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The Chief of Chaplains

General McConville, the Chief of Staff of the Army, recently reminded us that when our Army deploys we don’t go “to participate” or “to try hard”…..WE GO TO WIN. *Winning matters!* I couldn’t agree more with GEN McConville. Nested within our Army’s nonnegotiable contract to fight and win our nation’s wars is the Chaplain Corps’ unique purpose: To build Army spiritual readiness by caring for Soldiers, their Families, and Army Civilians across the full spectrum of conflict. Our Corps does this by being a world-class, fully-integrated network of Army religious support professionals who are known for their integral and critical contributions to enhancing readiness. The Army looks to us for spiritual leadership and direction. No other branch is charged with this solemn responsibility. It is our lane. We are the unit of action. The Chaplain Corps is the main effort on this important terrain for our Army and our nation.

Many of the articles in this edition of the *U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal* address difficult issues that our Corps and Army currently face (e.g., changes in the character of war, the unprecedented pace of transformation in virtually every aspect of our profession, the return of “great power” global competition). Many of the chaplains whose papers appear in this edition conducted in-depth research on topics that will assist our Corps in fulfilling its critical missions. These important areas of research include strategic advisement, moral injury, empathetic leadership, ethical fitness, and character development. Other articles in this journal remind us that our Corps has a unique obligation to be passionate about the souls of Soldiers and their Families. Much of the content challenges us to be open to new paradigms of religious support. I am confident that a deep and thoughtful reflection on each of these important topics will inspire us to even greater stewardship of the religious leadership that we are called on to provide for our Army.

Similar to last year’s publication, the CY19 edition of our Corps’ journal provides a valuable resource for promoting leader development across our branch. I’d like to offer my sincere gratitude to the thirteen members of the Journal Review Board, as well as the authors of the articles, for their leadership and contributions. *The U.S. Army Chaplains Corps Journal* represents exactly the type of intellectual excellence and thought-provoking analysis that will allow our Corps to continue providing world-class religious support and unmatched spiritual readiness for America’s Army!

Regimental Sergeant Major

George Marshall, one of America’s greatest leaders said….

_The Soldier’s heart, the Soldier’s spirit, and the Soldier’s soul are everything! Unless the Soldier’s soul sustains him, he cannot be relied on and will fail himself, his commander, and his country._

I can think of no words that are more powerful in describing how critical the Chaplain Corps is in building readiness across our formations. In caring for and nurturing the Soldier’s heart, spirit, and soul, we as a Corps are “going to the sound of the guns” with regard to GEN McConville’s #1 priority……our people!

Sergeant Major of the Army Grinston recently reminded us that America’s Army has been changing since the day it was formed in 1775, and that we…especially the NCO Corps….must do all that we can to make sure that we are ready and lethal for whatever our nation asks us to do. By highlighting some of the best articles from the past year on leadership as well as the rapidly evolving operational environment, this edition of our Corps’ journal provides valuable insight for our Chaplains, Religious Affairs Specialists, Civilian Directors of Religious Education, and other Army Civilians. I am confident that the topics covered in this publication will serve as a source of motivation as together we forge new models of religious support to enhance spiritual readiness across all three components of our Army.
“Our Army serves to defend the Nation. When we send the Army somewhere, we don’t go to participate, we don’t go to try hard, we go to win. Winning matters! We win by doing the right things, the right way.”

GEN James C. McConville
40th Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

“The Army has been changing since the Army has been in existence. We’re going to make sure that we are ready and lethal for whatever we’ve been asked to do.”

SMA Michael A. Grinston
16th Sergeant Major of the Army
A Reminder that Forty-plus Years of Chaplain Corps Knowledge is Only a Click Away

by CH Colonel Brian D. Ray, Ph.D.

The U.S. Army Chaplain Corps has a long and proud tradition of producing a top-quality academic journal. Our Corps published the first edition of its branch-specific journal in January of 1972. The Chief of Chaplains at the time, CH (MG) Gerhardt Hyatt, said the following about this new and important endeavor regarding our branch publishing content for the academic community as well as practitioners in the field.

_The publication of this initial volume is a signal event in the history of our branch. It means that a medium for the dissemination of scholarly articles and research findings has been provided. Since our whole reason for being chaplains must always be tied first to religious ministries, the contents of the journal will be that which assists military clergy in their very special calling. Our publication should also speak to the most vital problems faced….and possibilities seen….in the ripe fields and vineyards where chaplains labor. My hope is that the tremendous resources of scholarship and experience which are in our ranks….and available to us in the religious groups we represent….will be reflected in a growing collection of volumes across the years._

In keeping with Chaplain Gerhardt’s vision of “a growing collection of volumes across the years”, the Chaplain Corps produced over 100 editions of a branch-focused journal from 1972 through 2018. Over those forty-plus years, our Corps’ journal has been published under four different titles.

*Military Chaplains’ Review*

*The Army Chaplaincy: Professional Bulletin of the Unit Ministry Team*

*The Chaplain Corps Journal: The Professional Bulletin for Religious Support*

*The U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal*

Within the pages of the 100-plus editions of our Corps’ journal, there is a tremendous wellspring of knowledge on topics that are just as important to our Army today as they were decades ago. The chart on the following page shows an analysis of the main themes of the articles published in our journal. It is not surprising that many of the main topics focus on important areas like leadership, ethics, counseling, training, and homiletics. Imagine the many lessons learned over the years from our brother and sister
chaplains, as well as the wise counsel and knowledge of our religious affairs specialists, contained in the thousands of pages in our Corps’ journal!

Until 2018, that rich depository of knowledge was only been accessible by visiting the shelves of the library at the US Army Chaplain Center and School.

Through the tremendous support of the team of librarians at University of Florida Digital Collections, every single article published over the past forty-plus years in our branch’s journal is only a click away. To access the 100-plus editions of our Corps’ journal, visit the USACHCS Training Portal (usachcstraining.army.mil).

Many of the articles written over the years by chaplains and religious affairs specialists provide a great starting point for developing UMT training plans as well as conducting OPD and NCODP. The following are just a few examples of articles that are now available online for our Army.

**Main Topics of Articles from 1972 - 2015**

![Pie chart showing main topics of articles from 1972 to 2015]

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**Chaplain (COL) Brian D. Ray, Ph.D.**

Joint Staff Chaplain, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Army Reserve Element)

Executive Editor, U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal

CH Ray assumed his duties as the Joint Staff Chaplain for Joint Chiefs of Staff (ARE) in February 2019. Prior to this assignment he served as the Senior Army Reserve Advisor for the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School's transformation initiative. He also served as Command Chaplain for the 377th Theater Sustainment Command, the largest command in the U.S. Army Reserve with 35,000 soldiers serving in 500 units across the United States. In this role CH Ray directed the religious support of over 100 chaplains and 30 chaplain candidates. In his civilian capacity Dr. Ray serves as Director of the Poe Business Ethics Center at the University of Florida.
Religious Leader Symposium 4: All Things Gender

By: Dr. Grace C. Yeuell, Religious Education Program Director, IMCOM Directorate-Europe

How does the Chaplain Corps lead with moral conscience when so much of morality appears to be up for debate these days, particularly in matters of gender identity and human sexuality?

28 January-1 February 2019 in Southbridge, MA, the Chief of Chaplains hosted Religious Leader Symposium 4 (RLS4) “All Things Gender” to dig deeply into this complex question. Symposium organizer, CH (COL) Jonathan Shaw planned RLS4 as part of an ongoing series, moving from broad perspectives to particular challenges. RLS3 in 2018 introduced the topic of religious and moral leadership in the Army. RLS4 challenged Senior Chaplains, Religious Affairs Specialists, and Directors of Religious Education in attendance to push beyond deep thought on broad themes towards practical responses to a spectrum of moral issues facing Commanders, Soldiers, and their Families, including “all things gender.”

Chief of Chaplains (Major General) Paul K. Hurley welcomed attendees and prefaced the Symposium’s moral leadership theme with a reminder that the Chaplain Corps does “astonishing” work. The Corps “ministers to the souls of the Army, and maybe even the soul of the Army.” To do this work effectively within the Army’s pluralistic environment requires common grounding and unified effort from all
members of the Corps. CH Hurley emphasized that Chaplain Corps identity is grounded in the triad of leadership, legacy, and love. He reminded attendees that the Chaplain Corps today is called to provide moral leadership in a time of immense cultural upheaval. Mission success in this complex environment requires holding firm to the Corps’ storied legacy and reaching out effectively to show love and compassion towards all. MSG Edrena Roberts, Chief Religious Affairs NCO for U.S. Army Japan, was inspired by CH Hurley’s remarks to “tie my own passion into the Chief of Chaplains’ unified effort based on leadership, legacy, and love.”

Professor of Political Science, Emeritus at West Point and U.S. Army War College Adjunct Professor, Don M. Snider, Ph.D. reinforced CH Hurley’s message with a presentation on the challenges and opportunities inherent in a Chaplain’s dual calling from God and the State. Both callings carry with them moral responsibilities and the requirement to lead others with competence, character, and commitment. Dr. Snider noted that the challenge for Chaplain Corps leaders is to integrate their personal ethic with the Army ethic, while keeping true to particular religious commitments. Their opportunity is to welcome everyone who joins the Army, help to shape them into Soldiers of high moral character, and return them to the country as better citizens.

Outstanding Protestant, Jewish, and Catholic theologians followed by outlining their perspectives on moral leadership and gender-based religious support. A common thread connecting all presentations was the role of natural law in determining gender identity and sexual ethics. The Reverend Dr. Gifford Grobien, professor of systematic theology at Concordia Theological Seminary, provided solid academic and scriptural reasoning for a natural law understanding of gender and sex. He was followed by noted rabbinical scholar, Rabbi Daniel Lapin, who used humor and storytelling to extract practical life principles from the Hebrew Bible in support of a natural law approach. Dr. Janet Smith, professor of moral theology at Sacred Heart Major Seminary opened by tracing the historical quest for human happiness, from the virtues-based ancients to today’s relativistic and hedonistic culture. She ended with a pastoral appeal to be good listeners and use natural law reasoning to support Soldiers and Families making difficult moral decisions. SFC John Cushman of 1st Special Forces Command responded to the presenters by noting he had “a much better understanding of a complex issue and how to communicate with Soldiers about it.”

Each day process groups grappled with content presented and issues raised. These groups, led respectively by Senior Chaplains Faichney, Nakazono, and Wead, rallied to the task of discerning concrete ways ahead for strengthened moral leadership and religious support related to gender identity and human sexuality. One group affirmed the helpfulness of looking at gender and sexuality is-
sues from the perspective of the end user. To aid them in this task they first listed the design thinking process steps of Empathize, Define, Ideate, Prototype and Test on a cross axis from end users such as Commanders, Unit Ministry Teams, and Chapel Communities. The group then brainstormed practical moral leadership development and religious support ideas for each type of end user.

Another group first set themselves the goal of “a ready Army of strong, connected units and families respecting gender differences through engaged and trained religious support teams.” With this end in mind, they identified ways and means for enhancing future support, including continuing education to augment their skills in preaching, teaching and pastoral care.

The third group took the presentations as an opportunity to look more deeply into themselves as leaders, as well as into larger gender and sex issues facing today’s Army. The main theme that emerged from their honest dialogue was the need to practice moral leadership based on dignity and respect for the other as a human being. With this approach in mind they voiced their hope to broaden the conversation and hear face-to-face from more young Soldiers on the subject.

All groups acknowledged the significance of the issues presented, the value of their group processes, and the need to hear from an even broader range of voices moving forward. They also affirmed the value of gathering as senior leaders to talk about issues that matter, to share differing perspectives in an atmosphere of trust, and to rebuild a sense of esprit de corps with their peers. U.S. Army Africa Command Chaplain (COL) David Lile summarized his experience of the event as “a thoughtfully constructed assembly with a solid balance of fellowship and scholarship.”

Deputy Chief of Chaplains (Brigadier General) Thomas L. Soljhem bookended the Symposium by reiterating CH Hurley’s appeal to develop a shared sense of calling and unity of effort in these morally ambiguous times. He emphasized the criticality of gaining the trust of, and remaining engaged with Commanders, providing a moral compass as needed. The Symposium closed with his heartfelt reminder for Chaplain Corps leaders to continue loving and caring for the souls of all Soldiers and their Families.
Recent Chaplain Corps Recipients of Military Writing Awards

**CH (MAJ) Erik Alfsen, Regimental Chaplain, 75th Ranger Regiment**

*Arter-Darby Military History Writing Award* and the *Homeland Securities Studies Award*

CH Alfsen, an Art of War Scholar who wrote a DSCA case study at ILE, received two prestigious writing awards; the *Arter-Darby Military History Writing Award* and the *Homeland Security Studies Award*. His case study, entitled A Legacy of Ashes: The U.S. Army and the Destruction of San Francisco, focused on the moral and ethical implications of the military intervention in the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906.

The *Arter-Darby Military History Writing Award* was established to promote professional scholarship by encouraging research and writing on the evolution of American tactical doctrine. LTG(R) Robert Arter, a former deputy commandant, and former U.S. Senator Harry Darby, endowed this award to recognize students for writing a well-documented historical graduate thesis.

**CH (MAJ) John McDougall, BCT Chaplain, 4th IBCT (ABN), 25th ID**

*General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Writing Competition*

During his ILE studies, CH McDougall placed second in the General Douglas MacArthur Leadership Writing Competition for his paper on empathetic leadership and understanding the human domain. During each session of the Intermediate Level Education Course, the Command and General Staff College holds the General Douglas MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition. The award was established in 1985 to encourage and recognize scholarship and professional writing on leadership. Students author and submit papers on various leadership topics. Winning papers are selected by a panel of judges and evaluated on originality, scholarship, writing style, and value to the profession. The Douglas MacArthur Foundation in Norfolk, Va., sponsors this award and the Center for Army Leadership administers it.

**CH (COL) Brian Ray, Joint Staff Chaplain, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Army Reserve Element)**

*Dean’s Award for Excellence in Writing, Joint Forces Staff College*

CH Ray received the Dean’s Award for Excellence in Writing from the Joint Forces Staff College. This award recognizes senior military officers for excellence in academic research and analysis. CH Ray, who also serves as a Senior Lecturer of Leadership and Ethics at the University of Florida, co-authored a paper entitled Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Across the Seven Joint Functions. The article was recently selected for publication in Joint Force Quarterly. CH Ray co-authored his paper as part of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS). The JCWS curriculum prepares officers to lead joint planning efforts, integrate the creativity of operational art with the analytical process of operational design, and utilize the joint planning process to develop theater strategies and operational plans in complex global operating environments.
The United States and other liberal democracies across Europe have become increasingly secular over the past 50+ years. Friedrich Nietzsche’s famous declaration of the late 19th century, “God is dead,” served to highlight the belief among politicians and philosophers that religion was losing its influence over the affairs of men, at least in Western Europe. This trend is not present in many areas of the world today. To the contrary, U.S. policy makers and practitioners find it increasingly challenging to respond to the ever-expanding and prominent role religion encompasses in national and international affairs. For example, religion was a driving factor in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It served as a key motivational factor among the various factions in the former Yugoslavia leading up to the Serbian massacres of the Bosnian men and boys in 1995. Religion was a long-standing central component of the “Troubles” of Northern Ireland between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republican Army. The impact of religion, however, is not exclusively negative. On the positive side, religion provided an organizational framework for the establishment of political parties in the Post-Suharto era of Indonesian politics.

For much of the 20th century, religion as a topic of academic investigation in international relations was non-existent. World War I, World War II, and the Cold War all served to push the topic further from serious academic investigation. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the desire in the west among social scientists, policy makers, and governing officials was to advance the development of secular, liberal democracies. Regardless of their religious history, this was viewed as the best way to rebuild emerging nations as well as enhance their standing in the modern world.

The trend did not last. By the close of the Cold War, scholars increasingly, and sometimes reluctantly, began to understand religion was gaining increased influence within geo-political discourse, engagement, and policy. As is often the case, scholars recognized the deficit ahead of politicians and diplomats. The result for policy makers in the west has been increased frustrations attempting to navigate religion and its enhanced relationship to political and military affairs as a result of western democracies adopting secularization.
Ignoring or minimizing religion is no longer considered beneficial or wise. Effective relations require a greater awareness of the intricacies of religion in state affairs. A superficial understanding of religion by policy makers and state emissaries is neither satisfactory for diplomacy, strategic alliance building, nor responding to international crises. U.S. diplomats and Foreign Service personnel learned this after embracing their own inadequacies. Following her tenure as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and Secretary of State under President Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright actively promoted the need for U.S. diplomats to enhance their skills in religion as a critical function of international diplomacy. She called for focused training in local religions; the hiring of religious experts as a resource for State Department staff and diplomatic personnel; standardized, specific training for Foreign Service personnel; and the hiring of religious attachés for key embassies where religion is a critical factor.

During the term of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the State Department took significant steps to address its own assessed gaps in religious literacy and its ability to engage foreign nations on matters of religion. Secretary Clinton led the department to grow its capacity to effectively deal with religion throughout the world. In the final report to Secretary Clinton, the State Department recommended the U.S. develop a true national capacity guide for the engagement of religion abroad. The other agency seeking to expand religious literacy is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID recognized religion was a critical factor of state and regional development in many of the areas it engages around the world. It also recognized it possessed a serious institutional blind spot due to its lack of in-depth knowledge and expertise on religion in its various working environments. The result has been a call for lines of effort to expand its own religious institutional capacity to facilitate more productive responses in areas where religion is a pivotal social/cultural factor.

While the State Department and USAID specifically, and international diplomats more broadly, are recognizing a greater need for enhanced capabilities in religious literacy, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has not followed suit. Historically, the military services have relied on their trained religious professionals (chaplains) to provide awareness of distinctive faith groups and to advise the command on all matters of religion. While this has been a logical method for handling external religious concerns and religious advisement to the commander, it has not always been an ideal approach. The reality is very few chaplains have the professional training or the expertise to provide the commander with the detailed information requirements regarding indigenous religions. Furthermore, the strategic implications of how cultures, ethnicities, communities, and nations employ their various religious systems in a strategic theater is more of an area of investigation for the intelligence warfighting function than a religious concern.

For this reason, a new paradigm is needed for the DOD, in general, and the U.S. Army, specifically, regarding religious literacy and expanded religious engagement capabilities. As a subset of the DOD, the Army needs expanded religious literacy capability and an enhanced understanding regarding the role of religion among its practitioners within any geographic area. What strategic level commanders require...
is a robust religious engagement cell that can provide the commander with the nuanced religious advisement necessary to inform strategic and operational decisions. This cell would offer the commander real-time current assessments of how religion impacts the strategic theater and offer a research function to ensure the information provided evolves as the use of religion evolves in any given region.

Religion as an Operational and Strategic Factor

The ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven intractable for the DOD and the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. One difficulty is how these nations, with their myriad of divisions within them, have a culture that fuses religion, ethnicity, social structure, politics, and economics in a way that confounds many western thinkers and policy makers. Iraq and Afghanistan typify countries that intermingle their social, political and religious structures within their culture. Religion as a primary factor in diplomacy and engagement has challenged America’s ability to effectively respond.

With regard to international relations, religious factors are present among many people groups or nations in the world. Religion can be a direct or indirect, contributing or exacerbating factor in internal, territorial, or international conflicts. This is not to remotely imply religion is a primary factor underlying most national and international conflict. A number of researchers have investigated this long-held myth and found it does not stand up to sound scrutiny. Carmy has noted convincingly that many who maintain this mistaken notion are guided by a secular bias against religion that views their religiously devoid approach as the morally superior world view. The reality is aspects of religion are often present in conflicts that are not religious in origin. Therefore, a more developed understanding of religion within culture is critical to assessing how various local, nation/state, or territorial actors employ religion to achieve their respective ends.

Religion as an Integral Aspect of Culture

Historically many academic researchers have viewed religion as a separate and distinct category of investigation from the rest of culture. They have examined religion as though it is a standalone category of life in which there is no comingling of religion with any other aspect of one’s existence (i.e., family, vocation, politics, social advocacy, etc.). As Fitzgerald correctly notes, this has produced a distorted understanding of religion that has serious implications well beyond the study of religion. Baily and Redden add to this critical understanding of religion when they state, “for billions, religion does play a role in how life is lived, and scholars who attend only to the ‘secular’ or ‘religious’ aspects of diverse issues related to those lives risk conveying an impoverished understanding of the phenomena they study.”

Religion is a lived value in many parts of the world, a fact secular thinkers in the West often do not appreciably comprehend. Attempting to understand culture devoid of its religious underpinnings is misguided. As the insurgency in Iraq was gaining momentum, U.S. policy makers and strategic military leaders failed at multiple points to develop a coherent strategy to engage the religious leaders who could be both strategic and tactical assets. The U.S. lacked the awareness of how religion, specifically Islam, was a central factor in propelling the insurgents, and they failed to understand how it could be a primary resource to defuse the violence. Within Iraq those actors supporting U.S. interest and policy, and those actors opposing it
had the same religious/cultural system, with obvious variations. As Bingham stated, “At the strategic level of war, the integration of religion remains such a nonstandard task that most military planners have difficulty knowing where to begin.”

The U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan needed to fundamentally change the way it approached religion in terms of its strategic, operational, and tactical goals. Strategic military leaders and planners required the capability to truly analyze the role of religion in the strategic AOR. That resource did not exist during the rise of the Iraqi insurgency. Most attempts to understand religion at the time were more akin to an anthropological/cultural analysis lacking religious awareness or comprehension. As Bedsole wisely noted, using a social science paradigm to provide the analysis of religion is vastly incomplete. It is only when a fuller theological analysis is added to the social-cultural understanding of religion that the intricacies of the religious system’s impact become more evident. This provides the commander a more robust assessment of friends and foes alike.

History attests religion is a key component promoting violence in some conflicts. It can likewise be a vehicle to incite violence for the achievement of political goals. Conversely, a religiously-derived solution could be the ideal remedy a conflict requires if peace is to be found. Religion has the power to promote peace and harmony amongst people like few other systems in the world. An astute planner or commander must have the resources necessary to conduct the analysis of the religious system or systems involved in any area of engagement. Carlson calls this “getting religion.” He defines it thus: “Getting religion, then, entails learning how to operate in environments where religion is a crucial element in strategic and tactical centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities. This means being concerned not only with adversaries’ vulnerabilities, but the military’s as well.” Without the requisite knowledge of the intricacies of the religion from a cultural and theological perspective, this level of analysis would be difficult for the most skilled of military planners or strategic commanders.

Understanding the motivations local or regional populations possess are critical to strategic success for GCCs. As the DOD irregular warfare document states, “The population is important, as is a thorough understanding of the religious, cultural, and economic influences.” Though this document treats religion and culture as distinct variables, rather than intertwined variables, it correctly points out that commanders fighting irregular wars require an in-depth analysis of the primary motivators of the local population. The publication goes on to note that cultural-religious understanding of the population requires continuous assessment. The failure on the part of U.S. diplomats and military leaders to fully appreciate this reality is one of the key reasons why a meaningful response to the increased sectarian violence in Iraq faltered. The initial invasion and subsequent surge, which were designed in part to quell the rise in Sunni-Shia violence, were both planned without meaningful religious analysis or a robust scrutiny of how religion impacted the people, culture and insurgency. The results are well documented.

U.S. foreign policy experts and military planners have a long history of failing to understand Islam and how it influences its practitioners. From the Eisenhower presidency’s CIA led coup in Iran to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the limited understanding of Islam and its impact on cultures, societies, and nations has cost the U.S. in treasure, people, and standing in the world. Islam is the religious “failure de jour” in light of the last 18 years of combat operations in Islamic countries and regions. The lack of adequate understanding of the religious factors that influence Islamic communities, whether they be Sunni, Shia, or Khariji Islam, has proven costly in American foreign policy and American intervention. Another unintended consequence of failing to understand the cultural implications of Islam is how practitioners of Islam understand the west’s view of their religion. Due to the way the dialogue and debate were expressed in the public arena following the attacks of 9/11, many in the Islamic world came to view the west as anti-Islam. Though President Bush and other heads of state made public comments and speeches contradicting this belief, the perception has remained to one degree or another. This has only deepened the already expansive divide.

Other regions of the globe have people groups and ethnicities that possess a
strong religious identity within their cultures and nation every bit as strong as the deep Muslim identity with Islam. Military commanders need in-depth knowledge of the religions in those areas just as much as the strategic leaders in the U.S. Central Command AOR need to truly know the intricacies of Islam.

In order to gain a greater understanding of the influence of religion in an AOR, strategic leaders must engage a representative group of religious leaders in the region. However, engaging religious actors is not without a host of complexities. Religious tensions can transcend multiple generations. Religious animosity can be incredibly intense and personal for religious actors. In societies where religious leaders are revered or feared, their ability to channel religious passions into political or military action is a very real possibility. The rewards this outreach might produce could significantly benefit the commander who successfully navigates these challenges. The religious leaders who are a threat to U.S. strategic interest, and those who are a force for regional stability, are equally capable of assisting GCC commanders in securing strategic goals. In many cases, revered religious leaders have power and influence over the people and politics needed to promote peace and stability.

**Insufficient Advisers for Religious Operational/Strategic Implications**

Historically and doctrinally, the role of providing external advisement to the commander on matters of religion has fallen to the command chaplain and the staff he or she manages. The Army defines external advisement as advising commanders on how religion impacts a unit’s mission throughout its area of operations (AO). The aim of external advisement is to help commanders and staffs more clearly understand how religion shapes the battlefield and impacts mission success. As they better understand religion in an operational environment (OE), they are better equipped to avoid offense and, even more important, better informed of the dynamics for building relationships of trust and forming valuable partnerships.

The doctrinal assumption within the Army is that chaplains possess the required skills to easily and routinely perform this function. However, most chaplains lack the institutional or experiential knowledge to perform the various tasks that external advisement requires.

Chaplains are religions officers and leaders. They bring religious expertise to their work as chaplains. The expertise of the chaplain seldom extends past his or her distinctive faith tradition. Chaplains require a distinctive faith tradition or denominational (ecclesiastical) endorsement to perform their duties in the military. The ecclesiastical endorsement is a methodology that allows an ecclesiastical body to affirm the individual chaplain is a good faith representative of the ecclesiastical tenants of the endorsing agency. Prior to pursuing ecclesiastical endorsement, the chaplain must meet the educational requirements, often from denominational institutions. These requirements include a baccalaureate degree of not less than 120 semester hours and a post baccalaureate degree of not less than 72 hours from an approved educational facility.

Since endorsing agencies set both the educational, theological, and experiential requirements for religious ministry professionals seeking appointment as Army chaplains, it is understood chaplains are primarily educated in those matters that are deemed essential to the endorsing agent. In others words, chaplains are trained to be experts in the practices and beliefs of his or her faith tenants. The Army requires this faith group expertise of each of its chaplains to ensure it has a healthy and functional pluralistic environment for religious accommodation. Because of this distinctive faith tradition emphasis, chaplains typically possess little more than superficial knowledge of other religious systems. Additional training and professional preparation are required for chaplains to be able to provide the commander the external religious advisement required.

The Army does train and employ chaplains who are designated as subject matter experts on world religions. However, this capability is a limited resource. Currently there are only four chaplains serving in a utilization tour (a tour where the trained chaplain uses the additional educational expertise for the benefit of the Army for three years) across the Army. That small number does not meet the minimal requirement for each ASCC or GCC to have a world religions chaplain in the
organization. There are former world religion subject matter experts serving in various assignments throughout the Army, but those chaplains are seldom assigned on the basis their skill identifier as a world religions expert. Additional chaplains serve in positions that are coded as world religion positions for administrative purposes, but current Army staffing guidance does not require those positions to be filled by chaplains possessing a world religions skill identifier.

The reality is the Army lacks the critical capacity of chaplains trained in world religions who are able to advise the commander on the intricacies of religion in an AOR. A further challenge to chaplains advising commanders on religion is some of the information commanders require regarding religion in combat operations is for combatant purposes. This is information that would normally be produced by intelligence analysts rather than a chaplain. A key concern regarding chaplains providing external advisement to commanders is protecting chaplain’s noncombatant status. As noncombatants, chaplains must continuously exercise care not to violate this protected status.

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 1-05.3 states,

Chaplains participate in operational planning and advise commanders and staffs on matters as appropriate, consistent with their noncombatant status. This includes indigenous religions in the AO, holy days that could impact military operations, and the impact of local religious leaders, organizations, and religious structures.

This information briefed to the command and staff is important. It would be foolhardy to plan any type of combat or stability operation without this knowledge. The command, however, may have need of more nuanced information regarding religion than the Army doctrine and regulations allows a chaplain to provide. During the military decision-making process (MDMP), chaplains integrate their expertise on religion in the staff planning process. Extreme care must be exercised to ensure a line, not always clear or precise, is not crossed regarding noncombatant verses combatant capabilities. ATP 1-05.3 further notes, “Chaplains and religious affairs specialists may work in boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups to integrate their respective expertise and knowledge with the collective expertise of staffs to focus on specific problem sets and provide coherent staff recommendations to commanders.” Again, the information the chaplain provides may be valuable to the overall plan, but it may not necessarily be what the commander requires in the moment, especially during combat operations. The ATP acknowledges that all a chaplain may discover about religion in the AO may not be the information the commander requires. Discernment and reasoned judgement must be applied to ensure the commander has what is necessary to make informed decisions during the operation. Even with proper judgement applied, the chaplain may not be able to provide the commander the critical information on religion required to meet the strategic or operational need.

During the preparation phase of combat or stability operations, the commander’s intelligence staff produces the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). One of the key products of the IPB is the development of the commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR). It is possible that religion could become a PIR for the commander by any number of means. If some element of religion
is a strategic or tactical advantage for the opposition force, this could be a PIR. Religious leaders could become legitimate threats if they are responsible for directing hostilities toward U.S personnel. This could elevate these leaders to the commander’s PIR. If the enemy forces use elements of religion to motivate its personnel to action, or if the religion is co-opted in some way that creates a new and violent expression of that religion, this becomes a PIR for the commander. If a religious leader is proclaiming a message of violence and harm to U.S. or allied personnel, the civilian population, or strategic locations, this too becomes a PIR for the commander. As such, these are some aspects of religion for which chaplains could not advise the commander without possibly compromising their noncombatant status.

These examples highlight the fact that chaplains are limited in the information they can provide a commander during hostile or potentially hostile actions. Even if the chaplain possesses the knowledge and training to advise on the deepest intricacies of a religious tradition in an AOR, the information the chaplain can legally provide the command is still restricted by US and international law. Where chaplains are legally and regulatory limited in external religious advisement, the intelligence staff is the logical staff entity to advise the commander on matters of religion in lieu of the chaplain. However, this may not be the ideal solution.

Intelligence Professionals Lack Training to Address/Advise on Religion

Intelligence is a fundamental necessity to all military operations. It serves as one of the six warfighting functions at a commander’s disposal. “A warfighting function is a group of task and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.” The intelligence warfighting function is the employment of various tasks and systems to assist the command and staff in gaining a greater understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, or other factors that may directly or indirectly impact the mission.

Intelligence is defined as “the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.” The purpose of intelligence operations is to continuously analyze the operational environment to gain the most complete understanding of the operational variables. The operational variables commanders focus on are the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time domains. These are commonly referred to by the acronym PMESII–PT. Religion has the ability to be intertwined with many of these domains. Religion can comingle with local and national politics in a given AO. The Taliban seeking to return to some measure of power in Afghanistan is a contemporary example. Religion can be a key influential factor with the military and its political decision makers as is currently the case in Iran.

Religion in an AO matters to intelligence analysts and commanders. When examining the people and culture within the AO, intelligence analysts want to know how religion is practiced among the people and what impact religion may have in the operational environment. Since September 11, 2001, America’s military establishment has been violently awakened to the fact that religion is perpetuating some of the hate and animosity directed at western powers. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, there was a strong desire to bolster the myth that the attacks on New York and Washington, DC had absolutely nothing to do with religion or a religious motivation. The reluctance to address the obvious “elephant in the room” (religion) initially hurt the U.S. response to the attacks on its people
and institutions. Eventually policy makers and military leaders began to address religion as a primary driver of the organizations and people who were engaged in jihad. Though the response may have been slow, a consensus has been achieved in recognizing the negative impact of religion among some violent groups.

Assessing how religion influences culture, politics, and military operations by regular and irregular adversarial forces falls to intelligence personnel. Chaplains may have minimal involvement in this process, but the primary responsibility belongs to intelligence professionals. Most Army intelligence personnel are not trained in matters of religion or indigenous faith practices. There is no requirement for this training within the career field. Therefore, Army intelligence personnel lack the training necessary to conduct an extensive analysis of religion in order to provide the commander the quality intelligence output required. Johnston provides an excellent example from within Sunni Islam to highlight this reality. Researchers have identified three distinct forms of expression or groups, each with its unique world view and means of expression, among Sunnis. The first group is known as political Islamists. Their focus is on political reforms and developing social norms to address areas of injustice and social problems within the Sunni world. The second group is known as the missionary Islamists whose priority is on the individual moral and spiritual well-being of Muslims as the best means to counter unbelief. The third group are the jihadi Islamists. This group possesses a militant desire to establish a true Islamic caliphate using armed struggle and other means of force against a host of targets within the Muslim world and the West.

To the casual observer of Sunni Islam, these distinctions among these three groups could be easily overlooked or conflated. Army intelligence analysts who lack the critical training in Islamic history, culture, theology, and Qur’anic exegesis are limited in providing a commander the robust understanding of religion he or she needs to make timely decisions in the AOR. Army intelligence analysts are some of the best trained in the world. Intelligence analytical skills are perishable, however, without continued proficiency training. If in-depth religious literacy training was provided to intelligence analysts, it, would be a perishable skill requiring ongoing training by a subject matter expert.

No such expertise exists within the Army intelligence career field, in any appreciable way, to benefit the training and development of intelligence personnel in religion. A world religions chaplain serving at the Army military intelligence school could mitigate this gap in training, but it would not be the comprehensive solution required. The reality is the Army intelligence school does not possess a world religions chaplain to assist in training religious analytical skills. Even if one were present, the impact to intelligence collection would be minimal at best. Therefore, Army intelligence analysts are not ideally suited to provide commanders the critical intelligence assessments of religion in the AOR.

**Standing Up a Strategic Religious Advisement/Engagement Cell**

The mission command warfighting function requires commanders and their staff to be flexible, agile, and adaptive leaders capable of achieving the commander’s intent within unified land operations. During operations, commanders rely on their staff to provide the real time knowledge and information required to make key decisions through all phases of a given mission. For all Army commands, the role of the staff is to manage and process information and provide it to leadership as part of the commander’s assessment and analysis. This allows the commander to be better informed when making critical decisions. This implies strategic leaders will have the right people serving on their staff who are able to meet the commander’s needs for quality analysis. With regard to in depth religious analysis and external advisement on religion, a potential or real gap exists. Situations can and do arise where both the chaplain and the intelligence personnel are limited due to legal limitations (chaplain) or lack of expertise and knowledge (intelligence staff) to provide commanders the necessary analysis of religion’s impact on operations.

The solution to address this current gap is in the creation of a new staff cell within the ASCC or GCC headquarters that is staffed with true expertise on the religions within the AOR. For some time, policy makers and academics
have recognized the U.S. government, particularly the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the various intelligence agencies, have been lacking in religious literacy and the ability to engage religion with other nation-states and partners. Two U.S. government agencies with significant responsibility in foreign engagement, USAID and the Department of State, have recognized their own shortcomings with regard to religion and the ability to understand it within religious environments abroad. Each has taken steps to correct this gap.

The DOD must follow the precedent established by the Department of State, USAID, and international diplomats. The DOD should build capacity by expanding its religious literacy to provide combatant commanders the tools and resources necessary to execute the mission. Creating a religious advisement/engagement cell at the GCC or ASCC is a workable solution to a current gap. Throughout the military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders have utilized the chaplain to engage religious leaders and educate the formation on the specifics of religion in the AO. Johnston calls this “[t]he enlightened use of military chaplains.” He notes utilizing chaplains in this way is at the discretion on commanders. Patterson calls this an “ad hoc approach [that] began in the Balkans.” The use of chaplains for this purpose produced mixed results for strategic leaders in the AOR. Initially there was no doctrinal or training guidance for chaplains to use, especially in the area of engagements with local or strategic religious leaders. DOD and the Army sought to remedy this with the development of JP 1-05 and ATP 1-05.03. These publications authorized chaplains to conduct these engagements, but always under the discretion of the commander.

Commanders discovered however that the chaplain is not always the ideal candidate for the assignment. Johnston proposed multiple reasons for this. First, many chaplains who engaged with religious leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to produce successful outcomes. Lack of adequate training for the chaplain may have been a contributing factor. Second, some commanders assessed their chaplain knew less about the religion of the AO than they did. Third, some chaplains, having deployed multiple times, were dealing with their own traumatic stress issues limiting their ability to adequately focus on mission requirements. Fourth, some chaplains had a significant bias against practitioners of local religions and refused to engage them without a direct order from the command. Fifth, some ecclesiastical endorsers would not sanction their chaplains conducting interfaith dialogue. Sixth, the limited time chaplains were in theater prevented them from building the relationships with local religious leaders necessary to produce effective outcomes. Seventh, chaplains had limited language skills and cultural expertise to be effective in these environments. Eighth, some chaplains simply lacked the maturity, knowledge, or disposition to work with leaders of other faith groups.

Johnston favors chaplains having an expanded role in external religious advisement and especially in religious leader engagements in theater. However, he concludes his section on the potential limitations of using chaplains with a strong recommendation. “All of these considerations give added credence to the corresponding need for Religion Attachés (or their equivalent) in the U.S. embassies of those countries where chaplains could become involved on this basis.” Johnston is only half correct on this point. It is true, chaplains need help with these types of missions. This is especially true at the strategic level of Army chaplaincy. At present, there is no ongoing, systematic training mechanism to educate strategic level Army chaplains (Corps level and higher) on engaging religious leaders to achieve strategic level outcomes. It is also true that additional capacity for religious expertise needs to be developed. The religious advisement/engagement cell should reside in DOD rather than within the Department of State, as Johnston recommends. Specifically, it should reside in the ASCC or GCC. The GCC makes the most sense because that is the senior level combatant headquarters for any theater. If the expanded capability existed in the ASCC, it would be an Army controlled asset available uniquely to Army chaplains and Army commanders.

The religious advisement/engagement cell should be staffed and managed by civilians with the possibility of contracted augmentation for niche expertise. There are two clear reasons for this. First, the expertise this cell would require does not exist in any one Army uniformed member. The position would require someone or a team with
extensive training in regional religions, a thorough understanding of military intelligence with a focus on cultural analysis, and civil affairs or similar training in cross-cultural engagement. In the Army, these are three separate branches serving three staff functions in a headquarters. Therefore, a military solution to fill the capability is not practical. Second, professionals filling this capability require extended continuity to be effective in the region. Civilians have far more long term stability than do uniformed personnel, as a general rule. If civilianized, the cell lead should be graded equivalent to a GS13/14, depending on education level and experience in the field, in order to provide proper supervision/management of the team.

The size of the cell would vary depending on the GCC or ASCC in which it resides. Each GCC and its corresponding ASCC has diversely different needs for religious expertise. The two GCCs with the most complex religious environment are U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), focused on the majority of the African continent, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), focused on the Indo-Pacific region of Asia and Australia. AFRICOM is home to three primary religious traditions: African traditional religions, Christianity, and Islam. The complexity is that these religions vary in nuanced expressions across the continent. The tribal religions from one people group to another can be very different. There are additional variations within Christianity and Islam that add complexity. There is also a high degree of synchronism, meaning the religions comingle with one another over time. Across the Pacific Rim and Australia, there is a wider variety of unique religious traditions that are even more complex and diverse. The religious and cultural expertise required for either of these GCCs would be far greater than one person could manage. It would require a team of individuals that could advise and engage on various subsets of the religious spectrum within the AOR.

Each GCC/ASCC would have unique needs that would not look like the others. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has a mix of Roman Catholic, various Protestant traditions, other smaller organized faith groups, and a great diversity of indigenous religious traditions. Synchronism is an issue throughout the continent as well. U.S European Command (EUCOM) is influenced by Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Protestant traditions, and Islam from native Europeans and immigrants from Islamic regions of Africa and Asia. An emerging trend in EUCOM is the new divisions in the Eastern Orthodox Church which has political ramifications as well. Therefore, each GCC/ASCC would need to decide the size of its religious advisement/engagement cell based on its geographic needs.

**Conclusion**

Increasingly, the executive branch of the U.S. government is recognizing and attempting to address its deficits with regard to religious literacy and religious engagement in its foreign policy arena. The U.S. Department of State and USAID are leading in this endeavor. Multiple prominent academic institutions provide research and analysis to assist in the development of sound policy regarding U.S. engagement and religion. The DOD is failing to address its own gaps regarding religion. The DOD must see itself and recognize its deficiencies with regard to religious literacy, religious advisement to the commander, and religious leader engagement. It should follow the lead of other executive branch agencies and expand religious literacy capacity. A staffed and resourced religious advisement/engagement cell (the true name can be worked out in the development process) provides the GCC/ASCC commander with the required resources necessary to effectively engage and assess religious considerations in the AOR. The creation of this capacity within the strategic headquarters is in no way intended to remove the chaplain or ministry team from the staff process in religious engagements or advisement. Religious leaders within various AORs want to engage other clerics as part of their bi-lateral exchange. Chaplains are a logical resource for that cleric-to-cleric exchange. But the responsibility to be the sole subject matter expert on matters of religion within an AOR, especially in those GCCs where a great diversity of religions exist, cannot fall exclusively to the chaplain. If the chaplain remains the primary religious expert, it could negatively impact the essential Title 10 USC responsibilities of the command chaplain. Chaplains exist first and foremost to provide and ensure the free exercise of religion for all authorized personnel within the formation.
NOTES


4. Ibid.


8. ibid. 3.


16. Patterson, 74.


23. Ibid., 60.


29. Ibid.


33. Huusa and Mihntali, 187.


36. Chaplain (Colonel) Kevin Forrester, Ph.D., Command Chaplain 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley, Kansas


38. ibid., 4.

39. Ibid., 4.

40. Ibid., 11.

41. Johnston, 134.

42. AR 165-1, 24.
The Executive’s Shadow:
Utilizing Strategic Self-Awareness to Minimize Derailment

By Chaplain (Colonel) Carron A. Jones

Anyone who perceives his shadow and his light simultaneously sees himself from two sides and thus gets in the middle.

—Carl G. Jung

On February 7, 2018 the House Armed Services Sub-Committee called for all the Military Service Chiefs to testify concerning the topic of senior leader misconduct. Demanding full transparency into the investigative process and the prevention plan, the Members of Congress clearly displayed their disappointment and their determination to hold the Services accountable. By televising the session, Members of Congress communicated to the American people and to the Services, that “the special trust and confidence” invested in senior leaders had been compromised.

Readiness is the number one priority of the U.S. Army. In a high velocity, complex security environment, readiness is a critical component of a system that enables Soldiers to fight and win our nation’s wars. When Army senior leaders engage in misconduct, readiness and mission accomplishment are jeopardized. During fiscal year 2017, the Department of the Army Inspector General investigated and substantiated 162 allegations against Army general officers. Testifying before the Members, General James McConville, Vice Chief of Staff, owned the Army’s responsibility to produce leaders of character and thanked the Members for their sincere concern. Acknowledging that despite stringent promotion selection criteria and rigorous professional development,
officer misconduct still occurs. General McConville strongly affirmed that “one incident of senior misconduct is too many” and that violations of values or ethics are not just a mistake, they are a fundamental failure in meeting the standards of the Army profession.”

Responding to the call for prevention, General McConville articulated a three-tiered approach for stopping senior officer misconduct. In the first tier, general officers receive ethics training during the Army Strategic Education Program (ASEP-Basic). This ethics training, provided by Judge Advocate General, covers all illegal, immoral, and unethical behaviors and perceptions of behavior that could cause an officer to be placed under investigation. This senior leader ethics training builds upon years of accumulated training that officers receive on the Army Values and the Profession of Arms. This ethics training affirms that each time a leader is promoted to the next rank, it is reiterated to him or her that the commission and the oath constitute an individual moral commitment and common ethical instruction. The commission and the oath are the foundation of the trust placed in military officers by the American people.

The second tier in the approach to prevention, according to General McConville, is strategic education. The ASEP-Basic/Advanced outcomes focus on personal and professional responsibilities of senior leaders. It concentrates attention on stewardship of the profession and the appropriate use of power within the profession. Brigadier Generals attending the program repeatedly hear distinct messaging regarding behavioral expectations from the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Under Secretary of the Army, and from the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, “The mere appearance of impropriety is unacceptable.”

A new prevention addition to ASEP, is the General Officer Readiness Program (GORP) which focuses on health and wellness as protective factors. It will highlight key executive leader skills such as time management, health and wellness, and personal relationships. Additionally, it will provide opportunity to engage topics such as self-awareness. Coaching and networking opportunities will also be made available. This program is a product of research conducted in 2017 that revealed that the Army has not maximized wellness programs that exist in industry. This GORP change to ASEP will enable senior leaders to be better equipped to deal with loneliness, stress, and work-life integration.

The Army’s third tier of prevention lies in the reactive realm. This tier consists of the investigation and adjudication of allegations against general officers. Consequences for substantiated misconduct range from verbal counseling to General Court-Martial Convening Authority. Misconduct reporting outcomes will appear in the Annual Inspector General Report. The Army appears to have a well-managed approach to preventing senior leader misconduct enabling General McConville to report that substantiated reports have decreased 51% since 2013. But if misconduct is decreasing, why are our civilian authorities still demanding more accountability? Perhaps they are concerned that the Army, and the other services, have yet to address the root cause of why senior leaders derail.

Given the years of training and known professional experience we can reasonably affirm that Army senior leaders know right from wrong. There is no lack of knowledge about law, policy, or regulation. Our leaders know “what” to do. They know how they should conduct themselves, so what gets in the way? Why then, do senior leaders behave against their interests? What problem is creating this “knowing-doing gap.”

This paper proffers a leadership development approach informed by interpersonal psychology. It examines perspectives
on leader derailment from both military and civilian literature. It discusses expectations of leaders, the role of reputation, the shadow side of personality, and the requirement for strategic self-awareness. A strategy is presented for a more consistent approach to strategic self-awareness utilizing assessments, stakeholder feedback, and executive coaching. This development approach intends to help close the knowing-doing gap and reduce the potential for senior leader derailment.

**Strategic Leader Context**

Today’s strategic leader must have the ability to survive and thrive during high velocity change and uncertainty. A senior leader’s mental toughness and focus while being bombarded 24/7 with massive amounts of data and quick-turn decisions pertaining to complex adaptive systems is essential. Leaders are expected to push themselves and others hard. According to Erik De Haan, in his book, *The Leadership Shadow*, leaders in the military and industry must accept a difficult reality;

As an executive today, you have a multiplicity of factors to consider when making even the simplest of decisions. You have to consider more stakeholders, (internally and externally), more socio-political perspectives, more regulatory requirements, a greater range of cultural sensitivities, fuller transparency to the media and civil society, higher levels of accountability (for the decision as well as the consequences of the decision), more specific and rigorous governance standards, and more exacting performance criteria.

These conditions require leaders to manage the responsibility of closely attending to others while following as passionately as they lead. They must listen well to subordinates and teammates, understand their concerns, give them meaningful support, and at the same time motivate them for strategic level results. Today’s strategic leaders and executives are at risk, De Haan advises, of becoming “overcooked” as they take on unhelpful and ultimately unproductive patterns of demand, stubbornness, or frenetic activity. “Instead of being open to possibility and ambiguity, and willing to engage in continuous and creative conversations with themselves and others, these executives become obstinate, resentful, inarticulate, or intense.” These leaders, in a state of over-drive, find that the behaviors that got them promoted to the top and to achieve outstanding results and rewards, become unproductive. The unrelenting challenge to meet work and life demands often leads to inappropriate behaviors resulting in personal and professional catastrophes. Moral rationalizing becomes the method for coping with behavior that these leaders know is unethical and inappropriate.

Senior leaders are expected to be intellectually, emotionally, and physically resilient, capable of executing a brilliant strategy. During hectic travel across time-zones, leaders are expected to promptly respond to every email, text, or call, regardless of the hour.
They, and their family members, may feel as if they are on parade or living in a fish bowl. Our leaders must have a strong sense of self, be a high-functioning disciplined individual, a flawless communicator, and a solid team player. They must track allegiances, unwritten rules, and who needs to know what and why. Leaders must take care of the individual as well as the whole, nurture the core as well as track the periphery. They must be conscious of details, without getting bogged down, while creatively imagining the future and aligning the organization.

This endeavor to balance aspiration and frustration can have a negative impact on work and home relationships. It can lead to exhaustion and burnout. Loss of coping skills can potentially send a leader into a downward spiral of depression, illness, collapse, or destructive behavior. The leader’s fear of failure and the pressure to fulfill everyone’s expectations can result in the manifestation of a potentially negative personality trait known as hubris.

**The Hubris Challenge**

Lord David Owen, founder of the Daedalus Trust and the leading researcher on hubris syndrome, defines this personality trait with a paradoxical profile. The good of hubris manifests in leaders as powerful charisma; inspiring, persuading, and able to sell a grand vision. It produces leaders who are fearless in the face of risks and entrepreneurs who refuse to quit. Hubris can produce the enabling sense of boldness and self-confidence required by commanders on the battlefield or strategic leaders functioning at the enterprise level. The challenge is that hubris has another side, a much less charming side.

Negative hubristic behavior is described as a sense of overbearing pride, defiance, or presumption not justified by the circumstances or perceptions of others. It is cyclic in nature, most often present during periods of power. While in cycle, a leader can display excessive pride and pig-headedness along with public displays of overconfidence, which hide associated private and deeply held feelings of remorse, fear, and doubt. Cycling between excessive pride, deep shame, and self-doubt can result in a leader spiraling downward and losing control. Persons demonstrating three or more symptoms, as listed in the table, meet Owen’s criteria for a diagnosis of hubris syndrome. Lord Owen names Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, President George W. Bush, and Prime Minister Tony Blair as exemplifying hubris during their political tenure. These leaders displayed charm, charisma, the ability to inspire, persuasiveness, vision, and a willingness to take risks; all characteristics attributed to successful leaders. Their hubris developed over time, a combination of power and personality, manifesting as impetuosity, recklessness, and a loss of capacity to make rational decisions. Observers describe the behavior of these leaders with words such as “madness” and “he lost it.” Military historians might also recommend Napoleon Bonaparte, during the Russian Campaign of 1812, be added to this group of hubristic leaders.

**The Shadow Side of Personality**

In order to fully understand hubris as a contributor to derailment, personality must be defined. “Personality represents characteristic ways of responding to the environment and involves dispositions to think, feel, and behave in a particular manner.” It is further defined by domains using the terms bright side and dark side from organizational behavior literature. The bright side, a concept within the Big Five, or Five Factor Model taxonomy represents what observers view during social interaction when individuals are behaving at their best and self-monitoring. Bright side qualities include; outgoing and assertive (Extraversion), congenial and cooperative (Agreeableness), reliable and rule abiding (Consciousness), calm and steady (Emotional Stability), curious and worldly (Openness). Dark side behaviors
reveal an effort to get along and get ahead but with a distorted view of how one is to be treated. Persons operating from the dark side of their personality often neglect or disregard the needs of others. They seek to secure short-term self-serving benefits but fail to realize the long-term consequences of their choices. Dark side traits, to clarify, are not clinically viewed as personality disorders. They do not significantly impair life functioning, but they do have the potential to diminish emotional intelligence, damage relationships, and interfere with judgement. Losses of judgement, relationship failures, and poor job performance can become a slippery slope toward derailment.

Robert and Joyce Hogan offer that leaders can manage dark traits through self-awareness and self-regulation thus mitigating negative effects. Carl Jung, writing for Good and Evil in Analytical Psychology, concurs that self-awareness and understanding of personality is the key to managing one’s shadow side.

To confront a person with his shadow is to show him his own light. Once one has experienced a few times what it is like to stand judgingly between the opposites, one begins to understand what is meant by the self. Anyone who perceives his shadow and his light simultaneously sees himself from two sides and thus gets in the middle.

Leaders who lack self-awareness, those who have not placed themselves in the middle to see both their positive and negative behavioral tendencies, are more subject to negative emotions and dark side trait manifestation. Reactive leaders, those weak in self-regulation skills may respond to the never-ending demands of the current strategic environment with self-destructive dark-side behaviors.

Krolls, Toombs, and Wright argue that the source of hubris is a personality prone to narcissism; a string of successes that feed the narcissism, blindly believing the accolades of others, and a history of getting away with breaking the rules. All of these conditions can lead an executive to believe that he or she is above the rules.

Table. The Symptoms of Hubris

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<tr>
<th>Proposed Criteria for hubris syndrome according to David Owen and Jonathan Davidson</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A narcissistic propensity to see their world as an arena in which to exercise power and seek glory</td>
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<td>2. A predisposition to take actions which seem likely to cast the individual in a good light</td>
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<td>3. A disproportionate concern with image and presentation</td>
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<td>4. A messianic manner of talking about current activities and a tendency to exaltation</td>
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<td>5. An identification with the nation, or organization to the extent that the individual regards his/her outlook and interests as identical</td>
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<td>6. A tendency to speak in the third person or use the royal ‘we’</td>
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<td>7. Excessive confidence in the individual’s own judgement and contempt for the advice or criticism of others</td>
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<td>8. Exaggerated self-belief, bordering on a sense of omnipotence, in what they personally can achieve</td>
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<td>9. A belief that rather than being accountable to the mundane court of colleagues or public opinion, the court to which they answer is history or God</td>
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<td>10. An unshakable belief that in that court they will be vindicated by God</td>
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<td>11. Loss of contact with reality; often associated with progressive isolation</td>
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<td>12. Restlessness, recklessness and impulsiveness</td>
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<td>13. A tendency to allow their ‘broad vision,’ about the moral rectitude of a proposed course, to obviate the need to consider practicality, cost or outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Hubristic incompetence, where things go wrong because too much self-confidence has led the leader to not worry about the nuts and bolts of policy</td>
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Army senior leaders, in order to become general officers, have experienced 20 years or more of affirmation, promotion, and been rewarded with increasing positions of power and authority. Reward, power, and position combined with the daily grind of a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous strategic environment are the perfect storm for dark side traits to dominate a leader’s behavior, and this perfect storm shipwrecks many a vulnerable senior leader. Army senior leaders know the requirements of ethical conduct, and most have strong advisors available to advise and assist. Yet some still make bad choices, choices that may indicate hubris as a prevalent personality trait.
The Impact of Behavior on the Team

This connection between misconduct and personality is also made in industry. Dotlich and Cairo, in *Why CEOs Fail*, define leadership as the capacity to build and maintain high performing teams, and therefore, leaders should be evaluated on the performance of their teams. Teams demand leaders who are capable of operating with integrity, decisive and capable of sound decisions, competent, and able to explain the “why” in the vision. Teams value leaders who are humble and persistent. With this public knowledge of leadership in industry, what is the explanation for a 66% failure rate among Chief Executive Officers? According to Jim Collins, author of *Good to Great*, the most common reason is the inability to build and maintain a team. Dysfunctional dispositions and negative interpersonal tendencies manifest when leaders are put under stress or when they let their guard down. Failures happen when leaders act in illogical, irrational, or passive aggressive ways when interacting with teammates. Chief Executive Officer failures result in financial loss, negative publicity, loss of talented employees, and loss of momentum. Loss of trust, with internal and external stakeholders, is often the most devastating cost of an executive failure and can take years to restore.

David Rosenbloom, in the *Handbook of Federal Government Leadership and Administration* reminds us that as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, wrote the *Federalist Papers*, they were cognizant of the fallible nature of human beings and the potential that lies within man to misuse or abuse power. In *Federalist Paper No. 47*, Madison argued that “accumulation of powers . . . in the same hands whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective will lead to tyranny.” The 2015 Federal Government Employment Viewpoint Survey, conducted by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM, 2015), indicated that only 50% of respondents believed that “the organization’s senior leaders maintain high standards of honesty and integrity.”

According to Hogan, the best way for leaders to develop and maintain high performing teams is through strategic self-awareness. Hogan’s research in industrial and interpersonal psychology theorizes that personality drives behavior and behaviors accumulate into a leader’s reputation. Identity is who you say you are (the you that you know), but reputation is who your stakeholders or subordinates say that you are (the you that others know). Hogan believes that there is a direct correlation between performance and behavior. When behavior changes, reputation improves. For change to occur three things are required; appropriate feedback, coaching, and development.

In February 2004, the U.S. Army piloted
The Multi-Source Assessment Feedback (MSAF) program. The intent being to provide a confidential online assessment tool that would provide leaders feedback related to the eight leadership competencies in Field Manual 6-22. The MSAF 360 was formally implemented in 2008 and remained a leader requirement until 2018. The Army strongly believes that Soldiers deserve good leadership, and sought to assess attributes such as character, presence, intellect, leading, developing, and achieving.

The tool ideally would provide feedback on the integration of institutional, operational, and self-development learning as manifested through leadership practice. Army Regulation 600-100 states that coaching and mentoring can be provided to leaders. The regulation defines coaching as guiding another person's development in new or existing skills during the practice of those skills. It defines mentoring as a voluntary developmental relationship between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience characterized by trust and respect. The counseling aspect of Army leader development has proven extremely beneficial to non-commissioned officers and junior officers as it is formally connected to the performance evaluation process. Coaching is a mostly unused practice in the Army and the effectiveness of mentoring remains unevaluated. The MSAF 360 was removed from the Army Profession and Leader Development Program as a requirement for the officer evaluation process due to being deemed a minimally effectual instrument.

Another assessment that is regularly administered in the Army is the Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS). This assessment tool provides feedback to commanders in the areas of organizational effectiveness, fair treatment, sexual assault response and prevention, and an optional area of 15 questions from which the commander can select. The climate survey results provide data on “shared perceptions” of respondents about formal and informal policies and practices within the command.

Both the MSAF 360 and the DEOCS are intended to inform awareness and facilitate mission command. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operation. These assessments provide general input about follower perceptions of leader competence and their sense of safety within the organizational environment. They do not provide clarity by identifying specific leader behaviors that violate trust. Trust is inseparably tied to ethical leadership and is critical to mission command. When leaders allow disconnects between word and deed, between professed values and
actual practices, they breed cynicism, compromise mutual trust, and degrade organizational effectiveness as well as individual morale. This statement from Army Regulation 600-100 summarizes the impact of the knowing-doing gap.

Leaders are, and will continue to be, inundated with information due to the nature of their roles, responsibilities, and the strategic environment. When asked to articulate the most helpful feedback they have received, most will cite a memorable work experience or a key conversation with a mentor. Leaders who lack a structure for cataloging learning and experience, a type of heuristic, find the retention of performance-related feedback is low.

Strategic self-awareness, according to Hogan, involves knowing your strengths and weaknesses in comparison to those of your competitors in various activities. Strengths and weaknesses are framed in behavioral terms and can be observed and measured. These strengths and weaknesses are more fully understood when compared to peers in the context of a defined reference group. For example, what are the critical knowledge, skills, and attributes required of Army General Officers to serve as strategic leaders in a complex world? This method provides utility by creating a baseline by which to evaluate performance and set a target zone for future performance. As Socrates would remind us, to know thyself is a different type of self-knowledge. For the ancient Greeks, self-knowledge was defined as understanding the limits of one’s performance capabilities as compared to one’s competitors. Strategic self-awareness is not a call to simply discern what one is currently thinking or feeling. It is an individually motivated action whereby one seeks systematic, performance-based, behavioral feedback. It is directly related to behavior and reputation as perceived by colleagues or stakeholders. Feedback in this context may be either positive or negative, qualitative or quantitative. This approach enables greater specificity and is more applicable to behavioral change. When feedback is positive, it relates to a goal to be accomplished. When negative, it relates to a gap that needs to be closed. Motivation, on the part of the individual, and taking an active role, is essential to receiving feedback and hearing advisement that enables behavioral change.

Senior leaders often express difficulty in receiving feedback. They express a feeling of being “in a bubble,” protected by their staffs from too much input, especially negative news. Early in their careers, as emergent leaders, feedback was abundant particularly as it related to performance. Feedback, for those serving in executive roles, is especially difficult to acquire as it pertains to competencies. The leader must aggressively pursue feedback, set conditions of safety for it to be provided, and then demonstrate to stakeholders the ability to integrate the information. Again, it will greatly assist the leader to have a framework, or mental filing system, by which to categorize the input so it can be retained over time.

Speaking to the Emperor

The Department of Defense frequently engages with industry in order to learn new approaches to leader development challenges. Collaborative engagements with industry provide new techniques or processes that many times, have already been scientifically validated, and are ready for employment in a military context. In September 2018, OPM published, “Coaching in the Federal Government.” This memorandum states that coaching is a critical tool in developing the workforce that supports effective and efficient mission achievement and improved services to the American people. It lists the benefits of coaching as higher engagement, retention, organizational performance and productivity, better relationships between people and departments, self-awareness, and accountability. Coaching is an authorized learning and development activity as described in five Code of Federal Regulations 410.203. Office of Personnel Management encourages
federal agencies to embed coaching into organizational leadership programs for target populations. They encourage the development of internal coaching capacity and leveraging external coaching. They strongly encourage peer coaching. President Trump has added his endorsement stating that “federal agencies should expand their use of coaching; an experimental and creative process, designed for individuals to help government employees reach their full potential.” To promote a coaching culture within the federal government, the Federal Coaching Network was established to facilitate networking with internal and external coaches. Executive coaching is now a formally endorsed leader development strategy that can be used with both civilians in the Senior Executive Service and Army General Officers to improve performance.

Marshall Goldsmith, a frequent consultant to leaders in the Federal Government, and author of *Coaching for Leadership*, offers an excellent definition of coaching, one that is well suited for addressing senior leader behaviors that might lead to derailment. He defines executive coaching as “helping successful leaders achieve positive, long-term, measurable change in behavior; for themselves, their people, and their teams.” Positive change, for Goldsmith, is not judged by the client. Instead, it is judged by pre-selected key stakeholders. This approach to coaching focuses on two specific questions: 1) what are the key behaviors that will make the biggest positive change in increased leadership effectiveness, and 2) who are the key stakeholders that determine if these changes have occurred? This style of executive coaching is focused on behavioral change and clearly requires a client who recognizes a need for behavioral change and believes that they will benefit from the coaching process.

Requests for executive coaching for senior leaders come from boards of directors, agency heads, or supervisors. The motivation may be a remedial need where the senior leader has behaviors that need correction or elimination, or augmentative where the focus is on existing behaviors that need refinement. Leadership may request coaching to rehabilitate a leader with an integrity violation, but they should be advised that the best course of action is instead, to fire that person. In selecting a coach or contracting for coaching, the organization head should always look for credentialing by the International Coaching Federation (ICF). Ethical standards, vetting of coaches, and continuing education are managed through ICF.

Coaching generally occurs in steps or phases. The coach and the client have an initial meeting to discuss the potential coaching relationship and the client’s goals. A coaching agreement is then composed which might include roles and responsibilities of each party, length of engagement, parameters of confidentiality, where data about the client will reside, expectations regarding availability, frequency of reporting and to whom, frequency of contact, goal confirmation, end point evaluation,
and clarification of what the coaching process does not provide. \(^{100}\) Coaching is not mentoring, counseling, consulting, or sponsoring. \(^{101}\) The coach is not a “friend” to the client. Instead his purpose is to listen, ask key questions, and speak difficult truth to the client. The coach will frequently spend equal time with stakeholders and client. The executive coach will spend time observing leader behavior in meetings and public forums. The feedback of stakeholders regarding their experience of the leader in a variety of settings is essential to the process. If available, stakeholder feedback is compared and combined with 360 assessment results and personality assessments. This summary is briefed to the client, and together action plans for behavior change are constructed.

Coaching for behavioral change is substantially more effective when it begins with a personality inventory. Personality assessments are designed to build greater strategic awareness. Strategic self-awareness is used to identify behaviors that need modification, provide feedback, and provide a metric of the client’s reputation in the workplace. \(^{102}\) Literature from industry indicates that a more holistic picture of the client, can be acquired through the three-part Hogan Model; the Hogan Personality inventory, the Hogan Development Survey, and the Motives, Values, Preferences Inventory. These inventories provide data on the Bright side (strengths), the Dark side (vulnerabilities), and the In Side (motivators). \(^{103}\) Coaches certified in the Hogan Model will be able to brief the client and the agency head about how the inventories interact and combine to provide an accurate picture. \(^{104}\) Hogan model inventory data clearly portray personality traits that impact reputation and set the conditions for the coach to discuss the difference between a client’s sense of identity and his/her reputation as experienced by stakeholders or followers. \(^{105}\) This type of strategic self-awareness conversation begins the process for closing the knowing-doing gap for senior leaders. From the inventory analysis and interpretation for the client, direction is set for developmental efforts and behavior modification. \(^{106}\) Again, it must be reiterated that coaches only work with clients who are willing and engaged. Resistance to the process terminates the coaching contract. This process will feel uncomfortable and potentially embarrassing at first. The client should be advised that stakeholders are asked to speak from the present toward the future, a feed-forward type of input. \(^{107}\) They are asked not to dig up past disappointments but instead stay positive and see their role as an enabler of growth. \(^{108}\)

Coaches use client identity perception, input from stakeholders, personality assessments, and input from the boss to design a development plan that supports agreed-upon goals. Coaches will suggest stretch assignments or stretch activities for the client. These are actions that require the client to move out of her comfort zone. \(^{109}\) Examples of activities include; leading an enterprise level change event, leading a merger or acquisition, or leading a team through a Department of Defense reform project. \(^{110}\) For an Army senior leader, these action plans might focus on knowledge, skills, or attribute areas that enable more effective service as a strategic leader in a high velocity, uncertain strategic environment. It is optimal for these actions to be repeated and observable, and for stakeholders to provide feedback. \(^{111}\) Ongoing, timely, feedback reinforces the need for strategic self-awareness and allows a leader to modify behavior in real time. The role of the executive coach is to evaluate feedback in order to ensure that the client is engaged but is not overcorrecting. \(^{112}\) Overcorrecting often occurs in relationship-improvement activities. \(^{113}\) The leader wants desperately for stakeholders to see a change. This behavior is understandable as reputations die hard. Coaches help leaders to find balance amidst change.

Goldsmith would add another element to this coaching process. He is a proponent for coaching oneself. Coaching self encourages the client to add structure to behaviors in his daily routine. \(^{114}\) One step in adding structure is simply pre-awareness. Pre-awareness is the act of anticipating environments where best
behavior is at risk. Confrontational conversations, turbulent staff meetings, budget negotiations are often dreaded events. Pessimism going into these types of meetings can trigger unappealing behavior during the meeting. Annoying personalities on the staff or in a meeting can cause the leader to appear disengaged or irritated. Positive social events with clients can turn into opportunities to over-indulge in food or alcohol. As stated earlier, the leader is always in a fish bowl, being observed and evaluated. Mentally and emotionally preparing for what may transpire, and deciding in advance to self-regulate, can prevent reputation damage. Goldsmith advises leaders to hourly check-in with themselves and ask questions that begin with “Did I do my best to . . . control my temper, stay positive, to enjoy my guests more than the food.” Reality is, that another challenge, in another meeting, is probably only an hour away. A structured plan of anticipating the environment and its known stressors can be beneficial to observable behavioral change. Asking the question, “Did I do my best to . . . ?” is a commitment device. The leader is announcing his intention to behave differently when stress triggers are encountered. Journaling results of “Did I do my best to . . . ?” enables the leader to track personal progress. Hogan, would contribute these questions; 1) What strengths did I leverage today? 2) What interactions did I have with direct reports, peers, or boss? 3) What feedback did I receive today and how did I respond?

Coaching as a formal process has time limits. Finances may define these limits. As the coaching period approaches closure, there is an expectation for success to be measured. The boss wants a return on investment (ROI). The coach and client will re-engage the coaching contract where terms of success were delineated and discuss whether the person is behaving in the manner described as success. If a multi-rater 360 was administered at the beginning, it will be re-administered at the end for analysis of change. Stakeholders will be queried for observations and perceptions of change in the leader’s behavior. The coach will meet with the boss and get his assessment of the leader’s improvement. It is worth noting that coaching literature presents an interesting element of relative consistency in perception of change. Seventy-three percent of clients said they had “very effectively” or “extremely effectively” achieved their coaching contract goals. Of stakeholders, 54% also used these terms to describe goal accomplishment and 83% gave clients ratings of “effectively” or better.

Using the success measurement of stakeholder perception, it appears that executive coaching produces a positive ROI.

A Way Forward

In November 2017, a task force was formed to examine the overall health and strength of the U.S. Army active duty general officer corps. The study affirmed that the Army has an exceptional group of officers but
that it has not taken full advantage of the senior leader development programs that currently exist in industry and academia.\textsuperscript{126} The Army is not leveraging advances in neuroscience and psychology to help leaders with loneliness, stress, and work-life integration.\textsuperscript{127} The task force recommended improvements in executive health, use of authorized leave, transition training, self-awareness and self-regulation, mindfulness, time management, and relationship training.\textsuperscript{128} Executive coaching opportunities, as a result of this study, are being made available to all Army general officers through the GORP.

As General McConville briefed to the Members of Congress, a General Officer Readiness Program has been designed. Readiness in this sense refers to senior leaders who are physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually fit to lead. A focused, intentional approach to senior leader readiness will, the Army believes, impact leader conduct. As leaders receive training in the areas recommended by the task force, they hear a distinct message from the Army, “Your life and your family matter.” For nearly two decades, the focus has been on Soldiers and the effect of combat on them and their families. Now the Army is finally saying to senior leaders, “It’s your turn!”

The GORP is an important program, but it will not be enough to meet congressional expectations in eliminating senior leader misconduct.

The Army can provide a senior leader behavioral change metric for Congress by utilizing strategic self-awareness and executive coaching. Currently, the Army does not have the coaching capability resident within the force, and as a result contracts for service. In order to maximize the effectiveness of executive coaching, the Army should review OPM’s approach to establishing a coaching culture. In 2013, OPM, in partnership with the Chief Learning Officers Council, established the Federal Coaching Network (FCN).\textsuperscript{129} The FCN provides an internal coach training program, a database of certified coaches shared by all federal agencies, conducts a ROI to determine value, and establishes coaching policy and guidance.\textsuperscript{130} The FCN provides coaching to federal agencies at no cost and provides coaching certification at no cost.\textsuperscript{131} Agencies authorize coaching time for clients, and training time for persons interested in certifying as a coach.\textsuperscript{132} Office of Personnel Management strongly encourages all executives to have an executive coach and encourages agencies to have a coaching component in their executive development programs.\textsuperscript{133} The Army should consider best practices of this approach in formalizing executive coaching.

The Army should also review and consider requiring Executive Development Plans (EDP) for all officers, field grade and above. The OPM requires an EDP for all executives.\textsuperscript{134} It projects developmental activities, start and completion dates, and expected outcomes. The EDP lists the Executive Core Qualifications and associated competencies; leading people (conflict management), results driven (accountability), and building coalitions (political savvy) that the leader will work to develop.\textsuperscript{135} Office of Personnel Management requires the EDP to be updated every three years. The Army should require senior leaders to have EDPs with executive coaching as a mandatory developmental activity.

The OPM offers an assessment center with a variety of instruments to measure aptitude, personality, and skills. If would be beneficial to the Army to have consistent assessment tools to set the conditions for feedback between and among general officers and SES leaders. The Army should study the assessment center tools offered through OPM and industry and choose assessment tools that could provide the most benefit for executive coaching.

Critics offer that senior leaders who are consumed with hubris or other dark side behaviors will minimize the value of coaching. As Goldsmith and Hogan have expressed, coaching only works for motivated individuals who recognize and appreciate the opportunity to improve as well as understand that integrity violations cannot be tolerated. As an officer experiences executive coaching, the potential exists for a
new appreciation of strategic self-awareness. Environmental stressors and altitude sickness from new positions of power can lead to distorted thinking. As Army senior leaders engage with coaches, perceptions of self and the responsible use of power, can change. The Army’s general officers have been at war for over 18 years. They have epitomized selfless service and sacrificed at levels most American’s will never understand. They deserve the very best support that the Army can provide.

The current programmatic approach to executive coaching, as executed through the GORP, may experience limited success in achieving measurable behavioral change if resourcing constraints limit long-term use of the executive coaching process. For maximum effectiveness, and ROI, personality assessments and stake holder-based executive coaching should be a fully-funded program. For best results, the Army’s Futures Command, through its talent management strategy, should consider implementing a systems approach to these actions, requiring executive coaching at the Major-promotable level and continuing through General. As leaders prepare for new levels of command, career transition points create windows of opportunity for growth. For example, administering the Hogan Model just before the leaders assume their next command, positions the assessments and coaching engagements prior to entry into the new “power” role. Coaching that starts early in the command time can create accountability as well as sustainable strategic self-awareness. This approach can also set the conditions for structure and self-monitoring. By doing so, senior leaders will have the opportunity to be surrounded by stakeholders and executive coaches who are committed to their success.

Conclusion

Members of Congress recognize their role in holding the military services accountable for the behavior of their senior leaders. The Army appreciates that role and works hard to maintain the trust of Congress and the American people. Sustaining the Army’s current and emerging leaders necessitates consideration of new readiness strategies. It requires an Army culture that acknowledges the price paid by senior leaders in service to the nation. It demands a general officer culture that models appropriate self-care and strategic self-awareness. It demands a general officer culture that views “speaking truth to power” as a lifesaving and career-saving activity.

Implementing this leader development proposal enables greater senior leader accountability and behavior change that is measurable and growth-oriented. Derailment prevention is a critical investment in our senior leaders and an act of stewardship that preserves and protects the Profession of Arms.
Chaplain (COL) Carron A. Jones

Network Enterprise Technology Command Command Chaplain

CH Jones assumed duties as the NETCOM Command Chaplain in July 2019. Her most recent assignments include Deputy Command Chaplain for the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command and Senior Strategic Action Officer for the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

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Sacred Calling and the Future of the Chaplain Corps

by Chaplain (Colonel) Thomas B. Vaughn, Jr.

The future of the Chaplain Corps will be determined by how successfully we manage our talent today.

—Paul K. Hurley

Chaplain (Major General) Paul K. Hurley, the United States Army Chief of Chaplains, has rightly asserted that the Chaplain Corps’ ability to continuously provide religious support (RS) to Soldiers and families is contingent on its present-day effectiveness at managing talent. As evidenced by the Army’s recent emphasis and holistic approach on readiness, “talent management is the keystone and archway to readiness . . . and getting it right is essential to having the Army we need in the future.” Chaplain Hurley’s statement is straightforward, sets the stage for sharing strategic guidance to shape the Chaplain Corps’ future, and undeniably aligns with the Army’s readiness objective. So, what conditions in the existing environment precipitated this declaration? What aspect of talent management is so troublesome that failure to deal with it may threaten the future success of the United States Army Chaplain Corps?

The Talent Management Concept of Operations for Force 2025 and Beyond states, “Future Army organizations require the capability . . . to implement enhanced talent management so the right person receives the right career assignment (to include training and education) at the right time.” For the Chaplain Corps, one further element must be included: the right reason. Mike
Strasser notes, “Some are called to serve God. Others serve their country. For more than 200 years, Army chaplains have answered the call to serve both God and country.”

Thousands of men and women across the Total Force (Active, Reserve, and National Guard) have willingly responded to a sacred call upon their lives to serve in the military. Most faith traditions, despite doctrinal and theological differences, agree that a sacred calling includes an aspiration to serve, affirmation by special giftings or talents that meet others’ needs, and confirmation of a calling by means of an institutional invitation to fill a ministry position.

In all three aspects, it is God, not man that enables and empowers which signifies that “the minister has a calling that transcends loyalty to [an] employer and client.” For Army chaplains, this sacred calling is the reason they serve. And therein lies at least one answer to the earlier question—the disheartening reality that over time some of these same men and women now give the impression that rank, position, and the next permanent change of station location are their primary concerns. Somewhere along their military ministry journey, the extremely competitive environment created by the Army’s “up or out” promotion system kindled a noticeable shift in their priorities and the principal reason for serving. The inevitable result has been a focus on careerism, defined as the “pursuit of professional advancement as one’s chief or sole aim.”

Should the Chaplain Corps accept this shift towards careerism as normative for those serving in the Army or recommend innovative changes to and/or exemption from the promotion system to alleviate this tension?

A less apparent interpretation of Chaplain Hurley’s statement is the underlying and broader implication that the Department of the Army, Chief of Chaplains (DACH) officer personnel assignment process does not consistently facilitate talent management for chaplains. The Army defines talent as “The unique intersection of skills, knowledge, and behaviors in every person. Talent represents far more than the training, education, and experiences provided by the Army. The fullness of each person’s life experience . . . better suits them to some development or employment opportunities than others.”

This definition is especially fitting for the chaplaincy since talent management for those in ministry also encompasses specialized callings (i.e., pastoral care or counseling), passions for people groups or issues, and spiritual giftedness that many chaplains believe are God-given. Considering that the military operates in a “volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment,” it is essential that the Chaplain Corps “acquire, employ, develop, and retain officers” whose talent enables them to thrive within the armed forces.

As the former Director of Human Resources, any suggestion that the Chaplain Corps is not properly managing talent is troubling, and yet completely understandable regardless of the viewpoint’s origin. In the last decade alone, the majority of chaplain officer assignments have reflected an emphasis, and in some cases, an outright prioritization on career advancement. Chaplains, supervisors, and senior leaders routinely lobby for themselves and/or their subordinates to fill key broadening assignments to ensure competitiveness for future promotion boards and positions of greater responsibility. Some officers bypass their chain of command and the personnel assignment system altogether, banking on
personal relationships with senior chaplains to obtain these assignments, thereby underscoring their presumed importance. Far too often, the DACH has been forced to acquiesce to the personal wants and desires of officers to ensure individual chaplains and their families remain continuously content and willing to serve. Predictably, this hinders the approval process for compassionate reassignments, high school stabilizations, and other legitimate assignment issues because needed authorizations have been problematically filled with personal preferences. The end result is that the Chaplain Corps personnel assignment system has succumbed to managing careers and personal preferences, not talent. The emergence of career management rather than talent management is not surprising considering rampant careerism has gradually impacted every branch of the military.

Talent management has been a topic of discussion and debate within the Army Chaplaincy for many years. Recognizing the complexities involved, especially as it relates to the future of the Chaplain Corps, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains (OCCH) has strived to make talent management a top priority. The last five years alone have resulted in extensive research to include a Talent Management Tiger Team, two Talent Management Working Groups, ongoing interaction with the United States Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS), advisory meetings with the Office of Economic Manpower and Analysis, interface with Human Resources Command (HRC), and consultation with the United States’ Army Talent Management Task Force (TMTF). In addition, a White Paper and the last three United States Army War College (AWC) strategy research projects submitted by Army chaplains have been devoted to some aspect of this challenging issue. While moving in the right direction and greatly contributing to the overall conversation, it is this author’s contention that the majority of past research, discussions, and publications have missed the main target and treated symptoms of related problems and concerns. In essence, the Chaplain Corps has expended an exorbitant amount of time, energy, and resources pursuing solutions to meet the Army’s bureaucratic system of managing careers while talent management has been misunderstood or completely disregarded. An unintended consequence is that the heart of the Chaplain Corps’ existence, service to God and Country, has also been allowed to languish. Therefore, the purpose of this project is fourfold: 1) present historical context for why chaplains serve in the military in contrast with the Army’s view of itself as a profession; 2) illuminate the dangerous and foundational shift of the Chaplain Corps from “sacred calling” to a mindset of “careerism”; 3) explain the recent alignment of the Chaplain Corps’ personnel assignment system with the Army’s personnel system; and 4) provide recommendations for a proposed Chaplain Corps talent management pilot program that is synchronized with the U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy, Force 2025 and Beyond that also honors a chaplain’s sacred calling and original intent for military service.

Historical Perspective of the Chaplaincy and the Army

Considering the preeminence of the sacred calling for chaplains, something that is specific to each faith tradition, and neither defined by the government nor the military, a fundamental tension exists for men and women who serve in a dual role as an Army staff officer and a religious leader. Over time, this tension increases in view of the reality that “the more senior a chaplain, the more the chaplain functions as a staff officer and functional manager of religious affairs . . . rather
than as a direct provider of RS.” To properly frame the present environment and fully comprehend the pressure careerism exerts on the Chaplain Corps’ talent management efforts, it is important to first understand the origins, culture, and spiritual heritage of the chaplaincy.

The roots of military chaplaincy can be traced to the ancient days of the Old Testament as recorded in The Holy Bible. In Deuteronomy 20, the priest was divinely called out by God to accompany and provide spiritual care for warriors going into battle against their enemies. In the 1680s, Army regulations reflected a similar basis for chaplains, classifying their duty as simply the “care of souls.”

On March 4, 1791, President George Washington officially granted John Hurt the first chaplaincy commission in the United States Army at a time when “religious interest in the United States was at an unusually low ebb and spiritual deadness characterized the American churches.” However, Washington believed addressing the spiritual needs of Soldiers was integral to their success on the battlefield. On April 14, 1818, Congress “reduced the size of the Army and abolished chaplain positions, along with those of surgeons and judge advocates...but chaplains continued to serve the military.” No authorization, no official position, no pay, and no benefits, and yet these officers continued to serve for the simple reason that the chaplaincy was not a career, but rather a sacred calling to serve God and care for Soldiers. Despite the argument that chaplains violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the decision rendered in 1985 by the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Katcoff v. Marsh, “upheld the U.S. Army’s chaplaincy on the ground that service members have a constitutional right under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause to engage in religious worship, a right that the Army would unduly burden if it did not provide chaplains.” The spiritual “care of souls” is the core of the chaplaincy’s right to existence.

Bearing in mind that the Chaplain Corps is a special branch of the military, it is equally important for any conversation on talent management to consider and appreciate the Army’s representation of itself from a historical perspective. In 1957, renowned political scientist and author Samuel P. Huntington wrote, The officer corps sees itself as a profession, not a bureaucracy. It is a calling. Officers do not join the military for personal gain or to amass political power, and their tenures in senior leadership positions are too short to enable them to wield any power that they might gain. Instead, many would say that officers are part of the traditional profession of arms, whose members have taken on the obligation of defending the nation.

Huntington understood this calling on a personal level from his own service in the United States Army. A cursory glance of historical writings, to include military regulations and doctrine, corroborates his view that a sense of duty and selfless service permeated the officer ranks of all branches of the United States armed forces. In his book, The Greatest Generation, Tom Brokaw confirmed this impression by noting that “these members of the armed forces fought not for fame and recognition, but because it was the right thing to do,” exemplifying a generation united “not only by a common purpose, but also by common values.” Four chaplains, John P. Washington, Alexander D. Goode, George L. Fox, and Clarke V. Poling, epitomized this “calling” spiritually and professionally on the morning of February 3, 1943, as the USAT Dorchester was struck by a German torpedo.

According to survivors, these brave men assisted others in abandoning the sinking ship and “when the moment came, did not hesitate to put others before self, courageously offering a tenuous chance of survival [their own life preservers] with the full knowledge of the consequences.” Archived accounts of military chaplains throughout history reflect countless stories of officers genuinely fulfilling “a sacred calling of service captured in the motto, ‘Pro Deo et Patria’ (for God and Country).”

Remarkably, this courageous, values-based identity that motivated so many
to serve for the greater good, soon gave way to the mindset of careerism. In 1960, Morris Janowitz, a World War II veteran and sociologist wrote,

> Those who see the military profession as a calling or a unique profession are outnumbered by a greater concentration of individuals for whom the military is just another job . . . For a sizable majority—about 20 percent, or about one out of every five—no motive [for joining the military] could be discerned, except that the military was a job.²¹

This statistic demonstrates a momentous shift in culture for the officer corps at a time when the consistent representation was one of the officers answering a “. . . ‘higher calling’ in the service of society.”²² Efforts to manage talent were first and foremost about meeting the Army’s requirements for the nation. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur promoted this same ideal in his 1962 acceptance speech for the Sylvanus Thayer Award. Addressing United States Military Academy cadets, MacArthur proclaimed, “Duty, honor, country: Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what you will be.”²³ The bar for the American Soldier was extremely high, and yet the implication for chaplains was even more significant. Chaplains were expected to live up to the Army’s standard of a “higher calling” in addition to God’s sacred call, acknowledged as the “highest calling” of service given that it looked not only at present life but all the way into eternity.

During this timeframe, recruitment and management of chaplain assignments were driven by the need for religious leaders willing to represent God and serve the spiritual needs of Soldiers under their care. The probability of personal sacrifice, unconditionally accepted, was secondary to the importance of fulfilling the sacred call to service. Recognizing a major shift from the norm of this accepted culture of service, Janowitz cautioned “that the change in the social and political makeup of military officers [was] changing the nature of the profession.”²⁴

The Dangerous Shift from Sacred Calling to Careerism

So what accounts for this cultural shift among military officers, to include chaplains, from a sense of duty and selfless service to a job mentality that focuses on personal compensation and career opportunities? The most likely answer is that it was an unforeseen consequence of General George C. Marshall’s transformation of officer personnel management in 1940. Following his appointment as Army Chief of Staff, Marshall conducted an evaluation of general officers serving in senior leadership positions on his staff and discovered that they were
severely lacking in talent and adaptability. Unwilling to accept ineptitude or ignore associated risks to the military, he received congressional approval to bypass the existing personnel system, took control of promotions and retirements, and advanced only officers who met his personal standard of excellence. As Marshall reasoned,

I’ve looked over the colonels, the lieutenant colonels, and some of the majors of the Army. . . . I’m going to start shifting them into jobs of greater responsibility than those they hold now. . . . Those who stand up . . . will be pushed ahead. Those who fail are out at the first sign of faltering.25

Marshall’s well-intentioned change reflected an early vision of comprehensive talent management by placing the right Soldier in the right position at the right time for the right reason (i.e., talent and aptitude). This “perform or out” approach ensured that the Army only retained skilled officers capable of facing the present and future challenges. Moreover, it created what may have been the first instance of an “up or out” narrative for officer evaluations, linking promotability with performance.

Whereas Marshall’s decision resulted in a strategy for performance-based promotions, his successor, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, quickly realized that the replacement of senior officers did not automatically result in separations or retirements. Consequently, he expressed concern over the opposite end of the spectrum – how to get rid of these officers. Eisenhower stated,

I think that no great argument would have to be presented to show that our promotion system has been unsatisfactory. Until we got to the grade of general officer, it was absolutely a lock-step promotion; and short of almost crime being committed by an officer, there were ineffectual ways of eliminating a man.26

Although well-intentioned, the passage of the Officer Personnel Act (OPA) in 1947 undermined future adaptability, quickly anchoring the military in career management and the “up or out” promotion system. While providing an immediate solution to eliminating unsatisfactory officers, OPA also inadvertently resulted in a permanent change to how officers viewed themselves and their profession. For chaplains, this change meant balancing a service-oriented mindset based on sacred calling with one of competition against officers (to include the ones they served) and fellow chaplains.

Warnings of careerism and its potential danger to the officer profession temporarily diminished in 1973. With military needs less than the eligible draft population and growing opposition to the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon accepted the official recommendation “that the nation’s interests would be better served by an all-volunteer force than by a combination of volunteers and conscripts.”27 Sociologist Charles Moskos’ observation that the military’s institutional structure was evolving into an occupational design went generally unnoticed. Huntington’s viewpoint of “military service as a ‘calling to the nation’ was giving way to being ‘just another job,” just as Janowitz warned.28 Considering the number of people willing to voluntarily serve in the military met current recruiting needs, the question of why they wanted to serve was basically ignored as was the continual caution surrounding careerism.

Marketing for the Army reveals that a subtle, yet persistent change has been taking place in the thinking about military service since the beginning of the 20th century. In World War I, the Army’s slogan was “I Want YOU for U.S. Army” with emphasis on recruiting talent to meet the needs of the Army. In the 1950s and 1960s, “Look Sharp, Be Sharp, Go Army!” reflected an initial transition to the all-volunteer military by allowing individuals to choose a career field and/or location of assignment. The pendulum swung even further toward the individual in 1971 with the slogan, “Today’s Army Wants to Join You.” By 1980, the Army’s most popular slogan, “Be All That You Can Be,” completed the advertising shift toward fulfillment of individual wants and desires. Even 2001’s unpopular “An Army of One” sensationalized the importance of the individual. The bottom line is that recruiting no longer
emphasized identification of talent to meet Army needs, but instead promoted career opportunities for personal fulfillment that ideally resulted in meeting military quotas.²⁹ Although the Chaplain Corps remained faithful to its religious mission, careerism’s influence gradually intruded into a world inspired by sacred callings. Limitations were placed on the recruitment of chaplains in the grades of Major and above to “maximize the opportunity for those already serving on active duty to earn promotion in the higher grades [recognizing] the significant competitive difference in the active duty and Reserve/National Guard promotion systems.”³⁰ In other words, although not intentionally, promotions and career advancement swiftly became the new priority in place of sacrificial service to God and Soldiers.

In 1980, the Department of Defense passed the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) establishing “uniform laws for . . . promotion, and standards for the mandatory separation and retirement of officers.”³¹ Despite delineating much-needed criteria for recruiting and retaining superior officers, DOPMA further anchored the military in officer career management. Regardless of branch, “Virtually all officers [were] managed not by talents but by a rigid, time-driven methodology, one aimed at identifying and selecting a small pool of leaders for successively higher levels of command.”³² The Chaplain Corps fell prey to this same mentality, identifying officers early in their careers to serve as the future Chief of Chaplains and Deputy Chief of Chaplains, and then programming assignments to ensure they met future requirements. While succession planning is a sound military practice, this practice led to an unshakable perception that future leaders are identified, selected, and shown preferential treatment based on nepotism, a particular faith group, ethnicity, race, or even gender rather than actual talent. The fact that many officers pridefully nominate themselves for positions of higher responsibility, “replacing the higher calling with ambitions of personal gain and unaccountability”³³ simply substantiates concerns of a careerist environment.

Concern by the OCCH over careerism or a careerist mindset by its officers should neither be confused with a chaplain’s right to pursue success nor the Chaplain Corps’ inherent responsibility to provide training, education, and professional development opportunities that increase an officer’s likelihood of longevity to serve in the military. The pursuit of career advancement is not in itself wrong or unhealthy, often reflecting positive traits of drive and determination. However, it becomes problematic and detrimental to military ministry when chaplains consistently exhibit a predominantly self-centered focus. Left unchecked, narcissistic propensities create inconsistency and disharmony for officers serving within the chaplaincy. The crux of the matter is one of impetus. The Chaplain Corps exists, first and foremost, to serve God. As such, a chaplain’s identity is characteristically one of self-denial, submission, and personal sacrifice of which faith is an integral part.³⁴ Ecclesiastical endorsement to the Army Chaplaincy confirms that the chaplain accepts this identity, freely enters into the Army’s pluralistic environment, and is prepared “to observe the distinctive doctrines of their faith while also honoring the right of others to observe their own faith.”³⁵ Second, the Chaplain Corps exists to serve Soldiers, to perform or provide religious support to men and women, and “represent hundreds of American denominations and faith traditions.”³⁶ When the principle driving force for a chaplain’s service and/or assignment becomes ambition (i.e., the pursuit of military rank or position), such motivation appears to be captivated and compelled by an identity as a professional which “carries the connotation of an education, a set of skills, and a set of guild-defined standards which are possible without faith [emphasis added].”³⁷ If faith is no longer the driving force and essential element that makes the chaplaincy branch unique, then why does the Chaplain Corps exist? What legal justification, outside of faith, distinguishes chaplains as being any different from civilian counselors, speakers, teachers, behavior health specialists, or even secular philosophers? While chaplains are indeed part of the Army’s professional organization, lack of faith or failure to maintain its primacy in their identity undermines the sacred calling, weakens the military ministry environment,
and threatens the very foundation of the Chaplain Corps’ existence.

Alignment of the Chaplaincy with the Army

Surprisingly, the United States Army Officer Personnel Management Division (OPMD) does not manage chaplain assignments. Citing its uniqueness as a special branch as well as significant differences in the “life cycle of professional development,” the Chaplain Corps has operated externally from the rest of the Army for decades and managed its own officer assignments. 38 Army Regulation 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, dated August 31, 1989, officially consolidated no less than seven regulations pertaining to chaplains in the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve, and granted the Chief of Chaplains (CCH) full responsibility to “accession, assign, and reassign personnel to support total chaplaincy goals.” 39 From a positive perspective, this means final approval and/or disapproval of all chaplain movements are ultimately left up to the CCH’s discretion. Without question, this allows a tremendous capability to manage both talent and careers while at the same time honoring a chaplain’s sacred calling. Regrettably, as mentioned earlier, the Chaplain Corps has become entangled in the Army’s bureaucracy of career management to the neglect of talent management. From a negative perspective, the granting of full authority and control of all chaplain personnel requirements to the CCH means that the chaplaincy works outside the Army’s OPMD system. This places considerable limitations on subject matter expertise, regulatory oversight, and restricts the commanders’ recommendations for future assignments to their input on the Officer Evaluation Report (OER). Senior chaplains often express frustration with similar constraints, whereas, in many ways “Like the fireman on a steam locomotive, each stokes the bureaucratic engine but has little impact upon its destination.” 40

In an attempt to bridge some of these gaps, Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Jerry Black produced a Chaplain Personnel Information Guide in 1991 as a reference tool “for chaplains and their commanders on issues unique to chaplain professional development and career management.” 41 To its credit, the Chaplain Corps not only utilized this guide but later developed additional internal guidelines and procedures that resulted in systematic bi-annual personnel movements and sustained dependability for filling required authorizations in a timely manner. On the other hand, without regulatory oversight, the Chaplain Corps’ broad interpretation and implementation of Army policies and regulations led to intermittent tension between the OCCH and HRC. While differences of opinion are to be expected, the Chaplain Corps’ reputation for ethical decision-making eroded slightly in view of decisions that may or may not have adversely impacted the professional development and/or careers of select officers.

According to former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Brad R. Carson, “There is a revolution going on in human resources today and we are not taking part in it. What once worked for us has, in the 21st century, become unnecessarily inflexible and inefficient.” 42 Acknowledging the Chaplain Corps’ apparent struggle with identity, an antiquated system for personnel assignments, and the inevitable transformation of the rest of the Army, the OCCH determined that it was time for a change. Utilizing research from Chaplain (Colonel) Scott Jones’ AWC strategic research project titled, Addressing Officer Distribution Challenges in the United States Army Chaplain, Chaplain Hurley directed a two-year pilot program in 2016 to test a change in structure and systems with the key objective of aligning and integrating Chaplain Corps assignments and processes within the Army’s personnel system. 43 An initial assessment determined that the current decentralized system of personnel management was predominantly driven by chaplain preferences (careerism), lacked appropriate oversight (i.e., unauthorized intra-post transfers by commands), produced unnecessary over-strengths and vacancies, and failed to properly manage talent. Additionally, prioritization of movement was based on a Cold War legacy system filled first with authorizations Outside the
Continental United States and then followed by Continental United States assignments rather than the Chief of Staff of the Army's Active Component Manning Guidance. Chaplain Personnel Managers, representing each major command, met bi-annually with the DACH’s personnel director and assignment officer to determine chaplain placements. Without access to personnel records, distribution was driven primarily by the need for numbers rather than talent with operational units receiving the lion’s share. Misunderstandings commonly occurred between commanders, senior leaders, and unit administrators due to the Chaplain Corps’ lack of alignment with Army personnel systems, consequently creating needless tension. Despite denials by some senior chaplains, the “good old boy” system (i.e., by-name requests based on prior relationships or recommendations) often played a factor in final decisions.

With its initial assessment complete, the OCCH sent two officers to HRC for training on how the Army conducts assignments and to meet with strategic personnel, systems, and information technology subject matter experts (SMEs). Upon their return and subsequent back-brief, Chaplain Hurley authorized the first phase of the pilot program, implementing changes that would be instrumental in officially transforming the Chaplain Corps’ personnel assignment system. These changes included: 1) discontinuation of the bi-annual conference with Chaplain Personnel Managers; 2) expansion of the DACH consisting of assignment officers for each grade; 3) utilization of the Personnel Manning Authorization Document; 4) identification of Year Month Available dates and applicable timelines for officer movement; 5) incorporation of Officers Identified to Move, Mission Essential Requirements, and a Distribution Requirements List; and 6) alignment with the Army’s bi-annual Distribution Cycles.

The *Harvard Business Review* notes that “Change is hard in the same way that it’s hard to finish a marathon. Yes, it requires significant effort. But the fact that it requires effort doesn’t negate the fact that most people who commit to a change initiative will eventually succeed.” This principle proved to be true with the DACH’s personnel assignment pilot program. In the first few months, several senior chaplains were extremely resistant to the proposed changes, though in fairness additional messaging and preparation would have eased the transition. Nonetheless, the OCCH was committed to this new initiative and the results proved to be overwhelmingly positive. Commands provided advance listings of projected vacancies to the DACH prioritizing authorizations. Assignment officers worked directly with individual chaplains to ensure consideration of talent, professional development needs, and their sacred calling. Projections for assignments were briefed to the DCCH, adjusted where needed, and then submitted to the CCH for approval. Within the first year, outcomes included better alignment with the Army, standardized procedures, and release of Requests for Orders a full six months prior to reporting dates versus the previous average of three months.
prior to reporting dates.

In June 2017, the CCH authorized an expansion of the pilot program to experiment with additional information technology systems, further understand HRC processes, and test the efficacy of permanently moving elements of the Chaplain Branch to HRC at Fort Knox, Kentucky. This second phase required a Memorandum of Understanding between the OCCH, HRC, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, to delineate roles and responsibilities and safeguard the CCH’s authority and control of personnel. The DACH’s Lieutenant Colonel Assignment Officer and Account Manager were subsequently reassigned to the Pentagon with duty at Fort Knox. Over the next year, the pilot program continued to yield remarkable gains to include incorporation of the Chaplain Corps’ Personnel Management Authorization Document, strength reports in the Total Officer Personnel Management Information System, access to the Electronic Assignment Coordination system, and login permissions for the OPMD toolkit via CITRIX (remote server access platform). The two-year pilot program officially ended in 2018 with the return of all DACH personnel to the Pentagon.

The Chaplain Corps’ personnel assignment pilot program exceeded expectations in its objective to align the chaplaincy with the Army personnel system. After decades of maintaining an officer assignment system separate from the rest of the Army, the DACH officially adopted a modified version of the systems and processes utilized by the OPMD and HRC and fully integrated all of the changes and improvements into their standard operating procedures. Future success will depend upon the Chaplain Corps’ sustainment of SME relationships with the OPMD and HRC and ongoing awareness of new systems and processes that continually change and impact the Army. As a final point, it should be noted that additional discussions continued between the OCCH and HRC upon conclusion of the pilot program, specifically concerning the possibility of future staff integration. After considerable discussion and debate, a determination was made that complete integration of the DACH personnel directorate into HRC would require the CCH to relinquish authority and control of assigned personnel. Notwithstanding the incredible degree of organizational gains and progress, this proposal was rejected due to the Chaplain Corps’ demonstrative faith culture (i.e. praying over assignments), specialized talents, distinctive requirements, and spiritually embedded accountability to God as stewards of chaplains entrusted to its care.

**Recommendations for Proposed Talent Management Pilot Program**

The Director of HRC’s Officer Personnel Management Directorate, Brigadier General Douglas Stitt, recently conveyed the following reality:

> We are a human organization. We are fallible. But we are absolutely where the rubber meets the road in regards to actively managing the Army’s commissioned officer force . . . How do we balance the science of meeting the Army’s requirements while at the same time achieving the aspirations and goals of the officer? We do that through talent management.\(^{45}\)

The great news is that the Chaplain Corps has embraced reform, solved massive personnel challenges, and integrated into the Army’s personnel assignment system. At this stage, it would be easy for the Chaplain Corps to simply solidify its advancements in the personnel arena through carefully planned personnel assignments, professional development opportunities, promotions, and succession planning. Add to these increased accessions together with retention of highly proficient officers and commendations and accolades would be sure to follow. However, enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of the chaplaincy’s personnel system does not automatically equate to genuine talent management. As Steven Covey emphasizes in his book, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People,* “Sometimes people find themselves achieving victories that are empty—successes that have come at the expense of things that were far more valuable to them. If your
ladder is not leaning against the right wall, every step you take gets you to the wrong place faster.” Returning to the earlier concern over careerism, it is essential that the Chaplain Corps not lose sight of its long and proud history of service, distinct identity, and the centrality of faith that makes it truly unique. Promoting or accommodating careerism within the Chaplain Corps’ personnel assignment system undermines the heart and soul of the chaplaincy. Rather than reluctantly accepting careerism as a by-product of a changed culture and the Army’s bureaucratic system, true talent management for chaplains must meet the needs of the Army while concurrently honoring a chaplain’s intent for serving in the military.

How can the Chaplain Corps address the challenge of careerism, meet Army requirements, leverage talent to maximize knowledge, skills, and behaviors for career advancement and longevity within the military, and simultaneously honor a chaplain’s sacred calling? The remainder of this project provides four specific recommendations that serve as a baseline structure for a proposed Chaplain Corps talent management pilot program. First, recommend that the Chaplain Corps acknowledge that it has a problem with talent management and work in partnership with the Army for a solution. The U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy, Force 2025 and Beyond, states, “effective talent management requires a systems approach [emphasis added] to ensure the right person is selected for the right job at the right time.” Within the last year, the 2018 National Defense Strategy has called for a “broad revision of talent management among the Armed Services” and “Secretary of the Army Mark Esper added impetus by plainly declaring that talent reform was his top priority.” With renewed efforts by the Army’s TMTF and HRC coupled with DOPMA reform, the long-needed transformation of systems and processes that facilitate talent management are materializing. Thankfully, just as the Chaplain Corps aligned its outdated officer assignment process with the Army’s personnel system after decades of operating independently, the CCH has now directed the chaplaincy to embrace needed changes for talent management. Change is hard and resistance to change is inevitable, but recognition of the Chaplain Corps’ long-term ineffectiveness in addressing this issue is necessary to synchronize future efforts with the rest of the Army.

Second, recommend endorsement of a talent management framework that is specific to the Chaplain Corps. Whereas the Army is the system within which chaplains operate, a framework provides an opportunity for the chaplaincy to clearly define its organizational culture as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions . . . that [should] be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel.” These assumptions include: 1) chaplains serve in the Army in response to a sacred calling; 2) chaplains “Nurture the Living, Care for the Wounded and Honor the Fallen;” 3) chaplains perform or provide religious support for all Soldiers and their families; 4) talent management meets Army requirements and honors a chaplain’s sacred calling; 5) success is not defined by achieving a certain rank or position; and 6) the Chaplain Corps will faithfully steward chaplain talent. Successful implementation of this framework will enable assignment officers to recognize varying degrees of talent, accommodate distinct interests and needs, and genuinely evaluate individual performance to determine development, employment, and potential advancement of careers and longevity within the military.

Third, recommend a deliberate paradigm shift in how the chaplaincy views careers. As David Jeremiah points out, “We too, like to fit in. It scares us to be ‘peculiar,’ to stand out from the crowd and be different . . . [We need] to rediscover, reclaim, and embrace [our] identity in God—in marketing terms, [our] differential advantage.” The tendency towards careerism is unavoidably exacerbated when the very ones responsible for managing assignments, the Chaplain
Corps, simply reinforce the narrative. Many senior chaplains, through careless words and actions, unconsciously diminish the role of the sacred calling in favor of stressing the importance of a professional military career. This careerist attitude betrays the heart of servanthood and must change. For the Chaplain Corps, this means reforming any part of the personnel system that reinforces the prioritization of careers over service to God and Soldiers. Acceptance of this view provides linkage to the second recommendation’s proposed framework and “would prevent officers from focusing so much time and attention on ‘checking the box’ for needed career milestones . . . and allow personnel decision-makers to assign ‘the officer who represents the best talent match for a position.’”

Recognizing the constraints of the current Army rating system, this step will necessitate a revision to the existing OER system to ensure that chaplains are matched against appropriate Chaplain Corps’ requirements and rated accordingly.

Fourth, recommend the development of a program that captures the knowledge, skills, and behaviors (talent) of all chaplains and matches them to available authorizations and vacancies. Fortunately, the Army has been working on this issue and is in the process of implementing the Assignment Interactive Module 2.0 (AIM2). Designed as a bridging strategy into the future Integrated Personnel and Pay System-Army (IPPS-A), AIM2 is

a web-based, active component officer talent management portal... that enables interaction among the Soldier, the unit, and the assignment manager... [allowing] both officers and units to advertise themselves, express their preferences and interact with one another in order to shape both parties’ interests to increase satisfaction and meet requirements.

Assignment officers remain part of the process and work in collaboration with chaplains to determine professional development needs, military advancement requirements, and assignment to positions driven by an officer’s particular talents, interests, and passions rather than rank. Special attention should be given to flexible career pathways such as 1) Garrison (administration, pastoral); 2) Specialty Skills (Family Life, Clinical Pastoral Education, Resource Management); 3) Educational (USACHCS, National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, First Army); 4) Leadership (Brigade, Division, Corps, DACH), and (5) Special Operations. As one senior chaplain correctly noted, “The Army Chaplaincy is in danger of producing senior leaders who do not have the skills needed to be strategic chaplains for the 21st century.”

Acknowledging this reality, the CCH maintains final approval authority for all assignments to ensure Army requirements are met, quality senior leaders are developed as part of succession planning, and the Chaplain Corps’ needs are balanced against individual desires and exceptions to policy. While military service is recognized as a career for many officers, assignments must meet Army rather than individual demands as a matter of precedence to achieve consistent talent management across the Chaplain Corps.

The Army chaplain’s mission is to “bring Soldiers to God and God to Soldiers.” Regardless of religious tradition, there is a widespread view among chaplains that ministry is a lifelong sacred call from God. Unfortunately, the impact of careerism and a secular mindset have gradually weakened this viewpoint and diluted the reasons for serving in ministry both inside and outside of the military. The Louisville Institute, a Lilly
Endowment program for the study of American religion, commissioned a study to determine why so many pastors forsake their sacred calling. In the final report, Michael Ross notes, “Our ministry began with a call . . . We felt we were affirmed, encouraged, educated, and empowered by the church and its institutions . . . We did not realize that our call should not only be validated and reaffirmed but also continually redefined. It was what it was, a trophy on the shelf, and that seemed good enough.” For many chaplains, the sacred calling has become nothing more than a trophy on the shelf, reduced to an achievement that resides in a prominent place. To reiterate Chaplain Hurley’s statement, “The future of the Chaplain Corps will be determined by how successfully we manage our talent today.”

Frankly, the future of the Chaplain Corps is not simply a matter of concern over talent management, but rather what it means to be men and women of faith, conviction, character, and integrity within the officer profession. It is time for the Chaplain Corps to take the trophy of sacred calling off of the shelf and use it as a catalyst to remember that original moment of full surrender, excitement, and determination to serve God and Soldiers, “to build a monument in our heart, . . . come back often to polish it and remember that this represents the work of God on our behalf.”

Chaplain (COL) Thomas B. Vaughn, Jr.
Chief, Chaplain Corps Branch

CH Vaughn assumed his duties as the Chief, Chaplain Corps Branch, for the U.S. Army in July 2019. His previous assignment was Director of Personnel for the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps with responsibility for the worldwide assignment, talent and career management, and professional development of over 1,543 active duty chaplains. In this role, CH Vaughn served as the principal advisor to the Chief of Chaplains and Deputy Chief of Chaplains on all personnel-related matters and led the realignment of the Army Chaplaincy personnel system with Human Resources Command and the U.S. Army. He is a recent graduate of the United States Army War College in Carlisle, PA, where he received a Master of Strategic Studies.

NOTES

9 Talent Management Concept of Operations, 11.
Applying Mission Command to the Army’s Crucible of Character Development

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Foreword:

The operational environment requires an Army capable of executing Large Scale Ground operations in a Multi-Domain environment as part of a joint force. Army Soldiers and Leaders must be well trained and of strong character. Professionals that can operate effectively, fight and win in any environment. Soldiers and Leaders must possess strong character that enhances decision making, sound judgement and mission accomplishment. Character development initiatives include holistically training and developing leaders of character who are competent, confident, morally straight, strong team players pursuing excellence as Trusted Professionals. – MG Gary Brito, Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE) Commander

Applying Mission Command to the Army’s Crucible of Character Development

The operational environment requires ethically grounded, cognitively adaptive, and physically dominant close combat leaders. The expectation for these leaders is to be Trusted Professionals who adhere to the Army’s Professional Ethic. They must consistently demonstrate character, commitment, and competence with effective, efficient, and ethical intent and action, in order to pursue the desired end state facilitated by a realized Mission Command Philosophy.

Within the context of multi-domain operations, near peer threats, and emerging artificial intelligence applications, multiple complex dilemmas are challenging the mind, body, and soul of today’s close combat Soldier. Addressing character development tomorrow is too late. Holistic, collaborative, and cross domain leader development in the human dimension is an imperative that is non-negotiable, for as GEN Daniel Allyn (RET, VCSA, USA) declared, the pithy and profound truth is that: “you can’t surge character.” Growing leaders with character requires sustained purpose,
process, and passion because character is not a state that, once achieved, is impervious to the trials of time and context, but is instead a developmental process that unfolds across a lifetime.  

While the Army has always had many leaders who are of high character, it is also the case that character is neither universal nor something that can be assumed. Therefore, the Army needs a consistent, well-delivered, and transformative character development approach that includes growth-oriented feedback and that is applicable across the institutional, operational, and self-development domains.

In this manuscript we lay out an approach based on current efforts at the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE). We identify existing challenges and opportunities, illustrate growth-oriented approaches, and make recommendations for further implementation. If done correctly, this work has the potential to systematically grow Soldiers who are not only proficient at technical and tactical tasks but who are also leaders of character – Soldiers who are at once both lethal and honorable. Our goal is to illustrate “a way” to develop character in our leaders through a collective learning environment.

Fostering Collaboration & Cohesion

The MCOE’s holistic character development initiative is intended to inspire a process for developing combat arms maneuver Soldiers in a manner that achieves the Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) intent of building organizations of trust capable of winning our nation’s wars. The MCOE trains over 69,000 combat arms maneuver Soldiers a year, from basic trainees to brigade commanders, in integrated warfighting functions and combat skills. The MCOE also develops doctrine for various warfighting functions, including multiple character development pilot programs impacting enlisted Soldiers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), and Officers. The MCOE’s work on character development seeks to integrate key proponents including the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic’s (CAPE) strategic imperative to shape the Army Profession, the Army Chaplain Corps responsibility for moral leadership and ethics instruction, and the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) role in the creation of assessments designed to support Soldier development.

The Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE)

CAPE is the “proponent for the Army Profession, the Army Ethic, and Character Development.” CAPE’s key tasks are to “support Army-wide efforts...[and] create and integrate...doctrine into training, professional military education, civilian education systems, and operations.” CAPE produced ADRP-1 The Army Profession (2013), and, The Army’s Framework for Character Development (2017), by directives from consecutive CSAs. These guiding documents provide a valuable strategic framework that identifies the need and trajectory for the Army Professional Ethic and developing Trusted Army Professionals.

Building on these efforts, CAPE’s current focus is developing The Army’s Framework for Character Development Implementation and Assessment Plan with a projected rollout date of FY21. Leading this effort, CAPE already provides high-quality videos, vignettes, and curriculum via its website. However, CAPE faces a challenge in realizing its full vision for a variety of reasons, including the complexity of its Army-wide task, accommodating multiple stakeholders, non-infinite resources, and its location. At West Point, CAPE is able to “leverage the vast intellectual capital at the United States Military Academy.” While indeed valuable, CAPE’s geographical location at West Point also has the potential to limit direct access to additional environments that create, integrate, assess, and validate doctrine and curriculum. This gap has the potential to limit access to the Institutional and Operational spheres of influence and their intellectual and operational influencers.

Accordingly, given CAPE’s mission to develop doctrine, curriculum, and assess training efficacy for the entire Army, there is an opportunity to increase
impact by becoming better integrated with the Centers of Excellence (COEs) and with the Army Chaplaincy, specifically, the COE Ethics Instructors and Writers. At the time of this writing, efforts are underway to move CAPE to Ft. Leavenworth and become integrated with the Center for Army Leadership (CAL).

**The Chaplain Corps**

The Chaplain Corps’ (CHC) mission is to advise the Army on moral leadership: “The Chief of Chaplains (CHC) has the responsibility for moral leadership training in the Army.” Additionally, the CHC is required to staff, develop, and teach ethics and moral leadership in Army schools in support of the Army Profession and Ethic.10 The Army Ethics Instructor and Writer at each COE and Senior Service College fulfill these roles and responsibilities in conjunction with the Combined Arms Center (CAC). Within this context, Army Ethicists are the most strategically positioned and influential chaplains in the Army for developing doctrine, facilitating character development, and collaborating with CAPE on the Army Profession.

For FY19, the CCH’s priority is to “build spiritual readiness through the free exercise of religion, Soldier and Family care, and moral leadership.” This includes all Chaplains and Unit Ministry Teams with the end state that “The Corps is prepared and inspired to enhance moral leadership training across the Army Enterprise leading to a morally strong Force.” Furthermore, the CCH’s purpose includes strengthening “the Corps capacity to train moral leadership in order to increase unit and Soldier readiness and develop Leaders.” To begin movement toward this vision, we next describe efforts in character development that are in progress at the MCOE. At the time of this writing, the CHC is writing and reviewing DA PAM 165-16, Moral Leadership, in order to align narrative and publication with CACs directed revision of FM 6-22 and ADP 6-22.

**Implementing Character Development**

The MCOE Second Line of Effort, *Train the Fundamentals and Develop Leaders*, captures the high level objective to integrate transformational moral, ethical leadership and character development training into all Professional Military Education (PME) (Figure 1 and 3). In addition, the MCOE’s Maneuver Human Performance Model (HPM) establishes character as its foundation and spirituality as a critical component. To do this, it is necessary to define what moral and ethical leadership and character development mean and to demonstrate their interdependence and holistic overlap in human development.

![Figure 1. MCOE Lines of Effort](image)

![Figure 2. Human Performance Model](image)
Moral leadership emanates from an individual’s beliefs and values, it is not secular in nature. Moral leadership answers, “Who am I as a trusted professional?” Ethical leadership emanates from a systemic context and/or social constructs including code, creed, or ethos requiring individual ethical development. Ethical leadership answers, “Who are we as a trusted profession?” Character development is the metaphysical, cognitive, and psychological process of moral and ethical transformational leader development. The development of trusted professionals within a professional ethic confidently answers a third question, “Who benefits from us, and how?” Along these lines, in The Army Framework for Character Development, CAPE states:

Research on how people develop in character reveals that the process is multi-dimensional and informed by complementary, relevant disciplines and fields (e.g., philosophy, ethics, theology, law, medicine, psychology, sociology, anthropology, education). The science of human psychological and biological development confirms that our true nature evolves as we mature throughout our lives…In addition, our spirituality draws upon personal, philosophical, psychological, and/or religious teachings or beliefs and plays a significant role in character development.”

Within the context of this guidance, MCOE approaches character development as having a complex, multifaceted foundation.
Research finds that the moral and ethical leadership principles shaping warrior codes throughout history are: “closely linked to a culture’s religious beliefs, and can be connected to elaborate rituals and rites of passage.”\textsuperscript{15} Consistent with this viewpoint, developing cognitively adaptive and physically dominant Soldiers without addressing the character of the soul contradicts thousands of years of warrior ethos, spirituality, philosophy, theology, and psychology. Accordingly, MCOE’s character development program collaborates with command teams, ethics instructors, strength coaches, combatives instructors, mental skills coaches, and research psychologists.

Building on this view, character should be addressed at every level as today’s Soldiers must embrace a mindset of becoming lifelong learners in a manner that feeds all aspects of human performance. Ethics instruction was integrated into the Programs of Instruction (POIs) of Officer Candidate School (OCS), Infantry Officer Basic Course (IBOLC), Armor Officer Basic Course (ABOLC), Maneuver Captain’s Career Course/Reserve Course (MCCC/MCCC-RC), and Maneuver Pre-Command Course (MPCC), effectively reaching over 3,000 officers a year. This level of effort equates to every Brigade Combat Team Infantry and Armor Platoon Leader, Company, Battalion, and Brigade Commander receiving 6-8 hours of teaching and training annually through professional military education.

In FY17, the Character Development Instructor Course (CDIC), a pilot program providing teaching and training for Drill Sergeants (DS) and MCCC Small Group Leaders, began at the MCOE. The two day (18 hour) CDIC was completed by Drill Sergeants in a BCT unit during 3\textsuperscript{rd} QTR FY17. At the same time, the BCT trainee attrition rate for this unit went from 12\% in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} QTR to 3\% in the 4\textsuperscript{th} QTR FY17, potentially saving the Army resources in terms of retaining recruits and impacting talent management. Although correlational in nature, the unit’s CSM attributed part of this success to Drill Sergeants applying what they learned in the CDIC.\textsuperscript{16} Over 200 Drill Sergeants, MCCC Instructors, and Military Advisory Training Academy (MATA) instructors completed the course in FY18. In FY19, CDIC will train 250-300 MCOE Cadre.

The CDIC provides an experiential learning environment in which instructors can assess their competence as moral and ethical leaders while building teams through creation of a shared understanding based on personality type conflict styles and socio-emotional competencies. The course provides a model for how experiential moral and ethical leadership development training can be deployed within their units. To create an experiential learning environment, the CDIC tries to build a bridge to students by linking basic skills to moral and ethical development. It incorporates a tactical athlete assessment, the Myers Briggs (MBTI) Conflict Style Report,\textsuperscript{17} a combatives and boxing workout, an obstacle course, and one-on-one coaching based on the Emotional and Social Competency Inventory (ESCI) evaluating the domains, competencies, and leadership styles of an individual’s emotional intelligence.\textsuperscript{18}

To evaluate this approach, an initial sample of 70 Soldiers serving as Drill Sergeants and Small Group Instructors from one Basic Combat Training (BCT) Battalion (BN), three One Station Unit Training BNs, and one Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA) class completed a post-course survey.

The purpose of the post-course survey was to measure participant reaction to the course and participant attitudes about character development. The responses were used to determine instructional quality of the CDIC and to provide recommendations to improve course training. Overall, the course surveys indicated that the training event was typically rated above standard. Participants commented on the quality of training (e.g., material/content, instruction, and venue), and comments indicated that participants thought the training was excellent, practical, and demanding. Participants also indicated that they better understood themselves and others, intended to apply what they learned, and that others should attend similar training.

Overall, these data constitute initial evidence regarding the
effectiveness of the approach, which is grounded in the MCOE’s HPM as a holistic attempt to develop the 21st century American Soldier. To be the most cognitively dominant, realistically trained, and institutionally agile force in the world will require this type of development of strategic leadership and education across the Army.

**Assessing Character Development**

Along with these course content innovations, a complementary pillar of work at the MCOE has been the development of methods of character assessment. Like the instructor development course, the assessment development effort seeks to support growth. The assessments are intended to guide learning rather than to evaluate a level of competency.\(^{19,20}\)

Initial research efforts focused on assessment in the context of BCT.\(^{21}\) The emphasis was on Soldiers learning to embody the Army Values as a part of daily activities.\(^{22}\) In addition, the work sought to examine ethical decision-making as an application of the Army Values. Kohlberg’s theory of moral development suggests that individuals’ moral reasoning moves through stages wherein individuals initially focus on immediate personal consequences, and over time, they may transition to higher levels where they act in accordance with internalized principles (i.e., values based principles of conscious beyond specific rules of a society).\(^{23}\) This framework casts trainee development as change over time rather than simply the presence or absence of character. Trainees arrive at their basic training units with some element(s) of character, so the challenge is to facilitate growth in character in alignment with the Army Ethic.

Given the pace of the BCT environment, DS workload, and DS-trainee ratios, this work relied on two sources of evidence on character development – peer evaluations and ethical decision-making scenarios – that could be collected in a platoon classroom setting during a concise period of time (less than 90 minutes per phase of BCT).

The ethical decision-making scenarios were created by developing questions to accompany videos available from CAPE. The videos included stories that present ethical dilemmas focused on Army Values as told by trainees in a BCT setting or Soldiers with previous deployment experience. The questions were designed in the form of situational judgment test (SJT) items, which are low-fidelity simulations comprising a scenario (in this case, presented in the CAPE video), a prompt (e.g., what should you do?), and set of responses that are intended to elicit similar judgment processes as would occur in real world contexts.\(^{24}\) The trainees viewed the CAPE videos and responded to the SJTs using the clicker system.

These assessments could be formative in the sense that the clicker software enabled the DS and trainees to see group-level responses in real time, based on which DS could adjust instruction and/or discussions based on the responses. In addition, following Kohlberg’s theory, the response options were roughly mapped to stages of moral development, enabling interpretation of the responses by leveraging the idea that individuals at different levels may interpret issues differently.

The second source of evidence was peer evaluation. Each trainee rated every squad member on the Army Values and identified the top and bottom three members of their platoon. Peer evaluations were seen as critical because the trainees have unique perspectives on behavior in absence of the DS. Moreover, it is likely that trainees learn from one another in powerful ways by observation.\(^{25,26}\)

Initial empirical evidence suggests that these tools were able to capture changes in target attributes throughout BCT and, therefore, have the potential to provide the basis for a useful formative assessment approach. To test the tools, data were collected during the Red (beginning), White (middle), and Blue (end) Phases of BCT. Trainees across four platoons participated in the assessments. Performance on both the SJTs and the peer evaluations indicated that the trainees tended to grow over time on the assessed attributes.
The empirical findings also provided support for the view that locus of control – one’s general belief about the degree of personal control over the environment – is important for ethical behavior, as evidenced by adherence to the Army Values. Specifically, results showed that trainees with a more internal locus of control (i.e., belief that consequences are a direct result of their own actions rather than beyond their control) were perceived as more trustworthy and rated more favorably by their peers on the Army Values. As training progressed, trainees became increasingly more internal in their locus of control.

In addition, feedback obtained from the trainees and DS on the assessment approach was generally positive. The trainees were engaged in the discussions and expressed interest in the peer evaluation results. Trainees also indicated that they especially benefitted from seeing how the other members of their platoons responded to the SJTs, as the resulting discussions helped them to better understand others’ perspectives.

Overall, as this example illustrates, it is indeed possible to assess character in Army settings despite constraints on time and personnel, and to do so in a manner that supports MCOE and unit objectives, helps learners, and builds on CAPE resources.

Summary and Recommendations

Fostering collaboration and integration of output between organizations such as CAL, CAPE, CHC, and COEs advances the common goal of developing Trusted Professionals who adhere to the Army’s Professional Ethic. Writing, developing, assessing, and updating curriculum for PME courses exponentially improves in such a collaborative environment.

Preliminary evidence suggests that the CDIC was effective at helping instructors self-reflect and better understand others. Drill Sergeants in particular saw a benefit to hosting the CDIC at their COE rather than at the Drill Sergeant Academy. A CDIC at their home station provided DS time during the cycle break to reflect personally and professionally on leader development. DS expressed concern that a CDIC at the DS school would likely lose its efficacy by becoming immersed in an already demanding setting, which has the potential to marginalize the course’s value. The Ethics Instructor, strength coaches, mental skills coaches, and combatives instructors, along with selected chaplains and command team leaders served as the primary instructors for the course. MCOE funded the program to include professional certification, assessments, and course materials for instructors and students.

Work at the MCOE also illustrates that it is possible to empirically examine character development in Army training contexts. Additional approaches should be developed that are similarly based on theory, assessment, and programmatic feedback. In particular, it is important to extend these types of assessment approaches to Officer and NCO education, to other COEs, and to the operational force. In each case, it is necessary to understand how best to convey feedback and prepare instructors to give feedback to their target audience. Likewise, it is necessary to explore the development and validation of summative evaluations to accompany the formative evaluations outlined here. At the MCOE, efforts are already underway to develop assessment approaches for the OCS and the MCCC. It is also critical to better understand how Soldiers change across their career. To do so will require the collection of longitudinal data across institutional and operational training contexts. Such data will inform a deeper understanding of the rate at which Soldiers develop and will uncover opportunities to accelerate growth.

Conclusions

Ultimately, combat leaders are responsible for forging the Warrior Ethos of the American Soldier. General George C. Marshall said, “The Soldier’s heart, the Soldier’s spirit, the Soldier’s soul, are everything. Unless the Soldier’s soul sustains him, he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his command and his country in the end.” The Army’s greatest organizational constraint may be overlooking the timeless truth necessitating continual character development of a warrior ethos and culture. We must respond to our complex
world with a holistic and integrated approach that addresses spirituality along with character, social, cognitive, and physical performance. Success will require a realized mission command approach across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, institutionally, operationally, and individually. The Army Professional Ethic finds its ethos in the internalized creeds of our force such as the Soldier Creed, NCO Creed, Ranger Creed, and Oath of Office. Developing the character of the warrior’s soul is life-centric, life-long, and life-sustaining. It is multi-generational, customized to MOS/COE/Unit talent and makeup. It is a “bottom up” approach with “top down” intent and parameters empowering the moral autonomy of leaders to leverage the Army’s leader development model. It cannot be one size fits all. Accordingly, it requires integrating the resources and expertise of entities such as CAPE, the Chaplaincy, and leaders at all levels to develop trust and cohesion through cross-functional teams, quantified and qualified character development, and rejection of territorial instincts, instead favoring collaboration and shared understanding. We believe the recommendations presented here move in this direction by addressing doctrinal, organizational, training, assessment, and research needs. We illustrated current efforts at the MCOE as “a way,” understanding it may not necessarily be “the way.” We believe by modeling realized mission command philosophy and lifelong learning, the MCOE continues to embrace the soul of its own identity, humbly and resolutely “leading the way” in forging 21st century close combat Soldiers.

Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Randall, Anthony served as the Ethics Instructor and Writer for the US Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence, Ft. Benning, Georgia, from 2016-2019, having taught ethical leadership and character development to over 10,000 Officers and NCOs. He has served in Cavalry, Airborne, Ranger, Special Forces, and Special Mission Units including seven deployments as an Engineer Officer and Chaplain. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, a Masters of Divinity from Denver Seminary, a Masters of Theology from Emory University, graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and is currently a Doctor of Ministry student at Fuller Theological Seminary.

NOTES

9. FM1-05, ATP 1-05.04, para 1-1, 350-1, para 2-18; 165-1, para. 9-9
10. AR 350-1, para. 2-18 and AR 600-100 para. 2-1
13. Ibid
16. 1-46 IN BN Command and Staff, "1-46 IN End of Cycle After Action Review" (October 2017).
17. Damian Killen and Daniac Murphy, Myers Briggs (MBTI) Conflict Style Report, CPP the Myers Briggs Company (California, filed 2003, and issued 2003).
Principles of Strategic Advisement for United States Army Chaplains

by Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Michael J. DuCharme

In developing the 2018 Chaplain Campaign Plan, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains identified an issue within the role of chaplains as staff advisors to their commanders. In its process review, the Council of Colonels discovered chaplains to be deficient in advising and engaging commanders prophetically at the strategic level. ¹ To address the challenges in strategic religious advisement, this paper identifies the nature of such challenges and the expectations commanders have for chaplains as religious staff advisors at the strategic level. The paper then provides seven critical advisement principles for chaplains to apply in developing their advisement capability. These seven principles include: being a trusted advisor, becoming a verbal visionary, developing a leadership perspective, thinking strategically, becoming future-oriented by understanding patterns, giving constructive advice, and showing the commander how to use the advice provided. ² Following each principle, an application example from the career of Chaplain (Colonel) David Peterson (U.S. Army Ret.) will be presented.

The recommended advisement principles should be understood and applied from the context of chaplain identity. This identity is defined in the Army Chief of Chaplains’ Training and Leader Development Guidance for 2018, “Identity means the Unit Ministry Team members understand who they are apart from what they do. They operate from a deep calling and conviction that they serve God first, and this calling leads them to be true servant leaders within the Army.” ³ It is from this identity that the chaplain understands his/her calling to fulfill a uniquely dual role of religious professional and professional staff advisor.

Challenges

U.S. Army Chaplains function in two primary roles as defined by Army Regulation 165-1, “The Army requires the capability to provide religious support and the capability to advise commanders on the impact of religion. These two required capabilities
reflect the dual role of the Chaplain Corps: professional military religious leader and professional military religious staff advisor. Chaplains are expected to utilize these capabilities as they execute their responsibilities in every echelon from battalion through the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Traditionally, chaplains have done exceptionally well as religious leaders as they utilize this vocational calling as a professional basis for entering the Army Chaplaincy. The challenge has come in the second capability, serving as effective religious support staff officers.

As chaplains promote to the rank of colonel and serve in three and four-star commands, the challenges intensify in the role of principal religious advisor. Chaplain (Colonel) David West (U.S. Army Ret.) knows these challenges having served both as the deputy command chaplain of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and as the command chaplain for U.S. Special Operations Command Central.

Chaplain West states, “Throughout the career of most chaplains, regardless of service, most of their efforts are focused upon direct religious ministry, such as counseling, preaching, and providing the sacraments. Indeed, chaplains are trained as pastors first and foremost before joining the military as religious professionals. Thus, an assignment to a joint (multiservice) command staff like CENTCOM requires a shift of focus from direct ministry to more of a religious advisement role. For most chaplains, this is challenging, since it is very different from the direct ministry they have been performing within their service.”

Joint Guide 1-05 details the complexities of religious advisement at the strategic level. “Consistent with their non-combatant status, chaplains advise the commander and staff on matters pertaining to the ethical/moral implications of command plans, policies, operations, and strategies to include advice on the impact of operations on religious and humanitarian dynamics in the operational area.”

Colonel Celestino Perez Jr., Director of Military Strategy, U.S. Army War College, confirms how multifaceted the issues are, “...
a wide array of sociopolitical, economic, institutional, cultural, technological, ethical, and lethal dynamics about which no single person is an expert and about which there are multiple and opposing well-informed views.” This challenge represents what commanders face today at the strategic level. Chaplains as religious advisors in this context must engage not only the ethical issues mentioned by Colonel Perez but also the moral, religious, and cultural issues contributing to the environmental complexity. Dr. Eric Patterson, dean of the Robertson School of Government and Associate Professor of Political Science at Regent University, describes this religious complexity as editor of the book, *Military Chaplains in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond*. Patterson writes, "Religious advisement formally means all of the preparations necessary and the actual act of providing materials, briefings, reports, summaries, and counsel to warfighting commanders of the U.S. military and the role that religion and culture play in a specific theater of operations.”

**Leader Expectations**

Even though chaplains serve both the commander and the staff in an advisory capacity, their primary responsibility is to the commander. Therefore, the necessary place to start in defining strategic advisement is the commander’s expectations for his advisors. Commanders are looking for advisors to contribute to the “collective wisdom” General Brooks described. This requires a keen understanding of leader expectations on the part of advisors when executing staff advisory responsibilities. As an integral part of the advisory staff, chaplains must share this understanding and provide advice from two command perspectives. Internally, the chaplain advises on religious, moral, and morale needs of Soldiers, families, and authorized civilians. Additionally, the chaplain advises on the ethical impact of decisions made within the organization. Externally, the chaplain provides professional advice on the potential impact of religion and culture regarding plans and missions within the command area of responsibility. In his highly regarded book, *Why Should the Boss Listen to You? The Seven Disciplines of the Trusted Strategic Advisor*, Jim Lukaszewski lists six contributions leaders expect from their advisors. A leader expects real-time advice. Decisions are made and actions taken in real-time, and leaders expect advice on the spot. Leaders expect advisors to speak with candor by being honest and by supporting statements with relevant information, on any topic under any circumstance, with transparency. Leaders expect all advisors to provide suggestions with substance and benefit in every meeting with a high level of skill and intensity. Leaders expect advisors to understand and explain the second and third order of effects for various courses of action. Leaders expect their advisors to share critical information promptly. Leaders expect insight into what should be the appropriate next step. Incremental suggestions are often the greatest contribution advisors can make.

There are three important means available for sharpening insight and developing depth in the advisor capability. The first is seeking difficult and challenging career assignments requiring new skill acquisition and development. The second is staying current on geopolitical events through reading and watching news from multiple sources and perspectives. What happens in the world impacts the organization and those it serves while also providing insight into other nations’ advancements in technology, military strategy, leadership, and political objectives. Chaplains should pay particular attention to religious, moral, and ethical implications within this geopolitical context to sharpen their advisement acuity. The third means is accomplished by being proactive in personal development through reading a wide range of professional development topics and seeking developmental feedback from the commander and other respected staff members. Below are examples of resources a strategic chaplain should consider for building knowledge of both the profession of arms and the organization which he/she serves.

Many commanders publish an annual recommended reading list. For example, General Joseph Votel, Commander of CENTCOM, released his 2018 reading list containing the following categories: Leadership, Managing Complexity,
Strategy, and Understanding the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. By reading a portion of the books from each category or the works in their entirety, an advisor gains insight not only into the subject matter, but also a deeper understanding and appreciation for the commander’s command philosophy and focus in the current year. Another educational opportunity for the advisor is information generated through command organizational research. Referring again to General Votel, as the Combatant Commander he directs the production of the annual posture statement for CENTCOM. Providing valuable insight into the command area of responsibility and the complex issues within that environment, this document states the command mission and strategic posture. The narrative describes strengths, threats, opportunities, and weaknesses for consideration in future operations and articulates the ends CENTCOM will pursue in key areas of concentration. In summary, this lengthy and detailed document provides critical information a chaplain should utilize in preparation for being an effective advisor to the commander. These are foundational resources for consideration by advisors in general, but the chaplain has the need for additional resources and responsibilities exclusive to his/her role of being a religious staff advisor. In addition to the resources mentioned above, chaplains should read professional articles and books on the disciplines of ethics and world religions to remain current as well as develop depth in their professional areas of concentration.

The dual nature of serving as both a staff advisor and religious professional requires reflection and intentionality for advising within the context of being a chaplain. Commanders and their staffs understand and expect the chaplain to provide advisement from a context of professional competence and character. This context has the potential to segue into the religious capability of providing pastoral care to those alongside whom the chaplain serves. This sense of identity keeps the chaplain grounded in his/her vocation as he/she engages in the advisement capability. According to the Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 1-05.04, “Chaplains serve as members of commanders’ personal and special staff, and therefore are among that small group of leaders within units having direct access to commanders to discuss matters affecting all aspects of the unit and its people.” In addition, confidentiality in a spiritual advisory capacity must be understood, “… the complete confidentiality chaplains offer commanders and other unit decision makers … is a capability no one else can offer a commander to discuss freely and candidly issues without risk of disclosure.” This unique capability provides chaplains, at the discretion of commanders, the ability to offer a confidential ear and serve as a sounding board in arriving at conclusions and decisions on matters of the most serious and sensitive nature. These discussions can often transition to a personal nature as the commander comes to rely upon the chaplain as a confidant. Effective strategic leaders are aware of their own limitations and, “they exercise a wariness of their natural tendency to act in their self-interest and build a small cadre of advisors or accountability partners to protect themselves from personal mistakes that can affect the entire organization.” Therefore, the chaplain’s proficiency as a religious advisor advances the commander’s confidence in his/her pastoral character and professional religious competence should the commander decide to utilize the chaplain as a confidant. Having discussed leader expectations for advisors and the unique considerations for chaplains as advisors, the next step is exploring the seven advisement principles beginning with the chaplain as a trusted advisor.

**Trusted Advisor**

Trust forms the foundation of the relationship between the advisor and the commander. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, in defining the building of trust states, “When high levels of trust exist, people are more willing and naturally accepting of influence, and influence is more likely to occur in multiple directions.” ATP 1-05.04 poignantly states, “Trust is the most important variable in internal advisement relationships. A commander’s trust in the personal
character and competence of an advisor is self-evidently essential for influential advisement.” Lukaszewski identifies five components of trustworthiness: candor, credibility, competence, integrity and loyalty. Candor is truth with insight and honesty combined with receptivity to differing perspectives when evaluating problems and circumstances. Credibility is determined by another’s assessment of a person’s behavior, performance and results; what is promised is delivered. Competence is the ability to provide specialized knowledge, expertise, and experience in solving issues and problems within the organization. Integrity is knowing that an advisor can be relied upon to provide guidance in making morally correct and effective decisions. Loyalty is the faithfulness, dedication, and genuine concern for supporting the commander to the best of one’s ability. In the advisor’s relationship with the commander, loyalty is a powerful anchor for both trust and influence. It is the synergy developed when goals, interests, and actions are aligned. Loyalty has to have limitations to avoid violating the advisor’s integrity. A good rule of thumb is to set a loyalty limits barrier. The advisor composes his/her limitations or ethical framework of conduct and is prepared to explain the points of limitation in any given situation. This serves not only as the chaplain’s loyalty limitation, but also as the basis for ethical advisement discussions with the commander.

Knowing the elements of trust is the first step; the second critical step is knowing how to create and maintain trust. Stephen Covey, in an interview with Rodger Dean Duncan, leadership writer for Forbes Magazine, discussed the pragmatic behaviors of high-trust leaders. One such behavior is creating transparency. Transparent advisors strive to be open, authentic, and as real as possible. They speak candidly, openly, and honestly. Keeping commitments is the fastest way to build trust. Other trust-building behaviors include practicing accountability, clarifying expectations, showing loyalty, and demonstrating respect. Covey summarizes the behaviors of trust by stating, “The point is that rather than remaining this elusive, intangible, mystical concept, trust can be quantified. We can show the credibility and behaviors that enable trust to be built and built fast in a relationship, on a team, and in an organization.” Covey also emphasizes the importance of credibility by defining its four cores. The first core, integrity, is based upon honesty and nominal inconsistency between what a person says and the actions that follow. The second core is intent, depicting motives or agendas. Agendas that build credibility are those with a win-win outcome for the leader and the advisor. The third core is an advisor’s capability to continually improve through learning, growing, improving, and staying relevant. The final core is the advisor’s measurable performance, the direct result of competency. Being a trusted advisor is the sum of character and competency. Trust provides leaders with the assurance that an advisor is going to provide reliable and sound judgment from an ethical basis. It is advice meriting not only consideration but also value as a standard for evaluating others’ ideas and input. Thus, trust becomes the foundation for the advisor’s command and staff relationships and is the starting point in providing valued and respected advisory input.

Chaplain (Colonel) David Peterson was serving as the CENTCOM Command Chaplain under General H. Norman Schwarzkopf during the Gulf War when he received notification for his next assignment to be the United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Command Chaplain. Prior to reporting to CENTCOM, Chaplain Peterson served as the FORSCOM Reserve Affairs Coordinator under General Edwin Hess Burba Jr. In this assignment, he ensured units with chaplain vacancies received adequate religious support in part through reserve chaplains. Chaplain Peterson’s proficient staff work, pastoral skills, and character afforded him the opportunity to work with General Burba once again, demonstrating that a commander’s trust is earned and remembered through competence and character. The next principle is becoming a verbal visionary.

**Verbal Visionary**

To become a verbal visionary, the advisor must recognize advisement as both an art and a science, and must become
dependent upon the ability to communicate in a manner complementary to the commander’s understanding and consideration. This requires an accurate perception of the commander’s beliefs and values, motivation and goals, and how the chaplain as an advisor can provide the optimal contribution to the situation. Verbal visionaries seek and candidly share truth with the commander with a caring attitude. They convey difficult concepts and ideas through storytelling, a powerful means for explaining and focusing upon the lesson or obvious truth recognizable to the listener. They have the desire to motivate and inspire others in the shared process of problem solving. The verbal visionary is able to decipher clear concepts from difficult and complex problems, providing insightful analysis and summaries guiding the group toward collective understanding and analysis. He/she is focused upon future-oriented outcomes that move the problem-solving process incrementally toward goals worth achieving while simultaneously providing inspiration and motivation during the staffing decision process. Verbal visionaries provide clear understanding of the destination and help the staff understand the threats, opportunities, strengths, and weaknesses, outlining the process for reaching an eventual solution. Verbal visionaries are aware that they have successfully contributed to the team effort when other leaders share how they have benefited from this input, and advisors can see their work integrated into staff ideas and strategies.

Almost immediately upon arrival at FORSCOM, Chaplain Peterson learned of an Army-wide troop drawdown including several chaplain positions. This drawdown was initiated by the Clinton administration in response to campaign promises for reducing military spending. In addition, the FORSCOM G-1 Personnel supported the reduction of overall chaplain slots, suggesting chaplains were only necessary in time of war. Chaplain Peterson met with General Burba and shared a personal story of the far-reaching implications of eliminating unit chaplains. He described in detail the consequences of chaplains taking care of their assigned units while also trying to provide religious support to additional units. This factual conversation gained the commander’s attention and created the opportunity for preserving the chaplain positions.

Developing a Leadership Perspective

A leadership perspective results from an understanding of the organization through the lens of the commander’s goals and objectives, not a focus upon the advisor’s individual staff function. ATP 1-05.01 describes the importance of the commander’s role, “Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. They drive the operations process through the activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.” As a member of the commander’s staff, the chaplain seeks to understand the current situation in its entirety, both in the way the commander understands it and in the context of his/her goals and objectives. This requires developing what Lukaszewski calls a leader’s perspective, looking at the issue through the commander’s lens. As an advisor, the chaplain becomes well-versed in the unit operations process and uses operational language when communicating with the staff. ATP 1-05.01 states, “The successful execution of the concept of religious support is a result of effective mission analysis and integrated and detailed operational planning. In order to succeed, the unit ministry team or chaplain section must understand the operational environment, operational capabilities of the unit, its mission and its role in the larger headquarters mission.” The chaplain needs to practice learning, discussing, and instructing in things that matter most to those in operational design and leadership. Defining the command’s operational approach is paramount for shaping its mission success. The strategic advisor assists leadership and staff in understanding what needs to be achieved step-by-step through focusing on future outcomes as well as making conclusive recommendations that incrementally move the organization forward in its strategic goals and initiatives.

Chaplain Peterson developed a brief for the next FORSCOM
planning meeting pertaining to chaplain position reductions. He performed multiple brief rehearsals with the staff and the chief of staff during which staff members critiqued and suggested slide content modifications. The rehearsals and presentation edits were instrumental in Chaplain Peterson’s preparation for briefing the commander at the planning meeting. During this meeting, Chaplain Peterson informed the commander that a reduction in chaplains would have a corresponding adverse effect on unit readiness. Chaplain Peterson knew the importance of readiness to commanders, particularly the FORSCOM Commander who is directly responsible for providing trained and ready forces to combatant commanders. The next advisory principle is the practice of strategic thinking.

**Thinking Strategically**

James Lukaszewski describes a strategic thinker as one who is able to find methods and models for achieving different and unique solutions to problems and issues. Strategy is future-oriented and focuses on moving the organization from the current situation to tomorrow’s solutions. The chaplain determines the implications of issues as they relate to religion, ethics, morals, and morale utilizing strategic framing. Strategy is first a mental method before it becomes an action, and it comes with unique approaches for problem identification and solution recommendation. In strategic thinking all assumptions are questioned and challenged. Two vital components of strategic thinking are creative and critical thinking methodologies. Creative thinking is beneficial in identifying problems, and critical thinking is useful for developing efficient courses of action in selecting appropriate solutions.

Charles Allen describes creative and divergent thinking when he writes, “Our challenge is to push outward from our comfort zone and enter areas of discovery. While the divergent nature of creative problem-solving requires additional time, the value is that it encourages greater exploration of concerns and issues, unconventional problem identification, and ‘non-standard’

alternatives.” When used as a basis for identifying problems, creative thinking is multifaceted. It provides various methods for problem definition as well as options and alternatives in the divergent component. Joseph Anderson says creativity exists when one of three options are involved, “If a new thing comes into being that is creation. If two previously unrelated things are joined that is synthesis. Or if a thing is improved or gains a new application that is modification.” Creative thinking is best executed by using the chaplain section and staff to collectively brainstorm and challenge normal linear thinking methodologies and assumptions.

Having generated options, the thinking process moves from divergence to convergence through the use of critical thinking where alternatives are analyzed and judged for effectiveness in providing viable solutions to problems. Critical thinking experts Paul and Elder contend,

A well-cultivated critical thinker raises vital questions and problems, gathers and assesses relevant information, and can effectively interpret it; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical consequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring out solutions to complex problems.**
The advisor learns to analyze, synthesize and evaluate information in the pursuit of problem-solving and decision-making. Critical thinking requires the ability to address ill-structured problems lacking clear right and wrong answers. Issues are debatable and require reflective judgement. This is the type of thinking required for the “wicked problems” General Brooks depicted at the strategic level where answers are found in the second and third order of effects. Lukaszewski summarizes strategic thinking by challenging the would-be advisor with a series of questions, which answered in the affirmative, show acumen for being a strategic thinker. The relevant questions a chaplain should consider are as follows:

Can I develop a flexible approach to problems, looking for different approaches? Have I developed an understanding of the command that goes sufficiently beyond my staff function to enable a strategic approach? Do I understand how my actions and advice (as a chaplain) are relevant to achieving the command’s most crucial objectives? Do I have a bias for action while still questioning all decisions and assumptions? Do I focus on what is doable rather than the ideal?

Upon learning of the chaplain position reductions, Chaplain Peterson assembled his staff and described the situation and the importance of convincing the commander to preserve chaplain positions during the force drawdown. The staff used creative divergent thinking to brainstorm the best approach for gathering the necessary facts and data to support Chaplain Peterson’s position. Staff members contributed to the collective understanding by drawing from previous experience and determining the best approach. The chaplain section then utilized critical thinking by converging the information into a tenable solution. The result was a staff study capturing concise and relevant data justifying the preservation of chaplain positions.

To be a strategic advisor, one must be able to learn to recognize patterns by studying history, understanding human thinking and behavior, observing consistencies in leadership, being informed through current events, and identifying similarities from previous work experience. The objective in pattern analysis is to study significant elements, timelines, and repetitive events as a means for postulating future occurrences. Owen Jacobs describes the process of seeing patterns as being much like a chess master playing chess. The great memories of chess masters are not built upon movement sequences but rather learning to see patterns. Jacobs writes, “Expertise in solving strategic problems results from the same kind of hard work to learn to see patterns as is the case with chess or intelligence analysis.”

There are two significant benefits that come from observing patterns. First, greater knowledge is gained through seeing the larger picture because many people only see and think in segments rather than grasping the evidence of similarities from history. Second, because patterns are observed, they can be used as forecasting tools for predicting the future. Through pattern analysis, a strategic advisor is able to take the pieces of a problem and utilize them to develop a view of the whole, finding the similarities from past scenarios. This knowledge can then be used to forecast predictable outcomes within the current problem and shape the strategic approach and design for course of action development and analysis. Lukaszewski describes the process as pattern intuition. All circumstances and issues have prior history, and patterns can be derived from that history. Using the information gained from historic analysis allows the advisor to pull existing information together and extract new insights. These new insights are applied in developing solutions by analyzing the patterns. Utilizing the results of pattern intuition aids the advisor in developing reasonable forecasts about future outcomes. It is necessary to provide a word of caution with reference to pattern analysis. Although pattern
Giving Constructive Advice

Lukaszewski discusses a deficiency common to many staff advisors in the presentation of advice. Because the majority of command staff work requires strategic problem-solving and analysis, it necessitates the staff advisor, and the chaplain in particular, to intentionally think and communicate in a structured and process-driven format. As a means of guiding the staff advisor in this operational thinking process, Lukaszewski offers a model called the Three-Minute Drill. The intent behind this drill is to provide a tool sensitive to time and which utilizes a disciplined approach for preparing and presenting recommendations to the command.

The Three-Minute Drill is comprised of six sequential steps with each step having an apportioned number of words (see Figure 1). The entire six-step process contains an allotted 450 words which translates into a presentation time of approximately three minutes. Resembling a modified military joint planning process, The Three-Minute Drill is familiar and readily adaptable to the military staff advisor. In step one, the situation is described or rather the problem is framed using 60 words or less. Step two, called analysis and assumptions, presents the significance of the situation including the threats and opportunities to the organization and identifying the one or two primary assumptions on which the analysis is based. This is accomplished in 60 words. In step three, the goal or intended destination is defined and its justification stated. Goals should be achievable, incremental, positive, and deadline-specific with a 60-word limit. Step four identifies the options or courses of action. It is recommended that three options be presented including one to do nothing at all. Options are to be presented within the confines of 150 words. Step five is the recommendation step where the commander is presented with the advisor’s optimal choice. This includes the first task needing to be accomplished, the next steps to be taken, why it contains the least amount of risk, and why it was the selected option. The recommendation is to be presented in 60 words. Finally, step six is the justification step. In this step the advisor identifies the intended and unintended consequences of the three suggested options using 60 words.
For advice to be useful it must conform to three criteria. First, advice has to be goal-focused, positive in nature and must provide an attainable result that moves the organization incrementally toward the intended goal with clarity and focus. Second, the advice needs to be pragmatic, with its value being what it is able to accomplish rather than in the goals or objectives it proposes. The combatant commander is motivated by advice that moves the organization forward by shaping its environment and relationships toward the intended objectives. Third, the advice must have a process orientation. Particularly when addressing complex problems and offering courses of action at this level, it is useful to define outcomes in elements and phases that can be trained, reproduced, and evaluated to ensure actions are not only executed but also remain effective for the future.

Problems at the strategic level involve state actors who are often unpredictable yet adaptable in pursuing their objectives. As a result, courses of action need to be evaluated for effectiveness in this complex open and adaptive system dominated by human actors. A necessary feedback loop is to be included as the means for ongoing evaluation and adaptation for future outcomes. A useful framework for evaluating an advisor’s recommendation to a commander can be found in the Army War College Campaign Effectiveness Model.

Underpinning each of the six steps in the strategic advising process are three fundamental elements. The first is a basis of factual information which can be seen, measured, and relied upon. Second, each step is real-time with only a small gap between the decision outcome and execution of the follow-on actions. The more time that passes without action, the greater the probability the facts will change or the desired result will be compromised. Finally, the steps are outcome-focused with a positive future orientation aimed at producing concrete results derived from the decision-making process. The Three-Minute Drill is an adaptable model and can be modified and adjusted to the commander’s preference for receiving advice based upon feedback from its initial use. As Maister, Green, and Calford point out, the burden is upon the advisor to readily understand the commander’s preferred style of interaction and to be flexible in adapting to the approach which most effectively benefits the commander and succeeds in meeting his/her intended outcome.

Through the previously mentioned staff rehearsals, Chaplain Peterson learned the importance of presenting his argument for preserving chaplain positions in succinct and powerful language. He suggested several courses of action followed by his final recommendation. He stated the risks of eliminating the contested chaplain positions by emphasizing Soldier and family readiness. Chaplain Peterson’s multi-step preparation was instrumental in his strong presentation and produced an advocate for his position, the Chief of Staff, Major General Glenn Marsh. The final advising principle is showing the commander how to use the advice provided.

### The Three Minute Drill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1: Situation (60 words):</td>
<td>Briefly describe the nature of the issue, problem, or situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2: Analysis and Assumptions (60 words):</td>
<td>Briefly describe what the situation means, its implications, and perhaps, how it threatens or presents opportunities. Include one or two key assumptions that validate the analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3: The Goal (60 words):</td>
<td>The clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished. Goals keep everyone focused forward. Useful goals are understandable, brief, achievable, positive, and time/deadline sensitive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4: Options (150 words):</td>
<td>Always present at least three options for action. You can suggest more, but three is optimal for management to choose from. The goals you suggest are to “do something,” “do something more,” or “do nothing.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 5: Recommendations (60 words):</td>
<td>Be prepared to say what you would do if you were in your boss’ shoes, and why. The recommendation is usually selected on the basis of which option will cause the least number of negative unintended consequences. Be prepared to walk through a similar sort of analysis for each of the options proposed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 6: Justification (60 words):</td>
<td>Identify the negative unintended – but fully predictable – consequences of each option, including the option to do nothing.</td>
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Individuals should take note of the following words of caution when following the principles outlined in this paper. Should the commander utilize the chaplain as a member of his/her trusted advisory team, he/she becomes part of the “Inner Ring” as C.S. Lewis described it. The chaplain should heed Lewis’ warning cautioning a member of that group to, “make the work your end, you will presently find yourself all unawares inside the only circle in your profession that really matters. Doing those things which the profession exists to do.”

In other words, let the work and role of chaplain be the focus rather than being enamored by membership in the commander’s inner circle.

In conclusion, General Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defined well the significant challenge the U.S. and its military face in the future domain, “… the United States faces an extraordinarily complex and dynamic security environment. To keep pace with the changing character of war, we must globally integrate the way we plan, employ the force, and design the force of the future.”

This dynamic complexity is the challenge combatant commanders face on a daily basis. They require and expect the very best from their staff in planning and providing advice. The chaplain, as part of that staff, must prepare to the utmost of his/her ability to be an invaluable staff advisor.

The principles provided in this paper create a path along the educational continuum for further development as a competent staff officer. The chaplain has both a unique and challenging role in that regard. Serving as a member of the commander’s personal and special staff enables the chaplain to not only provide staff advice but also function as a spiritual confidant. As a proficient staff officer, the chaplain fosters a relationship with the commander producing advisory opportunities of a spiritual and personal nature. This advisement component is an integral part of senior leader care which is so critical for today’s military leaders. Chaplains developing their craft as staff officers simultaneously enable their dual capability as providers of religious support. Thus,
the two capabilities reinforce and promote each other. It is with this motivation and intention that the chaplain should master and apply the principles discussed herein. While this is true at all echelons of the chaplaincy, the implications at the strategic level are profound. Religious, moral, and ethical advice provided by the chaplain at the strategic level has a significant impact on both the command and the global stage on which it operates and executes its missions. Chaplains who learn and employ the advisory principles discussed in this paper posture themselves for effectively advising commanders in the navigation of current and future military challenges.
Empathetic Leadership: Understanding the Human Domain

by Chaplain (Major) John McDougall

“A true leader has the confidence to stand alone, the courage to make tough decisions, and the compassion to listen to the needs of others”

— General Douglas MacArthur

You have just arrived to your new assignment and stepped into a key billet in a joint assignment. Unlike your last job where everyone wore the same uniform and shoulder insignia, you quickly realize the diverse experiences and expectations of your team:

Your deputy is an officer from an allied nation and your first interaction was cold and formal, almost curt. You thought you were polite and positive, so you struggle to account for her response. You think, “Is this part of her personality or culture? Or is it just the result of a rough day? Is she like this toward everyone or just toward me?”

Your senior enlisted advisor is from a sister service and while you really hit it off, you can sense some frustration. He is aggressive and self-confident, attributes which have served him well but are liabilities here. As you reflect, you wonder: “How does he feel about this assignment and his role in it? How does he perceive his coworkers and subordinates?”

The civilian administrative assistant has 17 years in this command and you are the seventh officer to hold this position during his tenure. While clearly knowledgeable and well-connected, you sense an air of superiority, bordering on disdain. Though initially irritated, you ask yourself, “What would it be like to be in his situation? What assumptions has he made about me?”

Leadership isn’t easy. Each individual with whom we work with is a complex set of personality and experiences, hopes and fears. While every good leader tries to get to know his Soldiers, only the truly exceptional ones go beyond the surface level. They pay close attention to verbal and non-verbal cues and ask tough questions in order to better understand the experience, perspective, and feelings of the other person. In short, they have honed and applied the skill of empathy, a critically important, but often misunderstood element of leadership.
Unfortunately, while more and more professions are incorporating empathy into their practice, the U.S. military has mostly avoided the topic. Sure, it holds a small place in our leadership doctrine and in our flag officers’ speeches, but we still fail to comprehend what empathy is and why it is so important for leaders. We propagate an unspoken belief that this skill is necessary only for caring professionals—doctors, nurses, clergy, and counselors—and is of no tangible benefit to the profession of arms.¹

Yet, at its heart, empathy is about understanding people, namely how one’s worldview (cognitive) and emotions (affective) drive behavior.² It is primarily a mental task—the detailed observation of human terrain, comparable to a commander’s careful study of contour lines—and thus can be developed. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General (Retired) Martin Dempsey asserted it to be an important acquirable skill: “Effective Leaders have a sense of empathy. They listen. In listening they learn. In learning they become empathetic.”³ Like other critical skills, we will grow in empathy as we practice it.

Is there another profession that needs to grasp the complex human domain more than the military, where trust is our currency and lives hang on our decisions? How can we expect to influence and motivate diverse JIIM and multi-component organizations to accomplish inherently emotional missions without first seeking to learn what makes them tick?⁴ This article will argue that today’s military leader must properly understand, develop, and apply empathy to build cohesive teams and make better decisions in future operating environments.

Understanding Empathy

In order to avoid the common misconceptions about empathy, it is helpful to look at its origins and recent use. A nineteenth century German psychologist coined the term meaning “in-feeling” to describe the ability of a counselor to imaginatively enter the thoughts, emotions, and perspective of the client to both build report and gain understanding.⁵ Since that time, the emphasis on empathy has expanded throughout the medical profession. Doctors and nurses try to assume the viewpoint of the patient in order to provide more considerate care. In recent years, empathy has even moved into the boardroom as corporate executives try to better understand both their employees and their customers. These examples are useful both for the truths they affirm and the misconceptions they dispel.

First, empathy is not about feelings of sadness or overwhelming concern. The psychologist who is thinking of his own feelings is not paying attention to those of his client. As General (Retired) Stanley McChrystal recently explained, “Empathy is not sympathy. It doesn’t mean that you rub [your Soldiers’] bellies and ask them how they feel every morning. What it means is that you can see [the situation] through their eyes.”⁶ Military leaders must not confuse empathy with “going soft.” The goal is to learn what motivates a person or group. What leader, no matter how gruff, could honestly say, “I don’t want to better understand my Soldiers or my environment”? While sincere concern and compassion may occur as a byproduct, empathy is about gaining understanding, not generating personal feelings.⁷

Nor is empathy about having shared experiences with others. It is unlikely that the doctor had the same procedure as her patient nor that the executive had the same purchasing experience as his customer, but that does not preclude them from taking an empathetic perspective. It is not necessary to “walk a mile in another man’s shoes” to imagine what it might be like for him and respond accordingly.⁸ In the military, we often have similar personal or professional experiences as our subordinates. However, the sentiment of “I know what you are going through” paradoxically inhibits empathetic learning as the leader exports his own thoughts and feelings into the situation, rather than look for new insights. While commonalities can aid understanding, in truth, we learn more when we minimize apparent similarities and take a mental posture of curiosity.
The professional, therefore, applies empathy to gain understanding and make better decisions. His goal is not to generate sympathy nor to find common ground, but to create better outcomes for those he serves. As psychiatrist and business consultant Prudy Gourguechon instructs, “Empathy is a neutral data gathering tool that enables you to understand the human environment within which you are operating…and therefore make better predictions, craft better tactics, inspire loyalty, and communicate clearly.” If this skill can work in civilian occupations, could it also benefit the profession of arms?

**Empathy in Doctrine**

In 2006, while the U.S. military was heavily engaged in stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, doctrine writers at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas reconsidered Army leadership doctrine and asked the question, “What are we missing?” They surveyed the operational environment and the challenges facing commanders and decided to add “Empathy” under the character portion of the Army Leadership Requirements Model. Were they right to do so? The inclusion of such a “soft” concept into Army leadership doctrine has puzzled and surprised military insiders and outside observers alike. Perhaps that is why empathy remains such a marginalized aspect of Army instruction and culture, despite regular pleas to expand its role.

We still perceive it as an emotional event, rather than an analytic tool to build stronger teams and make better decisions. This collective error begins with the way we have addressed empathy in doctrine. First, we continue to conflate empathy and sympathy; the former is a cognitive process, while the latter is an emotional reaction. The definition of empathy provided in ADP 6-22 is sound, if not simplistic: “identifying and understanding what others think, feel, and believe.” However, subsequent clarifying doctrine only muddies the issue, encouraging leaders to “genuinely relate to another person’s situation” and even “share…someone else’s feelings.” The problem with this concept of empathy is twofold: it presumes shared experiences or emotions where they may not exist and, where they do exist, it encourages the leader to go beyond curious observer to emotional participant, a counseling lapse known as overidentification. This conflation was evident recently when a former brigade commander cautioned a class of mid-grade officers that empathy is a potential weakness when one is moved to have too much compassion.

Second, we categorize empathy as a leader attribute (i.e. what a leader is) rather than a competency (i.e. what a leader does). The distinction is subtle but important, because, for the most part, we do not train attributes, especially character attributes. We may talk about their importance and briefly assess them on evaluations, but we do not put a concentrated effort into their development. Moreover, we wrongly assume that most character traits are innate and cannot be developed. As a battalion commander told his newly arrived chaplain, “I am not very empathetic. I need your help to know when I’m being too tough.” While his self-awareness is commendable, he chose to delegate a weakness rather than strengthen it. Perhaps, this is due to our perception of empathy as an intrinsic attribute which some possess and others lack, rather than an important skill which a leader can practice and develop.

Third, we view empathy primarily within organic military units. The emphasis in doctrine is that commanders use empathy in order to better care for Soldiers, DA civilians, and families. While important, this perspective is much too narrow, minimizing its utility in JIIM organizations and partnerships, as well as in the operational environment. In fairness, Army leadership doctrine does hint at empathy’s broader applications including “local populations, victims...”
of natural disasters, and prisoners of war.” Yet, this interpersonal skill has not expanded into other facets of doctrine relating to the human domain, from developing cohesive teams to influencing foreign populations.

**Applying Empathy**

A military leader can—and should—use empathy to better understand her formation. This applies not just to individuals, but to the collective emotions, thoughts, and perspectives of subordinate units as well. If leadership is “the process of influencing people,” then critical to leadership is the ability to understand the needs and desires of others. This task is difficult enough with a relatively homogenous group of service members within an organic unit. It is significantly more so in a JIIM organization with, for instance, a company of Navy Seabees, a contingent of National Guard logisticians, a team of FBI agents, and a battalion of Polish paratroopers, with each group having its own unique culture, beliefs, and goals.

In 2011, the Rand Corporation published the results of a study titled “Developing U.S. Army Officers’ Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments.” As a part of their research, they interviewed over 100 military officers and civilian officials to determine what knowledge, skills, and abilities are necessary for success in a JIIM environment.

While empathy was not specifically mentioned, the majority of respondents identified “people skills” as the most critical attribute in these situations. “Interpersonal and other integration skills tend to be of primary importance in JIIM environments, in which success usually requires voluntary collaboration between independent organizations that are frequently pursuing different agendas.” Understanding these diverse perspectives is an essential skill for a leader to possess in order to align various goals toward a common end state.

Just as a commander can use empathy to better understand his organization, he can apply the same skill to map the human terrain in the operational area. The ancient Chinese war theorist Sun Tzu famously posited the critical importance of knowing both yourself and your enemy. Surely this principle extends beyond the science of war to the equally important human domain. Understanding the people in the area of operations—whether enemy, friendly, or neutral—requires a posture of curiosity; the willingness to ask and answer empathetic questions:

- *What has been their life experience to this point?*
- *How do they see the world and their role in it?*
- *What do they hope to achieve? What do they fear to lose?*

This type of empathy goes beyond mere cultural understanding or awareness in current operational doctrine. While the study of culture can assist with empathy, it remains an outside perspective, what “they” think or believe. Empathy, in contrast, seeks to understand from the inside, temporarily seeing the world from another perspective.

Furthermore, the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas has developed an excellent empathetic tool that helps a leader to both see himself and see his adversary, as Sun Tzu prescribed. In this model—called the “4 Ways of
Seeing”—an observing group asks two questions about its own perceptions (How do we see ourselves? How do we see them?) followed by two questions about the perspective of the observed group (How do they see us? How do they see themselves?). This fairly simple, but challenging, exercise can help a leader to overcome his own bias and grasp the viewpoint of another person, the very essence of empathy. The insight derived from this interrogative process can lead to better decision-making and ultimately success in the operational environment.

Empathy is a powerful tool for understanding the human domain, both at home and abroad. There is, however, an important step between empathy and sound decisions. Fundamentally, the ethical question is: What should I do with these empathetic insights? One option is to dismiss the new understanding and proceed without concern for the impact on others. Still another response is to weaponize empathy, using the new learning to gain leverage against a peer or to manipulate a subordinate. Neither action is consistent with the ethical values of the U.S. Army, nor does it engender a relationship built on trust, the bedrock of our profession. Those who use empathetic understanding in this way are the epitome of toxic leaders; apathetic and callous.

A third reaction is to apply empathetic understanding to seek the best possible outcome for all parties. While this could be motivated by compassion and concern, as we have discussed this type of feeling is not essential. Choosing to weigh the feelings and desires of another person in decision-making could derive from any one of the three major ethical models: a responsibility to care for subordinates and others (duty ethics), an adherence to personal or collective moral ideals (virtue ethics), or a desire to improve the situation for the people involved (consequentialism). Therefore, far from being “soft,” empathy is a leadership tool to gain understanding of the human domain and make sound moral decisions that will benefit the organization and positively shape the environment.

Conclusion

Empathy is the least understood trait on the Army Leadership Requirements Model and arguably among the most important. Since war is “a fundamentally human endeavor,” it is critical that commanders understand the human domain in order to build cohesive teams based on trust as well as influence foreign populations. The Army needs empathetic leaders who can apply this skill to difficult leadership and operational situations.

We need, therefore, to improve and elevate the role of empathy in U.S. Army doctrine. Within leadership doctrine, we must clarify its definition as an emotionally neutral skill used to better understand people. Empathy should also have a prominent place in doctrine related to building trust, especially when the cultural differences are great, as in JIIM organizations or with local nationals during operations. Furthermore, we need to expand this concept into other aspects of Army operations that could significantly benefit from empathetic insight. This includes, but is not limited to, Information Operations, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), Security Forces Assistance Brigades (SFAB), and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). These operations require empathetic understanding; cultural awareness alone is insufficient.

Moreover, we need to emphasize the development and evaluation of empathetic skill in leaders. In the institutional domain, we ought to take full advantage of pre-commissioning and NCOES opportunities to inculcate young leaders about what empathy is and how it enables better understanding and better decisions in the human terrain. In the operational domain, we need to coach and evaluate leaders to employ empathy as part of their leadership in both garrison and in the operational environment. Lastly, we must encourage the self-development of empathy by using it as an important selection criterion for command and other key leadership billets. If people are central to both leadership and warfare, we need leaders who can decipher human terrain
just as well as they can interpret a map.

The human domain is complex. Army leaders need empathy to better understand the experience, perspective, and feelings of people, and thus make better decisions. Our Soldiers deserve it and our future success depends on it.

Chaplain McDougall spent six years as an infantry officer before becoming a chaplain in 2010. Prior to joining 4/25 IBCT (A), he has served in the 82nd Airborne Division, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Military Academy (2000) and a Master of Divinity degree from Multnomah Biblical Seminary (2009) and is the author of Jesus Was An Airborne Ranger: Finding Your Purpose Following the Warrior Christ (Multnomah Press, 2015).

NOTES

9 Ibid.
10 Jon J. Falleson, Phone Interview with Author, 9 January 2019.
11 Garner, 84.
14 ADRP 6-22, 3-17.
16 Group Conversation with Author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 February 2019.
17 Carson Jump, Phone Interview with Author, 16 March 2019.
18 ADRP 6-22, 3-17.
20 ADRP 6-22, 3-20.
21 ADP 6-22, 3.
24 Similar to the “6 Empathetic Questions” found in The Red Team Handbook, version 9.0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies), 84.
27 “4 Ways of Seeing” The Red Team Handbook, version 9.0 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies), 78.
A Theological View of Moral Injury

by Chaplain (Colonel) Bradford A. Baumann

A Theological View of Moral Injury

The Army Chaplain Corps has identified the need and acknowledged responsibility for Chaplains to assist in the overall healing process for those suffering with a Moral Injury (MI). Although the field of study is still being developed, behavioral health professionals directly affiliated with the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) continue to conduct extensive research and search for effective treatment methods in the field of MI. In the past few years however, some of the leading researchers have identified significant gaps in their ability to fully and effectively care for those suffering from these unseen wounds. By its very nature a MI affects the human soul. Military Chaplains possess the training, and bear the regulatory responsibility, to speak to the issues pertaining to the soul. More specifically, Christian moral theology has the ability to offer depth of context to those suffering from a MI that clinical psychology cannot. If Military Chaplains are going to be successful in aiding in the MI healing process, they must reclaim their moral voice, and offer a moral theology, in order to more effectively assist in the reconciliation and redemption process for those who are suffering with a MI.

The purpose of this strategic research project is to search for possible solutions that could serve as aids in helping Christian Military Chaplains more effectively care for those suffering from a MI within the realm of their expertise as theologians. This study will ask, and then answer, five key questions in connection with the ongoing discussion pertaining to care of those suffering from a MI: First, what is Moral Injury? Second, what is the definition of morality? Third, is war morally justifiable? Fourth, if there is moral justification for war, should Christians who participate in war be left on their own with potentially destructive psychological and spiritual consequences? Fifth, what can Christian Military Chaplains do in the overall understanding, care, and ultimate healing process when a MI occurs?

What is Moral Injury?

Within the body of research, the definition of MI has gone through several layered progressions. The original body of literature and research came out of Jonathan Shay’s work he produced during the 20 years he worked at a Department of Veterans Affairs clinic in Boston. His definition is widely accepted, and his work is almost always referred to in some context in discussion on MI. Most
researchers begin by citing his original definition. Shay writes, “Moral Injury is (1) a betrayal of what is right, (2) by someone one who holds legitimate authority (e.g., a military leader), that (3) takes place in a high stakes situation.”

Building on this original research, Brett Litz et al., expanded on Shay’s definition. Litz and his colleagues state that MI is the “psychological, biological, spiritual, behavioral, and social impact of perpetuating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that transgress deeply-held moral beliefs and expectations.” This definition expands on Shay’s work in that it is not just that someone did something to me – an external betrayal by an authority figure – it expands it to include something an individual may have “done” or “failed to do.” Regardless whether they did it themselves, or someone did it to them, the betrayal has the ability to produce, “personal shame, feelings of estrangement from fellow human beings, and sense of alienation from God or a spiritual sense of grounding.” This becomes an important note for Christian Military Chaplains in that the research now expands the definition to include the topic of individual spirituality.

The working definition this study will use is “The stress (moral burden) from an experience or set of experiences that transgresses or violates (wounds the soul) deeply held moral beliefs and expectations, provoking mild or intense expressions of shame, guilt, anger, contempt, loss of honor, and even debilitating or harmful behaviors.” This definition was developed by Chaplain (Colonel) Gary Fisher in his work done for the United States Army War College study titled, The Army, Moral Injury and the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps.

**What is the Definition of Moral?**

For the purpose of this study, it is essential to begin by defining moral(s) or morality.

Specifically, for the Christian Military Chaplain this is essential because they bear a regulatory responsibility. DoD states that Military Chaplains are, “to assist Service members, their families, and other authorized personnel with the challenges of military service as advocates of religious, moral, ethical, and spiritual well-being and resiliency.”

The topic of morality is a broad subject. Scholars, poets, politicians, philosophers, and theologians have rigorously debated its exact definition and application to life throughout history. Equally as vigorously, they have argued who actually possesses the authority to define the term. The intent of this strategic study is not to debate all of the nuances and definitions of morality. Rather, it is to define Christian morality and use that definition to aid in the overall healing process for those suffering from a wound to their soul.

Beginning first with a universally accepted definition, most define a moral as, “of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior: ETHICAL.” In much of the literature pertaining to MI, researchers use the terms “moral” and “ethical” interchangeably, focusing more on the ensuing behaviors of right/wrong or good/bad. This then naturally leads to the historically debated question of “who then provides the authority to establish principles of good/bad or right/wrong behaviors?”

The DoD generally define moral(s) as: “Belief(s) about what is right and wrong (conscience).” The Army specifically defines ethics as an “evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs.” Undergirding these laws, values, and beliefs are five commonly accepted attributes: expertise, trust, development, values, and service. Each of the services that comprise the DoD has respective oaths, creeds, and norms of conduct, which very closely resemble one another, and are all undergirded by the U.S. Constitution and the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As General Dempsey stated, in America’s Military – A Profession of Arms, “Our profession is defined by our values, ethics, standards, skills, and attributes. As volunteers, our sworn duty is to the constitution. Our status as a profession is granted by those whom we are accountable to, our civilian authority, and the American people.” (See Figure 1)
Looking next to the DoD and VA Behavior Health community, they widely accept the Litz et al., definition that states moral(s) are “the personal and shared familial, cultural, societal, and legal rules for social behavior, either tacit or explicit. Morals are fundamental assumptions about how things should work and how one should behave in the world.” In Litz’s research, he and his colleagues lean heavily upon the works done by Lawrence Kohlberg (The Philosophy of Moral Development), Nancy Eisenberg and Paul A. Miller (The Relation of Empathy to Prosocial and Related Behaviors), and Christian Miller (Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics). An important note for this study is they specifically state that their basis for defining “moral(s)” is viewed through the lens of an “evolutionary psychology perspective,” which is not accepted by Christian Theology.

Looking finally to Military Chaplains, they have historically cited their sacred texts for the definition of morals/ethics and the ensuing “right/wrong” or “good/bad” behavior. Expressly for Christian Military Chaplains, the Bible provides the authoritative definition of what comprises what is morally right and wrong. Christian ethics are, first and foremost, a reflection of the character of God and His plan for His people. Simply defined, Christian morals are the righteous behaviors of the Christian that reflect the true and holy character of God. This study will examine in detail exactly what these behaviors look like throughout the remainder of this study.

**Is War Morally Justifiable?**

This naturally leads to the essential conversation about war and justice. Again, scholars, philosophers, and theologians have long debated and continue to debate the question: Is war ever morally justifiable? This is a pivotal question because of an inherent tension. On one side of the debate there are voices that state there is definitive moral justification for war. On the other side there are voices that state definitively there is no moral justification for war. In between the two views lies a chasm. Therefore, discussing whether war is justifiable or not is essential because of its implications – the potential for a MI.

If a member of the military believes his/her actions are morally “justified,” and s/he experiences an emotional/spiritual/moral disruption, it has the potential to lead to healing. If a member of the military believes his/her actions are morally “unjustifiable” in war, the action could have a negative outcome – cognitive or moral dissonance.

For Christian Military Chaplains, the Bible serves as their starting point. Although the Bible does not address the justification for war directly, theologians frequently turn to the Christian’s responsibility toward government and ruling authorities. The Bible highlights the Christian’s responsibility in Romans 13:1-7.

In this passage, three biblical principles emerge: 1) rulers are established by God (13:1); 2) those rulers legitimately function to protect the innocent, promote the good, and punish the evil (13:3-4); and 3) those who desire a well-ordered society ought to render the authorities the appropriate taxes and honor (13:5-7). This gives the clear idea that God’s rule frames war within the civil and state realms. Those leaders authorize the
act of war, and there is an ensuing expectation that Soldiers prosecute it for the express purpose of punishment of wrong doing and protection of the innocent. The challenge in the passage is that it does not specifically state whether or not the Soldiers are Christian or non-Christian.

A second biblical passage that highlights Christians' responsibilities to appointed authorities is 1 Peter 2:13-14. In these verses the Bible makes it clear that it is impossible to be a good Christian and a bad citizen at the same time. This does not mean, however, that obedience is always mandated when a law is anti-scriptural. In those circumstances, the Christian must obey God rather than man and then be prepared for the potential consequences. Jesus admonished his followers to “not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both the soul and body in hell” (Matthew 10:28).

Another key biblical principle that the Christian cannot overlook is love in the greater context of justice. The Bible teaches a Christian’s greatest responsibility is the duty to love. Everything within God’s plan must begin with love, be filtered through the biblical ethic of love, and ultimately end against the backdrop of love. Jesus states this clearly in Matthew 22:37-40 when he said the Christian's responsibility is twofold: 1) love God, 2) and love your fellow man. This is a foundational and inescapable principle.

In summation, the Bible sets obedience to government in the context of the Christian’s duty to love his/her neighbors while waiting for God’s ultimate justice. Political responsibility is a must in a world marked by selfishness and evil. The Bible concludes that love’s principles do not insist on one’s own rights. They must be prepared to suffer wrong (1 Corinthians 6:7). They do, however, insist on government (the present arm God uses for imperfect justice) to care for the needs of its people. Reinhold Niebuhr, a prominent theologian who lived through both WWI and WWII, highlighted this point when he said, “If the providence of God does not enter the affairs of men to bring good out of evil, the evil in our good may easily destroy our most ambitious efforts and frustrate our highest hopes.”

Out of these principles, scholars have attempted to establish a system, or lens, through which leaders can look when attempting to justify war. The two foundational voices on the topic of Just War Theory are Augustine (354-430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).

Augustine wrestles with the idea “of whether” there is moral justification for Christians to pick up the sword. In Answers to Faustus, a Manichean (Contra Faustum Manichaeum) book 22 sections 69–76, Augustine highlights the actions of King David (1 Samuel 18:7), 31 the Centurion (Luke 7:1-10), 32 Cornelius (Acts 10:1), 33 and the soldiers who came to John the Baptist (Luke 3:14). All these men, for Augustine, were professional soldiers, and presumably, all had been in the presence of those who had killed, ordered the killing of others, or did the killing themselves. Yet, Augustine questions why the Bible does not condemn them; rather, in most instances, they are lauded as examples of the faith.

In the end, Augustine did not see that Christianity was incompatible with war. He believed that peace should be the ultimate objective of our desire, and that war should be waged only out of necessity. His work, instead, focused on the attitude of the combatant within the profession. If ordered by a righteous or unrighteous king, it was the Christian warrior’s duty to serve. If his actions were out of obedience to the orders given to him by a commander or government, he need not be in fear of eternal reprisal.

What Augustine did condemn, however, were what he revealed as the “real evils” in war.

These are sinful attitudes that manifest into evil actions. He said those are:

“love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and such
like; and it is generally to punish these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that, in obedience to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake wars, when they find themselves in such a position as regards the conduct of human affairs, that right conduct requires them to act, or to make others act in this way.\(^\text{38}\)

For Augustine, sin ensured there would always be evil men among us. Accordingly, a just society has the responsibility to act on behalf of the innocent.

Augustine's ideas were further developed and codified by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas' work on just war theory has become one of the foundational benchmarks from which the majority of researchers argue their points for or against the theory. The theory of just war falls into two main parts: \textit{jus ad bellum}, which is concerned with the moral “reasons” civil authorities have for declaring and then fighting a war; and \textit{jus in bello}, which is concerned with the moral “means” adopted to fight that war (e.g. rules of engagement).\(^\text{39-41}\)

Although there have been and will continue to be opponents of the justifying principles of \textit{jus ad bellum}, and of \textit{jus in bello}, these principles have served as the foundation upon which most all subsequent work has been done on the topic of Just War Theory.\(^\text{42}\) (See Figures 2 & 3)

Before moving forward, it is important to briefly discuss justice and the actual act of killing in war. The reason it is important is because the act itself has the potential to leave a “moral burden” on the person who killed a fellow human being. It also has the potential to leave the “killer” feeling he has alienated himself from God. A leading voice on the subject of killing is Dave Grossman. In his chapter on the \textit{Burden of Killing} he says, “Killing is what war is all about, and killing in combat, by its very nature, causes deep wounds of pain and survivor’s guilt.”\(^\text{43}\)

For Grossman, the act of killing itself is a complex subject because the warrior is almost always caught in a Catch-22. If he kills, there is the potential for him to be burdened with “blood guilt.” If he does not kill, and a comrade dies because of his inactivity, there is the potential for the burden of guilt.\(^\text{44}\)

Therefore, the pertinent question here becomes “should a justified killing within combat leave a moral burden or feelings of guilt?”

Again, looking to the Bible for answers on this subject, it is essential to examine what the Bible says about killing versus murder. Beginning first with Old Testament, the sixth commandment (Exodus 20:13) says “You shall not murder.”\(^\text{45}\)

In the Old Testament, the Israelites understood murder as an act having “malice” thoughts and intent attached to it.\(^\text{46}\) Again turning to the biblical example of King David, a pertinent question reemerges, “why does the Bible not indict the actions of women of Israel, who came out singing and dancing after David had killed the Philistine, if in fact his actions were egregious? What the Bible actually says is “with joyful songs” they “danced” and sang, “Saul has slain thousands, and David his tens of thousands” (1 Samuel 18:6-7).\(^\text{47}\) The Bible does not portray David as one who had just committed the malicious act of murder within the confines of battle. Many argue, however, the ethic of the Old Testament is different from that of the New Testament.

Therefore, looking to the New Testament, what does it say? At the beginning of Jesus’ earthly ministry, he delivered the Sermon on the Mount. It is out of this sermon that Christians extrapolate the Christian ethic on killing. In this sermon, Jesus specifically addressed the sixth commandment in Matthew 5:21-22.\(^\text{48}\) As with the Old Testament, the listed actions of “murder” and “hate” have emotional and psychological intent attached to them. Jesus further develops this idea in Matthew 15:18-19.\(^\text{49}\) These versus further illustrate the fact that the Bible is more concerned with the attitudes and emotions of the individual’s heart.

Again, looking to what Augustine said, he too differentiated the evil attitudes pertaining to war, which are “love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power.”\(^\text{50}\) These are sinful acts and are in direct violation of the law of love.
Therefore, it is the conclusion of this study that war is justifiable, and that Christians are morally justified to fight in those wars and kill if necessary for the following reasons: 1) According to the teachings of the Bible, there are times in which divinely appointed civil and state authorities have the responsibility to protect the innocent, promote the good, and punish the evil. One manifestation of this responsibility is obviously war; 2) Augustine argued that in no place does the Bible condemn Christians for either serving in the military or fighting in a war. Rather, he specifically refers to the Christian’s responsibility as a citizen of a state, and the attitudes he should maintain during war. This augment is biblically supported in both the Old and New Testaments; 3) Thomas Aquinas, and others throughout history until today, have built on the principles established by Augustine, further refining them into specific criteria that serve as the foundation for modern day Just War Theory; 4) Killing in war is not murder unless the intent is evil or malicious.

**Consequences of War**

These conclusions now lead to a necessary look at the potential consequences of war for those who fight. There is strong evidence in the MI research that those who have been exposed to war have the potential to suffer from psychological, spiritual, and moral consequences. The question Christian Military Chaplains must ask is, “should Christian warriors experience feelings of personal shame, estrangement from fellow human beings, and/or a sense of alienation from God or their own spiritual grounding?” This study neither believes that Christian warriors should suffer from these psychological, emotional, or spiritual problems when a proper understanding of their faith is intact, nor does it believe that the behavioral health community is fully equipped to deal with issues pertaining to Christian morality.

As noted in the opening of this study, some of the leading behavioral health researchers and care givers have identified strategic gaps. These gaps have led to an inability to fully and effectively care for those suffering with a MI. Two psychiatrists who have addressed these gaps are Dr. A.A. Howsepian and Dr. Warren Kinghorn.

First, Dr. Howsepian, an Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco-Fresno, a Staff Psychiatrist in the VA Mental Health Clinic, and Director of Electroconvulsive Therapy, states that “moral injury involves an expertise that many mental health practitioners either do not possess or are uncomfortable employing in clinical contexts.” He further explains that “ethical” and “religious” situations are “outside of their scope of practice,” and many behavior health professionals believe they are private matters “whose entanglement in therapeutic contexts is perilous.”

A second voice is that of Warren Kinghorn. Dr. Kinghorn is a Duke University psychiatrist who teaches at both the Duke Divinity School and the Duke Department of Psychiatry, and is a staff psychiatrist at the Durham VA Medical Center. Based on both his mental health and theological training and experience, he believes the models that use the heuristic approach of evolutionary psychology are inadequate and more is needed. He specifically says, “The reality is that ‘moral injury’ calls for something that the modern clinical disciplines structurally cannot provide; something like moral theology, embodied in specific communities with specific contextually formed practices.”

Again, it is the intent of this strategic research project is to...
help Christian Military Chaplains more effectively care for those suffering from a MI within the realm of their expertise as theologians. With their training, Christian Military Chaplains are well-equipped to deal with the feelings of shame, estrangement, alienation, guilt, anger, contempt, and loss of honor or trust. They also have the ability to help bridge the strategic gap that appears to exist both within the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs behavior health field. Together with the behavioral health community, Christians Military Chaplains can aid in the healing process. In the above identified areas of “ethics” and “religion,” Chaplains have the theological training and ability to help Christian Soldiers understand “parts” of what they are struggling with emotionally and spiritually. By combining the training of both groups of professionals, this study believes the potential for successful treatment could be far greater.

The process of healing for the Christian warrior must begin with a proper understanding of their personal faith. The ethics of the Bible (right/wrong and good/evil behavior) provide key and essential insights that Christian Military Chaplains must introduce into the overall discussion concerning MI and the ensuing healing process.

As a starting point, a foundational principle is that of choice. That choice is either to believe that God has the supernatural power to heal even the deepest wounds caused by sin, or He does not. Christianity teaches that as a result of original sin, a fracture occurred in mankind’s relationship with God. The Bible also makes it clear that the only way mankind can have a relationship with God is through the redemptive work that His Son Jesus Christ did at the cross.

Oswald Chambers describes this eloquently when he said, “There is nothing in time or eternity more absolutely certain and irrefutable than what Jesus Christ accomplished on the Cross—He made it possible for the entire human race to be brought back into a right-standing relationship with God. He made redemption the foundation of human life; that is, He made a way for every person to have fellowship with God.”

Understanding the topics of original sin, the grace of God, the cross, and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ are essential. A proper understanding of these topics has the ability to bring healing, and as such, Christian Military Chaplains must introduce them into the broader topic of MI.

Beginning first with the original and continued sin of mankind, the Bible speaks very clearly about sin and its consequences. The first book of Bible, Genesis, almost immediately begins with the actions of Adam and Eve when they chose to disobey. Their choice to disobey produced consequences not just to them, but to all mankind. According to the Bible, God gave Adam and Eve a commandment not to eat from the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will certainly die” (Genesis 2:17). They obviously disobeyed, and the “death” referred to here introduced original sin into the world.

The Bible teaches that no person is free from the effects of sin. Sin introduced both spiritual condemnation and death on all of humanity. The New Testament says, “For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God (Romans 3:23),” The Bible further teaches that the consequences of sin disfigure humanity’s relationship (1) with God, (2) with one’s neighbors, (3) and with self.

First, sin undeniably disturbs one’s relationship with God. As a result of the original sin (disobedience), God judged Adam and Eve and expelled them from the garden (Genesis 3:23), and death has reigned from Adam onward (Romans 5:14). The Bible also teaches that true knowledge of God is lost (Romans 1:25), and mankind attempts to substitute for God’s knowledge by replacing it with their own knowledge and understanding (Ephesians 4:18). As a result of this, idolatry and wickedness overtook mankind. Without God there is neither meaning, goal, refuge, nor hope. Second, sin disturbs the relationship with one’s neighbors.
After Adam and Eve sinned, their eyes were opened to sin, immediately bringing shame (Genesis 3:7). The relationship between husband and wife also immediately become dysfunctional, evidenced by Adam blaming Eve for his participation in the sin (3:12). Relationships within families became dysfunctional, evidenced by Cain killing Abel (Genesis 4:8). This dysfunctionality has continued to fester and grow into conflicts between families, into inner tensions between tribes and nations, into tensions against the human family. Divorce, disrupted homes, trouble between labor and management, racial oppression and racial violence, ideological conflict, economic pressure, and international tension and divides, are only a small number of the consequences of sin.

Third, sin disturbs one’s inner psychological life. Because God created man and woman in the image of Himself (Genesis 1:27), only in God can mankind be fully satisfied. God created humans to be theocentric. It was, and still is, God’s intent to have Him as the central focus. All individuals have a sense of divinity. God created humans to worship Him and Him alone. Attempts to replace God only lead to further dysfunctions. Sin causes individuals to bend towards an autocentric orientation (self-centeredness or narcissism). The Bible speaks very clearly about the psychological damage this causes. One illustration of this is in Paul’s second letter to Timothy (2 Timothy 3:1–7). When man eradicates God from the scenario, it becomes a swirling cauldron of personal confusion. When man erases God from the picture, everything is blurred and open for speculation.

The Bible clearly illustrates that sin is a disruptor. The good news is that after God expelled Adam and Eve from the garden, He set in motion His plan for redemption through the power of grace. At the appointed time, He sent Jesus (Romans 5:12-18) to the world to live out an example (Hebrews 4:14-16), to die on the cross (Hebrews 9:11-14 & Philippians 2:5-11), to ultimately defeat sin and death through the Resurrection (1 Peter 3:18-22), send the Holy Spirit (John 14:15-21), and now His Church waits for His return (John 14:1-4). Although there is still suffering in this life, there is also tremendous hope and freedom through God’s grace. There is hope for those suffering from a MI in the power of God’s grace.

Returning to the question above, “Should a nation’s warriors have to experience feelings of personal shame, feelings of estrangement from fellow human beings, and a sense of alienation from God or a spiritual sense of grounding?” For the Christian warrior, the resounding answer is, NO!! The biopsychosocial impairments of shame, estrangement, and alienation should not be present within the life of a Christian Soldier if they are followers of Christ. As stated in the opening paragraph, military chaplains possess the theological training, and bear the regulatory responsibility (JP 1-05, vii), to speak to issues pertaining to the soul.

What Do Military Chaplains Have to Offer?

As the concluding section of this study, it is now essential to answer the final question,

“What can Military Chaplains do in the overall understanding, care, and ultimate healing process when a MI has occurred? There are three opportunities Christian Military Chaplains have moving forward.

First, in reference to understanding the problem of MI, Christian Military Chaplains need to apply the moral courage to speak
what they believe is true according to their sacred texts, and in doing so bring to bear their “Moral Voice” on the topic of MI. As trained theologians, military officers, and military spiritual leaders and advisors, this opportunity is present. That said, this must be done appropriately and with a carefully-regulated system. This study does not naively wave off the reality of the greater context in which chaplains work and serve. The military is designed to be both an apolitical and areligious organization. Not all those associated with the DoD or VA are Christians. Christian Military Chaplains cannot, and must not, use their voice to share the beliefs of their faith unless invited to do so by the individual or organization seeking their help and expertise. Also, not all Military Chaplains are Christians. Non-Christian Chaplains have the same responsibility to help in the healing process, and they too need to appropriately apply their voices where needed. Finally, not all Military Chaplains view biblical interpretation in the same way. However, this should not be seen as a problem given the fact that there is ample room within the military for healthy disagreement regarding specific methods of treatment.

Second, in the care of those suffering from a MI, morals, religion, and spirituality must become a priority in discussions when appropriate. What cannot happen is the removal or marginalizing of the topics of Christian morality, spirituality, or religion. America has been at war, and still remains at war, since October of 2001. Tens of thousands of DoD Military personnel, civilians, and contractors have been exposed to the trauma of war. There appears to be an undeniable emotional cost that comes with being exposed to war. Behavioral health specialists associated with both the DoD and VA continue to conduct extensive research and search for effective treatment methods in the field of MI. They have, however, exposed a strategic gap in their ability to fully care for those suffering from these unseen “moral” injuries. Some within these same communities believe that the application of a “moral theology” is necessary.

Third, Christian Military Chaplains have both biblical and DoD regulatory responsibilities that they are expected to fulfill. Referencing their biblical responsibility, Jesus commissioned all disciples in Matthew 28:19 to: 1) go out, (2) make disciples, (3) baptize them, and (4) teach. Referencing their regulatory responsibility, the DoD clearly states that Military Chaplains are, “to assist Service members, their families, and other authorized personnel with the challenges of military service as advocates of religious, moral, ethical, and spiritual well-being and resiliency.”

Conclusion

The purpose of this strategic research project was to search for possible solutions that could serve as aids in helping Christian Military Chaplains more effectively care for those suffering from a MI within the realm of their expertise as theologians. In an effort to accomplish this purpose, this study asked, and then answered, five key theological questions in connection with the ongoing discussions pertaining to Moral Injury. This study reached the following conclusions: First, that MI is a “moral burden” that can occur during war, and that “burden” has the ability to “wound” and potentially produce either mild or “intense expressions of shame, guilt, anger, contempt, loss of honor, and even debilitating or harmful behaviors.” Second, that for Christian Military Chaplains the definition of morality is the deeply held biblical beliefs concerning “right and wrong” behavior, and always reflects the character of God and His plan for His people. Third, that Christian warriors can participate in war, and even killing when necessary, and that they are both biblically and morally justified in doing so. Fourth, given that Christian warriors are morally justified, they need not be left with the potentially destructive psychological and spiritual consequences. Fifth, that Military Chaplains must regain their moral voice, working appropriately within the confines of the DoD and VA systems when asked to do so, and fulfill both their biblical and DoD regulatory responsibility to speak to issues pertaining to morality and ethics. Moving forward in the healing process of MI, there is both hope and multiple opportunities for Christian Military Chaplains to participate in this overall process.
Figure 1. The Framework of the Army Ethic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Foundation</th>
<th>moral Foundations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army as Profession</td>
<td>Legal-Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws/valeis/norms for performance of individual professionals of collective institution</td>
<td>The U.S. Constitution</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title 10, 32 U.S. Code</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Treaties of which U.S. is party</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Status-of-Forces Agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual as Professional (laws/values/norms for performance of individual professionals)</td>
<td>Legal-Individual</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Oath of Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enlistment</td>
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<td>Commission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Office</td>
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<td></td>
<td>U.S. Code – Standards of Exemplary Conduct</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UCMJ</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soldier’s Rules</td>
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Figure 2. The Just War Tradition as a Source of Criteria for Ethical Judgement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The jus ad bellum: Criteria defining the right to resort to force</th>
<th>The jus in bello: Criteria defining the employment of force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>JUST CAUSE:</strong> The protection and preservation of value</td>
<td><strong>PROPORTIONALITY OF MEANS:</strong> Means causing gratuitous or otherwise unnecessary harm are to be avoided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Classic statement:</strong> Defense of the innocent against armed attack</td>
<td><strong>Classic statement:</strong> Attempts to limit weapons days of fighting, persons who should fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retaking persons, property, or other values wrongly taken</td>
<td><strong>NON-COMBATANT PROTECTION:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment of evil</td>
<td><strong>IMMUNITY:</strong> Definition of non-combatants, avoidance of direct, international harm to noncombatants, efforts to protect them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RIGHT AUTHORITY:</strong> The person or body authorizing the use of force must be the duly authorized representative of a sovereign political entity. The authorization to use force implies the ability to control and cease that use that is, a well-constituted and efficient chain of command.</td>
<td><strong>Classic statement:</strong> List of classes of persons (civilians, merchants, peasants on the land, other people in activities not related to the prosecution of war) to be spared the harm of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Classic statement:</strong> Reservation of the right to employ force to persons or communities with no political superior.</td>
<td><strong>RIGHT INTENTION:</strong> The intent must be in accord with the just cause and not territorial aggrandizement, intimidation, or coercion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROPORTIONALITY OF ENDS:</strong> The overall good achieved by the use of force must be greater than the harm done. The levels and means of using force must be appropriate to the just ends sought.</td>
<td><strong>Classic statement:</strong> Evils to be avoided in war, including hatred of the enemy, “implacable animosity,” “just for vengeance,” desire to dominate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAST RESORT:</strong> Determination at the time of the decision to employ force that no other means will achieve the justified ends sought. Interact with other jus ad bellum criteria to determine level, type, and duration of force employed.</td>
<td><strong>REASONABLE HOPE OF SUCCESS:</strong> Prudential calculation of the likelihood that the means used will bring the justified end sought. Interacts with other jus ad bellum criteria to determine level, type, and duration of force employed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE AIM OF PEACE:</strong> Establishment of international stability, security, and peaceful interaction. May include nation building, disarmament, other measures to promote peace.</td>
<td><strong>Classic statement:</strong></td>
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Figure 3: Sources and Development of the Just War Tradition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Late Classical era: deep roots, early expressions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The Bible (Old and New Testaments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Roman law and practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Christian theologians: writers such as Clement of Alexandria, Ambrose, Augustine</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medieval era: coalescence of a cultural consensus</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Canon law: Gratian’s Decretum, writing of the Decretists and Decretalists</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Scholastic theology</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The code and customs of chivalry</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Customary right and practices of sovereigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The inherited idea of Jus Gentium (Law of people or nations)</td>
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<tr>
<th>16th to 18th centuries: consolidation, transformation, differentiation</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Transformation to natural-law base: Victoria, Suarez, Grotius, others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Theory of international law: Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military Codes of discipline replacing chivalric code</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Limited war theory and practice: “Sovereigns’ wars”</td>
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<tr>
<th>19th century: further definition within distinct streams</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Customary international law</td>
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<tr>
<td>- First Hague Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Origin of Geneva Conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military manuals on the law of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Popular, philosophical, and religious efforts to restrain or end war</td>
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<th>20th century: elaboration and growing interaction</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Positive international law:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Jus ad bellum: League of Nations covenant, Pact of Paris, UN Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Jus in bello: Arms limitation treaties and conventions, growth of humanitarian international law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military manuals on law of war, rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Religious and philosophical recovery of just war concepts, Public debate over war, its meaning and effects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chaplain (COL) Bradford A. Baumann
Command Chaplain, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Chaplain (Colonel) Bradford A. Baumann assumed his duties as the Command Chaplain, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in June 2019. Chaplain Baumann previously served as the Army’s senior OC/T at the Mission Command Training Program where he provided ASCCs, Corps, Divisions, and Brigade UMTs with technical advisements during numerous War Fighter exercises. Prior to this Chaplain Baumann served as the 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain where he provided religious support to over 19,000 paratroopers and 40 UMTs spread across the world and the division.

NOTES

5 Shay, Moral Injury, 182.
15 Ibid., 699.
17 As of October 17, 2018, the Army has 1,441. Out of this number 1,330 are Protestant and 82 are Catholic. Taken from the Army Chief of Chaplains Personal Brief: Gaining Perspective – Army DACH-, PER Brief, October 2018.
21 Romans 13:1-7
25 Although it is outside the scope of this study, a key question theologians and Soldiers must consider is, “If our primary responsibility is to love one another, including our enemies, is it wrong to kill in war?”
26 1 Corinthians 6:7.
29 1 Samuel 16:7.
35 Boniface Ramsey, ed., Answers to Faustus, a Manichean (Contra Faustum Manichaeum), section 75.
36 Ibid., section 74.
37 There is a third criteria offered that is outside the scope of this paper: just post-bellum, concerned with the conduct of the victorious party after the war. This theory alone could serve as a topic for a future strategic study. As highlighted through interview in Kan Burn’s and Lynn Novick series, The Vietnam War, a PBS 10 Part Documentary series aired on Netflix, many Vietnam veterans have returned to the places they once fought, and met some of those they fought against. These veterans have reported that it has aided in the overall healing process. There is ample research to support that the act of "forgiveness" is in the recovery of either PTSD or Moral Injury process.
42 Ibid., 86.
45 1 Samuel 16:8-7.
46 Matthew 5:21-22.
48 Boniface Ramsey, ed., Answers to Faustus, a Manichean (Contra Faustum Manichaeum), section 74.
50 Ibid.
52 Semana 2:17.
53 Romans 2:23.
54 Semana 3:23.
55 Romans 5:14.
56 Romans 1:25.
57 Ephesians 4:18.
59 Ibid., 521.
60 Semana 3:7.
61 Semana 3:12.
62 Semana 4:8.
64 Semana 1:27.
66 Timothy S. 1-7.
68 Romans 5:12-18.
69 Hebrews 4:14-16.
70 Hebrews 9:11-14.
71 1 Peter 3:18.
72 John 14:15-21.
75 Matthew 28:19.
80 Semana 1:27.
81 Ibid., pg. 24.
Leadership and the Profession of Arms

Five U.S. Commanders Everyone Should Study by Joe Byerly

When we begin our military career we have choices when it comes to developing our leadership abilities. First, we can go through our careers stumbling through leadership as we figure it out along the way. The problem with this approach is that we only get the privilege of command for short windows of time, and by the time we start making headway it’s time to move on. Or, we could emulate those leaders who we observe throughout our careers. While there is merit to this approach, it relies on luck. We’re hoping to come in contact with really good commanders worth emulating or that we will serve with really bad ones (to do the opposite of when it’s our turn). There is a third choice that brings us into contact with some of the greatest military leaders throughout history. We develop ourselves through reading about leaders who came before us. The U.S. military has had a number of military leaders worthy of study. By studying their leadership we gain an understanding of the problems they faced, the decisions they made, their successes and mistakes, and how they approached the art of command. More importantly we gain points of traction by which to grow our leadership abilities and become the best version ourselves.

https://wavellroom.com/2019/01/10/us-commanders-everyone-should-study/

Servant Leadership: Ten Military Figures Who Got it Right by Master Sergeant Aaron L. Griffing

In today’s fight, maintaining an advantageous position over the adversary is as challenging as it has ever been. The U.S. military’s proprietorship of technologically advanced equipment is no longer enough to tip the scales in America’s favor. The difference between triumph and defeat may come down to something intangible—leadership. A particular style of leadership in which the leader serves others and places their needs first in a humble approach to meeting collective goals is known as servant leadership. Though a man named Robert Greenleaf is credited with coining the phrase servant leadership in his 1970 essay, The Servant as a Leader, the philosophy has proven successful by world leaders for over 2,000 years. According to The Journal of Business Ethics, “The concept of servant leadership echoes the messages of Mother Theresa, Moses, Harriet Tubman, Lao-tzu, Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Confucius, and many other religious, historic, and current leaders. Many scholars model Jesus Christ’s teachings to his disciples as the ultimate example of servant leadership.” Servant leaders have and continue to thrive in the armed forces.

A Message to the Leaders of the 21st Century Interwar Period by Jonathan C. Nielsen

It is time to refocus military innovation. In the private sector, the most dominating and innovative companies are those with committed leaders who have an unquenchable thirst to tackle and the most daunting issues. One may argue that the military profession functions similarly as the greatest military leaders have valued a balance of learning and innovating as an essential blend to make the right decision at the appropriate time in what is, by nature, an uncertain and hostile environment. But even this comparison is inexact. The essence is not that corporate and military leadership is different, but the underlying fact is that a military leader is legally empowered to give orders that may tragically result in the death of a subordinate. It is an incomprehensible authority that is hard to fathom outside of the profession of arms. For that reason, above all else, it demands the greatest care, scrutiny, and competency. How then, can military leaders today and tomorrow effectively design and implement effective innovative solutions at the critical moment under challenging circumstances?

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/message-leaders-21st-century-interwar-period

July 2019 Release of ADP 6-22 Army Leadership and the Profession

ADP 6-22 establishes and describes what leaders should be and do. Having a standard set of leader attributes and core leader competencies facilitates focused feedback, education, training, and development across all leadership levels. ADP 6-22 describes enduring concepts of leadership through the core competencies and attributes required of leaders of all cohorts and all organizations, regardless of mission or setting. These principles reflect decades of experience and validated scientific knowledge. An ideal Army leader serves as a role model through strong intellect, physical presence, professional competence, and moral character. An Army leader is able and willing to act decisively, within superior leaders’ intent and purpose, and in the organization’s best interests. Army leaders recognize that organizations, built on mutual trust and confidence, accomplish missions. Every member of the Army, military or civilian, is part of a team and functions in the role of leader and subordinate. Being a good subordinate is part of being an effective leader. Leaders do not just lead subordinates—they also lead other leaders. Leaders are not limited to just those designated by position, rank, or authority.


Prevailing in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Character, Trust, and Mission Command

The FY 19-20 AAOP theme, “Prevailing in Large-Scale Combat Operations: Character, Trust, and Mission Command” supports the focus of the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) on readiness and lethality. The theme highlights the importance of the Army prevailing in large-scale combat operations by exercising mission command, which requires mutual trust and depends on character. This biennial theme continues the strategic intent of previous themes to inspire and motivate commitment to fulfill our professional responsibilities to each other, the Army, and the American people. In order to prevail in large-scale combat operations, Soldiers and Army Civilians must understand the interdependent relationships between character, trust, and mission command. Consistent demonstration of character, competence, and commitment develops mutual trust and cohesive teamwork – the first principle of mission command. The outcome is readiness to prevail in the complex operational environment described in our doctrine.

https://capl.army.mil/aaop/character-trust-mc/

An Abundance Approach to Organizational Leadership: Creating a Positive Deviance to Strengthen Combat Readiness by CSM John Troxell

This article provides an analysis and recommendation on strengthening our combat readiness by focusing on organizational leadership. This topic is designed to get leaders to focus less on a “problem-solving approach” to leading and more on an “abundance approach” to create or reinforce a “strive for excellence” attitude throughout the organization, thereby enhancing overall combat and organizational readiness. For the past 12 years our Army has been tried and tested in two major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan conducting mostly counterinsurgency and stability operations as well as multiple deployments to other countries conducting peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief among other missions, as well as exercises designed to shape
the environment by building partnerships and partner capacity. As we all know, units and Soldiers over that course of time have experienced multiple deployments to all of these areas. This constant “turn and burn” as sometimes referred has caused organizations to be on short timelines for reset and redeployment. Because of this it has caused some units to execute shortcuts or shoot for minimal standards as they prepare for their next deployment. What normally suffers with this attitude towards standards? Usually it is the professionalism and skills of the individual Soldier or of the organization as a whole. Leaders take on a problem solving approach to standards, accomplishment of missions or to get stuff done.


Mastering the Art of Dynamic Leadership

From the Chief of Staff of the Army down to the newest Soldier, leadership is the mainstay of Army life. It is codified in doctrine, taught at leadership schools, demonstrated every day, and is the focus of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s NCO 2020 Strategy. NCOs are effective leaders who rely on their experience to adopt the most effective leadership style to accomplish the mission. The Army develops its leaders using a tiered training approach with doctrine and leadership courses or academies. Academies and courses provide future leaders with recognized methods of leadership training, an advantage their civilian contemporaries do not necessarily have. Field Manual 6-22, Leader Development, states the overarching tenets of Army leader development are: strong commitment by the Army, superiors, and individuals to leader development; clear purpose for what, when, and how to develop leadership; supportive relationships and culture of learning; three mutually supportive domains (institutional, operational, and self-development) that enable education, training, and experience; and providing, accepting, and acting upon candid assessment and feedback. These principles reflect the leader attributes laid out in Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership, stating leaders need to have character, presence, and intellect. Demonstrating these attributes gives Army leaders a chance of successfully leading their Soldiers and accomplishing the mission.


Where Field Grade Officers Get Their Power by COL Robert T. Ault and Dr. Jack Kem

Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) graduates are expected to fulfill three crucial roles for the U.S. Army: they must be able to solve complex problems, build teams, and develop other leaders in order to meet the challenges of the future. These roles are reflected in the outcomes for the CGSOC. The focus of this article is on how field grade officers draw their “organizational power,” or influence, in order to solve those problems, build those teams, and develop other leaders after their CGSOC graduation. The backdrop for this discussion is the Army’s urgency to grow not just capability but readiness to fight and win against threats to the Nation. This specifically includes the ability to plan and conduct division- and corps-level operations against a peer or near-peer adversary threat with matching, or in some cases, overmatching military capabilities. To do this, the Army needs a vibrant, highly competent, critical thinking, professional core of field grade officers. When does the Army recognize its officers as being fully vested in the profession of arms? One proposition is that this recognition takes place at the same time an officer is promoted to the rank of major, which is also the same time he or she attends the CGSOC at the Command and General Staff School.

The Warrior Poet by CPT Ronald Roberts

The phrase “warrior poet” has its roots in the ethos of the medieval knight. A knight was trained from early youth to be a professional man-at-arms and had to progress through the requisite positions of page and squire, where other skills were needed beyond just weapons proficiency. There were also non-martial but still important accomplishments to acquire such as a knowledge of music, dance, as well as reading and writing in Latin and French. The long career progression, the advancement of noble skills and social etiquette, and adherence to the code of chivalry meant knights were warriors respected and looked up to by all. It not only implied that a knight was adroit with weapons; it was more than that. It personified a stainless and exemplary character that was beyond reproach: fair and just, honest, and generous.” The concept is similar to that of the Athenian general Thucydides who once said, “The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting by fools.”


Are You Enough: Our Speech to the PME Class of 2019 by David Barno and Nora Bensahel

If we could give an opening address to the military leaders attending every mid-level and senior service college class this year, here’s what we’d say. During the coming year, this stage will be filled by a wide variety of speakers, including some of the most senior leaders of the U.S. military. Many will remind you of the invaluable opportunity to reconnect with family and friends this year before returning to yet another taxing operational assignment. Nearly all will tell you to take time to reflect and recharge your reserves of energy. Some might even tell you that ten months of “taking a knee” at a staff college is the right thing to do — an opportunity you fully deserve, far away from the punishing daily demands of service in the field, on the flight line, and at sea. We’re not going to say any of those things today. In fact, you probably won’t like what we have to say at all, since we’re going to tell you the exact opposite. Our challenge, our question for you this year, is: Are you enough? Are you enough for what the country will need from you in the next 10 or 15 or 20 years? Are you capable of leading the nation and the military through its next major war? That’s a really big question, and the fate of the nation may very well ride on the answer. Each and every one of you should spend the next year making absolutely sure that the answer is a resounding yes. Here is a big idea to wrap your heads around. These next ten months in school may be the very last time you will be able to think and reflect, to learn and grow, before you have to fight in the next major war. You must seize this opportunity to prepare yourself for it, and to do everything in your power to ensure that you stand ready to help the nation prevail.


A Profession of Arms? Conflicting Views and the Lack of Virtue Ethics in Professional Military Education by CH (CDR) Tom Statler

The profession of arms is viewed in one of two ways by those who put on a military uniform. One perspective sees what they do as an occupation—the principle means of making a living. From an occupational point of view, the profession of arms is a collection of technical skills, or what I call a more quantitative view, that encompasses performing the duties that are expected of them, but such performance may not necessarily be a part of their self-identity. The evaluation of their job is associated with some end result: increasing profit margin, meeting quotas, completing a mission or report, and the like. In the military, extensive training hones skills in a particular context to reach desired outcomes by higher authorities. Professional military education should be much more encompassing than occupational military training. It must involve a multidisciplinary approach to topics, including those, like ethics, that are not directly related to achieving some defined outcome or product. Within PME, however, the processes of training and education are confused at the risk of becoming synonymous, and the width and depth of military study in general and the education of ethics in particular suffer as a result.

The Psychology Behind Unethical Behavior by Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg

On a warm evening after a strategy off-site, a team of executives arrives at a well-known local restaurant. The group is looking forward to having dinner together, but the CEO is not happy about the table and demands a change. "This isn’t the one that my assistant usually reserves for me," he says. A young waiter quickly finds the manager who explains that there are no other tables available. The group tries to move on but is once again interrupted by the CEO. "Am I the only one annoyed by the view? Why is there construction happening today?" he demands to know. The waiter tries to explain, but to no avail. "You really need to up your game here," the CEO replies. The air is thick with tension. After the waiter walks away, someone makes a joke about the man’s competence. This seems to please the CEO, who responds with his own derogatory quip. The group laughs. If you were present at that dinner would you let the CEO know that you disapprove of his language and behavior? Would you try to better a better example? Or stay silent?

This scene encapsulates three psychological dynamics that lead to crossing ethical lines. First, there's omnipotence: when someone feels so aggrandized and entitled that they believe the rules of decent behavior don’t apply to them. Second, we have cultural numbness: when others play along and gradually begin to accept and embody deviant norms. Finally, we see justified neglect: when people don’t speak up about ethical breaches because they are thinking of more immediate rewards such as staying on a good footing with the powerful.

https://hbr.org/2019/04/the-psychology-behind-unethical-behavior?

First to Fight for the “Right”: The Ethical Dilemma Inherent Within the Multi-Domain Battle Concept by CH (CPT) Bryan Hedrick

Just because we can, doesn’t mean we should—therein lies the ethical dilemma of war. Threats to our national security have exponentially increased; no longer can we depend on superiority across all domains of warfare. The situation is precarious; our adversaries are near-peer, peer, or even superior to our own capabilities. Technology has brought the fight to our own soil through cyber warfare, unmanned aircraft, long range delivery platforms, and artificial intelligence. Despite the vast changes in modern warfare, the human dimension of war still remains fixed—war has ethical limits. Multi-Domain Battle poses an intrinsic ethical dilemma to the warfighter’s ability to apply combat power congruent with the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello principles inherent within the Law of War. As strategies and tactics develop, it is imperative to consider the ethical ramifications of our actions.


Three Flawed Practices that Undermine Talent Management by Rob McNellis

Field grade leaders are failing to implement talent management at the battalion level. Rather than follow the clear guidance expressed in Army regulations and doctrine, most notably Army Pamphlet 600-3 (Officer Professional Development and Career Management) and Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-22 (Army Leadership), mid-grade leaders too often perpetuate three mistaken practices. As a result, Army talent management guidance is neither applied skillfully nor consistently, young officers miss out on critical staff development experiences, and the best junior officers do not have adequate opportunity to highlight their talents and potential. To cultivate the vast talent present in the ranks, leaders must adopt a new set of principles for talent management aligned with institutional policy and better suited to developing 21st-century leaders. There are several reasons why leaders persist with old ways that deviate from Army policy. Leaders resist methods different than their own paths to success. The Army has also undercommunicated its vision for talent management and failed to educate leaders in it. There are also human failings of egocentric blindness and confirmation traps. The result of these problems is an unacceptable variance in officer development for lieutenants and captains. If the Army does not improve, these problems will be perpetuated as these officers move into the field grade ranks.
Army Talent Management Reform: The Culture Problem by Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras

In what appears to be an amazing alignment of the stars, nearly every key piece required for Army talent management reform seems to be falling neatly into place. For starters, in the most recent National Defense Authorization Act, Congress gave the service secretaries maneuver room with a series of options intended to “modernize the 38-year-old officer personnel system.” Reinforcing fires came from the Department of Defense in its 2018 National Defense Strategy, which called for a “broad revision of talent management among the Armed Services.” Secretary of the Army Mark Esper added impetus by plainly declaring that talent reform was his top priority for next year and then tasking E. Casey Wardynski, one of the original champions of Army talent management, to execute sweeping changes as his newly installed assistant secretary of the Army for manpower and reserve affairs. To top off this remarkable confluence of reform efforts, the Army's Talent Management Task Force has been reinvigorated and a former Army G-1 well-versed in talent management is now the vice chief of staff of the Army. The potential for a major transformation of the Army officer career management system has never been greater.

Developing Senior Officers Who Soldiers Want to Follow by Chuck Allen and Craig Bullis

For over a decade, several Army War College colleagues have run a simple exercise with their students. Students are asked to think of the general officers and flag officers (GO/FO) with whom they have directly worked or have only one degree of separation, in other words GO/FOs with whom each student is very familiar. Based on receiving a notional phone call offering an assignment with that GO/FO, students then place each senior leader into one of four mutually exclusive buckets aligned with four responses.

Simplicity: A Tool for Working with Complexity and Chaos by Dale C. Eikmeier

In comedian Don Novello's satirical skit “The Five Minute University,” Father Guido Sarducci offered college degrees after completing a five-minute curriculum. The premise is only to teach what one could recall five years later because more than that was a waste of time and money. Thus, the economics course was “supply and demand,” and business was “buy low and sell high.” The skit was a huge hit, especially among university audiences. Novello capitalized on human nature's need to simplify complexity by reducing its key components to reasonably accurate “rules of thumb.” These simple rules help facilitate informed, timely, and acceptable problem-solving and decision-making.

Rules of thumb like supply and demand are heuristics that enable reasonably good decision-making without the time-consuming and occasionally paralyzing need to understand all the complexities and nuances of a situation. The fact is the “benefits of such heuristics are not only that they reduce complex information to a simple and manageable set of choices [but that] they [also] help people turn an intention into a realized action.” A good heuristic simplifies complexity by providing a “manageable set of choices” for taking action. Therefore, they are powerful tools that counter “paralysis by analysis” and procrastination and enable leaders to think and decide more quickly thus getting ahead of a competitor’s decision cycle.
Bay of Pigs: A Case Study in Strategic Leadership and Failed Assumptions by Vincent Dueñas

The Bay of Pigs invasion was President Kennedy's most controversial foreign policy mistake, and it serves as a useful case study in strategic miscalculation and faulty critical analysis. The failures in the planning and conduct of the operation highlight the leadership challenges and inherent difficulty in attempting to covertly overthrow another government deemed hostile to National Security interests. Planned initially during President Eisenhower’s administration and executed by President Kennedy’s administration, the Bay of Pigs was devised as an attempt to foment a popular uprising against the government of the newly triumphant Cuban dictator, Fidel Castro. In the end, the operation was overly complex, based on multiple unsubstantiated assumptions, and underwent too many last minute changes.


Strategy from the Ground Level: Why the Experience of the U.S. Civil War Soldier Matters by Alexandre Caillot

Does the humble private have a place in the making of strategy? For Civil War generals, the answer was no. Consider what Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant said in 1862: “The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on.” While his straightforward thinking contrasts favorably with infamously sluggish predecessor, Major General George B. McClellan, anyone who spends time immersed in Carl von Clausewitz’s On War knows that Grant’s prescription leaves out a great deal. Putting aside strategic complexities, the Union rank and file are noticeably absent from his dictum. This oversight implies that mastering warfare is a contest of wills between commanders whose armies are just the means to an end. The lessons derived from America’s bloodiest conflict are not an isolated product of the Victorian Era—they remain just as relevant for military organizations in the twenty-first century. Strategists today should note the enduring relationship between the soldiers’ ground-level perspective and their own high-level planning.


Military Bearing: Projecting Confidence and a Command Presence by CSM Naamon Grimmett

An Army’s ability to fight and win its nations wars is not solely dependent on weapons and training alone. It also rests on the attitude or climate of units, leaders and Soldiers. Find a winning Army and you will find a positive climate; the opposite is true about a losing army. While an Army’s climate is comprised of many factors, the most predominate is its military bearing, the way it conducts business from the top officers and noncommissioned officers down to the most junior Soldier. If an army possesses a positive climate at its heart, you will find a strong military bearing. Soldiers and leaders, who conduct themselves as professionals and do what is right regardless of the situation in which they find themselves, go the extra mile even when it would be easier not to in both peace and war.


How the Network Generation is Changing the Millennial Military by KC Reid

There is one problem with all the advice about how to recruit and lead young millennials in the U.S. military: Millennials are no longer the generation the military needs to focus on. Millennials — those born between 1980 and 1996 — are not joining the military; they are the military. As of 2015, about 72 percent of active duty personnel were millennials. Many millennials could have retired with
20 years in service last year. The junior enlisted service members walking out during training sessions that they deem unworthy of their time are not millennials. They are the next generation: the Network Generation. The Network Generation, members of which are known as NetGens, consists of those born in and after 1997. This generation accounted for about 70 million members of the U.S. population in 2015. With the eldest turning 21 this year, NetGens now make up much of the military recruiting pool and already form 15 percent of active duty enlisted in the Marine Corps.

This new generation is more intellectually prepared for danger and uncertainty, and is full of determination and self-confidence, but it is also uniquely fragile. The U.S. military requires mental toughness beyond what many NetGens possess when they join. NetGens receive information differently, see themselves as individuals first, and give little weight to traditional mantras. These new recruits are altering the personnel challenges the military faces. Today’s largely millennial military will have to change how it communicates to and trains individuals from the next generation, in order to continue creating fighters who can overcome the intense pressures of armed conflict.


Lost in Translation: How Language Affects Perception During Armed Conflict by Scott Bruck

Headlines announcing green on blue attacks provoke much less of an emotional response than a headline stating - “a friendly Afghan soldier killed a US Soldier”. The language of armed conflict is rife with ambiguity. Priding itself on direct communication, the profession of arms often muddles the point. Professional military language is rife with the use of euphemisms, metaphors, and clichés. The aforementioned examples may seem insignificant, but when one understands that language has the ability to influence perception, the implications are substantial. Language is the way in which we experience the world. Military professionals need to be cognizant of language on both a macro level (translation issues) and a micro level (within one’s native language) because it affects perception in international conflict.


Culture and the Competition for Influence Among the U.S. Military Services by S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Kimberly Jackson, Natasha Lander, Colin Roberts, Dan Madden, and Rebeka Orrie

This report analyzes the current character of competition between the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and examines how culture impacts the ways the services posture themselves to gain resources, authorities, access, and influence. The report identifies cultural characteristics, primary goals, and competitive strategies exhibited by the military services and USSOCOM. Further, it explores the current modalities of competition and tactics of competition employed by each service. The authors evaluate whether the cultures of the services have changed substantively over time and whether the services wield as much influence as they did before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Finally, the authors assess how each service might adapt and respond if it faced major policy shifts in the future, focusing specifically on contingencies in China and North Korea. The authors make three essential arguments: First, service personalities are alive and well. They endure, but they also evolve slowly to allow adaptation to the present environment. Second, post-Goldwater-Nichols, services remain the most powerful organizational actors in national defense. However, their relative edge over the Office of the Secretary of Defense, combatant commands, and the Joint Staff has decreased, leading to a more complex field of competition. Third, this complexity introduced by Goldwater-Nichols has created changes to the character of competition in the national security arena.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2270.html
The Evolving Operating Environment

Reinvigorating the Army’s Approach to Mission Command by GEN Stephen Townsend, MG Douglas Crissman, and MG Kelly McCoy

The mission command philosophy is the U.S. Army’s approach to command and control. It empowers subordinate decision-making and decentralized execution, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative in accomplishment of the commander’s intent. On this score, there is good news and bad news. The bad news is many in our Army find the idea of mission command confusing or insincere. For some, there is a significant difference between what mission command should be versus what actually happens. Over the past decade, leaders at various levels routinely cited their personal experience in garrison, during field training, and while operationally deployed as at odds with our mission command philosophy.

The good news is leaders at every level, from warfighters to doctrine writers and squad leaders up to general officers, are talking about mission command. We are currently engaged in a much-needed professional dialogue to get it right. Now is the time to reinvigorate our approach to mission command by evolving our doctrine, adapting leader development, and refining our training. It must be clear and convincing that the Army’s approach to command and control is mission command—as it is the only approach to leading a winning Army.


Putting the Fight Back in the Staff by Matthew T. Archambault

Brigades come to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to fight and win. Everyone knows that. A brigade combat team’s (BCT) purpose, its raison d’etre, is to fight and win. And in training to fight and win, much learning occurs as brigades compete against the world-class opposing force at JRTC as well as in exercises at the Army’s other combat training centers (CTCs). This article will focus on
ten common shortcomings derived from lessons learned at JRTC that span not only warfighting functions but also component parts of a brigade’s ability to conduct mission command. These are provided to help units prepare for their experience at a CTC. Among those observations, failure to integrate external units or conduct rehearsals of critical capabilities in reception, staging, onward movement, and integration undermines the technical means brigades have for mission command and misses an opportunity for team building with those external units. Additionally, the failure to move from conceptual planning to detailed planning as well as failing to synchronize the full effects of BCT combat power due to ineffective time management precludes accomplishment of mission orders. However, though these individual shortcomings adversely affect a BCT’s ability to fight and win, they are largely symptomatic of a larger problem that this article attempts to address: **brigade staffs are not arriving trained and ready to fight.**

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/JA-19/Archambault-Putting-Fight.pdf

**The Army’s Next Frontier Demands Transformations by Mark Pomerleau**

The information domain requires a level of speed significantly faster than the traditional domains. Accordingly the Army to rapidly integrating these capabilities into formations and even organizational changes, according to a top service official. Army Cyber Command, despite its name, is responsible for integrating and conducting not only cyberspace, but also electronic warfare and information operations. These capabilities, to some extent to include intelligence and space, are now being considered to be under the larger information-related banner of indirect and indirect operations that support U.S. and allied objectives and/or to degrade adversary functions.

https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/army/2019/03/18/the-armys-next-frontier-demands-transformations/

**Lessons on Collaboration from Recent Conflicts: The Whole-of-Nation and Whole-of-Government Approaches in Action by Brett Doyle**

Attempts to bring peace and stability in conflict plagued areas have dominated the foreign policy of the United States. In the era of globalization, however, the U.S. is only a single player in an increasingly complex “maze” of organizations addressing stability problems. The problems of coordination and cooperation have only intensified as the number of organizations engaged in stabilization increases. Though collaboration does not guarantee success, insufficient collaboration can ensure failure, as was seen in numerous reviews of U.S. activities. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in reconstruction assistance have been described as having been wasted, in part due to lack of coordination. Further still, collaboration failures have doubtless impeded the promotion peace and stability. The coordination and direction of U.S. stabilization efforts, which can be loosely described as political and economic support to reduce violence and promote stability, is complicated by the legal division of authority over U.S. civilian and military organizations. This has led to situations with uncertain authority or responsibility for areas of activity, as well as areas of overlapping authorities.

Chasing the Delta: A Pitfall of the Military’s ‘Can-do’ Attitude by COL JP Clark

Most readers who have served within a high-level headquarters will have at least once thought to themselves: “This will end badly.” That statement is not meant to be particularly cynical or pessimistic. Rather, it simply recognizes the reality that — by design — large headquarters deal with large problems, some of which are intractable. In short, the nature of strategic- and operational-level command ensures some sub-optimal outcomes. But the can-do military culture can exacerbate the situation when it comes up against a problem that is insoluble or, more commonly, one which requires the institution to either adopt unpalatable measures or to acknowledge unwelcome realities. I call the resulting internal dynamic chasing the delta. Essentially, chasing the delta is the “mood” within a headquarters desperate to fill a hole in a puzzle and willing to jam whatever piece comes first to hand into that space.

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/chasing-the-delta-a-pitfall-of-the-militarys-can-do-ethos

How to Win America’s Next War: The U.S. Faces Great-power Enemies…It Needs a Military Focused on Fighting Them by Elbridge Colby

The era of untrammeled U.S. military superiority is over. If the United States delays implementing a new approach, it risks losing a war to China or Russia—or backing down in a crisis because it fears it would—with devastating consequences for America’s interests. The U.S. Defense Department’s 2018 National Defense Strategy initiated a needed course correction to address this challenge. As then-Defense Secretary James Mattis put it in January that year, great-power competition—not terrorism—is now the Pentagon’s priority. But while the strategy’s summary provides a clear vision, it leaves much to be fleshed out. What should this shift toward great-power competition entail for the U.S. military?

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/05/how-to-win-americas-next-war-china-russia-military-infrastructure/

How Does the Next Great Power Conflict Play Out? Lessons from a Wargame by James Lacey

The United States can win World War III, but it’s going to be ugly and it better end quickly, or everyone starts looking for the nuclear trigger. That is the verdict of a Marine Corps War College wargame that allowed students to fight a multiple great state conflict. To set the stage, the students were given an eight-year road-to-war, during which time Russia seized the Baltics and all of Ukraine. Consequently, the scenario starts with a surging Russia threatening Poland. Similar to 1939, Poland became the catalyst that finally focused NATO’s attention on the looming Russian threat, leading to a massing of both NATO and Russian forces on the new Eastern Front. China begins the scenario in the midst of a debt-related financial crisis and plans to use America’s distraction with Russia to
grab Taiwan and focus popular discontent outward. And Kim Jong-un, ever the opportunist, decides that the time has arrived to unify the Korean peninsula under his rule. For purposes of the wargame, each of these events occurred simultaneously.


Non-Physical Communities: Understanding the Expanded Frontier by Jonathan C. Nielsen

The Great Power Competition might be determined by a non-physical capability. Traditionally when nations and international organizations assess threats, thoughts gravitate toward determining their physical size, composition, and capability. During the first engagements on the Western Front of World War II, Nazi Germany marched 41,000 vehicles, including panzer tanks, combined with the largest aerial attack in history to that point through the restricted terrain of the Ardennes forest and across the Meuse River in just 11 days in May 1940. The battle swiftly defeated the immobile French Maginot Line and sent shockwaves around the world as a faster and more mobile force defeated the paradigm military of the time. Other past conflicts would provide similar examples about the importance of understanding physical size, speed, and strength of an adversary. However, such an approach might be outdated for the Great Power Competition. Improvements in wireless networks and changes in social dynamics create a new environment that contributes to the size, speed, and strength of an adversary or near peer threat. Where should nations and militaries expand their aperture to assess the capabilities of current threats?

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/non-physical-communities-understanding-expanded-frontier

Welcome to the Fight Club: Wargaming the Future by Benjamin Jensen

Yes, I am going to violate the first rule of Fight Club and talk about it. The U.S. Marine Corps, in partnership with a network that includes the U.S. Army and multiple DoD agencies, has created a place where top officers go to fight each other and test how emerging technologies alter warfighting. There are winners. There are losers. Most importantly, this initiative, dubbed “Fight Club,” allows participants to talk openly and improvise, identify new concepts and capability requirements, and hone their operational judgment. Since 2015, the U.S. Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, U.S. Army Future Studies Group, and 75th Innovation Command, as part of the new Army Futures Command, have used this Fight Club to explore the changing character of war. The results are clear: Iron sharpens iron. Wargaming provides a competitive forum to test key assumptions and identify critical vulnerabilities and opportunities. Simulating mobilization planning, multi-domain operations, and the strategic risk of inadvertent escalation helps military professionals become better warfighters and understand modern capabilities and operational art.

The Army’s “Multi-Domain Operations in 2028” is an Important Doctrinal Development by Dan Gouré

In December 2018, the U.S. Army published the latest version of its concept for competing with Russia and China. The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (MDO 2028) is intended to guide the Service’s thinking on organizational change, future combat operations, and modernization priorities. The goal is to create a force that can prevail in a future conflict involving great power militaries equipped with advanced capabilities across all conflict domains. While acknowledging that MDO 2028 is a step in the evolution of the Army, it is an important departure for a Service that has been almost singularly focused on counter-insurgency warfare in an environment where the U.S. military owned the skies, held an overwhelming advantage in long-range fires, operated the only armored forces, and had unimpeded communications.

Today and into the near future, the Army must contend with potential great power adversaries that will have local quantitative superiority. Most significantly, these adversaries have built, and are continually modernizing, an intricate and multi-layered system of offensive and defensive standoff capabilities. These systems, generally described as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), are intended to dominate combat in nearby theaters while protecting their homelands and forces from attack. For the U.S military, these A2/AD capabilities pose a unique challenge. GEN Mark Milley framed the challenge that MDO 2028 is intended to address in the most straightforward and easy-to-understand way: “The military problem we face is defeating multiple layers of standoff in all domains in order to maintain the coherence of our operations.”

Tactical Art in Future Wars by MG(R) Robert Scales

The flurry of self-congratulatory prose emerging from multi-domain warfare literature today obscures the fact that a slogan such as “multi-domain” is not doctrine, and doctrine rooted in the fundamental tenets of warfare is a prerequisite for meaningful reform. Nowhere is the gap between sloganeering and meaningful doctrine more evident than at the tactical level. The thesis of multi-domain operations is that emerging technologies have added new dimensions to the traditional combined and joint layers of warfare: artillery, infantry, armor and air power. These new dimensions include space, cyber, electronic warfare, and information, among others. The literature suggests that new scientific developments will influence warfare principally in space and cyberspace. But there is more to war than firing digits in space and cyberspace. As Prussian Gen. Wilhelm Balck famously professed: “Bullets quickly write new tactics.”
Army’s Multi-Domain Unit ‘A Game-Changer’ In Future War by Sydney Freedberg, Jr.

The Army's experimental Multi-Domain Task Force is a “game changer” that’s turned the tide in “at least 10 wargames,” the commander of US Army Pacific says. “Plans are already changing at the combatant command level because of this.” The key: the unit cracked the Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) conundrum, Russia and China's dense layered defenses of long-range missiles, sensors, and networks to coordinate them. “Before, we couldn’t penetrate A2/AD. With it, we could,” said GEN Robert Brown of the task force's performance in “at least 10 exercises and wargames.” In the future, Brown said, “all formations will have to become multi-domain or they'll be irrelevant, [but] it's going to be years before it can happen.” The Army's goal is modernize enough forces to wage multi-domain warfare against either China or Russia — but not both at once — by 2028. To get there, Brown said the Army and the nation must make some tough decisions.


Mapping China’s Investments in Europe by Valbona Zeneli

China and Europe have long been steady trading partners. What has changed in the last decade is China’s increased footprint in European investment. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the European Union (EU) has increased by almost 50 times in only eight years, from less than $840 million in 2008 to a record high of $42 billion (35 billion euro) in 2016, according to Rhodium Group statistics. The current situation is reflective of a paradigm shift in Sino-European relations, which needs to be carefully assessed for its economic and geopolitical impact on Europe.

https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/mapping-chinas-investments-in-europe

Preparing for China’s Rapid Rise and Decline by Collin Meisel and Jonathan Moyer

China’s rise, one of the defining U.S. national security challenges of our time, has deservedly received attention in each of the last decades-worth of unclassified U.S. government strategies. Unfortunately, China’s pending decline — the one that is likely to occur soon after its rise — has received significantly shorter shrift, earning brief references to an aging population in Northern Asia in the 2015 and 2011 versions of the National Military Strategy. And yet, China’s rapid transition toward a downward trajectory will pose a unique set of national security challenges for the United States that could prove even more difficult than those posed by China’s rise. If this lack of high-level public discussion translates to lack of action, it will be to the detriment of U.S. national security. The time to prepare for China's descent is now, while the challenges that come with it still sit at the edge of the discernible future, and not at the edge of American shores.

New Report Explains How China Thinks About Information Warfare by Mark Pomerleau

The Department of Defense’s annual report on China’s military and security developments provides new details about how China’s military organizes its information warfare enterprise, an area that has been of particular interest to U.S. military leaders. In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army created the Strategic Support Force, which centralizes space, cyber, electronic warfare and psychological warfare missions under a single organization. The Chinese have taken the view, according to the DoD and other outside national security experts, that information dominance is key to winning conflicts. This could be done by denying or disrupting the use of communications equipment of its competitors. The 2019 edition of report expands on last year’s version and outlines the Chinese Network Systems Department, one of two deputy theater command level departments within the Strategic Support Force responsible for information operations.

https://www.c4isrnet.com/c2-comms/2019/05/03/new-report-explains-how-china-thinks-about-information-warfare/

From Competitors to Coalitions: Can Army Special Ops Forces Show the Way with China? by Hugh Harsono

History is replete with alliances among nations who were otherwise competitive with each other. For example, World War II brought together the U.S., Britain, France, and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. Today, strategic competition between the U.S. and China offers similar constraints against ordinary military-to-military cooperation. However, it is not hard to conceive various scenarios in which the U.S. and Chinese militaries would have to conduct combined operations. One example is a humanitarian event on the scale of the January 2019 tsunami that impacted Indonesia’s Sunda Strait, caused by an eruption from the volcano Anak Krakatau. The death toll from this tragedy already stands at several hundred, with officials fearing a rise in the near future. Keeping this in mind, along with the fact that thousands of individuals are currently displaced from their homes, it is without a doubt that this tragedy will require international humanitarian efforts in order to rebuild and stabilize the region.

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/competitors-to-coalitions-arsof-china

Learning Painful Lessons from Afghanistan by Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv

When the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) finally closed shop in Afghanistan in 2014, many participating nations professed a weariness with complex, civil-military, out-of-area operations. These operations demanded close, often awkward, relationships of cooperation, co-existence, and confrontation between different civil and military actors, including local civilians. Amid the withdrawal, many militaries and their defense departments seemed to express a collective sigh of relief, talking about a ‘return’ to strictly military priorities and operations. The focus shifted to ‘near area’ operations and security concerns at home.
However, two related problems remain: 1) It is very difficult to claim Afghanistan can be characterized as a success story as a functioning state for and with its people. Given the enormous effort, the outcome is nothing short of a disaster. We need more self-reflection as to why that is. 2) The civilian role in conflict is still sorely neglected – a perilous oversight for both understanding what happened in past operations but also for future conflict scenarios. There is a lot to learn from the civil-military relationships in Afghanistan.

Conflicts, both in Afghanistan as well as at home, will continue to have both a complex civilian and military character. Understanding past, current and future civilian domains is more necessary than ever before.

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/painful-lessons-afghanistan/

**Winning the Deep Fight: Why We Should Return to Echeloned Reconnaissance and Security by Rich Creed and Nathan Jennings**

The dynamic, multi-domain battlefield of the future will undoubtedly create challenges for a wide range of the US Army's functions. This is especially true for senior tactical echelons like corps and divisions as they modernize and focus on large-scale ground combat against highly capable adversaries. The requirement to execute reconnaissance and security operations, in particular, has emerged as an area of concern for Army forces as they prepare to fight across more expansive and lethal battlefields. So where should we begin looking for solutions to enable future success? As with many dilemmas about the future of war, pertinent insights may be found in the past.

https://mwi.usma.edu/winning-deep-fight-return-echeloned-reconnaissance-security/

**That’s Logistics: The Autonomous Future if the Army’s Battlefield Supply Chain by Uriel Epshtein and Charles Faint**

“Amateurs talk tactics, but professionals talk logistics.” It's a time-honored apocryphal quote, attributed to everyone from Napoleon Bonaparte to Omar Bradley. And it’s one that seems particularly appropriate in the context of the Army’s use of autonomous vehicles (AVs). While the potential of autonomous vehicles in some of the Army’s six warfighting functions—like intelligence, protection, and fires—at the tactical level is already proven, programs exploiting AVs’ potential for functions like sustainment and movement (particularly when it comes to ground transportation) are still in their infancy.

https://mwi.usma.edu/thats-logistics-autonomous-future-armys-battlefield-supply-chain/
The Elephant in the Tunnel: Preparing to Fight and Win Underground by Walker Mills

The Marine Corps has no clear or developed doctrine or training for dealing with underground facilities. The Army published its first doctrinal publication related to subterranean warfare in November 2017, *Small Unit Training in Subterranean Environments*. But one of the best descriptions of subterranean warfare comes from the world of fiction—the hypothetical scenario in Max Brooks’s *World War Z*, a novel set in a future where small paramilitary units are fighting a zombie infestation in the catacombs beneath Paris. The US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group has produced two good handbooks—the *Subterranean Warfare Handbook* and the *Subterranean Operations Handbook*—which start to address subterranean warfare, but both fall short of establishing either a subterranean doctrine or comprehensive set of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Aside from these publications, there are also a scattering of theses and dissertations from military researchers and case studies of underground warfare. Taken as a whole though, the sum of work the military has put into studying subterranean warfare pales in comparison to what is needed.

[https://mwi.usma.edu/elephant-tunnel-preparing-fight-win-underground/](https://mwi.usma.edu/elephant-tunnel-preparing-fight-win-underground/)

The Case Against Maneuver Warfare by Michael Gladius

Ever since the 1970s/1980s, maneuver warfare has been regarded as the ideal form of warfare. It’s associated primarily with the German Army of WWII and the Mongol Empire, and everybody wants to emulate their successes. However, maneuver warfare has several real weaknesses that do not translate well into the American way of war. This essay addresses two ways in which maneuver warfare can be defined, their weaknesses, and then how America can incorporate their benefits into its own doctrine.


The Art of Digital Deception: Getting Left of the Bang on Deep Fakes by Scott Padgett

This article explores how state actors are using advanced software development tools and artificial intelligence (AI) to invent and perfect new deception capabilities to fool both people and machines on the virtual battlefield. It examines intelligent computer vision systems and their capabilities to support state-sponsored hybrid warfare. We explore these capabilities in the context of two Russian disinformation campaigns, specifically Ukraine in 2014, and Venezuela in 2019. We then offer innovative concepts to mitigate these emerging enemy capabilities and threats. The first adversarial threats are “Deepfakes.” Deepfakes include a technique for human image and audio synthesis based on AI. It is used to combine and superimpose existing images and videos onto source images, or videos using a machine learning technique.
called a “generative adversarial network.” Deepfakes are being weaponized to support hybrid warfare to deceive and fool people. Adversarial threats use AI to manipulate and distort audiovisual content before it's analyzed, essentially using machines to fool machines.


**AI, Robots, and the Future of Warfare by Tom Piernicky of Army Futures Command**

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the University of Texas at Austin hosted the Mad Scientist Conference. The conference brings together military, academia, and private industry experts in fields such as artificial intelligence, robotics, ethics in future innovation, and the future of space. One conference focused on disruption and the future operational environment. With the Army's effort to modernize the force, it is critical for collaboration between the Army and the brightest minds of technological innovation. Collaboration today to solve the complex problems of tomorrow's battlefields requires significant imagination to predict possibilities. With the development of evolving artificial intelligence and robotics, Mad Scientists discussed the applications they have on future warfare.

https://www.army.mil/article/220914/ai_robots_and_the_future_of_warfare_discussions_among_mad_scientists

**Sensor Proliferation Is Changing How We Wage War by Sim Tack**

When imagining the future of warfare, we often envision newly developed weapons systems and anticipate their impact on the actual conduct of warfare. Not all warfare evolutions, however, can be encapsulated by individual systems or platforms. The most radical changes in the conduct of war often result from particularly extensive technological revolutions that apply across multiple weapons systems, altering the very nature of the constraints and imperatives that drive combat decision-making. One such revolution currently underway is the proliferation of sensors. Warfare utilizes sensors in countless ways — from optical sensors (aka cameras) to electronic intelligence sensors, up to full-fledged radar systems — and they are not new to the battlefield by any means. However, rapid technological advances in multiple fields have vastly expanded military sensor capability. Defense industries are developing new kinds of sensors at an accelerated rate — smaller, stronger and more accurate than previous generations. All are supported by modern platforms that carry significantly more sensors into the battlefield than previous systems. And beyond the sensors themselves, technologies that enable operators to simultaneously process large volumes of data are increasingly potent. The realm of warfare is well on its way to sensor proliferation, and changes are coming rapidly.

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/sensor-proliferation-changing-how-we-wage-war
The Hidden Costs of Strategy by Special Operations by Walter Haynes

As Libya descended anew into violence, the United States withdrew its small contingent of special operations forces from Tripoli on April 7, 2019. Most Americans had little idea U.S. forces were ever in Libya in the first place, much less why. This lack of transparency has a small subset of scholars and practitioners worried about increased civil-military tension in the U.S. government and society. Many books, articles, and even podcasts examine the relationship between America’s civilians and its soldiers, which, despite its challenges, still feels mostly healthy to me after a decade in uniform. For those interested in civil-military relations, debate is lively. What it often misses, however, is a look past “the military” writ large into the smaller tribes that comprise it. No part of the U.S. military has gained more in stature, funding, and importance during the wars that have defined the last thirty years than the special operations forces. The drawback to this approach, as evidenced in Libya, is the myopic use of U.S. special operations forces as a foreign policy “easy button” divorced from the hard work required to make lasting progress towards strategic objectives defined in the U.S. National Security Strategy: promote American prosperity; preserve peace through strength; and advance American influence.


Human Shields and Perfidy: Addressing Illegal Conduct in Operations by Louis René Beres

Misusing protected persons in war presents real and present challenges in the Middle East. Remember Saddam Hussein’s use of human shields during the Persian Gulf War? His illegal and contemptible movement of innocent civilians to military bases and other strategic locations was intended to deter the international coalition. In that instance, the Iraqi ploy had negligible effect on the outcome of the war, but misusing protected persons in war has been and will continue to be a challenge in the Middle East. Israel likely faces another intifada, another terrorist “war” centrally directed against its civilian populations. On legal matters Jerusalem should soon clarify that any enemy movement of civilians into designated military areas or (vice versa) movements of military assets into civilian areas, violates the law of armed conflict, as generally included in sources identified at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The specific violation here is called perfidy, defined inter alia at Geneva Convention No. IV, Article 28 of 1949 whereby protected persons are used to render certain areas immune from enemy military operations. This was clarified in 1977 to specifically prohibit the use of human shields to impede military operations. But one must be careful here not to narrow the scope of pertinent law to only human shields. Any movement of military forces into civilian areas specifically to preclude an attack is equally perfidious and represents a serious violation of the laws of armed conduct.

https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/human-shields-and-perfidy
As described in an earlier article, the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps has a long and proud tradition of producing a top-quality academic journal. With the successful digitization initiative that has now placed over 1,100 articles published by our Corps over the past forty-plus years just a click away, it is fitting to highlight the great work from decades past. As such, the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps Journal continues the tradition started last year of highlighting the best articles from forty years ago (1979), thirty years ago (1989), twenty years ago (1999), and ten years ago (2009).

**Articles from 1979**

**Avoiding an Ethical Armageddon**  
CH (MAJ) Allan Futernick, Ph.D., 7th Psychological Operations Group  
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00031/11j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00031/11j)

**The Chaplain Counselor as Strategist**  
CH (MAJ) Charles Mallard, 193d Infantry Brigade  

**The Impact of Mobility on the Family**  
CH (LTC) William J Hughes, U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School  
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00032/35j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00032/35j)

**Excellence in Preaching: A Neglected Art?**  
CH (MAJ) Charles W. Hedrick, Ph.D., U.S. Army Reserve  

**Articles from 1989**

**Mass Casualty Ministry at the Ramstein Airshow Disaster**  
CH (MAJ) Thomas W. Mitchiner, 2nd General Hospital in Landstuhl  

**The Ethics of Dying**  
CH (MAJ) Dave DeDonato, Clinical Chaplaincy Branch, Academy of Health Services  
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00070/69j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00070/69j)

**Mission Ministry: A Five-Spoked Wheel of Service**  
Chaplain (MAJ) Robert L. Gilbert & SSG Mike Swigler, V Corps UMT of the Year  
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00069/43j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062787/00069/43j)

**Articles from 1999**

**Reflections on Leadership**  
SGM Michael E. Pukansky, USACHCS Personnel Proponent Sergeant Major  

**Modeling the Unit Ministry Team**  
CH (MAJ) William C. McCoy, USACHCS Officer Training Analyst  

**Leader Development**  
CH (COL Greg Hill  
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00008/84j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00008/84j)

**Articles from 2009**

**Chaplains Advising Commanders in a post-9/11 World and Beyond**  
Dr. Pauletta Otis, Professor of Security Studies at the Marine Corps University  
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00018/34j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00018/34j)

**Religion Counts: Considerations for Religious Liaisons**  
CH (COL) Michael Hoyt, Command Chaplain for Army Test and Evaluation Command  
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00018/73j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00018/73j)

**Religious Area Analysis: An Annotated Bibliography**  

**The Human, Spiritual, & Ethical Dimensions of Leadership in Preparation for Combat**  
Dr. John W. Brinsfield, Chaplain Corps Historian & CH (LTC) Pater Baktis, VII Corps Deputy Command Chaplain  

**Spiritual Resiliency and the Senior Chaplain’s Role**  
CH (COL) Mike Dugal, Director of the Center for Spiritual Leadership, USACHCS  
[http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00019/12j](http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00062435/00019/12j)

**Soldier Resiliency and the Question of Evil**  
CH (LTC) Robert Roetzel, Army Center for the Professional Military Ethics  
Like an Angel Among the Wounded:
Chaplain John Milton Whitehead, 15th Indiana
The First Army Chaplain to Receive the Medal of Honor

By H. Allen Skinner, Command Historian, 81st Readiness Division (USAR)

For over 150 years, the Medal of Honor (MoH) has stood as a symbol of unmatched courage and heroism, generally displayed in direct combat with enemy forces. However, a relative handful of Medals have been awarded to servicemembers with a purely noncombattant role, primarily combat medics and corpsman, and chaplains. The focus of this article is to share the story of the first non-combatant Soldier to receive the Medal of Honor, Army Chaplain John Milton Whitehead of the 15th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. After a brief introduction to the history behind the Medal of Honor, this paper will then outline the history of the 15th Indiana, and John Whitehead’s connection to that organization. The remainder of the paper is then devoted to telling the story of Chaplain Whitehead’s battlefield courage during the bloody Battle of Stones River in January 1863.

Introduction

Prior to 1861, the American armed forces lacked a formal way of recognizing valorous deeds by service members. During the Revolutionary War, General George Washington designed a purple cloth heart (the forerunner of the modern Purple Heart medal) to recognize a singular meritorious action, but the award was quickly forgotten after the war. The concept of an award for valor was resurrected by the Union Navy in during the early days of the Civil War, ironically after the Army Chief of Staff had rejected the idea. The first Congressional resolution to create a naval medal of valor was signed in December 1862 by President Abraham Lincoln. Shortly thereafter, a companion Senate bill authorizing a similar Army Medal of Honor (MoH) was signed into law by President Lincoln on 12 July 1862.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause two thousand “medals of honor” to be prepared with suitable emblematic devices, and to direct that the same be presented, in the name of the Congress, to such noncommissioned officers and privates as shall most distinguish themselves by their gallantry in action, and other soldier-like qualities, during the present insurrection (Civil War).³

The new Medal of Honor proved popular with soldiers, especially since the resolution authorized the retroactive awarding of medals for exploits back to the beginning of the war. Ultimately, 1,522 Medals of Honor were awarded in connection with actions during the Civil War.⁴

In comparison to the stringent standards that apply to the modern Medal of Honor, many Civil War servicemen were awarded medals for what is best characterized as distinguished service, not for valor in actual armed combat. For many years after the war, veterans could obtain medals simply by mailing a written request to the War Department. After an excessively large number of Medal of Honor submissions were made after the Battle of the Little Big Horn in 1876, the War Department established a rule specifying the award was to recognize conduct beyond “the simple discharge of duty.” Concerns over the cheapening of the Medal of Honor led a group of Civil War-era recipients to form the Medal of Honor Legion, which engaged itself in lobbying for reforms of War Department practices. The efforts of the Legion culminated in 1896, when President William McKinley, himself a veteran of the Civil War, ordered the War Department to enact stringent requirements to preserve the integrity of the Medal of Honor. By June 1867, the Army had established a new set of regulations, stipulating that the submission of a Medal of Honor request had to include eyewitness testimony to deeds of extraordinary “gallantry and intrepidity” while in combat. The Army subsequently adopted the practice of an investigative board to carefully scrutinize each Medal of Honor recommendation, and in 1917 convened a review board which purged the honor roll of 911 medal recipients who had received the medal for merit instead of bravery in combat. The series of reforms not only restored the integrity of the Medal of Honor, but turned it into a truly unique award given only for exceptional feats of valor.⁵

The 15th Indiana Volunteer Infantry

The 15th Indiana Volunteer Infantry was originally organized into state service at Lafayette, Indiana in May 1861. When the Federal government called for the organization of longer service volunteer units, the provisional 15th Indiana was mustered into Federal service at Indianapolis, Indiana on 14 June 1861. The 15th Indiana, under the command of Colonel George D. Wagner, departed Indianapolis in July 1861 to take part in the campaign to protect the loyal western part of Virginia from Confederate control. The 15th Indiana was subsequently transferred to Louisville, Kentucky in late November 1861, where it joined the Army of the Ohio. In early 1862, the Army of the Ohio marched across western Tennessee to join General Ulysses S. Grant’s Army of the Tennessee in its campaign to take the major Confederate railroad center of Corinth, Mississippi. During that campaign, the 15th Indiana saw its first major combat at the battle of Shiloh on 6-7 April 1862.⁶

After the Corinth campaign, the 15th Indiana was ordered to Nashville, Tennessee where it was organized with the 2d Brigade, with the 15th Indiana’s Colonel George Wagner as the new brigade commander. The 2d Brigade, composed principally of Indiana regiments, was attached to the 1st Division (General Thomas Wood), of the Army of the Cumberland’s Left Wing, commanded by Major General Thomas L. Crittenden.⁷ Major General William S. Rosecrans, overall commander of the Army of the Cumberland, marched from Nashville on 26 December 1861 towards the Rebel army (commanded by General Braxton Bragg) arrayed near Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The Federal force marched in three columns (or wings), with Crittenden’s Left Wing moving along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad towards La
Vergne, Tennessee. Warned by his superb cavalry as to the Union advance, Bragg consolidated his army along the Stones River northwest of Murfreesboro, intent on halting Rosecrans’ advance further into middle Tennessee.

After Union patrols made contact with the Rebel main defensive line on 30 December 1862, Rosecrans paused to consolidate and prepare his army for an attack the following morning. Bragg was not content to remain passively on the defense, and made his own preparations for a dawn attack. As a consequence, both armies put into place mirror-image offensive plans for a morning attack on the enemy’s right flank. Crucially, Rosecrans timed his attack plans to allow his men time to eat breakfast in the morning. An admirable decision in soldier care, Rosecrans’s decision effectively ceded the initiative to Bragg. As a consequence, the Confederate attack at dawn on 31 December 1862 shattered the Federal right wing, and in short order Bragg’s army had pushed the disorganized remnants dangerously close to the Federal’s main supply line on the Nashville Pike.

At daybreak on that morning, Wood’s division of Crittenden’s Left Wing held the extreme left of entire Union army, with Wagner’s 2d Brigade sitting astride the vital Nashville turnpike. The 15th Indiana’s regimental return for December 1862 described their location on the morning of the battle as forming “the extreme left [of Wagner’s brigade] with no support from the other regiments of our brigade being on the right.” Compared to many other Union regiments, the veteran Hoosiers of the 15th Indiana were not unprepared for the Rebel attack, as Chaplain Whitehead related many years after the fact:

On Dec 31st, Colonel Wood walked along the line of officers at 5 o’clock, and said in a low tone of voice to each Captain, “get your men up and eat without kindling fires.” By 6 o’clock, the Rebel pickets were slowly advancing, driving ours back, step by step…At 7 o’clock the battle opened with [a] sharp rattle of musketry and the terrible roar of the artillery. The attack on our right wing was sharp and effectual for a time.

Whitehead did not exaggerate the effect of the attack on the right wing. With two Yankee divisions shattered in the opening blow by General William Hardee’s corps, the Union line gradually assumed the shape of a V, with the battered right flank bent back so its line ran roughly parallel to the turnpike. Hardee’s attack had driven dangerously close to the Federal line of communications, but in doing so had inadvertently compressed the Federal force into a compact defensive line, which granted General Rosecrans the priceless advantage of interior lines in shoring up his defenses.

Besides compressing the Federal line, the continued Rebel pressure forced Crittenden to extend his Left Wing to the northeast, thus anchoring his flank on the Stones River. While this was happening, Rosecrans concentrated on feeding fresh units into the line as they arrived on the battlefield. One such addition was the arrival of Colonel William B. Hazen’s brigade, which reinforced Wood’s brigade in the Round Forest, an area later known as Hell’s Half Acre. To accommodate the addition of Hazen’s brigade in the line, Colonel Wood drew up his brigade to the left (or northeast) towards the Stones River, using the river to secure the extreme left flank of the
Army of the Cumberland. Thus reinforced, the Federal left continued to inflict heavy casualties on Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk’s corps, which launched a series of strong but uncoordinated Rebel brigade attacks. While the Union left held firm, Rosecrans was winning the battle of reinforcements in the middle by building up a powerful line of artillery, that combined with rapid rifle fire from the blue coated infantrymen, shattered the Rebel attacks. The Union soldiers did not passively wait for the Rebels to attack: both Hazen and Wood released sharp counterattacks that further bloodied the enemy while taking considerable numbers of Rebel prisoners. The 15th Indiana regimental report notes that “we twice counter-charged a Rebel brigade…capturing 75 prisoners, mostly of the 13th Georgia Regiment. We were exposed to the counterfire of two batteries most of the time.” Writing after the battle to his wife, Indiana Private Samuel T. Smith related:

I am very happy to inform you that I am still among the land of the living and enjoying good health…I have seen the elephant [a 19th Century term for experiencing combat], a big one at that. I could tell you things that would make your heart jump out of your mouth if such things could take place. The 15th Regiment did some master fighting. They whipped three Rebel Regiments, took about 200 prisoners under the fire of three batteries of artillery. They made two bayonet charges; drove them [the Rebels] back slaughtering them like hogs. But our loss was also heavy. There was upwards of 200 killed and wounded. I think the number killed was 45, which is very heavy for the first fight. It is no use to say the Rebels will not fight for they shoot like devils but they got a good thrashing at this place. At least they left their dead on the field and that is good enough to know that they were whipped, and that badly.

The Army of the Cumberland and Army of Tennessee fought until sundown on that bloody New Year’s Eve. Bragg’s Confederates had badly battered the Union troops but ultimately failed to cut off the Union lines of communication along the Nashville Pike. Compared to the combat on 31 December, January 1st opened quietly and other than some minor probes, both armies spent the day on the defense, using the time to reorganize and resupply. A halfhearted probe by one of Bragg’s divisions late on 2 January 1863 was driven back with heavy losses from Rosecrans’ consolidated artillery. Weakened by heavy losses, and faced with the prospect of defending with his back to the Stones River against a much stronger Union force, Bragg ordered his army to break contact well after nightfall on 3 January, abandoning Murfreesboro in the process. In total, the Confederates lost slightly less than 12,000 dead and wounded, while Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland suffered 12,906 casualties. During the battle of Stones River, the 15th Indiana “repulsed the enemy in two attacks…he made on our position…we took 175 prisoners.” In return the regiment suffered heavily, losing 2 officers and 36 soldiers killed in action, with six officers and 137 enlisted wounded, and seven missing.

**Chaplain John Milton Whitehead**

Despite some of the irregularities discussed in the opening paragraphs, most Medals of Honor awarded during the Civil War were for legitimate acts of valor and courage while under hostile fire. One such courageous recipient is Chaplain John M. Whitehead, the first Army chaplain to receive the Medal of Honor. John M. Whitehead was born 6 March 1823, in Wayne County Indiana. From a young age, he felt called into the ministry, and by age 21 had earned his license and was an ordained minister.

An obituary of Whitehead written in March 1909 described his early years:

Born in Wayne County Indiana…and at the age of 16, joined the Baptist church. He early showed a preference for the ministry and in the year of 1844 entered this field of work. At one town he held a number of protracted meetings which was perhaps the greatest event in his life of church work, for in four of the meetings, over four hundred people united in baptism. It showed what influence he had over the people and what a great character he really was.

At the start of the Civil War in April 1861, Reverend Whitehead was pastoring a church in Westville, Indiana. Exactly how he was recruited into service is unclear. Regardless, Whitehead received his commission on 9 June 1862, and was mustered in the 15th Indiana on 15 July 1862 to replace Chaplain Evan Stevenson of Benton County, Indiana who resigned for unknown reasons in March 1862. At the point in the war when Rev. Whitehead was commissioned, Congress and the
War Department had established some minimum standards governing the practice of appointing a regimental chaplain. Ideally, state officials selected suitable chaplain candidates based on prior education and pastoral experience, with the candidates given a commission by the state’s governor before mustering for Federal service. In the pecking order of the Union army, chaplains were considered the equivalent of a captain, but without the authority to command soldiers. In camp or in the field, chaplains were expected to organize prayer meetings and services, minister to the sick, write letters for the illiterate, provide spiritual counsel, and most importantly, guard against sin in the regiment. In combat, the chaplain was expected to help with the wounded, comfort the dying, and tend to the honorable internment of the dead. In return for their services, chaplains were paid $120 per month, the equivalent of a captain’s monthly salary. No provision was made to appoint chaplains at higher ranks, or to create a chief of chaplains to oversee religious support within the field armies of the Union.

After mustering into Federal service, Chaplain Whitehead was stationed briefly in Indianapolis until 13 August 1862, when he was ordered to escort a group of soldiers and recruits to Nashville, where he was to “report to the Military Commander and obtain such information as will enable him to forward the men to their respective Regt.” Once in Nashville, Chaplain Whitehead presumably performed temporary duty at that location until the 15th Indiana arrived at the city in late November 1862. As a consequence of his late assignment with the 15th Indiana, Chaplain Whitehead had no significant exposure to combat prior to the battle of Stones River. Yet from the start of that battle, Chaplain Whitehead was in the thick of the fight with his men, as was reflected in his postwar account of the battle:

Order came to our Colonel Wood, to hold that point at all hazards: that meant to simply fight till you die on that field or conquer. When he received this order, he called “attention”, went through the manual of arms, then fixed bayonets, faced the enemy coming a brigade strong, ordered double-quick charged at Jackson’s Brigade coming down the right bank of Stone River. They were met at the crest of the hill and driven back, but they came back with additional reinforcement of another brigade, and were met “with bloody hands and hospitable graves.”

Casualties in the 15th Indiana’s ranks quickly mounted due to continuous rifle fire from the Confederate regiments to the front, as well as several batteries of Rebel cannons firing from across the Stones River. One of the first wounded helped by Chaplain Whitehead was Captain Robert J. Templeton, commander of Company D, 15th Indiana: “That noble officer, fell mortally wounded; I carried back the Captain to the rear and sat by him at his request and that of Surgeon Youart until he breathed his last. I copied his last message and sent it to his home in Lafayette [sic] Indiana.” Whitehead’s presence in the thick of the fight did not go unnoticed, as related by Captain Edwin Nicar, the adjutant of the 15th Indiana:

I know that, although a non-combatant, you [Whitehead] accompanied the regiment into action and bore yourself bravely; I know that when Captain Templeton of Company D was mortally wounded by the fire of the rebel battery…you hastened to him and bore him off the field in your arms; I know that you ministered to his wants, received his last words, and having done all that could be done, returned to the regiment. Owing to our exposed position and the terrible fire we were under, it was almost impossible for the ambulances to visit us, and almost equally impossible for the stretcher-bearers to do effective service…You accepted the chances of life and death with rare courage, and never faltered in the least…you carried a number of enlisted men off the field, and that all through the desperate fighting in which the 15th held to its place on the left-losing 189 officers and men killed and wounded out of 440 engaged, you were with us, cheering the living, caring for the wounded and receiving the last messages of the dying…until midnight or after, you never ceased in your work of mercy, and I know that each and every survivor of the regiment is proud of your splendid exemplification of Christianity.

Accounts differ as to exactly how many men Chaplain Whitehead carried from the battlefield on the first day. Chaplain Whitehead’s postwar account specifically names thirteen officers and men, but alludes to aiding many more men, not only from the 15th Indiana but from the other Indiana regiments in Wood’s brigade—as well as unknown numbers of wounded Rebels. Besides ministering to two of his own
company commanders, Whitehead tied off an arterial wound in the arm of Colonel I.C.B. Suman, the commander of the sister 9th Indiana, and rescued a badly wounded lieutenant colonel of the 40th Indiana. Whitehead’s postwar account:

Allow me to say that I was constantly with my regiment during that terrible day, carrying the wounded off the field, caring for the dying, whenever they came under my notice…most of those whose names I mentioned, I carried off the field or bound up their wounds, and to some I did both and I can truthfully say I helped scores of others whose names I cannot now call to mind. After night-fall when all was quiet, an order came…to move the wounded from the field hospital to the general hospital…a large brick house two miles back to Steuart’s Creek. Part of this time I was assisted by Assistant Hospital Steward E.M. Burns; when he was ordered to the…hospital I was left alone to get the wounded into the ambulances…about two o’clock I placed the last man in the ambulance…I rode an hour found my regiment holding the hotly contested ground in whose defense so many brave men had fallen the day before. I sat down with my mess-mates and ate the first food for twenty-four hours.  

Chaplain Whitehead remained with the 15th Indiana, serving with distinction to the end of his term of service on 29 June 1864 – a year shorter than the enlistment period of the soldiers and officers of the regiment. After demobilization, Whitehead returned to Indiana for a time but perhaps found the settled life of a pastor in Wayne County too boring. Reverend Whitehead soon shifted his energies to evangelistic work in Illinois, Iowa, and Nebraska. Sometime in 1888 he relocated to Topeka, Kansas, where he became involved in church planting activities and missionary work in the Great Plains. An account written in 1904 provided some highlights to Whitehead’s remarkable ministerial career:

He has been in the ministry over sixty-three years, forty years as pastor, twenty-one as evangelist, and two as chaplain of the Fifteenth Indiana Volunteers, and by congress was voted a medal for gallantry in the battle of Stone River. He held many meetings of great power, ten of them of special note. In each of the ten over one hundred united with the Baptist church, in two over two hundred so united. In one of these two, he baptized one hundred and sixty-three. Of these, eighty-eight were husbands with their wives, forty-seven were young men and forty-six were young women. In that number were nine entire households, each numbering from two to seven persons. He has assisted in dedicating one hundred and forty-six meeting houses. While pastor in Kankakee, Illinois, a house costing $20,000 was built and he raised $16,600 on the day of dedication. He assisted in dedicating the house at Battle Creek, Michigan, and raised on that day $19,500.

In 1897, several former members of the Army of the Cumberland began to lobby Congress to award a Medal of Honor to Chaplain Whitehead, who despite his well-known battlefield heroics, had never received any kind of official recognition for his valor. Former adjutant Captain Edwin Nicar wrote to Rev. Whitehead on 23 October 1897: “My dear comrade, I have learned with much satisfaction that many of the survivors of the 15th Indiana Volunteers are urging your claim to the government medal, which is being awarded
for gallantry and distinguished service on the battle fields of the late war.” 27 Probably the statement that carried the most weight was written by Colonel I.C.B. Suman, the former commander of the 9th Indiana who likely would have bled to death on the battlefield without Whitehead’s medical care:

I was very severely wounded in the early morning of the 31st of December, having been shot through the left arm near the shoulder, and a second ball in my shoulder, the wound in the arm having severed the artery and I was bleeding very profusely when this gallant chaplain came to me, bandaged my wounds, helped me to mount my horse so I could return to my regiment...when he gave me assistance he was as bloody as a butcher from the wounded he had cared for before he came to my assistance. He seemed to be a ministering angel among the wounded, Yank and Johney [sic] alike. He seemed to think nothing about the danger he was in by going from place to place, looking after the wounded...I came in contact with many chaplains in my long service, and can say that the Rev. John M. Whitehead...was the most worthy chaplain that ever came under my notice...especially his conduct on the battle field at Stone River, Dec. 31, 1862. I believe the nation owes this grand old christian [sic] a medal for heroism, energy and faithful services without hope of promotion as other officers of the line. 28

On 14 December 1897, Kansas Congressman Charles Curtis forwarded a request to the War Department, requesting a Medal of Honor for Chaplain Whitehead. Included with Curtis’ endorsement was a packet of letters from Colonel Sunman, Captain Nicar, and several other eyewitnesses to Whitehead’s valor on the Stones River battlefield. The War Department processed the application with remarkable speed, and on 22 March 1898 the Chief of the War Department Records and Pension office issued a memo: “The Secretary of War has directed the issue of a medal of honor to Rev. John M. Whitehead, late chaplain 15th Indiana Infantry, the medal to be engraved as follows: The Congress to Chaplain John M. Whitehead, 15th Ind. Inf., for gallantry at Stone River, Tenn., Dec. 31, 1862. 29 With that simple memo, John Milton Whitehead earned the distinction of being the first ever Army chaplain to receive the Medal of Honor. Rev. Whitehead received the Medal on 4 April 1898 by registered mail, at which time he was serving as the pastor for the First Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas. The citation for Chaplain Whitehead’s Medal of Honor award read:

Rank and Organization: Chaplain, 15th Indiana Infantry.
Place and date: At Stone River, Tenn., 31 December 1862.
Entered service at Westville, Ind. Born: 6 March 1823, Wayne County, Ind. Date of Issue: 4 April 1898. Citation: Went to the front during a desperate contest and unaided carried to the rear several wounded and helpless soldiers. 30

Shortly thereafter, Rev. Whitehead penned a letter of thanks to
the Secretary of War:

Dear Sirs. I am happy and also thankful for the medal you conferred to me. I value it for more than if it were gold. I have ever felt that I did my duty towards those brave men who fell on the front lines, upholding the nation’s flag at Stones River, Tenn. Please accept heartfelt expressions of thanks to you and all those who aided in conferring this valuable favor on me. Yours very truly, J.M. Whitehead, late Chaplain of the 15th Reg. of Indiana Vols. Medal received April 9th 1898.31

For many years thereafter, Reverend Whitehead remained deeply involved in his local church. For a period of time served as the chaplain to the Kansas state legislature. Having suffered for several years following a stroke-induced paralysis, Rev. Whitehead passed away on 7 March 1909 in Topeka, Kansas at the age of 86.32 After recounting his life’s story, Whitehead’s obituary ended by simply noting that, “Rev. Mr. Whitehead was a strong and powerfully-built man, and had been preaching the gospel until within a few months of his death.”33

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NOTES

2 http://www.cmohs.org/medal-history.php. Army Officers were not authorized to receive a Medal of Honor until the law was amended in March 1863.
4 http://www.history.army.mil/html/moh/mohdata.html. Of that total, 47 of the medals were awarded to servicemen with ties to Indiana; 44 Army soldiers and 3 Navy sailors—one of which was Chaplain Whitehead.
9 Whitehead, John, undated newspaper article. SRNB Collections.
13 Compiled Service Records, Regimental records of events, Nov-Dec 1862, pp. 344-5.
19 Special Orders No. 176, 13 August 1862. SRNB Collections.
21 Statement of J.M. Whitehead to Congress, 1 December 1897. SRNB Collections. 22 Ibid.
24 Statement of J.M. Whitehead to Congress, 1 December 1897. SRNB Collections.
26 E.D. Daniels, A Twentieth Century History and Biographical Record of La Porte County, Indiana (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1904) 269-9.
28 Letter from Colonel L.C.B. Samus, 4 November 1897. SRNB Collections.
Book Recommendations

**Redefining the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics**
by Nathan Finney and Tyrell Mayfield with a foreword by GEN(R) Martin Dempsey

This edited collection examines the changing character of military professionalism and the role of ethics in the 21st-century military. The authors, who range from uniformed military to academics to non-uniformed professionals on the battlefield, delve into whether the concepts of Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Sir John Hackett still apply, how training and continuing education play a role in defining a profession, and if a universal code of ethics is required for the military as a profession. Redefining the Modern Military puts a significant emphasis on individual agency for military professionalism as opposed to broad organizational or cultural change.

**Humility Is the New Smart**
by Edward Hess and Katherine Ludwig

This book is about human excellence – how human beings can excel at the skills that smart machines and smart robots will not be able to do well in the next few decades. It is the authors’ “Paul Revere’s ride” – a call to action – the smart machines are coming and we humans must take our cognitive and emotional skills to a much higher level and this book puts forth a game plan of how to do that.

Dr. Hess said, “This book is the most important book I have written. Why? We are on the leading-edge of a societal transformation that will be as challenging and transformative as the Industrial Revolution was for our ancestors, and we as a society and as individuals are not ready for what is fixing to hit us. In the next 10-15 years, technology will take over millions of jobs including professional jobs. To stay relevant, human beings need to excel at doing those skills that technology won’t be able to do well: higher order critical thinking, creativity, innovation, and high emotional engagement with other humans. The authors invite you to join them in the pursuit of the type of human excellence that will be necessary in the Smart Machine Age.

**On Grand Strategy**
by John Lewis Gaddis

For almost two decades, Yale students have competed for admission each year to the “Studies in Grand Strategy” seminar taught by John Lewis Gaddis, Paul Kennedy, and Charles Hill. Its purpose has been to prepare future leaders for responsibilities they will face, through lessons drawn from history and the classics. Now Gaddis has distilled that teaching into a succinct, sharp and potentially transformational book, surveying statecraft from the ancient Greeks to Franklin D. Roosevelt and beyond. An unforgettable guide to the art of leadership, On Grand Strategy is, in every way, its own master class.

“The best education in grand strategy available in a single volume . . . a long walk with a single, delightful mind . . . On Grand Strategy is a book that should be read by every American leader or would-be leader.” — John Nagl, Wall Street Journal
Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War
by Paul Scharre

The era of autonomous weapons has arrived. Today around the globe, at least thirty nations have weapons that can search for and destroy enemy targets all on their own. Paul Scharre, a leading expert in next-generation warfare, describes these and other high tech weapons systems—from Israel’s Harpy drone to the American submarine-hunting robot ship Sea Hunter—and examines the legal and ethical issues surrounding their use. “A smart primer to what’s to come in warfare” (Bruce Schneier), Army of None engages military history, global policy, and cutting-edge science to explore the implications of giving weapons the freedom to make life and death decisions. A former soldier himself, Scharre argues that we must embrace technology where it can make war more precise and humane, but when the choice is life or death, there is no replacement for the human heart.

* Winner of the 2019 William E. Colby Award  “The book I had been waiting for. I can’t recommend it highly enough.” —Bill Gates

The Future of Strategy
by Colin Gray

Strategy is not a modern invention. It is an essential and enduring feature of human history that is here to stay. Colin S. Gray, a world-renowned scholar of strategic thought, discusses the meaning of strategy and its importance for politicians and the military as a means of achieving desired outcomes in complex, uncertain conditions. Drawing on a wide range of examples from the Great Peloponnesian War to the Second World War, Vietnam, and the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gray ably shows how great military thinkers of the past and present have acted strategically in their various ideological, political, geographical and cultural contexts. Looking to the future, he argues that strategy will continue to provide a vital tool-kit for survival and security, but that the global threat posed by nuclear weapons remains an on-going challenge without obvious practical solutions. As Gray boldly asserts, there is no promised land ahead, only hard and dangerous times that will require us to master the theory and practice of strategy to secure our own future.

Strategic Leadership Primer for Senior Leaders (4th edition)
by Dr. Thomas Galvin and Dr. Dale Watson

With a Foreword from MG John Kem, 51st Commandant of the U.S. Army War College. The 4th edition of the Strategic Leadership Primer represents a major change in direction from previous editions. In the past, one could assume most U.S. Army War College students had little prior experience at the strategic level. In 2019, this is no longer the case, as some War College students have already served in enterprise-level assignments or performed duties at the strategic level in operational environments. The new Primer includes chapters on defining strategic leadership; understanding competitive environments both external and internal to the organization, competitive strategy; the evolving roles, competencies, and character required of leaders at the strategic level; and the need for continuous and lifelong development. The Primer is applicable for all senior service college students and graduates—whether military or senior civilian, US or international.
**Four Guardians: A Principled Agent View of American Civil-Military Relations**

by Jeff Donnithorne

When the US military confronts pressing security challenges, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps often react differently as they advise and execute civilian defense policies. Conventional wisdom holds that these dynamics tend to reflect a competition for prestige, influence, and dollars. Such interservice rivalries, however, are only a fraction of the real story. In Four Guardians, the author argues that the services act instead as principled agents, interpreting policies in ways that reflect their unique cultures and patterns of belief. Chapter-length portraits of each service highlight the influence of operational environment (“nature”) and political history (“nurture”) in shaping each service’s cultural worldview. The book also offers two important case studies of civil-military policymaking: one, the little-known story of the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in the early 1980s; the other, the four-year political battle that led to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The author uses these cases to demonstrate the principled-agent framework in action while amply revealing the four services as distinctly different political actors. This timely work brings a new appreciation for the American military, the complex dynamics of civilian control, and the principled ways in which the four guardian services defend their nation.

**Future War: Preparing for the New Global Battlefield**

by Robert H. Latiff

Civilian and military leaders have sought the ability to anticipate the nature of future conflicts and prepare for them for millennia. Robert H. Latiff, a retired United States Air Force Major General, gives us his vision of future war in his recent book Future War: Preparing for the New Global Battlefield. In a concise volume, he presents his assessment of where the U.S. military is now, the challenges ahead, and the way forward. Latiff is comfortable imagining a complicated ethical future of engineered soldiers and autonomous weapons while critiquing the political roots of persistent defense issues. His work is not simply an overview of emerging technology but a look at the coming changes in the character of warfare he believes these technologies will bring. He uses technology as a starting point for discussing the ethical and political limitations of the current state of the civilian and uniformed military civilian leadership at the national level.

**Building Militaries in Fragile States**

by Mara Karlin

Combining rigorous academic scholarship with the experience of a senior Pentagon policymaker, Mara E. Karlin explores the key national security issue of our time: how to effectively build partner militaries. Given the complex and complicated global security environment, declining U.S. defense budgets, and an increasingly connected (and often unstable) world, the United States has an ever-deepening interest in strengthening fragile states. Particularly since World War II, it has often chosen to do so by strengthening partner militaries. It will continue to do so, Karlin predicts, given U.S. sensitivity to casualties, a constrained fiscal environment, the nature of modern nationalism, increasing transnational security threats, the proliferation of fragile states, and limits on U.S. public support for military interventions. However, its record of success is thin. While most analyses of these programs focus on training and equipment, Building Militaries in Fragile States argues that this approach is misguided. Instead, given the nature of a fragile state, Karlin homes in on the outsized roles played by two key actors: the U.S. military and unhelpful external actors. With a rich comparative case-study approach that spans Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Karlin unearths provocative findings that suggest the traditional way of working with foreign militaries needs to be rethought. Benefiting from the practical eye of an experienced national security official, her results-based exploration suggests new and meaningful findings for building partner militaries in fragile states.
**Return on Character: The Real Reason Leaders and Their Companies Win**
by Fred Kiel

When we hear about unethical executives whose careers and companies have gone down in flames, it’s sadly unsurprising. Hubris and greed have a way of catching up with people, who then lose the power and wealth they’ve so fervently pursued. But is the opposite also true? Do highly principled leaders and their organizations perform especially well? They do, according to a new study by KRW International, a Minneapolis-based leadership consultancy. The researchers found that CEOs whose employees gave them high marks for character had an average return on assets of 9.35% over a two-year period. That’s nearly five times as much as what those with low character ratings had; their ROA averaged only 1.93%.

Character is a subjective trait that might seem to defy quantification. To measure it, KRW cofounder Fred Kiel and his colleagues began by sifting through the anthropologist Donald Brown’s classic inventory of about 500 behaviors and characteristics that are recognized and displayed in all human societies. Drawing on that list, they identified four moral principles—integrity, responsibility, forgiveness, and compassion—as universal. Then they sent anonymous surveys to employees at 84 U.S. companies and nonprofits, asking, among other things, how consistently their CEOs and management teams embodied the four principles.

**Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory**
by James Dubik with a foreword by GEN(R) Martin Dempsey

The intersection of strategy and ethics in matters of war, national security, and military affairs has been lamentably and noticeably absent in recent years. There is a substantial scholarly literature in the Just War Tradition (Just War Theory) in military and philosophical ethics; and there are serious and substantial discussions of the nature and process of strategy that recently have become more visible, in public discussions of national security and military affairs. However, there is very little, if any, discussion of the intersections and connections between these ways of thinking about war and warfare. James Dubik’s book Just War Reconsidered is an overdue contribution to filling that gap. Just War Reconsidered is a creative and compelling contribution to the discussion of Just War Theory, military ethics, and strategy; it asks the reader to take seriously the idea of war waging (the management of the war by senior officers and civilian authorities), as distinct from war fighting (jus in bello, on the ground combat by military personnel and directed by military leaders), as a category within the ethical structure of how to think about justifying war. His argument calls for an additional category of to be added to the traditional jus in bello category of Just Conduct. This new category, war waging, includes 5 moral principles: 1) the principle of continuous dialogue; 2) final decision authority; 3) managerial competence; 4) legitimacy; and 5) resignation.