history of Chaplain Gage Hotaling and the 4th Division Graves Registration Team. Go Forward Into the Storm uniquely contributes to the sensitive and niche mission of honoring the dead in a mass casualty situation. Commanders and chaplains would benefit from reading this account and discussing expectations for honoring the dead during Phase III operations.

In conjunction with this year’s Chief of Chaplains’ theme, The Year of Leader Development, your School is pleased to offer you the Commandant’s Reading List. In that Chaplaincy Leadership is about Servant Leadership, and Servant Leadership is about how others experience your Character, Competence and Connection, this year’s selections are shaped around these three dimensions of leadership, within which we all owe our best developmental efforts to those we serve.

**Commandant’s Reading List**

**Character**
- Called? Milton
- The Road to Character, ** Brooks
- The Miracle of Father Kapaun, Heying & Wenzl

**Competence (6 Enduring Skills)**
- Communicating for Change (Sacred Communication), Stanley
- Sin & Grace (Counseling / Pastoral Care), McMinn
- The 7 Laws of the Learner (Teaching / Facilitating), Wilkinson
- Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization* (Soldiering), Khanna
- FM 3-0 Operations (Staffing)
- FM 6-22 Leadership (Supervising / Leading)

**Connection**
- The Ideal Team Player, ** Lenconi
- Power Listening, Ferrari
- Harvard Business Review’s 10 Must Reads on Emotional Intelligence

* From the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Reading List
** From the Chief of Chaplains’ Reading List